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ABSTRACT 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to explain the significance 
of moves towards industrial democracy in Britain since the Second World 
War. It attempts not only to outline a comprehensive 'conceptual map' 
of the literature on the subject, but also to define the limits of what 
industrial democracy - in its various forms - can achieve within the 
context of an advanced, neo-capitalist society. 
Part I contains a sustained critique of liberal pluralist approaches 
to industrial relations which leads, in Part II, to an analysis of power 
relations in industry focusing on the Gramscian concepts of 'hegemony' 
and 'contradictory consciousness'. It is shown that, although workers 
often express socially consensual attitudes in abstract terms, their 
behaviour reflects conflictual responses whenever their interests are 
threatened on the shop-floor. However, the 'non-observable' aspects of 
power (such as property relations, the legal framework and the division 
of labour) constrain the kinds of action workers may undertake through 
its 'observable' aspects (such as collective bargaining or consultation). 
In Part III, it is argued that managements try to use forms of industrial 
democracy to incorporate workers' behaviour - many of their organizations 
already having been incorporated - but that such attempts tend to fail 
because of structural tensions at the non-observable level. Since unions 
also use forms of industrial democracy to extend their own marginal power, 
the meaning of· the term is best seen as centring on the 'frontier of 
control' between the two sides of industry and analysable by level, area 
(or subject matter) and method of influence. The development of industrial 
democracy in these terms - with particular reference to job-restructuring, 
consultation, collective bargaining and worker directors - is examined for 
the period 1945-1980. It is found that both sides of industry use 
different forms of industrial democracy in an opportunistic way to pursue 
their own interests at the 'frontier of control'. Part IV, however, 
investigates the circumstances in which groups of workers have tried to 
'break through' the institutional framework of the 'non-observable' aspects 
of power in order to establish an organization of industry which structur-
ally favours their own interests. The role of union trustees on the boards 
of occupational pension funds is investigated, as are work-ins, social 
audits, co-operatives and workers' alternative corporate plans. The thesis 
concludes that democratic planning must be systematically introduced at all 
levels of industry if radical industrial democracy is to flourish. 
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PREFACE 
'Industrial democracy' is a puzzling expression. We all know 
what industry is, and we all know - or like to think we know - what 
democracy is, but the two terms together make an uneasy alliance. 
The organization of British industry, with its foundation in private 
property and the hierarchical division of labour, would appear to 
contradict the very principles of democracy which are based on 
accountability and equality. 
This is indeed so, and it is pointless to try and avoid the 
resulting confusions. For this reason, the development of industrial 
democracy must be set squarely in the context of existing power 
relations in industry. Such an approach dispels some of the confusion 
because it highlights the different interests which the two sides of 
industry have in industrial democracy: incorporation of labour from 
the point of view of management, and control of management from the 
point of view of labour. Hence the title: industrial democracy, 
incorporation and control. 
The thesis concentrates more on the shop-floor than on other 
levels of industry and - importantly - more on what people do than 
what they say: it is more concerned with how people behave, and how 
they justify their behaviour, than with their intentions, prescrip-
tions and programmes. Finally, the thesis is interested in how 
behaviour is moulded through social structures and frameworks, and 
the circumstances in which 'ordinary' people may succeed in breaking 
through them to construct more satisfactory, less oppressive social 
alternatives. 
(v) 
The argument is developed from first principles in order to 
appeal to as wide a potential readership as possible. That is, it 
assumes little specialist knowledge on the part of the reader about 
industrial relations theory in general or industrial democracy in 
particular. The reasons for this approach are fully explained in 
the Methodological Appendix. 
Throughout the text, male personal adjectives and pronouns are 
intended to apply to females as well. Their use reflects only the 
clumsiness of continually specifying 'he or she' and so on, and not 
any sexism on my part. 
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(viii) 
INTRODUCTION 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to explain the 
significance of moves towards industrial democracy in Britain since 
the Second World War. It attempts to do this not only by outlining 
a comprehensive 'conceptual map' of the literature on the subject 
but also.by defining the limits of what industrial democracy - in its 
various forms - can achieve within the context of an advanced neo-
capitalist society. 
It is on this second problem - the limits of industrial democracy 
that most attention is focused. The course of discussion raises a 
series of interwoven secondary themes, each one of which corresponds 
to one of the four Parts into which the thesis is divided: 
Part I contains a sustained critique of the inadequacies of 
liberal pluralist approaches to industrial relations theory; 
Part II analyses power relations in industry with reference to 
the Gramscian notions of 'hegemony' and 'contradictory consciousness' 
and to the role of incorporation theory in attempts to deal with 
conflictual behaviour on the shop-floor; 
Part III defines the 'frontier of control' as the central feature 
of industrial democracy and examines the conditions under which it has 
shifted to-and-fro between management and labour since the War; and 
Part IV investigates the circumstances under which labour may be 
able to 'break through' the framework in which it functions in order 
to establish an organization of industry which structurally favours 
its own interests. 
(ix) 
These seoondary themes are all interrelated. Much of the 
confusion surrounding the industrial democracy debate - for example, 
over the extent to which the introduction of various schemes could 
establish industrial consensus - stems from inconsistencies in even 
the most sophisticated liberal pluralist approaches to industrial 
relations. Since such approaches still maintain their hold on many 
theorists, it is worthwhile to examine their assumptions at length. 
An analysis of power relations in industry reveals that, although 
these schemes may increase workers' 'observable' influence at differ-
ent levels of industry (for example through participation committees), 
the mainsprings of conflict at a structural or 'non-observable' level 
(such as property relations, the profit motive, and the legal frame-
work) remain untouched. As a result, conflict too remains endemic. 
The 'corporate bias' identified by some writers as a feature of 
British industrial life leaves out of account workers' own perceptions 
of their interests, perceptions coloured by this endemic conflict. 
According to Middlemas, for instance: 
"Before 1911, the greatest problem was how to assimilate 
working-class power into the forms of the political nation; 
in the inter-war years, how to incorporate the institutions 
of working-class industrial life. Now, there are no more 
organizations or classes to incorporate (unless the concept 
of class is strained to include categories such as the 
unemployed, women or youths) and the problem is to satisfy 
individual, multiple aspirations, and remedy the structural 
rigidities of traditional parties and of traditional trade 
unions."1 
This observation fails to notice a crucial distinction between 
working class institutions - such as trade ml.ion bureaucracies - and 
working class experiences on the shop-floor. It is not that "there 
(x) 
are no more organizations or classes to incorporate", but rather that, 
whilst some aspects of working class life have been incorporated, 
others most certainly have not been - indeed the Donovan Report in the 
1960s was set up in an effort to cure the 'diseases' of unofficial 
strikes, restrictive practices and wage drift. Working class 
behaviour on the shop-floor has remained conflictual and unincorporated 
because the very structure of industry itself stimulates conflict; 
private ownership establishes a gulf between the interests of those 
who control (and their agents) and those who are controlled; the 
division of labour leads to wide differentials and divergencies in 
working conditions between managements and work-force; and the profit 
motive and capital accumulation lead to industrial rationalisation, 
plant closures and structural unemployment. The effects are bewilder-
ment, resentment and conflict on the shop-floor and the systematic 
ruling out of genuine consensus. Even so, such experiences rarely 
get translated into anything more serious than strikes or riots - and 
usually little more than absenteeism and turnover - because in Britain 
the only countervailing ideology widely available to workers is 
labourism, which seeks at most to re-distribute income and wealth 
within nee-capitalism, and not to transcend its structure. 
As a result, industrial democracy may be viewed as the 'frontier 
of control' - to use Goodrich's phrase2 - between management and 
labour. For management, it involves the attempt to incorporate 
working class interests on the shop-floor through, for example, job 
re-structuring or joint consultation, or at corporate level through, 
for example, minority employee representation on company boards. 
For organized labour, it involves the attempt to consolidate or gain 
(xi) 
extra influence at the margins through extending collective bargaining, 
or perhaps through parity union representation on boards. In either 
case, industrial democracy can be analysed by level (e.g. work-place, 
company, industry); by~ or issue (e.g. canteen facilities, 
methods of payment , investment planning); and by degree of influence 
(e.g. consultation, negotiation, control). In the overwhelming 
majority of these cases, industrial democracy takes place within a 
given context of 'non-observable' power relations which guarantees 
ultimate control to management. 
However, in certain circumstances, this is not all that industrial 
democracy might mean to organized labour. Occasionally, it may come 
to mean a strategy for breaking the framework itself of industrial 
life. 
"Once one has grown accustomed to thinking within the frame 
of the inherited normative system, which offers the 
assurance of a 'beaten track', it becomes difficult to step 
aside and inspect the system from the outside, in the same 
way as it is difficult for creatures living two-dimensional 
lives on the surface of a sphere, to cite Einstein's famous 
example, to suspect the existence of a third dimension. 113 
Yet trade union trustees on the board of a pension fund may 
attempt to direct money into investments which create employment rather 
than short-term profits. Work-ins, sit-ins and social audits defy the 
right of owners to dispose freely of industrial assets when this 
disposal creates redundancies and run-down communities. The develop-
ment of producer co-operatives erodes the division of labour between 
management and work-force, whilst in larger companies alternative 
workers' corporate plans challenge management's right to close plants 
by advocating alternative investment programmes for socially useful 
(xii) 
products. 
Although governments may give more, less or no support to these 
radical forms of industrial democracy, they all represent bold 
challenges to the "beaten track" of industrial operations under neo-
capi talism. To that extent, they all offer glimpses of "how we 
might live".4 
Part I: Chapter One outlines the familiar differences between 
unitary and pluralist approaches to industrial relations, whilst 
Chapter Two turns to the contribution of Flanders to pluralist theory, 
highlighting the one-sided nature of his account of Durkheim which 
Fox attempts - but fails - to rectify satisfactorily. 
Part II: Chapter Three examines the work of Fox, Giddens, 
Lukes and Gramsci in drawing attention to a dichotomy in the study 
of power: 'observable' aspects - such as decision-making, law enact-
ment, democratic procedure and so on - and 'non-observable' aspects 
which include 'taken for granted' institutional arrangements reflect-
ing inequalities in property ownership, the division of labour, and 
so on. Chapter Four illustrates how working class institutions at 
the observable level of power have been incorporated whilst Chapter 
Five concentrates on working class industrial behaviour. It shows 
that although workers often express consensual attitudes in abstract 
terms, their behaviour reflects conflictual responses whenever their 
interests are threatened on the shoP-floor. However, they tend to 
lack the counter-ideology necessary to challenge the industrial 
structure at its roots, though it is this structure which engenders 
conflict in the first place. 
(xiii) 
Part III: Chapter Six suggests that industrial democracy has 
been the main method utilised by managements to incorporate working 
class conflictual behaviour. The meaning of the term centres on 
the shop-floor 'frontier of control' and schemes can be analysed in 
a three-dimensional approach by level, area and degree of influence. 
Chapter Seven investigates the balance of this 'frontier of control' 
between 1945 and 1970, and Chapter Eight looks at the same issues 
between 1970 and 1980. Both these chapters restrict their analysis 
to schemes operating within the overall control structure of industry. 
Part IV: Chapter Nine, however, looks at the attempts of union 
trustees to democratise the investment policies of their pension 
funds. Chapter Ten examines the significance of the Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders' work-in for subsequent sit-ins and work-ins, as well as 
forthe development of the social audit, and Chapter Eleven examines 
in a similar way the role of co-operatives and alternative corporate 
plans in elaborating more radical forms of industrial democracy to 
come to grips with the non-observable aspects of industrial power. 
The thesis concludes that democratic planning at all levels of 
industry must be systematically introduced if radical industrial 
democracy is to stand a chance - but that as liberal pluralist 
solutions are seen to fail, given the nature of nee-capitalist 
institutions, the prospects for such planning are dim without hard 
work. Authoritarian solutions imposed from the Right may be more 
likely. 
PART ONE 
"A main cause of philosophical disease - a one-sided 
diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one 
kind of example." 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), para. 593, p.155e. 
1. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Industrial Revolution and its Consequences 
Did the Industrial Revolution make the working classes better 
1 off, or not? It would be fruitless to try and reach agreement on 
such a question. Answers would necessarily make moral and political 
assumptions about what is meant by the "standard of living". On the 
one hand it could be maintained that life in the agricultural villages 
had been short and hard and that industrialisation led to the develop-
ment of initiative in trade and commerce which, in turn, led to a 
considerable growth in real income. On the other hand, emphasis 
could be placed on the social disruption which resulted: rapid 
urbanisation and the growth of slums, the harsh discipline of factory 
life, poor hygiene, periods of mass unemployment and so on. 2 
These two attitudes towards industrialisation are not altogether 
mutually exclusive. Marx, for example, admires the accomplishments 
of the bourgeoisie, the property-owning class responsible for "wonders 
far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts and Gothic 
cathedrals", whilst condemning their methods as a class, and their 
"naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation".3 For him, the two 
aspects - accomplishments and methods - are inextricably linked, for 
once bourgeois property relations are destroyed then the exploitation 
which they created is destroyed as well and the classless society 
which emerges will be free to enjoy the benefits of capital accumula-
tion in a fully equal manner: " ••• the free development of each is 
the condition of the free development of all".4 
2. 
However, many writers would agree that, when evaluating the 
consequences of the Industrial Revolution, a conceptual problem 
always remains: "the insoluble difficulty (is) the inability to 
compare changes in real income with changes in the social and economic 
circumstances under which people live and work".5 The point is that 
people have two sets of interests which need to be weighed up: as 
consumers, with an ability to command disposable income, and as 
producers, with an ability to influence the quality of their working 
conditions. These two sets of interests may conflict if a social 
system tends to satisfy - for example - the first set at the expense 
of the second. 
There is, however, considerably less difficulty in establishing 
the historical facts of the Industrial Revolution: 
" ••• the Industrial Revolution had in the Victorian era 
increased the disparity of wealth between the very rich 
and the very poor, and had segregated classes geographically 
by substituting great cities divided into various social 
quarters, in the place of the life of villages and market 
towns with some features and interests common to all. But 
industrial change had also increased the number of middle 
classes of varying levels of wealth and comfort; and it had 
raised the standard of life of the better-to-do working 
classes, such as engineers, far above that of the unskilled 
labourer and slum-dweller."6 
Such inequalities of power and conditions form the background 
against which the first trade unions - with the craft unions taking 
the lead - were formed in the early 19th century. The story of 
their early struggle is well-known and does not require detailed 
exposition here.7 But accepting for the moment the crude version 
of the Marxist social dichotomy into the bourgeoisie (the owners of 
the means of production) and the proletariat (those who own nothing 
but their labour power which they sell to live), it is not hard to 
view the development of the Labour movement in the last century as 
3. 
a contest for power between the two main classes - albeit within a 
reformist and, as a rule, not revolutionary framework. The repeal 
of the Combination Laws in 1824 and 1825 allowed organizations of 
workmen to agree wages and hours with their employers; the disillu-
sion of the working class with the 1832 Reform Act hastened the 
formation of the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union in 1834 
which collapsed the same year as a consequence of the case of the 
Tolpuddle Martyrs; the emergence of Chartism between 1836 and 1848; 
the setting up of the Trades Union Congress in 1868 and the first 
Representation of the People Act in 1867, which extended adult male 
suffrage, eased the introduction between 1871 and 1875 of a series 
of emancipatory statutes exempting unions from charges of criminal 
conspiracy; the rise of the 'new unionism' - organizations of the 
unskilled - after 1889, the year of the Great Dock Strike; the 
gradual development of the Labour movement's political activity both 
inside and outside Parliament, culminating in the formation of the 
Labour Representation Committee - the precursor of the Labour Party -
in 1900; and the eventual passing in 1906 of the Trades Disputes Act 
which granted unions legal immunity from civil action when engaged in 
a trade dispute - all these developments represent stages in the 
struggle of the organized working class to protect its interests in 
the labour market up until the First World War. This was carried 
forward both through the formation of national unions, parties and 
campaigns as well as through the passing of legislation favourable 
to Labour. 
The Evolution of Management 
However, the struggle for control has, since the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution, proceeded at other levels as well: we 
shall be concerned here principally with the factory or enterprise 
level, which focuses on the relationships between work-force and 
management~ It was as producers that workers began to experience 
at first hand the attempts made by employers to extract from them the 
greatest amount of labour because, according to 1"1arx: 
"The value of the labouring power is determined by the 
quantity of labour necessary to maintain or reproduce it, 
but the use of that labouring power is only limited by the 
active energies and physical strength of the labourer. 11 8 
As a result, it is in the interests of the employer - assuming 
that he maximises profits - to impose on the work-force whatever 
conditions might be necessary to ensure as high a level of production 
as possible. As Blackburn puts it: 
11 
••• the labour contract is not an exchange of equivalents; 
it is structurally asymmetrical. It is not just that the 
labourer has to sell his work in order to live whereas the 
capitalist is not similarly constrained to buy labour. By 
the terms of the contract, the worker receives a definite -
and usually public - rate for the job whereas the employer 
receives an impalpable potentiality whose ultimate develop-
ment it is for him to determine."9 
The result of this "asymmetry" is that the work-force tends to 
develop its own countermeasures to prevent its total domination by 
the employer. An area of work activity remains continually in 
dispute between the two sides: 
"This struggle is reflected in the a:rray of sanctions and 
rewards deployed by employers, and the forms of resistance 
generated by workers against speed-ups, tight piece rates, 
unsatisfactory working hours and conditions. 1110 
At any given moment, "the frontier of control", as Goodrich 
11 has called it in his classic work, may be more or less in the 
workers' favour depending on a series of factors - the economic 
climate, the relative strength of organized labour, the political 
party in power, and so on. 
The point here is that the time of the work-force - and hence 
notions of punctuality, efficiency and a "fair day's pay" - became 
12 more and more a concern of the employer. And with time, the 
problem of industrial control became more and more central. With 
the emergence during the 19th century of the joint stock company -
one in which ownership and control are formally separate - control 
gTadually became a problem for professionals. Braverman is worth 
quoting at length: 
And: 
"The capitalist ••• working with hired labour, which 
represents a cost for every non-producing hour, in a 
setting of rapidly revolutionising technology to which his 
own efforts perforce contributed, and goaded by the need 
to show a surplus and accumulate capital, brought into 
being a wholly new art of management, which even in its 
early manifestations was far more complete, self-conscious, 
painstaking and calculating than anything that had gone 
before. 11 13 
"Like a rider who uses reins~ bridle, spurs, carrot, whip, 
and training from birth to impose his will, the capitalist 
strives, through management, to control. And control is 
indeed the central concept of all management systems, as 
has been recognised implicitly or explicitly by all 
theoreticians of management."14 
5. 
The question of how management attempts to maintain control is 
highly complex and provides a central theme of this thesis. Indeed, 
this control function is central, no matter from what perspective 
6. 
management is itself viewed. Child, for example, has identified 
three possible such perspectives on management: as technical ad.mini-
strators, as executors of policy, or as an elite social grouping 
maintaining authority. 15 However, although all three may be 
distinguished, Child is careful to establish that both a legitimatory 
and a technical function need to be kept apart in management thought: 
"The legitimatory function related to the status position 
(in the broadest sense) of managers, while the technical 
function related to the improvement of their perfonnance. 
Both functions can readily be seen to be associated with 
the question of managerial authority. The legitimatory 
function was primarily linked to the securing of social 
recognition and approval for managerial authority and the 
way in which it was used, while the technical function was 
primarily linked to the search for practical means of 
rendering that authority maximally effective. 11 16 
Managers themselves frequently treat management as purely the 
acquisition and employment of technical skill. It is possible to 
find general textbooks which make no reference to a legitimatory 
function. 17 Yet managers - either consciously or unconsciously -
are themselves concerned to justify their technical functions, and 
it is possible to trace changes in legitimations over time in accord-
ance with prevailing social attitudes. During the Victorian age, 
ownership was sufficient reason to justify management control of an 
enterprise; later, with the development of the technical side of 
management in other spheres - for instance, bureaucracies and the 
civil service - the manager's professionalism became paramount: 
"We further know that management is independent of owner-
ship, :rank, or power. It is objective function (sic) and 
ought to be grounded in the :responsibility for performance. 
It is professional - management is a function, a discipline, 
a task to be done; and managers are professionals who 
practise this discipline, carry out the functions and 
discharge these tasks. It is no longer :relevant whether 
the manager is also an owner; if he is, it is incidental 
to his main function, which is to be a manager."18 
Or, still more recently, a third development has become apparent; 
"management is beginning to accept the legitimacy of a different 
basis for authority - that of consent". 19 Managers may now feel the 
need to win the active consent of their work-force because "in a 
society in which democratic rights are increasingly recognised, it 
becomes more and more difficult to maintain that industry should 
20 remain exempt". 
It is hardly surprising that industrial management thought should 
reflect prevailing values since its role - administering and legitimis-
ing the activities of the enterprise at the place of work - is a 
central one in advanced capitalist societies (both liberal democratic 
and state socialist). 21 However, it is just because of this central-
ity - in particular in relation to the development of industrial 
democracy - that it is worthwhile to consider management 'frames of 
reference' and belief systems at greater length. Indeed, it is 
through an extended analysis of the various perspectives of manage-
ment towards the enterprise that we can begin to refine our own 
conceptual framework - a necessary step in accounting for the growth 
in industrial democracy. 
Management Perspectives 
It was Alan Fox who first elaborated the useful and influential 
distinction between unitary and pluralist 'frames of reference' 
towards industry, in a research paper submitted to the Donovan 
Commission in 1966 described on its title page as "an assessment of 
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the contribution which industrial sociology can make towards under-
standing and resolving some of the problems now being considered by 
the Royal Commission11 • 22 The main contribution of the booklet was 
its analysis of 'frames of reference' towards the enterprise, which 
were considered important because they determine our expectations 
of people's behaviour, our reactions towards their behaviour, and 
the means we employ to alter their behaviour. 
Fox has, since then, changed his views towards pluralism as we 
shall see in the next chapter. His analysis of the 'unitary' frame 
of reference, however, is less controversial and has remained the 
same in all his writings on industrial relations. 
1. Unitarism 
The essence of unitarism is that the notion of a team is 
considered the most appropriate metaphor to describe the enterprise: 
"A unitary system has one source of authority and one focus 
of loyalty, which is why it suggests the team analogy ••• 
We expect (a team) to strive jointly towards a· common 
objective, each pulling his weight to the best of his 
ability. Each accepts his place and his function gladly, 
following the leadership of the one so appointed. There 
are no oppositionary groups or factions, and, therefore, no 
rival leaders within the team. Nor are there any outside 
it; the team stands alone, its members owing allegiance to 
their own leaders but to no others. If the members have 
an obligation of loyalty towards the leader, the obligation 
is certainly reciprocated, for it is the duty of the leader 
to act in such ways as to inspire the loyalty he demands. 
Morale and success are closely connected and rest heavily 
upon personal relationships. 11 23 
Other analogies found are with ships and £amilies; or else 
stress is laid on 'working together', •.pulling together' or 'being 
all on the same side'. Such attitudes may exist both at national 
level - in "bringing about economic recovery, we should all be on 
the same side1124 - and at company level -
"The only harmonious organization that is worth anything 
is an organization in which all the members are bent on 
the one main purpose - to get along towards the 
objective. 11 25 
Several consequences follow from this perspective. One of the 
most important is that trade unions and shop stewards' organizations 
are viewed as an aberration in the body industrial. If the interests 
of all within the enterprise are assumed to be the same, then any 
other organization which claims employees' loyalties and sets itself 
to represent them in opposition to management must clearly pose a 
threat. So, the growth of workers' organizations has to be explained 
in terms of "agitators" or "militants" who stir up trouble amongst men 
who are otherwise basically decent. Or else, if the existence of 
trade unions is grudgingly permitted, a nuance is to suggest that they 
have been subverted; both these points are illustrated in the 
Conservative Manifesto, 1979: 
"Between 1974 and 1976, Labour enacted a 'militants' charter' 
of trade union legislation. It tilted the balance of power 
in bargaining through.out industry away from responsible 
management and towards unions, and sometimes towards 
unofficial groups of workers acting in defiance of t..~eir 
official union leadership. 11 26 
In this case, 'responsible' management is faced not only by the 
unions, but also by "unofficial groups of workers". How such groups 
obtain a power base within a factory is left unsaid. 
A second consequence of unitarism is that blame for economic 
ills is to be located in the tmions and that only effective leadership 
can sort them out: 
"One can with justice blame the unions (for Britain's 
'serious industrial relations problem') and claim that 
trade union reform is necessary. But the unions alone 
are not to blame; if government had governed and 
management had managed effectively, industrial relations 
would never have got into their present state. 11 27 
With such a notion of union reform, we begin to move into a 
slightly different brand of unitarism - one which does not flatly 
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deny the legitimacy of the unions and their activities, but is rather 
concerned to ensure that they play their 'proper' role in the economy: 
"This has stemmed from the consciousness that the unions 
might have something useful to offer provided that they 
were prepared to accept the essential framework of the 
social order and did not develop ambitious aspirations to 
encroach too seriously upon managerial discretion. 11 28 
To this extent, terms like 'responsible' and 'proper' can be 
applied to unions which aid management in problems relating to control. 
'Reform' is intended to strengthen those procedures which allow 
moderate leaderships to resist industrial action, 'unsensible' pay 
claims and restrictive practices, as well as ensuring good communica-
tions between management and union: 
"The penalty of bad communication is the grape-vine and the 
rumour, and many of the agitators in British industry will 
privately admit that their success has been based on 
exploiting situations which have arisen from bad communica-
tions.1129 
We can now begin to distinguish between two forms of unitarism 
(as an extension to Fox's own theory). First of all, there is 
unitarism which, embracing both national and enterprise level, denies 
that unions should exist at all as they are disruptive agencies. 
Such a view is clearly associated with the 19th century principle 
that ownership means control; as Fox points out, "not un-til 1875 did 
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Master and Servant legislation become the Employers and Worlanen 
Act."30 Even so, even today, supervisors are still assumed to need 
skills to motivate and brief "their" work-force.3
1 
However, secondly, a development of unitarism accepts the 
existence of unions provided that they operate as any other consensual 
institution· to protect dominant interests. In this case, unions' 
interests are assumed to coincide with those of 'society' (at national 
level) and 'management' (at enterprise level). If they claim to 
represent their members best through opposition to management, then, 
as we have seen, this is thought to be the work of agitators. It is 
presumably only the long established fact of a union role within the 
economy which has led unitarists to accept them at all. In fact, 
when unitarists refer to the social consensus, unions are usually not 
mentioned. Rather, the reference is to 'employees' or to 'men', 
possibly because, not being organized, such are felt to be more 
amenable: 
"The basic aim which underlay the activities of the One 
Nation Group was to strive to produce a united, prosper-
ous democracy, with management and men working together 
for an ever improving standard of living •••• 11 32 
Such a possibility illuminates the reasons why management 
stresses the participation of employees in the company, rather than 
the unions.33 
Still, this discussion raises a major problem for unitarists. 
Unions are here to stay and have established structures; the 
difficulty is how to ensure that all elements within the union behave 
consensually. One method sometimes advanced is to reform internal 
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trade union machinery: the assumption is that, given the chance, 
ordinary members would not want to vote for "extreme Left-wing 
groups". 34 This question - how to achieve consensual behaviour on 
the shop-floor - is an important one for management and we return to 
it in Chapter Five. 
The main deficiency of this frame of reference is that it simply 
does not explain or clarify what actually happens in industrial 
relations. Conflict is structurally present on the shoP-floor 
because many of the employer's interests are diametrically opposed 
to those of the employee, especially at the place of production; for 
example, the employer needs to keep wages down as far as possible 
since for him they represent a cost, whilst the employee wants to 
raise them as far as possible, since for him they represent a revenue. 
Similarly, the employer tries to extend his control over productive 
processes, whilst the employee resists what he considers intrusions 
into his territory.35 
Many managerial writers recognize these points to an extent. 
Hooper, for example, calling trade unions "anti-bodies", goes on to 
explain: 
"They were formed to combat and curb the power of employers; 
to meet what amounted to a severe attack on the individual, 
brought about by the industrialisation of our society, an 
attack utterly irremediable except by organized, defensive 
effort; and to redress, in favour of labour, an existing 
adverse balance of power." 
He continues that this process is "entirely understandable 11 36 -
a comment which would not be made by a unitarist. However, in an 
interesting section, Hooper develops his theme that management must 
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attempt to create a good work climate by reducing the suspicion in 
which the work-force holds them, both in the enterprise itself and 
more generally as a class. This in turn would lead to trade unions 
revising their self-images from one of "anti-bodies" to one of 
organizations actively co-operating with management in its objectives: 
"Clearly this will not be easy. The transition of a trade 
union from being an anti-body to management to being a co-
partner of management, sharing a joint common interest, 
while retaining power of effective leadership over its own 
rank and file, calls for as delicate a piece of leadership 
as anything well could. The natural tendency will be for 
the rank and file to accuse those of its leaders who attempt 
it as 'ratting' on the labour movement, and to transfer 
their allegiance to new unofficial leaders who will continue 
the anti-body role as active grievance-leaders. 11 37 
To prevent such an occurrence, management must understand the 
difficulties of the unions: 
"It will be a part of that understanding not to embarrass 
the leaders of organized labour by insisting too soon or 
too openly on the identify of interest between labour and 
management. 11 38 
Labour should be left to itself to discover such an identity 
since, according to Hooper, time and the "education of events"39 will 
ensure that it does so. 
Strands of unitarist thought are easily identifiable in Hooper's 
observations: management "leadership" is to be the key factor in 
persuading the unions to join a co-partnership; and "a joint common 
interest" is assumed to unite labour and management - the possibility 
of there being divergent aims and aspirations is never even considered. 
It requires only "experience" to show labour that co-operation rather 
than conflict is its best course of action. 
14. 
Yet on the other hand, other strands in Hooper's thinking go 
beyond the unitarist perspective. First of all, there is an under-
standing of the unions' struggle to organize labour in the face of 
employers' power. Furthermore, there is an underlying sympathy with 
the representative function of the unions. It will be "natural" for 
the rank and file to "transfer their allegiance to new unoffical 
leaders" if the unions fail to represent the perceived interest of 
the members as "grievance-leaders". Disillusion with the unrepre-
sentative nature of the union structure was certainly a central 
reason for the emergence of the shop-steward movement in the engineer-
ing industry during the First World War, 40 so Hooper is correct in 
showing concern not to "embarrass the leaders of organized labour". 
The unresolved tension in Hooper's writing lies precisely at this 
point. On the one hand he stresses the need for co-partnership of 
employers and unions yet on the other he understands that unions 
evolved to protect their members from the power of the employers. 
His solution - management gradually extending trust to the unions to 
illustrate the existence of joint interests - must rest on shaky 
premises if the very structure of the enterprise which gives rise to 
grievances in the first place remains unchanged. 
It is consideration of this point that has led to the development 
of pluralism in management thought. 
2. Pluralism 
The main plank of pluralism is that "the legitimacy and justifi-
cation of trade unions in our society rests ••• on social values 
which recognise the right of interest-groups to combine 8.L"'ld have an 
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effective voice in their own destiny."41 This does not mean 
integration of unions into managerial processes of decision-making 
so that joint policies can be made more acceptable to the work-force; 
rather, it means that the aims of the union are considered legitimate 
even when - or especially when - they conflict with those of manage-
ment. In other words, the right of unions - and shop stewards' 
committees - to operate independently within the work-place rests on 
their function of representing their membership, and takes for granted 
both that divergent interests exist and that they require expression 
in the face of 'management prerogative'. 
If unions are allowed this role, then there are several important 
consequences. First of all, union members owe allegiance to organiz-
ations outside their own work-place; by paying dues to a union which 
represents members across the nation, a worker may well be called on 
to show solidarity with it in the course of its activity - for instance, 
in settlement of a dispute - and thereby place union before company 
interests. This immediately destroys any notion of the company as a 
team striving for a common purpose. Secondly, pluralism admits 
conflict as a central feature of industrial life. Rather than defining 
it as a foreign element brought in by "agitators", the pluralist is 
able to focus on it in a more realistic manner. 
For example, it becomes possible to question the common belief 
that the presence of conflict is a bad sign for the enterprise, or 
alternatively, that lack of it is good. Argyris, for instance, argues 
that the commonly used criteria to judge the health of an organization 
in business circles - low absenteeism, low labour turnover, high 
16. 
productivity, in short, little conflict - in fact distort the basis 
on which to judge the health of the individuals within it. Quoting 
figures to show that most workers are interested only in pay, and 
not in plant-based friendships, job content or promotion, Argyris 
claims that the prevalence of monetary or de-humanised values leads to 
an overall decline in people's ability to express mature behaviour -
independence, creativity and responsibility.42 Whether or not such 
a view is correct is not at issue; the point is that the question 
could be raised only by one able to doubt the attitude that conflict 
is always bad. 
But also, pluralism allows a debate to begin on how best to 
resolve, or at least channel, conflict. The introduction of joint 
representation committees, improved methods of consultation and the 
strengthening of collective bargaining are examples of the methods on 
which pluralists have concentrated to ensure the controlled expression 
of conflict. This gives rise to an important distinction between 
substantive agreements - "intended to regulate the employment of 
labour within their jurisdiction" - and procedure agreements - to 
"provide means for conciliating or determining disputes {sic) which 
arise between organized workers and their ma.nagers".43 The origin 
and status of these procedures - and the norms which they create -
have become an important topic of discussion between pluralists and 
their critics. This is because if it is accepted that "the degree 
of common purpose which can exist in industry is only of a very 
limited nature", 44 then the role of management becomes that of 
balancing the diverse aims of those who ·have an interest in the enter-
prise - shareholders, unions, shop stewards' committees, suppliers, 
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customers, the financial sector, the local community, and possibly 
the Government as well. Under these conditions, the procedures 
through which conflicts are resolved become highly important. Only 
if all participants abide by the rules of conflict settlement oan the 
enterprise hope to achieve necessary compromises. 
The Emergence of Pluralism 
Pluralism has developed as both a descriptive and prescriptive 
theory of democracy, based largely on the existing government structure 
of the USA. 45 Pluralists see the freedom of diverse social interests 
to fo1'lll associations, gather support and influence government in their 
favour as the guarantor of Western democratic systems. Indeed, 
democracy itself comes to be defined in terms of the free competition 
for votes by political elites. Here again, it is easy to see how 
procedures become a focus of attention - adherence to them alone 
ensures stability of the system; if people do not accept the authority 
or legitimacy of the rules through which decisions are made, then they 
have no reason to abide by the decisions themselves. 
It has not proved difficult to extend this analysis of government 
• 
structure at national level to embrace similar problems of industrial 
relations at work-place level. Since the Second World War concern 
has been increasingly expressed at Britain's low level of productivity 
in relation to its international competitors, and the adverse effect 
which this has had on its economic performance at home and abroad.46 
Many British institutions have come under attack from one quarter or 
another for being to blame, but few more so than the industrial 
relations system. A paper published by the Department of Employment 
succinctly summarises the chief points: 
"During the 1950s the British system of industrial relations 
was subjected to increasing criticism. First it was said 
to have failed to prevent a rise in unauthorised strikes, 
which were usually in breach of established procedures for 
avoiding disputes. Second it was argued that industry-wide 
arrangements for settling pay were becoming less and less 
relevant as local work groups, led by shop stewards, 
negotiated shop-floor settlements far in advance of those 
obtained at industry level. Third it was suggested that 
existing methods of collective bargaining had failed to 
provide agreed ways of dealing with so-called 'restrictive 
labour practices•. Britain was not making the best use of 
its labour resources and was suffering from overmanning in 
many industries and firms."47 
Notice that each of the three criticisms centres on the non-
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adherence to established procedures by parties involved in industry, 
or the non-existence of appropriate procedures: strikes - the 
breaching of "established procedures for avoiding disputes"; wage 
drift - "industry-wide arrangements" were becoming "less and less 
relevant" for negotiating pay because of the shift in power to the 
shop-floor; and 'restrictive labour practices' - "existing methods 
of collective bargaining" had not created "agreed ways of dealing" 
with inefficient use of manpower. The authQrs are keen to re-assert 
the binding strength of procedure on industrial relations, and not to 
deprecate the role of the unions themselves by asserting - as 
unitarists might - that they are disruptive or unrepresentative. 
Indeed, since the Donovan Report in 1968, the principal industrial 
relations perspective amongst informed observers has been pluralist.48 
Because of the dominance and influence of pluralism, it is worthwhile 
to outline the conditions which are necessary in a society before such 
a perspective can be widely accepted. 
First of all, individuals with common interests must come together 
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in an organized fashion and through regular social interaction 
establish "a structure, a form of organization, a programme or goal, 
and a personnel of members"49 The formation of the earliest labour 
organizations created interest groups - trade unions - whose members' 
interests lay in their common class position. 
However, the ability of unions (or interest groups in general) 
to emerge - and not remain secret organizations for example - depends 
on the second condition for pluralism: 
"Where a plurality of conflicting parties is not pernlitted 
and their emergence suppressed by the absence of freedom 
of coalition and by police force, conflict groups cannot 
organize themselves even if all other conditions of their 
organization are present. 11 50 
As outlined above, before the unions in Britain were able to 
gain any ground for themselves in terms of economic advance, they 
had first to win recognition through the law. 51 Their ultimate 
success in organizing bodies of individual workers across many 
different industries - and creating a climate of toleration for their 
activities - was owing to several factors. By withdrawing, or 
threatening to withdraw, labour the unions were gradually able to 
force employers to concede some of their requests, in particular 
over wage negotiations, hours and conditions. 
However, it is also true that employers began to realise that 
unions could help them in at least two ways. First, industry-wide 
agreements would ensure that an employer would be paying the same 
rates as his competitor - which would mean that labour costs could 
be stabilised between them.52 Second, the unions themselves could 
help to maintain work discipline. If employers and unions reached 
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agreement on an issue then the unions would be required to enforce 
the decision on the shoP-floor. This point is sometimes made 
nowadays when it is stressed that shop stewards frequently try "to 
bring some order into a chaotic situation", most times being "either 
less militant than or only as militant as their members. 1153 
So the unions have established themselves only through a 
continued struggle and through concessions which have often been to 
the employers' own longer term advantage in any case. The result 
of this has been the development of a 'labourist' ideology within 
the union movement and the incorporation of its structure into the 
social framework. 
The third condition necessary for the emergence of the pluralist 
perspective involves a general recognition - at all levels of society -
of the reality of conflict. Although certain branches of management 
thought appear superficially very different from one another, many are 
unitarist and deny that endemic conflict exists. Henry Ford, for 
instance, espousing the scientific management of F. w. Taylor, claimed: 
"Really, we have no fixed classes. We have men who will work, and 
men who will not."54 He considered that the rationalisation of work 
processes was beneficial to hard-workers as they could then earn more 
more even than a union could demand. High productivity was conse-
quently in both employer's and employees' interests, and as such formed 
a principle of harmony. 
On the other hand, the school of Human Relations appears very 
different, with its stress on cohesive work groups, quality of humane 
supervision and informality. While it shares the Taylorian concern 
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for high productivity (Child's "technical function") the assumptions 
it makes about the worker - and hence its methods - are very 
dissimilar (its "legitimatory function").55 It assumes that the 
enterprise is an organic unity and that the problem of industrial 
relations consists purely in the removal of bad communications. 
Nevertheless, neither Taylor nor the Human Relations school believes 
in endemic conflict, each school ta.lcing the view that the manager is 
to some degree able to control (and therefore motivate) the behaviour 
of the worker. High wages and a "sense of belonging" are the key 
determining elements, respectively. 
However, during the 1940s and 1950s social scientists, often 
funded through government grants, became more interested in industrial 
behaviour. As the result of this interest, many Human Relations 
t . t b di 11 . t . . d 56 assump ions came o e ra ca y cri icise • The factor binding 
all these criticisms is that the ability of the manager to control 
workers' behaviour within the factory is severely limited by: 
- the economic situation of the firm, which may determine not 
only the kind of organizational structure relevant to its efficiency,57 
but even the attitudes towards work and productivity prevalent within 
•t 58 1 ; 
- the kind of technology characteristic of the factory, which 
may have a strong influence on the kinds of social relationships 
possible with.in it by fostering or hindering certain types of inter-
action;59 
- and the structure of the local comnnmity which may play a role 
in shaping workers' attitudes towards technical change. 60 
22. 
Finally, conflict itself began to be seen not only as a normal 
aspect of life in organizations, 61 but even as having positive value 
in adapting operations to necessary change.
62 The positive 
contribution as the result of this work has been to place rigorous 
qualifications on managerial assumptions about consensus both in 
terms of s~owing up the kind of influencing factors which they omit 
and also in terms of their role in justifying the existing industrial 
structure. 
"British management thought developed slowly over the best 
part of a half-century. It grew confident in the utility 
of its constantly repeated themes, and their demise within 
the space of a decade at ~e hand of social scientists 
represents a revolution." 3 
With the rapid development of management education during the 
same period, these debates reached an increasingly wide audience. 64 
Wheatcroft notes that: 
"Sociologists, psychologists and political scientists have 
been contributing research and new theories about the 
relationships between social and political groups, between 
individuals within the group and the motivation both of 
individuals and of people working together in groups, all 
of which have a considerable bearing on the problems of 
the manager."65 
Her book concerns the increasingly close relationship between 
institutes of higher education and management education. 
So V. L. Allen may be right in part when he states that "a list 
of the academic subscribers to the convention of industrial harmony 
66 would be a very long list indeed containing many illustrious names." 
But only in part: since the 1950s academic researchers have been 
at the forefront of establishing the recognition that conflict is an 
integral part of the enterprise: 
" ••• the legitimate expectations of labour and of 
management belong to those which are inevitably in 
conflict. Management can legitimately expect that 
labour will be available at a price which permits a 
reasonable margin for investment, and labour can 
legitimately expect that the level of real wages will 
not only be maintained, but steadily increased. 
Management can claim a legitimate interest in obtain-
ing for each job the most qualified worker available, 
and labour can claim a legitimate interest in obtain-
ing a job for each worker who is unemployed •••• "67 
And such realisations lead to the fourth condition for pluralism: 
that effective, formal rules - procedures - are established for the 
joint regulation of disputes. Such procedures have existed, through 
collective bargaining, between employers and unions for a century or 
more. But this point brings us a full circle: pluralism begins to 
disintegrate if the procedures are not respected. During the 1950s 
it was felt more and more that existing procedures were in a state 
of collapse, and needed strengthening. It was largely for this 
reason that academias began to research the system and put forward 
solutions; 68 the Donovan Report was the logical culmination of this 
process. The key question is, however: if the system is based on 
conflict, why should the parties adhere to rules which allegedly 
bind them? This question, with its sociological underpinnings, forms 
the theme of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
We ended the last chapter by noting that the development of 
pluralist thought depends on four conditions: the effective organ-
ization of interest groups; freedom for them to operate; recognition 
of the reality and legitimacy of conflict; and the adherence by all 
parties concerned to clearly defined, formal rules of conflict 
resolution. These general conditions operate at various levels 
not only in national politics, but also within organizations, like 
industrial enterprises, where different interests compete. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, many of Britain's economic problems were being 
blamed on the industrial relations system, which led a particularly 
influential group of writers to suggest reforms based on a more 
thorough analysis of industrial relations in Britain than had been 
attempted by anyone before. 
This chapter sets out the development of these writers, 
especially in relation to the sociology informing their work and to 
a neo-Durkheimian critique of pluralism which gained ground in the 
1 1970s. The inadequacies of this critique themselves form an 
introduction to Chapter Three in which an analysis is presented based 
on endemic conflict. 
The 'Oxford School' 
The writers who have been most associated with the propagation 
and defence of pluralist ideas in industrial relations are sometimes 
collectively called the 'Oxford School 1 • 2 They include Clegg, the 
'early' Fox, Flanders and McCarthy. It is not always easy to identify 
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members of a 'school', but there are certain distinguishing aspects 
of these authors' works which are more or less present within the 
corpus of their writings like 'family resemblances•. 3 
First of all, the issues or topics which they identify for 
analysis. They show concern at certain problems which they consider 
dominant within British industrial relations. Principally, these 
are the three already mentioned in the previous chapter: the rise 
in number of unofficial strikes, wage drift and restrictive practices. 
The Donovan Report, by concentrating on these issues, represents the 
height of the pluralists' influence. As Goldthorpe points out: 
"The leading figures in the Oxford School were all in one way or 
another heavily involved in the affairs of the Commission". 4 
Secondly, their perspective or 'frame of reference'. They are 
committed to 'pluralism' both as an adequate description of the way 
in which the industrial relations system operates and also as a 
prescription of the way in which it should operate. In other words, 
they view 'pluralism' as a value to be defended in itself as well 
as portraying the institutional framework of industrial relations in 
Britain. 5 
Thirdly, their solutions. They are reformist and pragmatic. 
All have a keen sense of the gradualism implicit in the development 
of British politics in general and the industrial relations system 
in particular, and put forward solutions which do not radically 
challenge the existing order. Their emphasis is on re-establishing 
a new value consensus and social order, both within the enterprise 




It is important to note that these three aspects of the work 
of the 'Oxford School' combine together to form a coherent pattern. 
A pluralist is bound to consider certain features of an institution 
threatening if they appear to damage the smooth functioning of 
conflict resolution. In this case, an alteration in the balance 
of power - towards the shop floor - appears to upset the system (that 
is, adherence to industry-wide agreements negotiated between employers' 
representatives and unions). An industrial relations problem is 
defined as a development which tilts such a power balance. Being 
pragmatic, the pluralist does not - unlike the unitarist - attempt 
to coerce the unions into a more "reasonable" mould. Instead, reforms 
are put forward to establish a new consensus, one in which power is 
once again more equitably shared. So it is, for example, that 
productivity bargaining and job evaluation are designed to eliminate 
restrictive practices, whilst Government Commissions are designed to 
promote voluntary acceptance of new methods of conflict resolution -
such as making companies publicly accountable for their industrial 
relations practices, incomes policies and so on. 
There are several articles which succinctly put forward the 
liberal pluralist position: one is by Allan Flanders,7 and another 
is by Flanders and Alan Fox.8 Hugh Clegg, in his 1974 Introduction 
to the book in which these and other essays are collected, stated of 
Flanders that: "for him, it was not trade unions but the processes 
of collective bargaining that held the_key to understanding the 
industrial relations system ••••" He added, of the two essays cited: 
"These were the two most important contributions to the 
theory of collective bargaining that had appeared for 
many years; and no one has significantly advanced the 
theory since he wrote. Consequently everyone who sets 
out to understand the subject today must reckon with 
these two essays, whether to build on them or to refute 
them. 11 9 
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In addition to these two, there is a third article by Flanders 
which was written as a submission to the Donovan Commission.
10 
Bain has written of it: 
" ••• as the Research Director of the Donovan Commission 
has pointed out, 'it is true to say that this was the 
only piece of written evidence that made a significant 
impact on their thinking. Virtually all their worthwhile 
ideas for reforming industrial relations appear in some 
form in his submission' ••• "11 
These three articles, taken together, do provide an insight 
into the prevalent thinking about industrial relations by the 'Oxford 
School'. The first analyses the notion of collective bargaining, 
and concludes that it is a rule-making process based on the power 
relations between unions and employers; the second looks at the 
fragmentation of these rule-making processes in the 1950s and 1960s 
and concludes that the present system is characterised by 'anomie' or 
normlessness; and the third puts forward a series of solutions in an 
attempt to rectify the perceived problem. 
Flanders' Theoretical Analysis 
Flanders objects to the Webbs' account of collective bargaining. 
According to him, they believed that collective bargaining arose 
through the realisation by workmen that combining together allowed 
them to control competitio~ amongst themselves for a job. Whilst 
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some individuals were more willing than others to settle for lower 
wages or poorer conditions, employers were able to 'divide and rule' 
and thereby exploit labour. However, if workers organized them-
selves in trades, they could stand against the employer by relying 
on their collective strength to force better terms of employment. 
Over time,_ as unions grew, the geographical areas covered by 
collective bargaining grew as well - from the shop-floor to the 
district, from the district to the region, and finally to the entire 
industry. "In short, for the Webbs, collective bargaining was 
exactly what the words imply: a collective equivalent and alternative 
to individual bargaining."12 
Flanders makes a minor and a major criticism of such a view. 
The minor one is that it ignores any positive advantages which the 
employers might have derived from the development of collective 
bargaining, by assuming that it was forced on them through the threat 
of sanctions, like strikes. 
The major one is that collective bargaining is not, paradox-
ically, collective bargaining. Defining 'bargaining' as the method 
by which the opposing interests of buyer and seller are eventually 
settled culminating in an exchange, Flanders maintains quite 
correctly that such a definition - in industrial relations - accords 
only with specific, individual bargains concluded between an employer 
and an employee in the labour market. The institution usually called 
'collective bargaining' on the other hand in fact secures agreements 
between employers and employees on how to regulate a whole series of 
questions relating to employment - primarily on wages and conditions. 
His first main point, then, is that: 
"Thus collective bargaining is itself essentially a rule-
making process, and this is a feature which has no proper 
counterpart in individual bargaining. 11 13 
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Collective bargaining, therefore, regulates, but does not replace 
individual bargaining, which continues either in a looser or stricter 
way, depending on circumstances, within the context of the rules 
established through collective bargaining. 
As a result of this, Flanders continues: 
"This brings us to the second truly characteristic feature 
of collective bargaining, apart from its being a ru.le-
making process, namely, that it is 'a power relationship 
between organizations."'" 14 
He then carefully differentiates economic from political power 
by countering the argument that the unions' chief function is to 
organize their economic strength - to work or not to work - to obtain 
their members' interests. He states that the strike sanction is not 
the collective equivalent of an individual's refusal to work: 
"The assumption behind every strike is not that the workers 
will seek employment elsewhere if the employer fails to 
meet their demands. It is the reverse: that sooner or 
later their present employer will be compelled to reinstate 
them. In the event of his being able to replace the 
strikers by an alternative labour supply, the strike ceases 
to be an effective sanction and turns into a futile gesture. 
A strike is therefore a temporary refusal to work in 
accordance with the prevailing employment contracts (or on 
other conditions that are not specified or implied in the 
contracts), combined with the firm intention, at least on 
the part of the great majority of the workers involved, of 
not terminating their contracts. 0 15 
Flanders therefore establishes that market behaviour (competition 
and bargaining) is quite different from industrial relations behaviour 
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(the negotiation of procedures and the use of industrial sanctions). 
For instance, full employment (Flanders was writing in 1967) means 
that enterprises must compete more keenly in the market for labour; 
as a result, union negotiators are less likely to have to use the 
strike threat to achieve their aims. 
The economic context, in this case full employment, can improve 
the bargaining position of workers because they become in short 
supply. However, the political activity, negotiation of wages and 
conditions, continues within the same procedures and rules as before, 
having been "jointly determined by representatives of employers and 
employees who consequently share responsibility for their contents 
and observance." 16 For this reason, Flanders prefers the term 
'joint regulation' to 'collective bargaining' (though he acknowledges, 
of course, how deeply rooted the latter term is) since the authorship 
of the rules has been undertaken by both sides of industry in agree-
ment. The administration of these rules is also a matter of joint 
responsibility in practice, he asserts, whether they are substantive 
or procedural. This means that all conflict resolution carried out 
through the normal procedures is also to be included under the rubric 
'collective bargaining', since the procedures used have also been 
jointly agreed. 
For Flanders, then, the political nature of collective bargain-
ing is the key feature of industrial relations and he emphasises its 
non-economic achievements: 
"The rules in collective agreements may also regulate such 
matters as dismissal, discipline, promotion or training 
which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be included 
under price. What is more, because they are rules 
defining rights (and obligations) they are a means of 
preventing favouritism, nepotism, victimisation and 
arbitrary discrimination of any sort. Thus one great 
accomplishment of collective bargaining has been its 
promotion of the 'rule of law' in employment relations. 
Far from being a change in the method of marketing labour, 
it has to be regarded as an institution freeing labour 
from being too much at the mercy of the market."17 
In support of his theory - that collective bargaining is 
political, rule-making activity - Flanders cites examples of non-
31. 
economic factors which influence the behaviour of employer and union 
negotiators; the need to preserve the credibility of the institution 
of collective bargaining by not making exaggerated demands; the 
prestige of the negotiating union in the eyes of its membership; 
social ideas about a 'living wage', and so on. All these factors 
shape the eventual, negotiated settlement. In addition, Flanders 
cites examples of types of non-economic conflict which may be resolved 
through collective bargaining: the closed shop, dismissals policy 
and security of employment. 
Finally, Flanders moves on to consider the scope of collective 
bargaining. Following Chamberlain, 18 he distinguishes three possible 
theories about its nature. First, that it is a means of negotiating 
the conditions of labour (similar to the Webbs' economic or market 
theory); secondly, that it is a type of industrial government (similar 
to a sort of constitution for industry); and thirdly, that it is a 
fonn of management (and constitutes an encroachment, or penetration, 
by the unions into unilateral management decision-ma.king). He 
recognises that the three theories can be seen to mirror different 
stages in the history of the evolution of collective bargaining, summing 
them up as follows: 
"One might say that, while the first theory draws attention 
to the trade union acting as a labour cartel in collective 
bargaining, the second sees it as introducing an autonomous 
and agreed rule of law into employer-employee relations, 
and the third stresses its contribution towards ma.king 
management more democratic or furthering industrial 
democracy. 0 19 
However, he rejects the first view for the reasons that he 
criticises the Webbs', and the second for being too restrictive in 
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stressing procedural rules at the expense of substantive ones. But 
the third, the "management theory", he finds the most satisfactory 
in the quest for a single account of collective bargaining because 
"a modern view of collective bargaining, then, must recognise that 
it is an institution for regulating labour management as well as 
labour markets."20 
This simply implies that the substantive issues covered by 
collective bargaining have expanded with the necessary development 
of procedures to match. For instance, collective agreements have 
curtailed management prerogative either by preventing some sorts of 
activity {e.g. excessive overtime); or by requiring rules to be 
followed over others {e.g. transfers, promotions); or by insisting 
that management acts only with the consent of the union {e.g. in areas 
of joint consultation). 
In these cases, he alleges that collective bargaining is the 
same as joint administration, which comes to the same as joint manage-
ment. This helps to explain why unions do not only represent the 
economic interests of their members, as the Webbs suggest. Rather, 
unions evolve their own institutional interests, in particular in 
relation to a need to survive, grow and achieve stable link~ with 
33. 
management and perhaps government. In addition, members view their 
union not simply as an instrument of economic rebalance in the face 
of employers, but also in terms of its ability to defend their status, 
security and ability to participate in the formulation of rules of 
collective bargaining. 
In summary, Flanders states his case as follows: 
"In the economic meaning of the word trade unions do not 
'bargain' with employers. They negotiate collective 
agreements with them to regulate bargaining and competition 
in labour markets, but also their own procedural arrange-
ments and, now increasingly, managerial relations arising 
out of the exercise of managerial authority within the firm. 
Since collective agreements represent a body of jointly 
agreed rules of varying degrees of precision or generality, 
and the process of negotiation in arriving at them is best 
conceived as a diplomatic use of power, trade unions operate 
primarily as political, not economic, institutions."21 
With this theory in mind, Flanders suggests elsewhere that there 
are three principles which characterise the traditional system of 
collective bargaining in Britain. First, priority is given to 
collective bargaining over other forms of job regulation such as uni-
lateral imposition of rules, tripartite regulation and state regulation. 
Secondly, priority is given to voluntary rather than compulsory 
procedural rules through the law. And thirdly, the parties to 
collective bargaining have concentrated more on procedural than on 
substantive rules - that is, they have tended to establish a framework 
of procedures to cope with problems as they arise rather than negotiate 
labour codes regulating, for instance, minimum wages, hours worked and 
22 so on. 
Such a system depends on trust and goodwill to operate smoothly. 
Evidence that the system was breaking down in the 1950s and 1960s 
resulted in the appointment of the Donovan Commission (1965-1968) 
to investigate employer/employee relations in their various forms. 
Flanders and Fox: From Donovan to Durkheim 
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The main findings of the Donovan Report are very familiar, but 
they hinge on the distinction between 'the two systems' of industrial 
relations - the 'formal' and the 'informal'. 
"The formal system assumes industry-wide organizations 
capable of imposing their decisions on their members. 
The informal system rests on the wide autonomy of 
managers in individual companies and factories, and the 
power of industrial work groups. 11 23 
The former system assumes industry-wide agreements covering a 
narrow range of issues, based on written codes. The latter system, 
on the other hand, gives prime importance to negotiations undertaken 
at factory or plant level, on a wide range of issues, based on custom 
and practice. The 'two systems' are in conflict - accepting the 
typology for the moment - since the informal one encourages: unofficial 
action in the face of established union machinery; an increasing gap 
between earnings negotiated on site and official rates negotiated for 
the industry; and fragmented bargaining leading to restrictive 
practices, which personnel management tolerates for the sake of short-
term advantage. 
The report observes gloomily: 
"Any suggestion that conflict between the two systems can be 
resolved by forcing the informal system to comply with the 
assumptions of the formal system should be set aside. 
Reality cannot be forced to comply with pretences. 1124 
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The unitary perspective is firmly set aside, and it is at this 
point that Flanders and Fox 'step in', as it were, to accomplish two 
ends. One is to analyse the problem in sociological terms and the 
other is to present solutions on the basis of such an analysis. 
Rejecting the popular belief that excessive union power is to 
blame for the failings of collective bargaining, Flanders and Fox 
claim that the case for reform is summarised in Durkheim's concept 
of 'anomie' which describes: 
" ••• a state of normlessness resulting from a breakdown in 
social regulation. The concept can be elaborated and 
refined in many different ways~ For our present purposes 
we will argue that the social conditions which he (Durkheim) 
characterised as a state of normlessness may be produced by 
an excessive proliferation of different normative systems 
which are unrelated and divergent. 11 25 
The authors maintain that industrial relations systems are all 
normative systems which regulate employment relations. In Bri taiz1, 
the main characteristics of this normative system, as outlined above, 
are found in the primacy accorded to collective bargaining, the notion 
of voluntarism and an emphasis on uncodified procedures. 
These principles - like any normative system in general -
"provide a framework of comparisons and constraints within which 
otherwise unlimited aspirations can be shaped with some concern for 
social proportion. 11 26 Social order, the bedrock of society and its 
subsystems, depends, it is claimed, on such a framework. 
In some circumstances, of course, aspirations may outstrip the 
chances of their satisfaction. Conflict remains latent if the group 
with the aspirations in question lacksthe power to mobilise: but it 
36. 
becomes manifest if the group is able to mobilise for whatever 
reason. In this case, compromise may be reached over what adjust-
ment is necessary in prevailing norms. In an important passage, 
the authors declare that whilst a complete consensus on values is 
not implied by this adjustment: 
"Clearly the agreement to compromise expresses at the very 
least a consensus that the game should continue, and be 
played moreover according to certain rules. But within 
this procedural consensus, different groups may reach 
normative compromise on substantive issues while still 
retaining normative aspirations which markedly diverge. 11 27 
Collective bargaining, in its political dimension stressed by 
Flanders, is the medium for such re-negotiation of procedure and 
consensus. 
However, changes in power relations may become so great that the 
normative system - collective bargaining - is unable to deal with the 
•extra conflict'. According to Fox and Flanders, there may be four 
sources of such conflict: one group may unilaterally try to alter 
the procedural norms (e.g. when unions first attempted to enforce 
bilateral negotiation on employers in the 19th century); or one group 
may unilaterally try to alter the substantive norms (e.g. if an 
employer cuts wages without notice); or if one group has normative 
aspirations which lack regulatory procedures for fulfilment (e.g. a 
union's impatience with an industry negotiated wage-rate in a profit-
able company which could pay more); or if there is a splintering and 
breakdown of existing regulative systems. This might take place if 
larger units of regulation, like industries, are replaced by many 
smaller units, like plants, which fragment in an ml.controlled fashion. 
Overall, the maintenance of order becomes a problem since different 
groups establish different sets of aspirations, and a multitude of 
normative systems grow up to deal with them: 
"An excessive proliferation of normative systems can 
therefore produce social consequences that are similar to 
those resulting from the absence of any norms to regulate 
conflict. Both situations can be seen in terms of a 
breakdown of social regulation. Both can be described 
in terms of Durkheim's characterisation of anomie. 11 28 
37. 
The reasons for this include economic competition by employers 
over labour resulting in the bidding up of earnings; unions out-
bidding one another in competition for membership; and increased 
demands from the shop-floor as the result of full employment -
different groups of wage-earners compete increasingly amongst them-
selves for comparative advantage in pay settlements. 
Full employment and competition along a series of dimensions, 
the authors maintain, have created just such disconnected normative 
systems within British industry, each one sometimes covering no more 
than a plant-wide agreement. They quote Durkheim with approval: 
" ••• the strongest succeed in completely demolishing the 
weakest, or in subordinating them. But if the conquered, 
for a time, must suffer subordination under compulsion, 
they do not consent to it, and consequently this cannot 
constitute a stable equilibrium. Truces, arrived at after 
violence, are never anything but provisional, and satisfy 
no one. Human passions stop only before a moral power 
they respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting, 
the law of the strongest prevails, and latent or active, 
the state of war is necessarily chronic. 11 29 
The clear implication is that a new moral order is required, 
given that: 
"Fragmentation today is the cause and effect of disorder 
of a highly visible kind which is regarded as serious by 
many opinion groups with otherwise little in common. 
Its economic effects are palpable; much of the disorder 
emerging as overt conflict, dislocation and inflation. 1130 
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Indeed, the authors do pay much attention to the reconstruction 
of a new, normative order to overcome this fragmentation and they 
clearly recognise the problems: established interests feel 
threatened by reform; old ideologies still justify outworn forms 
of behaviour; and most importantly, what forms of 'normative order' 
can be set up to create social order within the company or plant? 
The fullest answers to this question Flanders gave in his 
evidence to the Donovan Commission. They are pragmatic, in that 
they "are all concerned in one way or another with the future of 
collective bargaining. 11 31 They include productivity agreements 
and job evaluation to be introduced at shop-floor level; a new labour 
tribunal to cope with problems concerning union recognition and 
procedures; a degree of legal enforcement for the substantive parts 
of collective agreements; state regulation to oversee voluntarism; 
and incomes policy to set collective bargaining within the context of 
national planning. We can readily observe many of these features in 
the development of British industrial relations during the late 1960s 
and 1970s. 
A Critique of Flanders 
A number of questions now arise about this approach. First of 
all, what are Durkheim's views on solidarity, and does Flanders 
represent them accurately? And if, as it turns out, Flanders is 
accurate as far as he goes, then secondly, how selective is his use 
of Durkheim's work? Does he choose to ignore any aspects of Durkheim's 
analysis which could damage the validity of pluralist assumptions? 
And if, as it again turns out, Flanders has ignored such aspects, then 
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thirdly, what consequences does this have for pluralism? How 
possible is it for Durkheimian analysis in its entirety to serve as 
the basis for pluralism? 
The rest of this chapter looks at each of these three questions 
in turn. 
1. Durkheim and Flanders on Solidarity 
In "The Division of Labour in Society", Durkheim is concerned 
to analyse the sources of consensus within society; what holds it 
together. Indeed, Lukes has described him as "haunted by the idea of 
man and society in disintegration".32 For this purpose, Durkheim 
makes the classic distinction between two forms of solidarity, the 
'mechanical' and the 'organic'. Broadly speaking, these exist in 
traditional and advanced societies respectively: 
"If there is one' rule of conduct which is incontestable, 
it is that which orders us to realise in ourselves the 
essential traits~ of the collective type. Among lower 
peoples, this reaches its greatest rigour."33 
In traditional societies, the "essential traits" become established 
in a tightly knit body of moral and ideological beliefs which Durkheim 
terms the "collective conscience". He maintains that the main role 
of punishment - repressive sanctions - is to defend the collective 
conscience against any actions liable to threaten its binding and 
authoritative nature. Such is 'mechanical solidarity'. 
However, with the advent of industrialisation, the collective 
conscience tends to lose its force because of the developing division 
of labour which affects not only economic and market relations but also 
the whole range of social functions: politics, the law, education, 
administration and so on. Under these conditions: 
" ••• The categorical imperative of the moral conscience 
is assuming the following form: Make yourself usefully 
fulfill a determinate function. 11 34 
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A different form of solidarity - 'organic solidarity' - should 
then emerge to prevent the break-up of society. As links with 
tradition, religion and family splinter: 
''Man would no longer be sufficiently obligated; he would 
no longer feel about and above him this salutary pressure 
of society which moderates his egoism and makes him a moral 
being. This is what gives moral value to the division of 
labour. Through it, the individual becomes cognisant of his 
dependence upon society; from it come the forces which keep 
him in check and restrain him. In short, since the division 
of labour becomes the chief source of social solidarity, it 
becomes, at the same time, the foundation of the moral 
order. 11 35 
So it is that advanced societies are characterised by the growth 
of civil law and 'restitutive' sanctions designed to regulate social 
interaction where formality is necessary. A claim of damages, for 
instance, is intended to restore the relationships between the two 
parties to the position before the law was transgressed. Contractual 
relationships are central to 'organic' societies. 
The difference between the two types of moral consensus is well 
summarised by Giddens: 
"Where mechanical solidarity is the main basis of societal 
cohesion, the conscience collective 'completely envelops' 
the individual consciousness, and therefore presumes identity 
between individuals. Organic solidarity, by contrast, pre-
supposes not identity but difference between individuals in 
their beliefs and actions. The growth of organic solidarity 
and the expansion of the division of labour are hence 
associated with increasing individualism. 1136 
Of course, Durkheim does not suggest that commonly held beliefs 
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in advanced societies disappear altogether - they simply lose their 
primary role in creating and maintaining the moral consensus. As 
societies industrialise and develop, people's functions bring them 
into certain types of social interaction which gradually evolve 
regular patterns: these regular patterns over time become rigidified 
into rules of conduct - or regulative norms - which operate at various 
levels, for instance, legal, professional and so on. Acceptance of 
this moral ordering of society allows individuals to locate themselves 
within a stable normative structure which provides the basis of social 
consensus. 
It is easy, at this stage, to see the relationship between Flanders 
and Durkheim. Flanders, at subsystem level, stresses the same features 
of social organization that Durkheim stresses at societal level: 
regular patterns of interaction establish normative systems; in such a 
way potentially unlimited aspirations are moulded and given priority 
through the development of institutions; and so divergent interests 
are reconciled through the agents' acceptance of the procedures designed 
to resolve them. Other writers besides Flanders have explicitly pointed 
out analogies between the industrial relations system and the social 
system: 
"An industrial relations system creates an ideology or 
commonly shared body of ideas and beliefs regarding the inter-
action and roles of the actors which helps to bind the systems 
together ••• The ideology of the industrial relations system 
comes to bear a close relation to the ideology of the 
particular industrial society of which it is a subsystem. 11 37 
It must also be pointed out that Durkheim's notion of 'anomie' is 
well represented in the quotations already cited from Flanders. For 
Durkheim, the normal state of advanced societies was one of order based 
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on organic solidarity, which created a taken-for-granted acceptance of 
certain rules and procedures regulating social interaction. These 
rules are shared by all members of society who internalise them through 
the processes of socialisation. Anomic behaviour is associated with a 
break-down of such rules. 
The originality of Flanders lies in having adapted the work of a 
19th century French sociologist concerned with social disintegration 
to throw light on the practical problems of 20th century British 
industrial relations theorists concerned with "shop-floor" power. At 
this point, then, no violence seems to have been done to Durkheim in 
terms of accuracy of concept. However, criticism can be levelled at 
Flanders for ignoring a major element in Durkheim's thought and thereby 
de-radicalising his intentions, in particular over the preconditions 
necessary for establishing social consensus.38 
2. Durkheim and Flanders on Equality of Opportunity 
In Section III of his book, Durkheim investigates the "Abnormal 
Forms" of the division of labour. It is here that he puts forward 
the notion of anomie not only in descriptive but also in analytical 
terms: 
"Since a body of rules is the definite form which spontaneously 
established relations between social functions take in the 
course of time, we can say, a priori, that the state of anom.y (sic) 
is impossible wherever solidary organs are sufficiently in 
contact or sufficiently prolonged."39 
The questions which now arise are: what are "spontaneously 
established relations between social functions"? And nnder what 
circumstances does such spontaneity arise or not? These are not the 
same questions posed by Flanders (pp.35-8) - he considers the circum-
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stances under which "healthy" social interaction, once established, 
breaks down. Durkheim is here asking for the conditions or the 
assumptions under which organic solidarity arises in the first place. 
It is this point that Flanders ignores. 
In an important passage, Durkheim states: 
" ••• the division of labour produces solidarity only if it 
is spontaneous and in proportion as it is spontaneous. 
But by spontaneity we must understand not simply the absence 
of all express violence, but also of everything that can 
even indirectly shackle the free unfolding of the social 
force that each carries in himself. It supposes, not only 
that individuals are not relegated to determinate functions 
by force, but also that no obstacle, of whatever nature, 
prevents them from occupying the place in the social frame-
work which is compatible with their faculties. 1140 
The crucial issue is, of course, what Durkheim means by the kind 
of "obstacle, of whatever nature" which can hinder spontaneity - that 
is, prevent people's occupation of those social positions which are 
in line with their capacities - and with it, the evolution of organic 
solidarity. 
He distinguishes, first of all, between "social" inequalities 
and "natural" ones. Under conditions of perfect spontaneity, social 
inequalities should correspond exactly with natural ones (which are 
left undefined). No "external causes" should affect the role which 
natural inequalities play in leading a person to carry out the social 
function to which he is best suited. 
So, equality of opportunity is Durkheim's central condition for 
the emergence of organic solidarity. In addition, there is an 
allusion to the notion of redistributive justice to ensure that 
"external causes" do not impinge on the operation of spontaneity.; 
"It consists, not in a state of anarchy which would permit 
men freely to satisfy all their good or bad tendencies, 
but in a subtle organization in which each social value, 
being neither overestimated nor underestimated by anything 
foreign to it, would be judged at its true worth."41 
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However, Durkheim admits that such a condition exists nowhere as 
a "realised fact", and proceeds to list those features of society 
which count. as "external" constraints on spontaneity. Examples he 
gives include a closed career structure and the persistence of customs 
and prejudices whereby "a certain distinction is attached to some 
individuals, a certain lack of distinction attached to others, regard-
less of merit. 1142 
Perhaps the most interesting feature he mentions, though, is the 
question of wealth. Having noted that the suppression of conflict 
rather than its expression constitutes the real threat to spontaneity, 
he observes: 
" ••• even where there remains no vestige of the past, 
hereditary transmission of wealth is enough to make the 
external conditions under which the conflict takes place 
very unequal, for it gives advantages to some which are 
not necessarily in keeping with their personal worth. 1143 
This hereditary transmission of wealth must depend on the owner-
ship of private property. It now becomes obvious that, for 
deductive reasons, the question of private property must become 
central for Durkheim. We have seen that, according to-him, the 
division of labour produces organic solidarity only when it is 
spontaneous. In turn, spontaneity refers to the perfect freedom 
which members of society must enjoy for their occupation of social 
positions commensurate with their capacities. Such freedom never, 
in fact, exists, because of certain social constraints - the 
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"hereditary transmission of wealth" being one such important example. 
As societies develop, and depend increasingly for their cohesion on 
organic solidarity, then it must follow for Durkheim that a major 
reason for their inability to establish a normative consensus lies 
in the unequal distribution of ownership and wealth within them. 
For him, as. traditional social ties loosen their hold in advanced 
societies, and society itself loses the transcendent quality it 
appeared to have in the "lower societies", social organization also 
loses its integrative nature: 
"That is why, in organized sC!>cieties, it is indispensable 
that the division of labour be more and more in harmony 
with this ideal of spontaneity that we have just defined. 
If they (organized societies) bend all their efforts, and 
must so bend them, to doing away with external inequalities 
as far as possible, that is not only because enterprise is 
good, but because their ve existence is involved in the 
problem. For they can maintain themselves only if e 
parts of which they are formed are solidary, and solidarity 
is possible only under this condition."44 
However important progress towards justice has been in the past, 
Durkheim concludes that "it gives, in all likelihood, only a small 
idea of what will be realised in the future."45 These passages show 
the importance that Durkheim attaches to genuine equality of opportunity 
in advanced societies, a side to his work not apparent in Flander's 
adaptation. 
But there is more. We have already seen that contractual oblig-
ations are an integral element in the concept of "organic solidarity". 
Durkheim himself is well aware that private property, as well as 
hindering spontaneity, also influences the balance of power in the 
settlement of contracts. If the parties to negotiation cannot call 
on equal access to resources, then the stronger may be able to oblige 
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the weaker to submit to a solution irrespective of its fairness. The 
weaker may become desperate to settle at all costs as time progresses 
if, for instance, negotiations disrupt earning power, whilst the 
stronger may be able to hold out indefinitely if, for instance, the 
ownership of wealth allows a living irrespeotive of any disruption 
caused by negotiations. The inheritance of wealth is simply a device 
whereby the stronger party is historically able to maintain its 
superior privileges. Durkheim himself writes: 
"(There exists one class) which in order to live has to make 
its services acceptable to the other at whatever the cost; 
the other class, which can do without these services, because 
it can call upon certain resources, which may, however, not 
be equal to the services rende=ed by those who have them to 
offer. Therefore, as long as such sharp class differences 
exist in society, fairly effective palliatives may lessen 
the injustice of contracts; but in principle, the system 
operates in conditions which do not allow of justice. It 
is not only to cover certain particular points that 'lion's 
share' contracts can be entered into, but the contract 
represents the 'lion's share' system as far as any relations 
of the two classes are concerned."46 
Flanders does not consider this point in his three classic 
articles; private property affects both the degree of solidarity 
that may develop in an advanced society, as well as the justice, or 
lack of it, inherent in the contracts which regulate behaviour within 
it. For this reason we can fairly object to his selective reading 
of Durkheim. 
At this point, we can usefully summarise the main arguments in 
Fla.nder's work in relation to their derivation from Durkheim. For 
Flanders, industrial relations are based on a normative system which 
regulates the relationships between employer and employee. For 
Durkheim, organic solidarity evolves in advanced societies owing to 
the increased interdependence of function resulting from the division 
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of labour. It is for this reason that both writers see forms of 
deviant behaviour as a problem. Neither is at all self-conscious 
over imposing his own definitions on behaviour; Flanders, for 
instance, does not consider the possibility that the "informal" 
industrial relations system may well work strongly to the advantage 
of shop-flo~r workers who would resent attempts to control it from 
above. Durkheim, in a similar way, states that " ••• like all social 
facts, and more generally, all biological facts, (the division of 
labour) presents pathological forms which must be analysed. 1147 The 
analogy of a social system with a biological one leads to little or 
no attention being paid to the acto1s' own self-perceptions. This is 
a criticism we return to later. 
However, a divergence occurs at this stage between the writers. 
Flanders maintains that there had been consensual agreement on 
procedures within the industrial relations system but that it had since 
disintegrated owing to the emergence of what the Donovan Report calls 
the "informal" system. Durkheim, on the other hand, maintains that 
consensual agreements based on contractual solidarity carmot emerge 
without perfect equality of opportunity. To the extent to which this 
does not exist - owing in particular to inequality of wealth - then 
neither does solidarity. Durkheim, then, views property ownership 
and class relations as a problem. His analysis is more plausible 
than Flanders'; nowhere does Flanders consider the possibility that 
unequal, structural power relationships in society might influence the 
kind of procedural or substantive agreements over which unions, for 
instance, are able to bargain collectively. He never poses the 
question: what is the balance of power between the parties negotiating? 
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Still less does he analyse 'power' in any depth or ask what ~ of 
management/labour relations are possible within the existing structure 
of industry. 
Durkheim is at least bothered by this sort of issue, and in the 
remaining part of this chapter we look at the development of a neo-
Durkheimian· critique of Flanders and the Donovan approach put forward 
in the later work of Alan Fox. Fox explicitly takes into account 
class relationships and power imbalances - though outside a Marxist 
framework. The question which remains, then, is how successful can 
an attempt be to admit the ownership of property and class analysis 
into the pluralist framework. 
3. Fox's Neo-Durkheimian Critigue of the 'Oxford School' 
Before continuing, it is necessary to recap the identifying 
features of the 'Oxford School' which we listed at the beginning of 
this chapter. We noted then that the 'Oxford School' defined certain 
issues or topics as problems and as a result tended to ignore the 
agents' own perceptions of the phenomena - for example, the fact that 
workers do not necessarily agree that 'restrictive practices' are 
harmful. The 'Oxford School' is also fully committed to the pluralist 
perspective or frame of reference when analysing industrial relations, 
and puts forward solutions to industrial relations problems in a 
refonnist, pragmatic mould. We also noted that these three aspects 
of the 'Oxford School's' work are mutually reinforcing: a problem is 
whatever upsets the balance between the pluralist partners and must 
be dealt with within the context of the existing system. 
The effect of Fox's later work is to broaden the range of issues 
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considered as problems; in particular, he is interested in the nature 
of work organization itself and how it can be made more fulfilling. 
In addition, his critique of pluralism - made in quasi-Marxist terms 
shows an acute awareness of the limitations of its perspectives. 
However, his solutions appear incongruous in that they remain firmly 
reformist. They do not seem to follow very easily from his analysis 
of industrial relations under advanced capitalism; for instance, his 
appeal to management for reform seems to ignore their ideological 
role within the economic structure which he otherwise so clearly 
illustrates. Below, we examine the development of Fox's thought under 
the three headings: issues, perspectives and solutions. 
(i) Issues 
It is worth pointing out that Fox's contribution to Donovan was 
not a technical one; his paper48 was concerned with theory - "frames 
of reference" and the "structural determinants of behaviour at work" -
and their relationship to problems in industrial relations. He was, 
then, never directly concerned - as were, for instance, McCarthy,49 
Marsh50 and Bain51 - with the more narrowly defined issues defined 
by Donovan as problems. Perhaps for this reason it was easier for 
his theoretical scope to widen. His later work is concerned, broadly 
and historically, with "the gathering speed of an ever-widening human 
impulse towards an enhancement of individual life and experience. 11 52 
In particular, what interests him is the way in which authority is 
increasingly questioned and collective strength mobilised "not through 
convulsive and spontaneous gestures of revolt but through. organized 
and calculated pressure on the policy-makers."53 
Fox is concerned to widen the issues of investigation: 
"Those who try to deepen their lm.derstanding (of human 
motivation and response) may be tempted to reduce the 
problem by confining their attention to what goes on 
within the organization itself ••• Attention becomes 
focused on the organization alone, to the exclusion of 
the wider society in which it is embedded. Th.is 
exclusion is fatal for a full lmderstanding of the 
issues involved ••• Organizational issues, conflicts and 
values are inextricably bound up with those of society 
at large. 11 54 
Social factors like the family, class, peer groups, local 
environment and the media exert an influence on aspirations which 
transcend the influence of the organization alone. This helps to 
explain, of course, the origin of the diverse perspectives towards 
the enterprise which co-exist within it amongst its participants: 
as a team, career structure, means of earning a living, and so on. 
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It is within this context that Fox elaborates his views on work 
organization. Unlike the Donovan Commission - which considered the 
"informal" industrial relations system as something to be controlled -
Fox is interested in why the problem arises in the first place, that 
is, why some groups within an enterprise identify themselves with its 
goals (and so see themselves as trusted), and why others do not (the 
"informal" system). Fox points out that in the running of an enter-
prise, many decisions must be taken - about the enterprise's 
objectives, the means of achieving them, marginal distribution of 
rewards and so on. The company trusts those groups involved in 
making such decisions, and tends to distrust those groups not so 
involved. 
"In the creation of these categories (i.e. the trusted 
and the non-trusted), and in the changes which they 
generate, power is the essential agency. Power enables 
the few to minimize their dependence on the many. It 
enables the few to minimize the discretion of the many in 
the making of decisions deemed by the few to be important 
for their purposes. 11 55. 
The "few" refers to management, and the "many" refers to the 
work-force: 
"The absence of commitment or moral involvement which the 
manager so often deplores in the lower ranks of the 
organization is, in considerable measure, a consequence 
of the low-discretion roles that he and his forerunners 
have designed for them and for earlier generations of 
employees who have bequeathed their low expectations and 
responses to their children. 11 56 
For Fox, "low-discretion roles" comprise five elements: the 
role occupant sees himself as distrusted by his superiors to carry 
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out tasks properly; he is therefore subjected to close supervision; 
his activities are highly co-ordinated with others through rules and 
routines; failures are assumed to result from disobedience and 
therefore elicit closer supervision or punishment, or both; and 
conflict is dealt with on a group basis through bargaining. On the 
other hand, "high-discretion roles" involve the opposite of these 
elements, following from the occupant's self-pereeived trust relation-
ship with his superiors. As a result, there ensues a reliance on 
self-discipline and responsibility in the performance of duties. 
The central concept in this, then, is "trust". So: 
" ••• we are referring to the perceptions men have of the 
trust reposed in their behaviour, as it is expressed and 
embodied in the rules and relations which others seek to 
impose on them •••• We follow Zand in using trust to mean 
'not a global feeling of warmth or affection, but the 
conscious regulation of one's dependence on another' •••• 
Trust used in this sense is compatible with personal 
dislike of the person trusted; distrust with personal 
liking and respect for him. 11 57 
Using this as a frame of reference, Fox analyses - using a wealth 
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of secondary sources - the dynamics which have led increasingly to 
low-trust relationships, with the focus on work organization as the 
key. The trend observable in advanced capitalist societies "towards 
extreme differentiation and specialisation of function ••• squeezes 
out the reciprocal diffuseness of obligations which is the necessary 
condition o~ high-trust relations. 
to economic exchange. 1158 
It is the movement from social 
The sociological underpinnings of Fox's work - its own frame of 
reference (broadly, social action theory), and its scope as an analysis 
of work organization - prevent a narrow identification of problems. It 
represents in this respect a break from the 'Oxford School' because it 
looks behind the notion of a problem. Fox investigates both how 
problems come to be defined as such and the self-perceptions of the 
agents involved. 
(ii) Perspectives 
However, Fox's split from the 'Oxford School' is most pronounced 
in his critique of its perspectives. This critique he presents in a 
variety of forms. 
First of all, the 'harmony' which pluralism claims to generate 
in reference to management/union relations - according to Fox takes 
place between unequal partners. Work group or union representatives: 
" ••• have already been socialized, indoctrinated, and 
trained by a multiplicity of influences to accept and 
legitimize most aspects of their work situation; a 
situation designed in the light of the values and 
purposes of the major power holders."59 
Fox's point is similar to the one already attributed to Durkheim -
that contractual arrangements between unequal partners are not 
valid: 
"Given a consciousness of bargaining under duress, what 
happens to the moral obligation to observe agreements 
'freely and honourably negotiated'? Those who feel 
coerced feel no obligation. 1160 
This Fox concludes after a description of the nature of the 
power relations between the two sides of industry, raising a question 
which is discussed at length in the next chapter - the way in which 
power often operates in a 'non-observable' manner. Social condit-
ioning leads workers' representatives to accept the main organizational 
structure of negotiations before they even begin. Therefore, marginal 
adjustments can be made through collective bargaining or productivity 
bargaining, for instance, which leave totally untouched the principle 
of hierarchical rewards or the concept of efficiency. 
"By accepting this definition of 'problems', those working 
with a pluralist framework implicitly accept the master 
institutions, principles, and assumptions of the status quo 
as non-problematical. In doing so, they add their 
professional status, personal prestige, and influential 
involvement in public policy making to the forces and 
influences which lead subordinate groups to continue seeing 
the status quo as legitimate, inevitable, unchangeable, 
'only to be expected', subject only to changes at the 
margin. 11 61 
This last criticism appears to be a very direct criticism of the 
'Oxford School'. The point is that those employees who do see through 
the operation of power relations will not feel morally bound by 
decisions made within their ambit, but will simply accept them on 
pragmatic grounds because of the sense of "overwhelming odds" against 
them. This is clearly not the basis for the consensus that pluralists 
must assume for their system to function. 
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So, the fact of unequal power relations - albeit at times 
'invisibly' - and their consequent effect on the binding quality of 
contracts suggests that pluralism and its apparent stress on equality 
is a managerial ideology aimed primarily at gaining the work-force's 
consent. Fox bolsters this argument by pointing out that pluralists 
treat non-conformers - those who do not accept the procedures designed 
to resolve conflict - as eccentrics or subversives; this view, he 
maintains, betrays the pluralists' underlying interest in upholding 
social consensus - and with it power inequalities - at the expense of 
giving adequate representation to the views and demands of the non-
conformers. 
These criticisms of the ideological leanings of pluralism are 
not, of course, Fox's alone. Playford, for example, in a useful 
synthesizing article sums up three such arguments from the literature 
on pluralism as a political creed. 
The first criticism attacks the "balance of power" theory: 
11An approximate equality is said to be maintained between 
business and labour, but the fact that labour constitutes 
the overwhelming majority of the population is not seen as 
a reason for allocating influence in proportion to relative 
numbers. 11 62 
Furthermore, many groups in society - like consumers, non-unionised 
labour and immigrants - are either not organized at all, or only poorly 
so and hence are unable to have their interests represented very 
effectively in the political process in any case. 
The second argument - 11 the limits of pluralism" is an elabora-
tion of Fox's point on the invisibility of power: 
"The theory of pluralism in all its forms has the effect of 
discriminating not only against certain groups or interests, 
but against certain sorts of proposals for the solution of 
social problems •••• Pluralism does not acknowledge the 
possibility of wholesale reorganization of ••• society. 11 63 
55. 
It is able to banish certain sorts of solutions to problems from 
discussion because stability of the system is considered all important. 
This stance·led, as Playford notes, to the 'end of ideology' idea of 
the 1950s and 1960s. The notion of politics is reduced to peaceful 
competition between pressure groups to determine allocation of resources 
and privilege within the value consensus. 
The third argument - "the referee theory" - follows from the 
assumption that interest groups are equally represented in society, and 
sees the role of government as that of supervising and regulating the 
competition between those groups. Hence, governments pass pure food 
and drug acts and anti-monopoly legislation on the one hand, and even 
become involved in the internal operation of interest groups on the 
other - for example in providing funds for union elections. 
The criticism, of course, is that government's role is not neutral: 
" ••• this 'referee' function of government systematically 
favours the interests of the stronger against the weaker 
party in interest-group conflicts. By tending to solidify 
the power of those who already hold it, the government play~ 
a conservative, rather than a neutral role in ••• society." 4 
This is particularly the case with labour relations, and forms a 
basic part of Marxist analysis of government. In one classic state-
ment: 
"Whenever governments havefel t it incumbent, as they have 
done more and more, to intervene directly in disputes between 
employers and wage-earners, the result of their intervention 
has tended to be disadvantageous to the latter, not the 
former. On innumerable occasions, and in all capitalist 
countries, governments have played a decisive role in 
defeating strikes, often by the invocation of the coercive 
power of the state and the use of naked violence; and the 
fact that they have done so in the name of the national 
interest, law and order, constitutional government, the 
protection of 'the public', etc., rather than simply to 
support employers, has not made that intervention any the 
less useful to these employers. 0 65 
The government, as employer in nationalised industries and as 
conciliator and arbitrator in industrial disputes, can exert its 
influence in industrial relations both directly and indirectly. 
(iii) Solutions 
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It is this criticism of the pluralist ideology which leads us on 
to the third and final aspect of Fox's relationship with the 'Oxford 
School' - the kind of solutions he is able to suggest to overcome the 
crisis in industrial relations. 
Central to Flanders' work is the establishment of a new value 
consensus, in particular through state intervention (Flanders himself 
became a member of the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1969). 
Fox's views on government intervention have changed, however. 
he wrote: 
"If unions are to stand any chance of forcing management to 
yield a share in decision-making, however, their struggle 
and the methods used must be tolerated by society and the 
state. In the last resort, it is the values and norms, 
legal and otherwise, of the wider society which determine 
whether or not the collectivity is able to impose itself 
upon the organization's procedural system. 0 66 
In 1971 
No reference is made here to the institutional setting of such 
"values and norms". But by 1974: 
"The two major interest groups of capital and labour appear 
to have equal access to governments for supportive legis-
lation and, given the political pendulum which seems to 
award its favours alternately between the major parties, an 
approximation to rough justice is assured over the long 
term •••• {However) t'he legislative struggle takes place 
over measures designed to strengthen or weaken the ability 
of organized labour to challenge management only a~ the 
margins of the institutional structure of industry. '!61 
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The fundamentals of the structure - "hierarchy, subordination, 
extreme division of labour, labour as commodity and massive inequal-
ities of treatment".
68 - are left intact. 
It is clear, then, that Fox, unlike Flanders, is not likely to 
set much store by government interv&ntion. Yet Fox's own solutions 
do remain very muoh in the pluralist mould, as if, though bankrupt 
intellectually, pluralism still remains the 'best guide to action' in 
policy terms. 69 Fox claims that movement towards high-trust relations 
in industry would be worthwhile not only because it would develop 
greater satisfaction at work but also because it would allow more 
efficient adaptation to accelerating change. However, he is able to 
offer only exhortation as a means to illustrate to workers the benefits 
of high-trust relations (even though workers at present show no sign 
of interest in sacrificing extrinsic for intrinsic rewards from work 
if need be70), and education as a means to illustrate to management 
the choices facing it. Such education would consist in asking whether 
management finds social inequality morally offensive or not and dis-
covering whether for the purposes of simple expediency "a growing need 
for a readier rank-and-file response to management leadership" is likely 
to be forthcoming given social inequality "along all the important lines 
of life and experience. 11 71 
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There are several curious or incongruous aspects of such 
solutions. 
In the first place, Fox assumes that workers could be led to see 
the importance of work organization in their lives even at the expense 
of material well-being, though he offers no ideas on how such a change 
in attitude could be brought about. In other words, the development 
of high-trust relations is seen in a vacuum. Wood and Elliott point 
out with some plausibility that attempts to eradicate low-trust 
relations, if initiated by workers, will be seen as an attack by 
management, and if initiated by management would simply lead to further 
incorporation.72 There is now evidence for this view - which we 
examine in Chapter 11 - in the light of shop stewards' committees' 
experience with the development of alternative corporate plans. 
Fox himself gives only cursory treatment to the role that underlying 
economic control would play in the development of high-trust relations: 
"Public ownership is the necessary but certainly not the 
sufficient condition for any change in the primary object-
ives and methods of work organizations."73 
Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on how high-trust relations 
could be developed in public industry as a policy initiative. Instead, 
he still apparently holds on to the possibility of their growth in 
private U}dustry, thereby pre-supposing a value consensus - or "community" 
- which according to his own analysis does not exist. 
Finally, there is no reason to suggest that management would ever 
become convinced by the moral arguments for social equality. And if 
it did become convinced through expediency, then the power contexts in 
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which it continued to operate would, of course, remain the same; 
and it is these very power contexts which Fox himself criticises so 
trenchantly as the source of trouble. 
We must, then, conclude that Fox, despite a radicalisation of 
his views on issues and perspectives, retains a pluralist notion of 
a 'solution'. There is no suggestion on where the agency for change 
might be found; there is the lingering assumption of a value consensus 
in industry; and only fleeting reference is made on the role of public 
ownership in establishing high-trust relations. 
PART T W 0 
"Circus dogs jump when the trainer cracks his 
whip, but the really well-trained dog is the 
one that turns his somersault when there is 
no whip." 
George Orwell, "As I Please", Tribune, 7 July 
1944, quoted by Bernard Crick, George Orwell: 
a Life (London: Secker and Warburg, 1980), 
p.314. 
"People frequently do act on a mistaken diagnosis -
usually, perhaps, one too simple for the situation. 
Nothing is more likely to lead to bad political 
strategies than to misunderstand 'power', to mis-
perceive 'the power structure', for to be misled 
about 'power' is to be misled about the prospects 
and means of stability, change and revolution." 
R. A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1970), p.15. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Having now analysed the deficiencies of liberal pluralist theory 
and illustrated as well the weak points of Fox's neo-Durkheimian 
critique, we present in Part II the theoretical outline used to explain 
the development and significance of industrial democracy in the rest 
of the thesis. 
The major flaw of the 'Oxford School' is its failure to come to 
grips with power relations in industry. Even Fox, for example, seems 
to betray through his faith in exhortation and education a basic, 
continued belief in an industrial v~lue consensus. The emergence of 
high-trust relations seems to assume that both sides - in the wake of 
some ill-defined 'change of heart' - will come to believe in their 
necessity either for reasons of morality or expediency. The circum-
stances which might lead to such a change of heart (and Fox himself 
stresses the long-term historical trend against it) are not considered; 
he states that "men are faced with a choice, and that rational choice 
implies some lmowledge of the costs and benefits of the alternatives. 111 
Rational choice, though, implies a common set of assumptions which 
everyone adopts. As Bertrand Russell put it: 
"Reliance upon reason ••• assumes a certain community of 
interest and outlook between oneself and one's audience. 
It is true that ¥.trs. Bond tried it on her ducks, when she 
cried, 'come and be killed, for you must be stuffed and my 
customers filled'; but in general, the appeal to reason is 
thought ineffective with those whom we mean to devour. 11 2 
The principal task of this chapter is to show that many workers 
feel that they are about to be -'devoured' - which prevents there being 
a stable "community of interests" with management. Order in industrial 
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relations is maintained less through the establishment of a value 
consensus than through the suppression of an alternative set of beliefs 
which would allow workers to understand the structural origins of 
conflict on the shop-floor. 
Fox, Giddens and Lukes on Power 
In recent years, there has developed an important view of 'power' 
which has broken radically from pluralist assumptions. The following 
extract from Alan Fox is worth quoting at length as it shows awareness 
of this body of theory: 
" e•• this negotiation of order within the enterprise takes 
place only at the margins. Management and the interests do 
not jointly build their collaborative structure from the 
ground floor up. Power and social conditioning cause the 
employee interests to accept management's shaping of the main 
structure long before they reach the negotiating table. 
Thus the discussion may be about marginal adjustments in 
hierarchical rewards, but not the principle of hierarchical 
rewards; about certain practical issues connected with the 
prevailing extreme subdivision of labour, but not the 
principle of extreme subdivision of labour; about financial 
(extrinsic) rewards for greater efficiency, but not about 
the possibility of other types of (intrinsic) reward with 
some sacrifice of efficiency; about measures which may 
achieve company expansion and growth but not about the 
principle of company expansion and growth; about how the 
participant interests can protect and advance themselves 
within the structure operated by management to pursue its 
basic objectives, but not about the nature of those basic 
objectives. 11 3 
Here, we have two aspects of 'power' which are contrasted. First 
of all, workers' representatives may well be able to influence "marginal 
adjustments" in pay, conditions, productivity and so on. This influence 
can be observed every time that negotiations take place between manage-
ment and workers; the outcome reflects.a certain 'balance of power' 
between the two sides. However, Fox also emphasises the importance of 
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the second aspect of power that operates: "power and social 
conditioning cause the employee interests to accept management's 
shaping of the main structure long before they reach the negotiating 
table'-'. Though his terminology is a little confused - he seems to 
call only the operation of social conditioning 'power', leaving out 
of the definition the processes of marginal adjustments he gives 
examples of "the main structure" including "the principle of hier-
archical rewards", and "the principle of extreme subdivision of labour". 
Fox is discussing here industrial relations, but it is interesting 
to compare with that discussion Anthony Giddens' analysis of power at 
societal level. This analysis also contrasts 'observable' and 'non-
observable' aspects of power: "we may distinguish two forms of the 
mediation of power relationships in society" - "the mediation of power 
in terms of control" and "the institutional mediation of power11 • 4 
Each of these two forms closely corresponds to Fox's two 
categories. 
"The mediation of control refers to the actual (effective) 
power of policy-formation and decision-making held by the 
members of particular elite groups: how far, for example, 
economic leaders are able to influence decisions taken by 
politicians, etc. 11 5 
He elaborates by relating such control to: 
" ••• a 'distributive' aspect, in the sense that certain 
groups are able to exert their will at the expense of 
others. The mediation of control is thus expressed in 
terms of 'effective' power, manifest in terms of the 
capacity either to take or to influence the taking of 
decisions which affect the interests of two or more 
parties differentially. 116 
Secondly, however, he points out the underlying institutional 
arrangements in society which structure and shape control issues: 
"By the institutional mediation of power, I mean the 
general form of state and economy within which elite groups 
are recruited and structured. This concerns, among other 
things, the role of property in the overall organization 
of economic life, the nature of the legal framework defining 
economic and political rights and obligations, and the 
institutional structure of the state itself."7 
Again, he elaborates on this concept by relating it to: 
" ••• a •collective' aspect, in the sense that the 
'parameters' of any concrete set of power relationships 
are contingent upon the overall system of organization of 
a society. 118 
Broadly, then, for Giddens, groups in society are able to forward 
their interests in a way which implies a distributive element in the 
balance of outcomes; such are 'control' issues. On the other hand, 
these interests are themselves structured through the 'parameters' of 
the social system - private property, legal relationships and so on. 
This is the collective element in power relations which rarely 
operates in a very visible or observable manner. These parameters 
normally fo:mn the context in which control issues are raised; they 
themselves are not the topic of negotiation. 
The third writer who draws these distinctions by far in the most 
explicit way is Steven Lukes, whose analysis points up the theoretical 
existence of three 'faces' of power.9 In setting out his views here, 
we shall contend that Lukes' first two 'faces' correspond largely to 
Fox's 'marginal adjustments' and Giddens' 'mediation of control'; 
and that the third 'face' corresponds largely to Fox's 'main structure' 
and Giddens' 'institutional mediation of power'. 
The first face of power Lukes - with reservations - characterises 
as pluralist, identifying it in particular with Da.1:1110 and Polsby. 11 
Pluralist authors stress behaviour. In other words, when analysing 
power, their emphasis is on studying what people do and on basing 
conclusions on concrete evidence. As a result, power is seen to 
manifest itself principally in decision-making. For example, the 
group whose interests prevail after a political tussle over a 
decision (for instance, on a city council) have more power than the 
group whose interests are overridden. This in turn means that 
observable conflict becomes the focus for political analysts who, in 
turn, must select issues for study which provoke conflict; disagree-
ments over controversial matters are a necessary condition for conflict 
to arise and for power to become observable. Finally, then, interests 
come to be defined in terms of policy preferences, openly adopted and 
def ended. 
"Thus I conclude that this first, one-dimensional view of 
power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of 
decisions on issues over which there is an observable 
conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy 
preferences, revealed by political participation. 11 12 
The second face of power Lukes expounds through a critique of 
pluralism made by Bachrach and Baratz (who coined the phrase 'second 
face of power•).13 The principal point made by these two authors is 
that groups can erect or:r:elnforce barriers so that policy conflicts 
are never given open, public exposure. To this extent, such groups 
possess power: predominant beliefs and institutional processes do 
themselves contain biases towards vested interests which can manipulate 
them to ensure that certain issues are never presented for debate. 
Schattschneider's well-known expression is quoted with approval: 
"organization is the mobilisation of bias."14 
Lukes maintains that this theory is anti-behavioural to a degree, 
as it alleges that the analysis of both decisions and non-decisions 
is necessary in the study of power. Non-decision-making refers to 
those instances in which demands for change are suffocated before even 
being expressed (for example, by prohibiting access to the media). 
Attention is, therefore, focused on potential issues which such non-
decisions suppress, and on - as a symptom - covert as well as overt 
conflict. It is the researcher's task to investigate covert conflict 
which will evidence the existence of interests being ignored by the 
system. 
"So I conclude that the two-dimE;:nsional view of power 
involves a gualified critique of the behavioural focus 
of the first view (I say qualified because it is still 
assumed that non-decision-making is a form of decision-
making) and it allows for consideration of the ways in 
which decisions are prevented from being taken on 
potential issues over which there is an observable conflict 
of (subjective) interests, seen as embodied in express 
policy preferences and sub-political grievances. 1115 
At this point, we might draw some parallels. The areas which 
Fox identifies as 'marginal' to the structure of industrial relations 
over which management and unions bargain - practical issues, financial 
rewards, measures to achieve company growth and so on - are all 
observable phenomena, and involve decisions taken over well-known 
issues of conflict relating to the self-perceived interests of each 
side of industry. Conflict may sometimes take a covert form - for 
example, absenteeism and labour turnover - but this does not make it 
in principle unidentifiable. Similarly, Giddens' concept of the 
'mediation of control' refers to "the actual (effective) power of policy 
formation and decision-making held by the members of particular elite 
groups". The capacity here to influence decisions affecting the 
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interests of various social groups again identifies the locus of 
power. A trade union official or a shop steward may be seen, of 
course, as members of an elite. 
There is, then, a convergence in the analyses of these writers, 
though it may be obscured through dissimilar terminology. This con-
vergence continues when we turn to what Lukes calls the 'third face 
of power'. 
Lukes objects to the assumption that a 'decision' is the key to 
the possession and deployment of power. Even 'non-decisions' rely 
on the power holders' consciousness of the existence of at least covert 
conflict. This makes the exercise of power into a matter of chosen 
actions carried out by individuals aware of the consequences. Lukes 
points out that the social structure and culturally patterned behaviour 
can make the position of power holders so snug that they a.re genuinely 
unaware of any alternatives to the status quo, indeed, unaware as well 
of any biases in their actions. Consequently, the possession of 
power should not be linked simply with observable conflict. Power can 
be exerted by so moulding another person's or group's desires and 
perceived needs that compliance is obtained by defining potential 
conflict out of existence. Lukes maintains that "the crucial point 
(is) that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent 
such conflict from a.rising in the first place11 • 16 
The pluralists• assumption is that if no grievances can be 
uncovered, then a consensus on values operates and all interests are 
served equally. Two problems arise, however. The pluralists do not 
define 'grievance' or 'conflict' - it could range from a polftically 
conscious demand through to an underlying sensation of ill-will; and 
they ignore the possibility that shaping people's self-perceptions 
and thoughts might be the best way to hinder the emergence of conflict 
in the first place. 
As before, Lukes summarises his position: 
" ••• the three-d.im~nsional view of power involves a thorough-
going critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views 
as too individualistic and allows for consideration of the 
many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, 
whether through the operation of social forces and institutional 
practices or through individuals' decisions. This, moreover, 
can occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which 
may have been successfully averted - though there remains here 
an implicit reference to potential conflict. This potential, 
however, may never in fact be actualised. What one may have 
here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction 
between the interests of those exercising power and the real 
interests of those they exclude. These latter may not express 
or even be conscious of their interests •••• 1117 
Again, then, there is a convergence between Fox, Giddens and 
Lukes. Lukes' 'third face of power' corresponds to views already 
quoted from Fox, in which he refers to the role of power and social 
conditioning in causing employees to accept management's structure for 
negotiating (p.61); and to extracts already quoted from Giddens, in 
which he discusses the parameters set on power relations by social 
structure (pp.62-3). 




Observable Aspect of Power Non-observable Aspect 
of Power 
Fox Marginal negotiation Bias in the 'main 
structure' or social 
structure 
Giddens Mediation of Control Institutional Media-
tion of Power 
Lukes First/Second Faces or Third Face or 
Dimensions of Power Dimension of Power 
The chief contrast to be drawn here is between, on the one hand, 
observable conflict and its resolution, and on the other, the structural 
suppression of potential conflict. This contrast can be made either at 
societal or institutional level. Giddens, for example, focuses on the 
first; Fox on the second (industrial relations). 
The Observable Aspect of Power 
Liberal pluralists have, as Lukes shows, tended to concentrate on 
the observable aspects of power (and authority). For instance, Emmet, 
in criticising Russell's definition of 'power' as "the production of 
intended effects", herself calls 'power' an 'omnibus term•. 18 However, 
in doing so, all the passengers in her omnibus are in principle observ-
able and identifiable: according to her, the exercise of power may 
involve causal efficacy {e.g. bringing about change in the world); 
creative energy (e.g. in artistic pursuits)1 personal influence (e.g. 
through strength of character); ritual (e.g. in the effects of magic); 
or the law (e.g. in the capacity of the Authorities to achieve some 
purpose). 
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It is then not difficult to extend this approach to the problem 
of 'authority' which rests on the ability, as Fried.rich puts it, to 
issue communications possessing "the potentiality of reasoned 
elaboration - they are 'worthy of acceptance'". 19 The idea is that 
•good reasons' for doing something add an extra quality to the use 
of power. Indeed, some writers contend that there is a conceptual 
connection (not simply a c·ontingent one) between social, rule governed 
activity and de iure authority. To follow social rules: 
" ... is to accept that there is a right way and a wrong way 
of doing things, and the decision as to what is right and 
wrong in a given case can never depend entirely on one's caprice 
••• (For) one is a social being engaged in rule governed 
activities and on that account able to deliberate and to choose, 
(this) is in itself sufficient to commit one to the acceptance 
of legitimate political authority. For the exercise of such 
authority is a precondition of rule governed activities. 
There would be therefore a sort of inconsistency in 'choosing 
to reject' all such authority. 11 20 
This is a view which runs implicitly, but strongly, through 
Flanders' observations on the nature of collective bargaining (pp.27-34); 
collective bargaining is a rule-making, political activity which assumes 
the legitimacy of prevailing employment contracts. Strikers, he points 
out, do not wish to terminate their contracts, but rather to improve 
them. 
However, more generally, this view makes a series of questionable 
assumptions. First of all, it assumes a 'seamless web' of rule-
governed activity. In other words, the possibility that there are 
multiple systems of authority within a society or an institution, each 
one legitimate in the eyes of its adherents, is not considered as a 
special problem. However, the relationships between such authority 
systems, for instance at different levels of society, might themselves 
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constitute a major focus for inquiry (as we shall find later on in 
this chapter). Secondly, the origins of the rules which govern 
social activity are not considered either. But this is a major 
factor in their acceptance as legitimate: we have already seen that 
rules established by two sides - one of which holds greater power 
resources than the other - can lead to poor internalisation of the 
rules by the weaker side ~d the emergence of anomie in consequence. 
The circumstances surrounding the development of rule-making are 
central when their legitimacy is under review. Thirdly, these rules 
and the exercise of authority through them are, once again, a matter 
for observation. Analysis of authority relations is held to rely on 
the study of behaviour, whereas to the extent that authority depends 
on power, it can also have a non-behavioural dimension. 
At this stage, it becomes easier to understand why - using these 
liberal pluralist notions of power - many writers in the 20th century 
have asserted that capitalism has changed so radically since the 19th 
century at all levels, both societal and industrial, that it should 
be termed something else (such as 'post-industrial' or 'post-
capitalist• ). 21 Clear, visible alterations in the power structure 
of these societies have taken place: the extension of the franchise 
to all sectors of the population and the rise of organizations 
representing labour; the extension of citizenship as a result; the 
introduction of the welfare state to ensure a basic standard of living 
to all; the development of government intervention in the market in 
terms of nationalisation, Keynesian economic planning and increased 
state aid to private industry; and the gradual diffusion of economic 
power. Into the last category fall a number of items: the growth 
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of joint stock companies and the so-called 'managerial revolution• 22 ; 
the alleged greater interest of private companies in growth rather 
f •t . . t' 23 d th than pro 1 max1m1sa ion; an e emergence of institutional share-
holders - such as insurance companies and occupational pension funds 
which appear to 'share out• the distribution of equity capital more 
. 1 24 fair y. 
All these trends share a common feature: their visibility. To 
study them involves studying the paradigm of the first and second 
faces of power as defined by Lukes. The behaviour of people and 
institutions; decisions taken; the debate of issues; conflict 
identifiable through social pressures or the passing of laws; and the 
reconciliation of interests. These features all attract connnent. 
This is particularly true in the case of the apparent 'shift of power' 
to the shop-floor in Britain which we discussed in Chapters One and 
Two. 
However, it might be claimed that none of these trends has actually 
altered the non-observable aspects of power relations in capitalist 
. t• 25 soc1e 1es. The 'parameters' of such power relations in, say, Britain 
may well be substantially similar to those predominant a century ago. 
It could even be, in fact, that these trends within capitalism have 
strengthened the nature of the economic structure which protects vested 
interests by diverting attention towards visible economic and political 
activity. This captures the argument advanced by Giddens; he main-
tains persuasively that these trends have led not to post-capitalist 
but rather 1neo-capitalist 1 society. 26 
According to him, the mediation of control has widened (in 
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government, the civil service, business and so on) because increased 
social mobility allows, in principle, lower class recruitment into 
these circles. Nevertheless, although these elites may now be 
considered more or less open, the middle classes stand a better chance 
of recruitment to them than the working classes, whose 'long-range' 
mobility is limited. This, he maintains, is generally the case 
throughout Western Europe. . Giddens concludes his argument: 
" • • • it still makes sense to speak of the contL'"'l.uing 
existence of a 'ruling' or 'governing class' ••• The 
terminology is not particularly important; what is 
significant are the variations in the mediation of 
control between the capitalist societies •••• "27 
And he adds: 
" ••• in modern societies, in contrast to previous types 
of social order, there is a strong pressure upon members 
of the upper class to deny the operation of the 'class 
principle', and thereby to deny their own distinctive-
ness as a separate and isolable class. The 'invisibility' 
of the upper class in capitalist society is ••• the 
natural expression of whatever degree of monopoly the 
upper class maintains over access to elite positions in a 
form of society in which ideals of political and economic 
'equality of opportunity' prevail. 11 28 
The Non-Observable Aspect of Power 
This quotation leads us to consider now more closely the other 
aspect of power, identified earlier, the 'non-observable'. This is 
essential before continuing to analyse the bearing of this discussion 
on value consensus in industrial relations. The argument will be 
that a society or an institution does not require value consensus of 
an observable kind to hold together in the barest sense, provided 
that the ideology supporting the non-observable level of power remains 
intact and unquestioned. Conflicts on the shop-floor - which exhort-
73. 
ation and education are useless in preventing - arise because of 
employees' direct experience of contradictions in capitalist 
production. Through the exercise of non-observable power this 
experience is not allowed expression in coherent or logical form. 
Workers, therefore, remain apathetic, confused and frustrated - all 
of which promotes the stability of nee-capitalism. 
(1) Antonio Gramsci and 'Bourgeois Hegemony' 
First, however, we must turn to the notion of non-observable 
power. For this purpose, the work of .Antonio Gramsci is central. 
Since 1945, the theories of Gramsci have become increasingly influential, 
no doubt largely because he concentrated attention on the reasons for 
the longevity of capitalism. 
Gramsci himself (1891-1937) is a highly sympathetic figure; 29 
born into a poor family in Sardinia, he left school at eleven, but 
later on, won a scholarship to the University of Turin in 1911. He 
became a founder member of the Italian Communist Party - and briefly 
its General Secretary until arrested by Mussolini's forces in 1926. 
Till his death in 1937 he was kept in prison. His life was hard in 
personal, emotional, political and economic terms. Yet despite this 
(or perhaps because of it) he is one of the few Marxist theorists to 
have studied the survival of capitalism; how bourgeois class interests 
have managed to construct a bulwark for themselves against the possi-
bility of a revolutionary, working class movement. 
As Joll puts it: 
" ••• one of the reasons why Antonio Gramsci has assumed an 
importance which one might not have expected, given his own 
political failure and the fragmentary and difficult nature 
of much of his writings, is that he suggested both reasons 
for the strength of liberalism and capitalism and ways in 
which a revolutionary movement might gain ground even when 
the old regime still seems firmly established in power."30 
So in recent years, there has been an upsurge of interest in 
Gramsci's ideas. Texts and commentaries have burgeoned.31 The 
intention here cannot be to analyse Gramsci's voluminous writings 
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in detail in order to establish what he did or did not say on given 
. 32 issues. Rather, it is to extract what is important theoretically 
with the use of commentaries, in order to further the analysis of 
industrial relations ideology on the shop-floor in Britain. 
There is disagreement in the literature over the fairness of such 
a procedure: 
"The main pitfall to be avoided at all costs, is an 
instrumental reading of Gramsci, one which takes advantage 
of the unsystematic nature of his work to extrapolate 
passages in an arbitrary fashion in order to back up a 
thesis bearing little relation to his thought."33 
Yet on the other hand: 
"It may in fact belong to the nature of Marxism, as not a 
system but a search, to function best in this apparently 
34 haphazard fashion, and never arrive at codification •••• " 
And it is with Kiernan's notion of a "search" firmly in mind 
that we should turn to Gramsci's achievement. 
The main focus of his work was a critique of 'economic determin-
ation'. 35 This consists of two closely related views. First, that 
there is a causal relationship between the economic substructure of 
society - the ownership of the means of production - and the super-
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structure, such that the superstructure can be reduced to terms 
reflecting the economic base. For example, religion might be 
described as the product of bourgeois property relations. Second, 
the superstructure comes to be seen as nothing more than an 
epiphenomenon - that is, as a social phenomenon merely accompanying 
the economic substructure as an outcrop, with no independent part to 
play in the historical process. For example, acting on this belief, 
a revolutionary movement will ignore the role of religion in a society, 
concentrating instead purely on changing its economic base and property 
relations. 
Gramsci's principal contribution lies in highlighting the severe 
limitations of such a view of economic determinism. It is through 
his concentration on a Marxist theory of ideology that he was able to 
account for the strength of capitalism in the 20th century. The 
elusive and illuminating concept of 'hegemony' is central to his theory 
of superstructure and ideological integration. An early formulation 
of it is presented by Williams: 
"By 'hegemony' Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political 
situation, in his terminology a 'moment•, in which the 
philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equi-
librium; an order in which a certain way of life and 
thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is 
diffused throughout society in all its institutional and 
private manifestations, informing with its spirit all 
taste, morality, customs, religious and political 
principles, and all its social relationships, particularly 
in their intellectual and moral connotation. An element 
of direction and control, not necessarily conscious, is 
implied. This hegemony corresponds to a state power 
conceived in stock Marxist terms as the dictatorship of a 
class. 11 36 
Though not entirely accurate - especially, as we shall see, in 
the last sentence - this quotation points out several interesting 
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features in Gramsci's use of the term. 
First, the dominance of a "certain way of life". In the case 
of bourgeois hegemony, this means that the dominant class - the 
bourgeoisie - has succeeded not only in expressing its class interests 
at an economic level, but also in establishing a coincidence between 
the interests of the subordinate classes and its own. The subordinate 
classes may then support this dominant "way of life" not only passively 
but also actively (though reservations about how active such support 
may be are considered towards the end of this chapter). Simon, for 
example, asserts that: 
" ••• hegemony in the Gramscian sense may be defined in a 
preliminary fashion as a relationship between classes in 
which one class or fraction of a class exercises leadership 
over other classes and strata through gaining the active 
consent of the members of those classes and strata."37 
Similarly, Hall, Lumley and McLennan stress that hegemony: 
" ••• involves the organization of 'spontaneous' consent 
which can be won, for example, by the ruling bloc making 
economic concessions that 'yet do not touch its essential 
interests', combined with other measures that foster forms 
of consciousness which accept a position of subordination 
{what Gramsci refers to as sectional and corporate 
consciousness)."38 
Some examples of such "economic concessions" will include some of 
nthe changes" within capitalism in the 20th century - for instance, the 
development of the welfare state - which we have already briefly 
touched on in the discussion of the 'observable aspect of power'. 
Secondly, the 'exercise' of hegemony - and its content - are highly 
elusive. References are made to the "diffusion of a concept of reality", 
and so on. Often, like God, it appears to surround us all everywhere: 
"In reality, the hegemony of one social class over other 
subordinate classes in society may be extremely complex, 
a cultural tissue of great variety and subtlety, extend-
ing all the way from the education of infants to the 
naming of streets, present in people's inhibitions and 
mental blocs as well as in what they profess to believe 
all that tradition of the dead generations 'weighing like 
a nightmare on the brain of the living', as Marx said. "39 
Yet thirdly, hegemony concerns in some sense a unified set of 
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beliefs about social reality. It is a 'Wel tanschauung' - a way of 
seeing the world, a prism through which reality takes on its many 
colours. The different elements which together constitute the super-
structure are not reducible to the economic substructure; nor, indeed, 
are they mere by-products of it as they may affect changes in the 
substructure. Yet taken together they coalesce into an all-pervading 
world view, which protects the interests of the dominant class. 
Merrington states: 
"While the various political and ideological formations 
correspond to the interests of the dominant class, they 
cannot be reduced to mere emanations or epiphenomena of 
the structure, and are susceptible to different historical 
forms and combinations which in turn react upon the 
structure. It is through this 'unity in multiplicity' 
that it becomes possible, by the analysis of relations of 
forces within a determined historical situation, to 
establish the objective co-ordinates of the political 
struggle as a whole, taking account of the possibility of 
error or unforeseen results of actions on the part of the 
agent."40 
This notion of "unity in multiplicity" is also taken up by 
Nowell-Smith: 
"Hegemony is the exercise of power through a unified system 
of apparatuses, in so far as this power does not require 
the use of force or the making explicit of relationships of 
dominance. The importance and the utility of the concept, 
thus defined, lie in the fact that hegemony is not a property 
of all systems of social and political relations."41 
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Here, Nowell-Smith injects a new element into the discussion. 
Not only is 'hegemony' in some sense a "unified system" but, and this 
constitutes the fourth aspect associated with this concept, as such 
it may either be present or not within the battery of methods that a 
governing class has at its disposal to secure the compliance of 
subordinate classes. It is, therefore, not accurate to assert, as 
Williams does, that hegemon.Y merely equals state power "conceived in 
stock Marxist ter'llls as the dictatorship of a class."42 It is quite 
possible for dictatorships representing class interests to rule by 
force and violence alone, or at least with the barest consent of the 
subordinate classes; in such a case, their active consent is lacking, 
and with it, hegemonic rule. According to Nowell-Smith, hegemony is 
present when "power does not require the use of force or the making 
explicit of the relationships of dominance'.'. Stated in this way it 
is clear that 'hegemony' bears a striking resemblance to what we have, 
till now, been calling the non-observable aspect of power. Indeed, 
this is the case, though Fox and Giddens do not make such an observation, 
and Lukes does so only tangentially. But the critical difference 
between the treatment of the two concepts by Lukes, for instance, on the 
one hand, and Gramsci on the other, is that Gramsci - as an active 
Marxist - is particularly concerned to find out how the concept of 
'hegemony' should lead to developing strategy in the world of revolu-
tionary politics. Lukes is primarily interested, as an academic, in 
"a deeper analysis of power relations ••• "43 
Gramsci's activity led him, broadly, to two major conclusions. 
The first was that active intervention in politics was necessary for 
the working class and those 'organic' intellectuals nurtured within 
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it through the Communist Party. A proletarian hegemony had to be 
developed to counter the bourgeois variety, as the major impetus behind 
revolutionary progress: 
"One of the constants of Gramsci's position was his view 
that revolutionary politics must necessarily be an active 
intervention in history, and could not consist simply in 
adopting 'correct' positions and waiting to be proved 
right •••• "44 
But it is the second conclusion, related to the first, which we 
must grasp here. It is that a strict analysis of the existing power 
structure of the bourgeois state - especially the complex relationship 
between force and consent - should underpin all such revolutionary 
activity. Gramsci, for instance, was careful to distinguish between 
Social Democracy and Fascism, unlike many on the Comintern who noted 
simply that they shared the same economic substructure. 
"He was critical of Bordiga (in Spring 1924, still leader of 
the Italian Communist Party) for underestimating the internal 
contradictions of Italian capitalism and for believing that 
the specific forms of bourgeois rule were irrelevant and that 
the only perspective was one of a crisis of the capitalist 
system •••• "45 
So it is that we draw out the fifth aspect of hegemony. Not 
only is it either present or absent within a given society, but it 
will also take on a very specific form. The relationship between 
hegemony and the State is a varying one. The State's ability to 
mobilise consent through its quasi-autonomous ideological structure 
will play a crucial part in deciding the outcome of any heightened 
class conflict. Consent is a key resource of the State, but the 
question is open in any particular situation how easily, for instance, 
consent can be won amongst subordinate classes to use force against 
a particular sector which is threatening subversion (for example, the 
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use of troops to carry out strike-breaking activity). 
One of the most compelling discussions of Gramsci's thought in 
this respect is a seminal article by Perry Anderson. In it, he 
carefully traces the origins of the term 'hegemony', with particular 
reference to the bourgeois variety. He also establishes that there 
are three differing treatments of the concept by Gramsci himself. 
Each one relates to a different 'extent' of hegemony - that is, its 
pervasiveness - within a particular formation of advanced capitalism. 
The basic premise is that for Gramsci: 
" ••• the normal structure of capitalist political power in 
bourgeois - democratic states is in effect simultaneously 
and indivisibly dominated by culture and determined by 
coercion."46 
In other words, the everyday functioning of nee-capitalist 
societies is ensured through the operation of hegemony - which here 
includes both cultural and political dimensions - but force, through 
the army and police, is always present to intervene in the case of 
threatening disorder or rapid socialist advance. 
But what, then, is the balance between force and consent, and 
how is it maintained? 
"Gramsci's first and firmest answer is that hegemony 
(direction) pertains to civil society, and coercion 
(domination) to the State."47 
In this formulation, there is a contrast drawn between "civil 
society" (in this case, those institutions providing for cultural 
expression like the churches, the family, the educational system, 
the media and so on) which is hegemonic, and the State, whose function 
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is the control of violence. This contrast can be illustrated by 
Gramsci's views on the differences between the revolutionary struggles 
in Russia in 1917 and in the advanced capitalist societies later on. 
In Russia, the State - the symbol of coercive domination - was unable 
to withstand the ravages of defeat in World War I. Lacking popular 
support and standing alone, the State was toppled by an "incursion", 
a "war of manoeuvre", by the Bolsheviks when its capacity for coercive 
repression, its only defence, was at its lowest ebb. On the other 
hand, in the W·est, civil society presents - like a system of trenches 
in a "war of position" the principal defence against catastrophe. 
Even severe recessions hardly mark the apparent capacity of neo-
capitalism to survive, since civil society, in all its absorbent 
complexity, has such a pervasive hold on the minds, loyalties and 
activities of its members. The final resource of the State - violence 
can remain hidden. 48 In consequence, the 'contrast' model - civil 
society v. the State is not such an obviously appropriate one for the 
West as it is for dictatorships and autocracies, in which violence is 
far more part of everyday life in the suppression of dissent. 
This leads on to a second formulation: 
" ••• in which Gramsci speaks of hegemony, not as a pole of 
'consent' in contrast to another of 'coercion', but as 
itself a synthesis of consent and coercion."49 
In this model, hegemony encompasses the political dimension of 
class domination, in addition to the cultural dimension of "civil 
society". That is, it includes the notions of parliamentary democracy, 
regular elections, freedom of speech, association, press and so on -
none of which exist in the first model. These democratic developments 
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in the West during the last century or so are all features of the 
apparent "shift" in the visible aspects of power already discussed 
in relation to liberal pluralist theories. However, active consent 
in State domination through parliamentary institutions also means 
that, as Anderson succinctly puts it: 
"There is always a structural asymmetry in the distri-
bution of the consensual and coercive functions of this 
power. Ideology is shared between civil society and 
the State: violence pertains to the State alone. In 
other words, the State enters twice over into any equation 
between the two."50 
Through parliament, the subordinate classes will express active 
consent in the use of State coercion against those seeming to threaten 
it. This "twice over" element helps to explain the firmness, the 
apparent impenetrability of State power under nee-capitalism: 
"The novelty of this consent is that it takes the fundamental 
form of a belief by the masses that they exercise an ultimate 
self-determination within the existing social order. It is 
thus not acceptance of the superiority of an acknowledged 
ruling class (feudal ideology), but credence in the democratic 
equality of all citizens in the government of the nation - in 
other words, disbelief in the existence of any ruling class."51 
The "ruling class" has then become invisible. This is the point 
made by Giddens (p.72), and ties in once more with the theme, the non-
observable aspect of power. The dominant class is most powerful when 
invisible, because hegemony comes to embrace or encompass the State as 
well. In such conditions force is less likely to be needed to maintain 
control, but if it is needed, its use is unlikely to provoke sharp or 
damaging reaction amongst the subordinate classes. Such is the case 
in the Western "bourgeois democratic" nations in the latter part of 
the 20th century. 
In the third formulation, 
" ••• the distinction between civil and political society 
disappears altogether: consent and coercion alike become 
co-extensive with the State. 11 52 
Here, civil society (consent) becomes identical with the State. 
In other words, the State swallows up both cultural and political 
hegemony, so that the distinction between it and them vanishes. 
This is a totalitarian model. Gramsci, of course, had direct and 
brutal experience of Fascism in Italy; as Fascism developed, the 
realm of civil and political privacy was gradually eroded. Inter-
mediary organizations - such as those belonging in civil and political 
society - were slowly subjected to State domination and control. 
This did not impinge only on the rights of the individual to belong to 
diverse political parties and trade unions; it also extended to the 
rights of the individual to have his own thoughts in his own home. 
In ~ermany, for instance, children were expected to report on their 
parents through the Nazi youth organizations.53 
So, in sunnnary, as Anderson demonstrates, for Gramsci "the State 










Broadly speaking - and this is not Anderson's phraseology - the 
three models correspond to 'dictatorship', 'bourgeois democracy' and 
'Fascism'. It will be the second model which provides our main focus. 
So far, then, we have separated out five aspects of 'hegemony' 
which most coIIllllentators, with more or less emphasis, characterise as 
the defining features of the concept. In r~sum~, they are: 
class rule through the dominance of a "certain way of life" which 
enjoys the active consent - albeit unconsciously - of the subord-
inate classes; 
a considerable elusiveness in precise definition, with reference 
often being made to the "diffusion of a concept of reality" 
throughout society (though keenness to be more specific may simply 
betray a strong dose of British empiricism); 
the fact that 'hegemony' nevertheless presents a unified view of 
society and that there is "unity in multiplicity", i.e. that 
although the interests of different political formations amongst 
the dominant superstructure may indeed conflict and put forward 
differing rationales of behaviour, they agree over the "real 
nature" of society, human nature and the fundamental course of 
economic and political activity; 
'hegemony' is only one means amongst others - for instance, the 
use of force, or ideological domination with only passive consent 
from subordinate classes - which can be employed by a dominant 
class; and furthermore, it is foi.md (in its bourgeois form) only 
in the advanced, neo-capitalist societies of the West; and 
finally, 
when present, it will take on a very specific form. For instance, 
one State may be more easily able to use force in given circum-
stances with popular consent against a sector of the population 
than another. Anderson distinguishes three such forms from 
Gramsci's writing, what we have called here the 'ructaiorship', 
'bourgeois democratic' and 'totalitarian' models. 
So it is, then, that we arrive at an 'ideal type' of hegemony. 
(2) Contradictory Consciousness 
The question which now arises is how we can use the concept to 
further the analysis of industrial relations. To do this, we have 
to be very sure about what it does and does not entail. For this 
purpose, a distinction can be drawn between social harmony and social 
integration. Following Eld.ridge, in turn following Da.hrendorf, 
social harmony involves the pursuit of consensus for example, through 
political coalition or industrial co-partnership as a good in itself, 
with a consequent "institutionalised fear of social conflict."55 
Harmony might be a goal at national or industrial level, but under 
capitalism conflict is not, of course, eradicated; denied social 
expression it tends rather to manifest itself through the behaviour 
of individuals - poor morale or high rates of absenteeism in industry, 
for example. The pursuit of social harmony can be compared to the 
'unitary frame of reference' discussed in Chapter One in that it assumes 
a communality of interest between all sectors of a population or enter-
prise. On the other hand, social integration presupposes the 
legitimacy of conflict; procedures are designed to give it shape, and 
in turn, they allow the social system to cohere as a whole. For 
liberal pluralists, then: 
" ••• integration is to be understood within a pluralist 
framework in which adequate institutions for conflict 
regulation are established as between the State on the one 
hand and the enterprise on the other, so far as industrial 
life is conoerned. 11 56 
However, some theorists, as Eldridge points out, have not seen 
social integration in such a benign light. Marcuse, for instance, 
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in "One Dimensional Man", views social integration as the result of 
ideological manipulation by elite groupings: 
"By virtue of the way it has organized its technological 
base, contemporary industrial society tends to be 
totalitarian. For 'totalitarian' is not only a terror-
istic political co-ordination of society, but also a 
non-terroristic economic-technical co-ordination which 
operates through the manipulation of needs by vested 
interests. It thus precludes the emergence of an 
effective opposition against the whole. Not only a 
specific form of government or party rule makes for 
totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production 
and distribution which may well be compatible with a 
'pluralism' of parties, newspapers, countervailing powers, 
etc. Today, political power asserts itself through its 
power over the machine process and over the technical 
organization of the apparatus."57 
According to Marcuse, individuals in industrial societies, as 
presently constituted, live under repressive conditions; despite the 
potential for human emancipation which technological development 
represents, it has never been unleashed because the military, big 
business and their political allies are concerned only with arms 
manufacture and destruction. 
Now, Marcuse's use of the term 'totalitarian' in the last 
quotation has a resonance with the third formulation of Gra.mscian 
hegemony outlined above (p.83). However, Gra.msci himself, as we saw, 
insisted on a distinction between 'bourgeois democratic' and 'fascist/ 
totalitarian' societies, despite their similar economic substructures. 
It is not helpful at all to stretch the meaning of words like 
'totalitarian' as Marcuse does: the State in the Western neo-capitalist 
societies has not assimilated intermediary groups into itself, nor has 
it systematically sought to eradicate the privacy of individuals. 
Marcuse effectively blurs the differences between terms like 'bourgeois-
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democratic' and 'totalitarian', and correspondingly blurs the 
differences between terms like 'social integration' and •social 
harmony' as conceptual categories. Often, the reason for this is to 
illustrate the similarities between the current order and Fascism: 
"The monopoly capitalist management of the population, 
the inflated economy, the 'defence' policy of kill and 
overkill, the training for genocide, the normalisation 
of war crimes, the brutal treatment of the vast prison 
population have built up a frightening reservoir of 
violence in everyday life ••• The whole complex of 
aggression and (its) targets indicates a proto-fascist 
potential ;par excellence."58 
The subtlety of Gramsci 1 s theory is that, within the procedures 
established by the 'bourgeois democratic' State to achieve social 
integration, it aclal.owledges the considerable autonomy permitted to 
the interests of the subordinate classes. For example, campaigns 
to prevent racial or sexual discrimination at work avail themselves 
of these procedures to achieve their ends - though even when success-
ful, the mere use of the procedures and other cultural resources has 
helped to maintain the hegemonic power of the dominant class. 
And this leads to one of the most original aspects of Gramsci's 
concept. Marcuse's ''Man" might be one-dimensional, but Gramsci's is 
most certainly not. On first view, the concept of 'hegemony' has a 
heavy, all-embracing feel. Like the night, it is everywhere yet 
nowhere, stifling yet invisible. Yet Gram.sci observed that belief 
systems and world views - people's cognitive apparatus - do not always 
necessarily match actions or behaviour. In other words, people often 
think one thing, but do another. 
Earlier on, we noted that active consent in the social structure 
was one of the hallmarks of hegemonic domination. It is time now to 
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qualify this statement. Femia, in an absorbing article, quotes 
Gramsci .who draws attention to the frequently passive or superficial 
consent persisting under capitalism by contrasting belief with 
behaviour: 
" ••• is it not often the case that there is a contra-
diction between one's intellectual affirmation and one's 
mode of conduct? Which then is the real conception of 
the world: that logically affirmed as an intellectual 
act? Or that which emerges from the real activity of 
each man, which is implicit in his behaviour? 11 59 
And again: 
"The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but 
has no clear theoretical consciousness of this activity ••• 
One might almost say that he has two theoretical conscious-
nesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is 
implicit in his activity and which truly unites him with all 
his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of 
reality; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which 
he has inherited from the past and has uncritically accepted. 
But this 'verbal' conception is not without consequences. 
It binds together a specific social group, it influences 
moral conduct and the direction of will, in a manner more or 
less powerful, but often powerful enough to produce a 
situation in which the contradictory character of conscious-
ness does not permit of any action, any decision or any 
choice, and produces a condition of moral and political 
passivity. 1160 
This concept - 'contradictory consciousness' is immensely 
important, and together with 'hegemony' will form the basis of our 
analysis of industrial democracy. Though empirical evidence for it 
will be examined in Chapter Four, it is relevant to make some theoret-
ical observations here. 
We have seen that "the active man-in-the-mass" may well participate 
in much of the dominant belief structure (though not, it is true, as 
coherently as members of the political elite).
61 
However, at their 
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work-place people often betray conflictual patterns of behaviour - the 
trilogy of industrial relations "problems" outlined in Chapter One 
(strikes, restrictive practices and wage drift) are evidence of that. 
In addition, they will frequently point to concrete examples of 
management inefficiency with the complaint "they don't know what 
they're talking about" or "we could have done better than that 11 • 62 
Several writers have pointed out the theoretical implications of 
this state of affairs: 
"Consent, then, becomes essentially passive. It emerges not 
so much because the masses profoundly regard the social order 
as an expression of their aspirations as because they lack 
the conceptual tools, the 'clear theoretical consciousness', 
which would enable them effectively to comprehend and act on 
their discontent - discontent manifest in the activity uniting 
them 'in the practical transformation of reality•. 1163 
The point made there by Femia is developed by Parkin: 
"The fact that the subordinate class tends to have two 
levels of normative reference, the abstract and the 
situational, is highly relevant (as to) whether it is more 
plausible to speak of a common value system shared by all 
classes, or a class differentiated value system. 1164 
Parkin elaborates the view that studies of working class attitudes 
which rely on questions put in general or 'abstract' terms tend to 
elicit consensual responses, because they reflect the dominant (hegemonic) 
value system. However, those studies which rely on questions put in 
'situational' terms requesting information about actual behaviour in 
given circumstances tend to elicit more conflictual responses "because 
in situational contexts of choice and action, the subordinate value 
system will tend to provide the moral frame of reference". 65 Here 
Parkin assumes the existence of a "subordinate value system", which 
would evidence a relatively sophisticated work or occupational community -
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- more likely, such an integrated community is absent. 
This angle is pursued by Mann, who analyses carefully the 
different elements which constitute "subordinate value systems" in 
his eyes, the processes through which working class consciousness 
emerges. He distinguishes four stages. 
First, workers must define themselves as working class with an 
identity in coIIllllon with others occupying similar positions in the 
economic substructure. Second, they must come to see capitalists 
and their agents in opposition to workers' interests. Third, the 
notion of class totality must bring the realisation that the class 
system defines the quality of workers' lives both socially and socie-
tally; in other words, it is the central feature determining life 
chances. .And finally, there must emerge "the conception of an 
alternative society" - one in which class antagonisms are superseded 
once and for all through socialism. As Mann continues: "True 
revolutionary consciousness is the combination of all four, and an 
obviously rare occurrence."66 
It is clear that no smooth or automatic link exists between 
these stages. 67 This can be demonstrated through a survey of socio-
logical literature on levels of consciousness amongst groups of workers. 
Much has been written on this - much, indeed, also, on the concept of 
'consciousness' itself - but usually as we see in Chapter Four in very 
static terms, for example with reference to occupational status. The 
concept of contradictory consciousness helps to explain this static 
quality in the literature. 
As Mann argues: 
"Thus the most common form of manipulative socialisation 
by the liberal democratic state does not seek to change 
values, but rather to pe:rpetuate values that do not aid 
the working class to interpret the reality it actually 
experiences. These values merely deny the existence of 
group and class conflict within the nation-state society 
and therefore are demonstrably false. 11 68 
This is an admirably succinct statement of the notion of 
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"contradictory consciousness". But if true, then the Western working 
classes will rather lack a coherent self-image. Instead, there will 
be a multitude of patchy 'consciousnesses' at various stages, and 
mainly of an occupational or 'labourist' class identity nature. This 
is precisely what does happen. Given the hegemonic fonn of class 
domination, even the idea that there is an enduring dominant class 
acting in opposition to working class interests will be rare. As we 
have seen, the dominant class lies invisible. So we can go beyond 
Femia and Parkin: not only does hegemony prevent the emergence of 
"clear theoretical consciousness" about alternative social realities, 
but it also hinders the development of notions of totality and opposi-
tion - and in many cases, even class identity itself. Ins·tead, workers 
will mouth consensual attitudes at the abstract level, and, experiencing 
conflict at the work-place, express resignation, frustration or apathy 
there, or else indulge in individualistic acts of protest. 
'Contradictory consciousness', once established conceptually and 
empirically, must deal the final blow to the liberal pluralist analysis 
of industrial relations in even Fox's amended fonn. Fox, despite his 
neo-Durkheimian critique of the 'Oxford School', still advocates 
solutions for industrial relations problems similar to theirs: the 
development of high-trust relationships in industry, for example, 
assumes a basic value consensus between management and work-force. 
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It is, then, the task of the next two chapters to disprove that 
any such consensus exists by carefully examining the evidence for 
'contradictory consciousness'. This provides the necessary founda-
tion for the subsequent analysis of the role of industrial democracy 
in British industry since around 1945. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
So far, we have presented a theoretical critique of the liberal 
pluralist perspective on industrial relations through an analysis of 
'contradictory consciousness'. We must now complete this critique 
and prepare the ground for our analysis of industrial democracy by 
further examining contradict.cry consciousness in relation both to 
empirical evidence and to theories of incorporation. 
Contradictory consciousness illuminates incorporation theoT1J, 
which in turn explains how, in progressive stages, working class 
interests have been de-radicalised. This might take the form of 
granting concessions to these interests - for example, by allowing 
certain legal immunities to trade unions; or it might mean moulding 
them - for example, by shaping working class political aspirations 
through parliamentary democracy; or it might mean limiting or 
constraining them - for example, by imposing a 'frontier of control' 
on the shop-floor. 
The role of contradictory consciousness in such a discussion is 
to account for the relative success of incorporation. In this chapter 
we look at political, economic and some forms of industrial incorpora-
tion,all of which have enjoyed some success in stemming working class 
conflict. For Gramsci's "active man-in-the-mass", these levels of 
incorporation correspond mainly to what we have called the 'abstract' 
level of attitude and belief - although in politics and industry a 
strong tradition and language of reformist labourism still provide a 
focus for working class conflicto However, in Chapter Five, we turn 
to shop-floor behaviour; at the point of production, the "active man-
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in-the-mass" appears to remain stubbornly committed to act in a 
conflictual way to defend his interests - and as we shall see in 
the rest of the thesis, industrial democracy is designed to cope 
with this 'situational' level. The process of incorporation is, 
therefore, a complex and subtle one ••• and we begin by analysing 
some of the awkward questions raised by the concept itself. 
The Relevance of Incorporation Theory 
In general terms, there are two accounts put forward on the Left 
to try to explain the lack of revolutionary ardour amongst the British 
working classes; why it is, for instance, that trade unions have 
become enmeshed in negotiating the annual pay round instead of demand-
ing structural change through abolishing the wages system itself. 
Coates summarises the first position: 
"The most popular explanation offered up on the Left at 
the moment is a rather vulgarised version of Lenin's theory 
of 'labour aristocracy'. Simplifying Lenin's subtle 
formulae, it is assumed that imperialism, colonial and 
monopolistic extortion, has enabled the metropolitan ruling 
classes to cast 'crumbs from its table' to favoured sections 
of the working class. The latter are thus bought off, 
given high hopes of reform and persuaded to settle for such 
reformist solutions to their complaints. 111 
The author goes on to point out the disadvantages of this view: 
"For one thing, the most militant and aggressive sections of the trade 
union movement in almost every advanced country are the better paid 
2 ones." 
Now we clearly cannot delve here into the relationship between 
the development of imperialism and the labour aristocracy. However, 
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there is a certain similarity between the 'labour aristocracy' thesis 
and the literature which burgeoned in the late 1960s around the 
famous 'affluent worker' studies.3 Basically, the similarity is that 
sectionalism - splits within the working class founded either on status 
or income differentials - hinders the emergence of working class 
solidarity with coherent, radical demands. There is certainly some 
truth in this belief. Evidence suggests that workers within status 
groups - unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled - tend to compare their 
relative life chances only with others in adjoining social status 
groups. 4 That is, they do not identify themselves as working class, 
with a common relationship in the labour market subject to the same 
uncertainties and problems in consequence. We return to the 'affluent 
worker' in Chapter Five - the point made then will be that his relative 
prosperity during economic booms does nothing to alter his objective 
position in the labour market as a wage-earner • 
.And so, this aspect of the affluent worker question can be 
collapsed into the second general explanation for working class accept-
ance of capitalism; since affluence alone cannot be sufficient, we 
turn to the concept of 'incorporation'. This term, coming from the 
Latin word 'corpus', meaning 'body', refers to the process whereby a 
subject draws an object into itself, to form with it a single cohesive 
whole - a body. 
In this thesis, we have been arguing for and then assuming a 
conflict model of society. Nevertheless, as l'lennell declares: 
" ••• it is certainly nonsense to see consensus and conflict 
simply as opposites. c. H. Cooley put the matter in a 
nutshell when he observed that 'conflict and co-operation 
are not s-eparable things, but phases of one process which 
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always involves something of both'"5 
To the degree that this is a truism (albeit an important one), 
it seems reasonable to postulate that some form of incorporation of 
the working class by the ruling class takes place in Western 
societies, simply because 'consensus' and 'agreement' imply incorpor-
ation or 'taking in'. However, as Eldridge points out, the concept 
does have "some frayed edges": 
"There are many variations on the theme of incorporation 
and a range of judgements as to the desirability of the 
processes discerned. What does seem to be implied with 
greater or lesser degrees of firmness is the proposition 
that wage labour in Western societies has been contained 
by the capitalist system. This thesis does typically 
present itself as an alternative to the polarisation 
thesis of class conflict. Indeed, it partly addresses 
itself to the question of why such revolutionary conflicts 
have not occurred. 116 
So we may begin by conceding that "the capitalist system" is the 
subject which incorporates "wage labour" in Western countries. But 
beyond that, a whole series of questions arises. 
First, what exactly is the object of incorporation? That is, 
what aspects of wage labour are allegedly being incorporated? 
Consensus and agreement are being sought over what? - its values and 
beliefs? Or merely its participation in the social structure? 
Second, in which areas of social activity is incorporation taking 
place? In moral codes of conduct? In political decisions or in 
economics and industrial relations? 
Third, at which levels does incorporation occur? Just at 
national levels through parliamentary democracy, and the involvement 
97. 
of, for example, the TUC in the pursuit of economic objectives? 
Or does it extend downwards through industry as well? 
These three questions are explored in this chapter, and in the 
following one we turn to a fourth: how far have the processes of 
incorporation affected shop-floor behaviour? And what significance 
do our answers to this question have for our understanding of 
industrial relations and industrial democracy? 
The notion of 'incorporation' which emerges from this discussion 
serves as the foundation for the rest of this thesis. 
The Object of Incorporation 
Many writers - both sociologists and non-sociologists - have 
made the assumption that societies 'hold together' because their 
members share certain elements in common. This sharing, usually of 
values, is alleged to be the basis for the legitimacy of the social 
structure: 
"Any community will have certain moral ideas and ideals 
in common. Without some fundamental concepts held in 
this way, a society would disintegrate. This basic 
consensus constitutes the 'common possession' of society 
••• (and is) reflected in the law and structure of 
Government."7 
Obviously, if the working class are being incorporated, they 
must be coming to share these 'ideals' as well. But what range of 
ideals are there? As Mann points out, there are three possibilities: 
"Firstly, there are those (writers) who stress the 
commitment of social members to ultimate values, of 
which examples might be generalised beliefs in equality 
and achievement ••• Others, however, stress commitment 
to social norms, of which well-known examples are an 
adherence to the 'rules of the democratic game' and 
opposition to those who introduce strong conflictual 
elements {such as class ideology) into politics ••• 
Finally, there are writers who stress commitment 
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to beliefs about how society is actually organized ,,8 •••• 
Mann, in this article, is not coucerned with the process of 
incorporation; all the same, he highlights several conceptual 
problems related to the view that shared values, norms and beliefs 
integrate society. It is, to start with, usually very difficult 
to specify which values and so on have an integrative effect. As 
he says, notions of "social justice" and "democracy" are very vague, 
held often by both conservatives and revolutionaries alike.9 But 
in any case, the holding of even precisely stated values can lead to 
conflict, not consensus; for instance, not everyone can achieve 
"economic success", and failure - on an individual level - may lead 
to bitterness and envy. In addition, dominant values may frequently 
conflict with one an.ether: "competition" conflicts with "equality" 
unless definitions are muddled, in which case the value rather loses 
its content, and with it presumably its binding character. Finally, 
in the case of this kind of value conflict, social-cohesion is more 
likely to result from the lack of commitment to 'core values'. If 
the working classes are not committed to 'achievement' then social 
stability is more likely to ensue than if they are, since not every-
one can •achieve' in narrow terms. It may be that role specific 
values, though widely differing (e.g. teacher, parent, school 
governor), may produce greater social cohesion than commitment to 
core values through the development of a Durkheimia.n organic solidarity. 
For these a priori reasons alone, then, it would appear that any 
process of incorporation is unlikely to lead to general, working 
class commitment to core social values, norms and beliefs. Indeed, 
after an extensive review of the literature, this is Mann's 
1 
. 10 
cone usion. So we are still left with the question: what is 
being, or has been, incorporated? 
Areas of Incorporation 
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The answer becomes clearer when we turn to the second question 
posed above: in what areas is incorporation supposed to take place? 
There are, broadly speaking, three main areas which emerge: politics, 
and the extension of citizenship; economics, and the development 
of corporatism; and industry, with the focus on trade unions and 
industrial democracy. For many writers, the underlying dynamic 
behind these trends is the incorporation of working class interests. 
This is often related to commitment to those common social procedures 
designed to resolve conflict. Rights to participate in the 
procedures are granted in exchange for the responsibility to follow 
them. In the case of industrial relations, for instance, we have 
already seen how Flanders lays great emphasis on collective bargain-
ing as the chief method of job regulation in Britain through which 
workers' economic interests are mediated. Such a view implies a 
certain commitment - by at least sections of the working class, in 
particular union representatives - to laid down bargaining procedures. 
Fox, when analysing work attitudes, is careful to draw a distinction 
between 'substantive' orientations to work (concerning pay, conditions, 
security and so on) and 'procedural' orientations (concerning decision-
maki )
11 ng processes • 
It is frequently assumed by liberal pluralists that following 
100. 
procedure confers legitimacy on the outcome. 12 As we shall see, 
commitment to procedure varies considerably amongst the working 
class, dependent on the extent to which it protects their own self-
perceived interests. Indeed, much procedure is accepted only 
pragmatically. Only to the extent that workers internalise 
commitment, can it be maintained that they are incorporated and that 
their interests are legitimised. We now investigate three areas in 
which this could be claimed to happen. 
(1) Political Incorporation 
Perhaps the best known and most influential study of political 
incorporation is that of T. H. Marshall in which he distinguishes 
three elements in the concept of "citizenship". These are the civil 
element: "the rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty of 
the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own 
property ••• ,"; the political element: "the right to participate in 
the exercise of political power •••• "; and the social element: "the 
right to a modicum of welfare and security •••• 111 3 
The question which fascinates Marshall is how these principles 
of citizenship and social equality can co-exist with the pre-existing 
inequalities of class. In fact, of course, conflict between the two 
is transcended because: 
" ••• our society today assumes that the two are still 
compatible, so much so that citizenship has itself become, 
in certain respects, the architect of legitimate social 
inequality. Is it still true that the basic equality can 
be created and preserved without invading the freedom of 
the competitive market? Obviously it is not true. 1114 
The point is that "citizenship" has not interfered at all with 
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the functions of the free- market. Once again, we have the tension 
between observable and non-observable aspects of power. Free market 
relations are assumed when discussing citizenship, the development of 
which is an observable phenomenon. Indeed, as Marshall argues: 
"civil rights were indispensable to a competitive market economy111 5 
because individuals could then be expected to struggle independently 
for themselves in the market and not expect social protection. 
Political rights, despite their potential danger to the system, led 
to pressure for social ones. Yet here, the result has been the 
remoulding of inequalities, with new ones arising: education, through 
its relation to the occupational structure, gives rise to streaming; 
council housing estates maintain physical divisions between the social 
classes; the National Health Service is neglected by consultants who 
prefer to spend more time in remunerative private practices. 
himself concludes: 
" ••• there is a kind of.basic human equality, associated 
with full community membership, which is not inconsistent 
with a superstructure of economic inequality. 1116 
Marshall 
This conclusion is echoed by Bendix who extends Marshall's analysis 
to c·over many other European countries, with special reference to working 
class entry into national politics. He states: 
" ••• all adults who would take advantage of their legal, 
political and social rights naturally associate with one 
another in order to advance their claims as effectively as 
possible, and such associations reflect (or even intensify) 
the inequalities of the social structure. 1117 
The social structure remains intact. 
Now, the effects of this extension of citizenship have been 
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commented on at length. In relation to working class political 
incorporation, for example, the whole process is the subject of a 
well-known study of the Laboux Party by Miliband. 18 Clause Four of 
the Labour Party Constitution states clearly that "common ownership 
f th f d t • di t 'b t• d h II i •t • 19 o e means o pro uc ion, s ri u ion an exc ange s 1 s aim, 
yet the main achievement of the Parliamentary struggle has come to 
mean little more than support for the Welfare State. Yet there is 
overwhelming evidence that the Welfare State is compatible with 
20 continued poverty and unequal life chances; that it helps to pre-
serve the status quo in times of recession through the provision of 
basic requirements; 21 that its principal purpose is to service the 
needs of industry through the provision of a healthy, educated labour 
22 force; and that, because it does not recognise social provision as an 
end in itself, it can in any case be progressively dismantled by a 
government determined to cut public expenditure. 23 Welfare provisions 
- social rights - are therefore marginal. They do not at all imply 
changes in the structuxe of capitalism; the changes represented can be 
studied very much at the observable level favouxed by liberal pluxalists. 24 
It can, then, be argued that the focus on Parliament as the arena 
for political confrontation and the emergence of the Welfare State 
have represented a major compromise of working class interests. 
However, despite this, there has been little disenchan"bnent with Parlia-
mentary proceduxes. This is largely because, as the Times once noted 
in a leading article: 
"It is a well-tried principle of British political life that 
to institutionalise protest is an effective way of 
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charmelling it into constructive ends. 1125 
This somewhat complacent observation rings true because the "construc·t-
ive ends" referred to are defined predominantly through Parliamentary 
procedures which themselves protect hegemonic interests. The 
deficiencies·of the Welfare State become:victim of the "mobilisation 
of bias" - as is well understood, a large proportion of the working 
class votes Conservative in the UK. 26 
To achieve such a state of affairs, the dominant class has also 
compromised its interests - but very much within the 'observable' 
aspect of power relations. Its major achievement is to have developed, 
at national and local level, a strong hegemonic grip. Moorhouse has 
provided an interesting and important historical account of how this 
occurred. 27 He points out - following historically what Mann has 
emphasised theoretically - that the working class were not incorporated 
into politics in the 19th century through subjective factors (values 
and ideals). That is, explanations which emphasise working class 
values - deference, desire for respectability, religion and so on - as 
the principal force behind working class political incorporation are 
. t d 28 mscons rue • In fact, claims Moorhouse, working class 'compliance' 
was achieved through the structural constraints of the political system 
itself. For instance, the extension of the franchise in 1867 was 
"essentially a controlled experiment" which through various political 
devices and the exploitation of economic relationships limited the 
chances of revolutionary working class mobilisation: 
11 e•• the ruling class, collectively or individually, strove 
to control a changing and threatening situation to their 
advantage. The 'rights' granted to the new voters consisted 
almost entirely of being able to choose between the 
alternatives set by those who already controlled the major 
sources of economic and political power."29 
Indeed: 
" ••• far from altering economic and social structures, 
the new electoral arrangements served as an added buttress 
to inequality."30 
104. 
Examples of political an~ economic devices used to achieve these 
ends included: strict qualifications on residence requirements for 
electoral registration (changing lodgings meant loss of the vote for 
two years before the residence qualifying period was met); under-
representation of urban areas in Parliament; bribery of working class 
leaders; the use of family fortunes to bribe voters; and so on.31 
So choosing between pre-established political objectives meant 
for the voter that priorities for political conflict were set 'from 
above'. The development of latent conflict was inhibited or suppressed, 
and as Moorhouse observes, participation in such a system without real 
power soon became "ritualistic".32 Such external constraints, as they 
made themselves understood and became implanted in working class 
mentality, turned into internal or subjective constraints - that is, 
apathy, frustration and so on. In such a way are political rights 
made compatible with social inequality. 
In addition, though, this ability to fix alternatives also throws 
light on the "unity in multiplicity" dimension of hegemonic domination 
in Britain. Alternative political prograrmnes are permitted and 
legitimised to the degree that they correspond to a notion of the 
'national interest' - whose supreme political symbol is Parliament 
itself. This does not, of course, prevent alternative political 
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programmes from differing considerably from one another; the strength 
of active consent by all classes in the Parliamentary process is at 
least in part explicable through its symbolic character in unifying 
these alternative programmes. Historically they have been pre-
established by the means described by Moorhouse, which have now become 
the "well-tried principle" vaunted by the Times to channel protest 
into "constructive ends". The symbolic character of these Parliamentary 
processes extends Moorhouse•s observation on "ritualism" - and leads us 
to consider Lukes' insights on the same subject. 
In an illuminating re-analysis of political rituals - the Coronation 
and the Investiture of the Prince of Wales in the UK; and Memorial Day, 
Kennedy's Inaugural and popular reaction to his assassination in the 
USA - Lukes maintains: 
"Such ritual plays ••• a cognitive role, rendering intelligible 
society and social relationships, serving to organize people's 
lalowledge of the past and present and their capacity to imagine 
the future. In other words, it helps to define as authori-
tative certain ways of seeing society: it serves to specify 
what in society is of special significance, it draws people's 
attention to certain forms of relationships and activity -
and, at the same time therefore, it deflects their attention 
from other forms, since every way of seeing is also a way of 
not seeing."33 
As a result, political ritual can be considered as a means of 
exercising power. Lukes makes no reference in this article to the 
"third face of power", but he continues that his approach to ritual: 
" ••• would examine the cognitive dimension of social 
control within modern, class-structured societies, 
revealing the manifold ways in which institutionalised 
activities, seen as rituals, can serve to reinforce and 
perpetuate dominant and official models of social structure 
and social change, of, say, the 'kingdom', the 'fil:npire', the 
Constitution, the Republic, the nation •••• "34 
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This, in itself, is a highly suggestive way of studying ritual. 
But Lukes develops his view by maintaining that many other political, 
institutionalised forms of activity can be seen in the same way, 
even though not normally identified as ritual. As examples, he cites 
the 'Law', the activities of Legislatures and elections, all of which 
perpetuate the political system by defining our perceptions of it. 
For example: 
" ••• it is, undoubtedly, elections which are the most 
important form of political ritual in liberal democratic 
societies, partly because of their central place in the 
official ideology of such societies, partly because of 
the high degree of mass participation which they involve 
••• The ritual of voting draws (voters') attention to a 
particular model of 'politics', of the nature of political 
conflict and the possibilities of political change. 
Moreover, it both results from and reinforces the belief, 
in which there is normally little truth, that elections 
give them an influence over government policy. In this 
way, participation in elections - that minimal but most 
basic democratic activity - appears as the essence of 
'democracy' and thereby contributes to the stability of 
both the liberal and socialist democracies."35 
Incorporation at this political level - the extension of citizen-
ship and the promotion of active consent in Parliamentary processes 
through their ritualisation - have certainly been one of the chief 
factors accounting for the relative stability of Western nee-capitalist 
societies. The political structure placed a constraint on working 
class activity, with incorporation taking the form initially of a 
limitation on the kind of political participation which was possible. 
The development of active consent in this limitation has since made 
Parliamentary politics a bulwark of hegemonic control. This is 
undoubtedly because Parliament's role in the emergence of citizenship 
has been in working class interests - social rights have been established 
through pressure from Labour representation in the Commons. One of the 
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key distinctions drawn by commentators between the economic depressions in 
the 1930s and 1980s lies in the existence today of a greater range 
of welfare benefits to cushion unemployment.36 Parliamentary 
procedure, by producing such benefits, is legitimised. It interferes 
very little with the roots of inequality and does nothing to prevent 
unemployment in the first place. 
Parliament is, then, the core defence of neo-oapitalism in any 
protracted "war of position". However, as we come 'nearer' the roots 
of working class experience, especially in the areas of economics and 
industry, 'incorporation' becomes an increasingly difficult concept to 
apply to the working class. 
(2) Economic Incorporation 
The second area in which incorporation of working class interests 
is alleged to occur is the economic - in particular, the development of 
corporatism. This term is a difficult one to define, but Winkler, 
after a review of the literature, states that: 
"Corporatism is an economic system in which the state directs 
and controls predominantly privately owned business according 
to four principles: unity, order, nationalism and success."37 
Having distinguished facilitative, supportive and directive roles 
which the State might play in the economy, Winkler maintains that under 
corporatism its role is essentially directive. In addition, unity 
and co-operative effort are preferred to competition as collaboration 
is seen as the key to social survival; order and stability are created 
through State intervention in the economy to oblige collaboration; the 
main focus of economic activity is the nation (and ostensibly not class), 
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with protectionism as the central means to national performance; 
and success in such performance overrides maintenance of legal and 
social rights. 
Winkler makes the rather over-confident (and in the light of 
events wrong) prediction that: " ••• a corporatist economic system 
is the most likely development for the United Kingdom over the next 
five to ten years"·. 38 Despite this, the trends which he observes in 
the economy do merit attention. It is certainly true, as he says, 
that there has been a trend towards State planning in the British 
economy since the early 1960s. 39 The Conservatives set up the 
tripartite National Economic Development Council in 1962, which was 
followed in 1964-70 by the Labour Government's National Plan, Industrial 
Re-organization Corporation and prices and incomes policies, amongst 
other measures. The subsequent Conservative Government during its 
1Selsdon Man' phase introduced the Industrial Relations Act (1971), 
and then later its own prices and incomes policy amongst a battery of 
other instruments for State intervention in the economy. In 1974, 
all three major parties proposed some form of economic regulation by 
the State in some way or another. However, the 1974-9 Labour 
Government was the high point of corporatism according to Winkler 
(writing in 1976), especially the 'Social Contract' which was designed 
to give union support for a wages policy in exchange for a series of 
pro-union measures.40 
For Winkler, such a 'corporatist' response in Britain is the 
result of economic crisis, industrial concentration, declining profit 
levels, technological developments and sharpening international 
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competition. Although aware of alternative approaches - minor 
adjustments to the status quo, socialist appropriation and restoration 
of a "free market" economy, Winkler extrapolates the trend towards 
•corporatism'. Working class economic interests - especially the 
annual pay round - would be subsumed under some form of harmonistic, 
corporate control. The idea seems to be that workers would enter 
an 'economic citizenship' through acceptance of, presumably, the TUC's 
deliberations with Government and the employers.41 
Two major questions arise at once. First, is Winkler correct 
in conceptualising the growth of State intervention in the economy as 
corporatism? And secondly, even if so, what likelihood has the trend 
of continuing? 
Marsh and Grant, in a powerful critique of the corporatist theory, 
make a distinction between a 'strong' form of liberal corporatism 
(Winkler•s) and a 'weak' form, which they term 1 tripartism'. Tri part-
ism "emphasises the relationship between government and the peak 
organizations" (the C:BI and the TUC). 42 They claim, very plausibly, 
that four conditions must operate before tripartism - let alone 
corporatism - can take root: 
(1) the Government, CBI and TUC must agree common economic 
and industrial policies; 
(2) this policy must be ml.derpinned by consensus: "in 
particular, the parties involved would be willing to 
set aside any fundamental disagreements about ultimate 
goals in order to arrive at agreed solutions to specific 
problems"; 
(3) leaderships would have to be willing to persuade 
their members to comply with agreed policies -
without this, their cha.nee of successful imple-
mentation is slight; 
(4) each of the three must have similar influence on 
policy development - if not, its obligations to the 
other two vanishes~43 
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Concentrating on the period 1964-76, the authors discover that 
none of these four conditions operated. Though relations had some-
times been good between Government, CBI and TUC, harmony had never 
persisted: 
"One of the problems is that however good bilateral 
relations between the government and the CBI and the 
government and the TUC have been, there has rarely been 
a good working relationship between the CBI and the TUC."44 
There is simply no consensus on long-term goals as a basis for 
continuing co-operation. In addition, the CBI and the TUC lack 
executive control over their membership; and in neither case anyhow 
does their membership represent a high density respectively of the 
country's employers and employees. So although both 'peak organiza-
tions' usually enjoy good access to Government, each is best considered 
as a coalition of varying interests. Finally, the influence of neither 
organization with governments remains steady. Even during the Social 
Contract, for instance, the TUC was tmable to influence the Labour 
Government on import controls or on the restriction of public expend-
iture cuts. This, in general, is because: 
"Governments have to take much more than the views of the 
CBI and TUC into account when fonnulating economic policies, 
not least some estimate of likely electoral consequences 
(especially when the government has a slim Parliamentary 
majority). 11 45 
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Historically, then, the authors conclude that State intervention 
in industry does not amount to corporatism.46 
So, given this analysis - which we accept - what chance does 
corporatism, or even tripartism have of developing in the UK? Rather 
low, we shall suggest, because such theorists leave certain factors out 
of account or else underestimate their importance. 
In the first place, Winkler underestimates the potential that the 
dominant class still possesses in times of recession for the suppression 
of working class interests. Given political hegemony, it is able -
through appeal to the 'national interest• - to cut relative living 
standards with comparative ease: 
"One of the p e.nalties which the subordinate classes pay 
for their subordination - indeed what almost defines them 
as subordinate classes - is that their demands can be made 
to appear in this light, as injurious to the 'national 
interest•, especially when members of these classes take it 
into their heads to press their demands with a vigour which 
is necessarily and by definition disruptive. 1147 
Winkler does remark that "another Selsdon phase" is possible if 
a certain section of Conservative leadership were elected to power 
during economic "expansion" (sic) and growth in oil revenues. 48 
However, this line of argument is not pursued, and Winkler fails to 
show how such a popularly elected government, mobilising terms like 
'national survival', could engage with little resistance on widescale 
spending cuts, relative increases in defence expenditure and monetarist 
policies.49 When we come to investigate industrial relations, 
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we shall discover again that suppression of working class interests is 
the iron fist in the velvet glove of incorporation. 
But the other, major problem for Winkler - which he acknowledges 
but does not sufficiently stress - is that different levels of the 
trade union movement can be incorporated in varying degrees: 
"It is here that resistance is most likely to emerge. Any 
British corporatist regime would almost certainly not attempt 
to break the union movement, in Nazi style, but rather to 
co-opt it into corporatist institutions. Union officialdom 
may acquiesce if it is offered a sufficiently significant role 
in the planning system to replace a lost collective bargaining 
role. The rank and file will probably be the principal source 
of opposition. Their incorporation will depend on (a) the 
attractiveness of the controlled-wages-plus-welfare package 
they will be offered; (b) how grim the alternatives, unemploy-
ment and inflation, look at the time; (c) the willingness of 
the government to coerce; and (d) the realism of any socialist 
alternative."50 
The point is that any such incorporation would at best be 
pragmatic, and would not involve active consent as political incorpor-
ation does. The alternatives are either a carrot (a), or two sticks 
(b) and (c), or a phantom (d). Winkler is here making a crucial 
distinction between sections of the working class. Labour leaders in 
Parliament, union officialdom, the shop stewards' movement, and the 
rank-and-file are all organized differently and have differing ideologies 
and interests within the hegemonic political domination of the dominant 
class. It is quite impossible to discuss baldly the incorporation of 
working class interests without discussing these different levels. 
Indeed, it is a common mistake made by incorporation theorists to general-
ise too easily about the objeot of incorporation. Cousins and Davis, 
for instance, having looked at the concept of 'labour aristocracy' as an 
explanation for the failure of working class revolutionary exertions, 
note that: 
" ••• another argument has been advanced, derived in one 
version from the New Left out of Gram.sci, and in another 
version seemingly influenced by phenomenological sociology: 
the working class is ineffective because it has been 
'incorporated' ••• The second argument is quite unlike the 
first since it openly admits and indeed depends upon the 
unity of the working class at some (unspecified) cultural 
level. The working class has been 'incorporated' but 
swallowed whole and perfectly intact."51 
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Such a view of incorporation is naive. The working class is 
not a "whole" as it has sectional interests which may be incorporated 
differently - indeed, the concept of contradictory consciousness tells 
us that the same worker may hold consensual and conflictual attitudes 
at the same time. It is also more fruitful to work with the notion 
of interests rather than "cultural incorporation". 
So our lengthy discussion of contradictory consciousness in 
Chapter Three has provided us with a powerful conceptual tool to come 
to grips with incorporation the.ory. Successful at national and local 
political levels through hegemonic domination; partially successful 
in economic terms through faltering tripartism; it is almost entirely 
unsuccessful in coping with working class interests in industry. 
Contradictory consciousness is the key to discovering why this is so. 
(3) Levels of Incor,Poration in Industry 
We have now, in fact, by starting to look at industrial incorpor-
ation, approached the third set of questions which we posed at the 
beginning of this chapter: the levels at which incorporation takes 
place. In politics, it occurs at national and local levels through 
elections to Parliament and councils; in economics, it occurs at 
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national level through - occasionally - joint agreement of policy by 
Government, CBI and TUC; and we have now to analyse industrial 
relations, an analysis which will rely heavily on distinctions between 
levels. 
(i) Value Integ:ration 
On the Left, one of the most common understandings of 'incorpora-
tion' is the value integration of individual trade union and political 
leaders. This is sometimes seen as their corruption. As Marx puts 
it: 
"The leadership of the working class of England has wholly 
passed into the hands of the corrupted leaders of the trade 
unions and the professional agitators •••• "52 
It is, of course, perfectly true that individuals do change their 
values as the 'move up' the social ladder into positions of leadership. 53 
An interesting view of this process is provided by Goffman in terms of 
'frontstage' behaviour (when individuals are in the public eye) and 
'backstage' behaviour (when they are out of the public eye): 
" ••• persons of high rank tend to operate in small teams 
and tend to spend much of their day engaged in spoken 
performances, whereas working-class men tend to be members 
of large teams and tend to spend much of their day backstage 
or in unspoken performances. Thus the higher one's place 
in the status pyramid, the smaller the number of persons with 
whom one can be familiar, the less time one spends backstage, 
and the more likely it is that one will be required to be 
polite as well as decorous."54 
It is less, then, that decorum and courtesy help someone to high 
position, but rather that they become likely to develop once he has 
attained that position.55 Obviously, though, such a change in behaviour 
observed in a labour leader by fonner colleagues may well be interpreted 
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as a 'sell-out' to the bosses. This not to say, of course, that 
such leaders do not internalise dominant values but simply that the 
micro-sociological reasons for the change are usually ignored. 
However, since we are concerned with the structural dimensions 
of industrial incorporation rather than the biographies of individuals, 
we turn now to the ideological dimension of incorporation. 
(ii) Ideology 
We have already shown that the working class is dominated through 
bourgeois hegemony. Patterns of property ownership, hierarchical 
reward and division of labour form the very basis of the sway of the 
dominant class. In Britain, the extension of 'citizenship' has 
helped to achieve this. In politics, however, Roth points out that 
there are two other alternatives available to the dominant class for 
c o pfug with lower class demands. One is complete suppression as 
attempted by Imperial Russia; the other is what he terms "negative 
integration", as practised by Imperial Germany and by the Third, 
Fourth and - at least until 1981 - Fifth French Republics: 
" ••• a political system permits a hostile mass movement 
to existlegally, but prevents it from gaining access to the 
centres of power ••• A radical mass movement constitutes at 
least a potential source of instability, but if it can be 
legalised without sharing in governmental power it may 
contribute to the stability of the dominant system by leav-
ing intact the latter's basic structure and by developing 
vested interests in its own legal status."56 
In fact, though, such negative integration need not be political. 
It can also be industrial. The argument here is that the successful 
establishment of hegemony in British politics is counteracted by the 
negative integration of the trade unions at industrial level. The 
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Labour Movement certainly has its own radical ideology in both 
politics and industry, as embodied in Clause IV of the Labour Party 
and in similar clauses in other union rule books.57 However, this 
radical ideology operates within the structural limitations of 
bourgeois hegemony and centres on the union movement; the negative 
integration lies in its inability ever to initiate policy or to control 
actively. Clegg, for instance, admits quite explicitly: 
"The trade union is thus industry's opposition - an 
opposition which can never become a govemment. 11 58 
Despite its radical overtones, such a view is essentially reformist, 
operating well within the hegemonic structure of class domination. As 
Anderson puts it: 
"A combination of structural and conjunctional factors in 
the nineteenth century produced a proletariat distinguished 
by an immovable corporate class consciousness and almost no 
hegemonic ideology. This paradox is the most important 
single fact about the English working class. If a hegemonic 
class can be defined as one which imposes its own ends and 
its own vision on society as a whole, a corporate class is 
conversely one whiQh pursues its own ends within a social 
totality whose global determination lies outside it. 11 59 
Anderson's theory is that a premature bourgeois revolution in 
the 17th century led to the emergence of a premature working class 
movement whose struggles reached their height in the 1830s and 1840s 
before socialism became a resource available to them. Hence their 
corporate and non-hegemonic identity. The details of this approach 
have been strongly challenged by E. P. Thompson, who nevertheless 
ad.mi ts: 
" ••• we must, I think, recognise that once a certain 
climactic momentispassed, the opportunity for a certain 
kind of revolutionary movement passes irrevocably - not 
SO"much because of 'exhaustion' but because more limited, 
reformist pressures, often from secure organisational 
bases, bring evident returns. 11 60 
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Thompson's resigned tones do not deny .Anderson's central point, 
that the British working class is conservatively corporate and 
rejects revolution. 
Yet: 
" ••• in Britain it took two hundred years of conflict to 
subdue the working people to the discipline of direct 
economic stimuli, and the subjugation has never been more 
than partial. 1161 
Within corporate reformism, the "partiality" of this subjugation 
is what puts the contradiction into contradictory consciousness. 
Experience of conflict on the shop-floor - itself often produced by 
events outside the factory, such as a merger - not only prevents the 
total assimilation of the working class into industry, but also helps 
it to sustain its corporate class identity. The UCS work-in, for 
example, challenged the rights of owners to dispose freely of property 
even if, more usually, the experience of conflict tends simply to fuel 
the radical nature of working class corporate identity.62 
However, this identity is itself fragmented both temporally and 
spatially. Trade union executives may become more or less militant 
over time, 63 and different parts of the country may be characterised by 
different reputations for milita.ncy.64 Most important, though, is 
that a wide spectrum of views can be identified within the ideology 
which sustains corporate class identity. The most reformist end of 
this spectrum is frequently called 'labourism': 
"Labourism was the theory and practice of class collabor-
ation; it was a tradition which in theory (always) and in 
practice (mostly) emphasised the unity of Capital and 
Labour, and the importance of conciliation and arbitration 
in industrial disputes. 1165 
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This is doubtlessly the dominant strand within corporate working 
class ideology as it exists in Britain: 
"Labourism, as a theory and practice, is deeply rooted in 
the social structures a.rid organizations of the British 
working class. It has the enormous force of a tradition 
established and practised over many decades. This side 
of economic and social catastrophe, it is likely to prove 
stubbornly resistant to change. Which is not to say that 
change cannot, or will not, come. 1166 
As we have seen, Thompson notes that such practice does bring 
"evident returns" to the working class: material advantage on the one 
hand, and rules and procedures to protect marginal interests on the 
other. So how is change to come? 
At the other end of the spectrum, still within the reformist 
tradition, is the radical (but not revolutionary) version. Barratt 
Brown, Coates and Topham, for instance, answer a plea for revolution67 
by rejecting it in the following terms: 
" ••• the limits of reform have not yet been reached ••• 
As they come into view, so the pressure for structural 
reform will mount, as it has been mounting for the past 
decade. 1168 
Indeed, their commitment to non-violent reformist methods is also 
very strong: 
'~The revolutionary) sees the capitalist state and society 
as a totality, with which we would agree; but sees its 
transformation in terms of its overturn, as it were from 
outside, in what he himself calls a cataclysm, while we 
see the possibility of the disintegration of its baneful 
power structure by encroaching control from within. 1169 
And still more forcibly: 
"If Western European capitalism really could not be over-
thrown without liquidating all the positive gains of 
bourgeois democracy, it would be better even for its most 
e~loited victims to allow it to continue ••• "70 
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As a result, then, whilst we may accurately call the dominant 
counter-ideology amongst the British Labour movement 'reformist•, we 
must be careful to distinguish the range of reformist views available 
within it. Tb.is is especially crucial when we turn to the issue of 
'industrial democracy'. Traditional labourism may be class collabor-
ationist, but at the other end, broadly in line with the Institute for 
Workers' Control and the Tribunite wing of the Labour Party, lies the 
view that the revolutionary transformation of capitalism can be 
achieved through democratic reformism.71 
However, the common quality of both these extremes of the ideo-
logical spectrum is their - to use Roth's term - "negative integration". 
Whilst the working class is largely assimilated into bourgeois hegemony 
in political terms through Parliament, elections and so on, a hostile 
counter-ideology is allowed to exist with its base predominantly in 
industry. As we have seen, workers' lives are rooted in conflict on 
the shop-floor, and as we shall see, in one circumstance or another, 
they all draw on the conflictual elements of labour ideology to 
rationalise their behaviour. This ideology is legal - indeed, the 
liberal pluralist perspective is founded on its legality - but it is 
not permitted in any way to impinge on the running or government of 
industry beyond certain issues at the margins of power. That is, 
whilst trade unions bargain over the effort/reward relationship, manning 
levels, discipline and so on, many technical functions in industry, 
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crucial for the continuance of nee-capitalism, are still exclusively 
within the remit of managerial prerogative: mergers, takeovers, 
investment strategy, marketing and so on. Trade unions, therefore, 
contribute to the stability and smooth running of industry whilst 
leaving its fundamentals intact. Indeed, they develop their own 
vested interests over time, for instance, in their legal status and 
their role in economic planning. In such a way, their influence is 
contained. Roth's concept of "negative integration" which he uses 
to analyse German politics, therefore, serves us well in analysing 
British industrial relations. No wonder, then, that Anderson states: 
"All mature socialist theory since Lenin has started by 
stressing the insurmountable limitations of trade union 
action in a capitalist society."72 
Unions, negatively integrated, are a component of nee-capitalism, 
as bargainers, not transformers. 73 
So far, then, in reference to 'levels' of incorporation we can 
speak of working class political incorporation through hegemony and 
the negative integration of reformist labour ideology, wi~h the wide 
range of attitudes that this embraces. To complete discussion of 
'levels' in relation to industry, we must now look at working class 
experience on the shop-floor. Has working class behaviour been 
incorporated? And if not, then why not? 
In the next chapter we analyse first the determinants of shop-
floor behaviour, and then the way in which social actors structure 
rationales to account for their own behaviour. As we shall see, the 
kinds of rationales available depend very much on the coherence of 
ideological resources available, the presence or absence of 'labourism' 
through trade union activity being particularly important. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
In the last chapter we discussed the incorporation of working 
class political interests through the operation of bourgeois hegemony. 
We also saw how working class interests are systematically excluded 
from power in industry through the negative integration of reformist 
labour ideology, though freedom to react to events is normally 
legitimated. In such a way conflict is kept manageable. 
However, when it comes to shop-floor behaviour, conflict is often 
thought not to be manageable as we saw in Part I. Yet the paradox 
appears to be that many workers combine conflictual attitudes at work 
with consensual attitudes towards politics - a paradox which we have 
already analysed at length as contradictory consciousness. It is 
important to stress that this notion is no mere abstraction recognised 
only in sociological theory. For example, Jack Jones, former General 
Secretary of the TGWU, has pointed out that trade unions have lacked 
success in explaining their role in British society, as a result of 
which even working class opinion is fragmented about them. According 
to him, this fragmentation is "the main problem" facing the Labour 
movement: 
"People may accept that a trade union is good for them, but 
at the same time condemn as irresponsible a group of workers 
taking trade union action elsewhere. They may see the 
necessity of militant strike action in their own circum-
stances, respect their own shop steward, yet regard shop 
stewards in general as trouble makers. They may recognise 
the necessity of collective strength in their own place of 
work, understand its role in offsetting potential tyranny 
of ownership and management power, and yet still be able to 
talk about 'the unions having too much power these days'!"1 
These observations lead us to examine why it is that, despite their 
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own protests that "unions have too much power these days", workers 
nevertheless will often behave in a way considered by management as 
conflictual. 
The Determinants of Work-place Behaviour 
Such conflictual behaviour ranges in extremes from absenteeism, 
bad timekeeping and labour turnover, to strikes, sabotage and riots. 2 
A dramatic example will illustrate the point: although 77°fe Luton 
car workers in the 'Affluent Worker' study had a 'co-operative 
attitude towards management•, a month after these findings' publica-
tion, "near-riot conditions developed" after the workers involved 
were subjected to a four-day week and a relative wage reduction despite 
record profits announced by the company. During the riot, the workers 
attempted to storm the main company offices.3 
Of course, most conflictual behaviour is less extreme than this, 
but management has always been preoccupied with its control. As we 
saw in Chapter One, the impetus behind Taylor's work was to limit the 
work task to such an extent that no discretion - or room for hostile 
behaviour - was left to the worker at all. Yet even implementing 
this prooess can in itself create conflict, 4 and there have now been 
many studies of the determinants of shop-floor attitudes and behaviour. 
Some writers, adopting a functionalist approach have made causal 
assumptions about the relationship of work-place technology or group 
organization and workers' orientations to work. Sayles, for instance, 
writing in 1958, states: 
"Ideally, it should be possible to develop predictive 
tools that would pennit the design of organizations for 
specific ••• industrial relations characteristics. The 
millenium is nowhere in sight ••• but our research should 
move us in this direction."5 
Not all writers would adopt such a determinist outlook, of 
course, but factors which have been singled out for attention as 
influencing work-place behaviour include, in addition to those 
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already cited in Chapter One· (pp.21-2): 6 age; organizational size;7 
8 supervisory style; and family commitments (which may affect 
absenteeism and the desire for overtime).9 
.Another group of researchers has emphasised the occupational 
group. Sykes, for example, has shown the importance of Chapel 
cohesion in allowing print workers to develop mutual support against 
10 the employer; Cannon has illustrated the case of compositors in 
11 the same way; whilst Brown and Brannen have shown how the existence 
of trade groups amongst shipbuilders - each one facing varying degrees 
of labour market instability - has tended to prevent the emergence of 
class solidarity even within an area of traditional heavy industry: 
12 "Homogeneity at some levels is combined with diversity at others". 
However, undoubtedly the most well-known and controversial account 
of workers' attitudes and behaviour is the 'Affluent Worker' series 
carried out by Goldthorpe, et ai. 13 
In a discussion on method, Goldthorpe explains that previously: 
"Explanations (of behaviour) have been offered ••• from 
the point of view of the functioning of the enterprise as 
a production {or 'socio-technical') system - and not from 
the point of view of the actors involved."14 
This functional approach, with its stress on systems, is 
rejected in favour of: 
"a 'social action' perspective. The starting point is 
••• with the ordering of wants and expectations relative 
to· work, and with the meaning thus given to work, which 
result in men taking up and retaining assembly-line jobs. 
And the key explanatory notion to which we have then 
referred is not that of the enterprise as a production 
system, but that of the definition of work and of the 
work situation, dominant among the assemblers we studied; 
that is, as we have shown, a definition of work as an 
essentially instrumental activity - as a means to ends 
external to the work situation •••• "15 
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The understanding of behaviour is, therefore, located squarely 
with the social actors themselves. Their own definitions and 
meanings of social situations are the key to the determinants of shop-
floor behaviour. This approach is basically Weberian, and its 
importance in industrial relations is that it focuses attention away 
from managerial preoccupations towards workers themselves, towards 
their identities and concerns. 
The studies provoked a series of criticisms which are grouped 
here under two headings: Marxist and social action. A review of 
both groups helps us to answer the fourth question posed earlier (p.97): 
how far can the process of incorporation affect shoP-floor behaviour? 
And what theoretical significance emerges from our answer to such a 
question? 
(1) Marxist Critiques of the 'Affluent Worker' 
We have already noted Blackburn's description of what he called 
"an explosion of consciousness" at the car plant subject to Goldthorpe 
et al.'s investiga.tions.16 A riot it was, but "an explosion of 
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consciousness" it undoubtedly was not. Mann, in a discussion of 
Blackburn's comments, argues that such a riot is entirely compatible 
with underlying, conservative attitudes about the wrongness of 
strikes 
1
7 - and indeed, the riot did not lead to a strike either 
then or during the other disputes which hit the plant in 1965-7.18 
Th.ere are, however, two substantial critiques of the 'Affluent 
Worker' from the Marxist angle. The first is from Westergaard. 19 
In it, he attacks not the evidence of the studies, but their inter-
pretation. In contrast to the working class 'embourgeoisement' 
theories of the 1950s, Goldthorpe et al. discovered that affluent 
workers were home-oriented, isolated from their residential community 
and did not seek assimilation into middle-class values and culture. 
Their attitudes to work were instrumental, that is, they obtained 
little or no satisfaction from their jobs beyond their wages, the 
level of pay being the single most quoted reason for staying with 
their firm. Westergaard points out that this is not a new phenomenon. 
Indeed, for Marx, the 'cash nexus' was the chief, residual binding 
force of capitalist society. But at the same time, it is highly 
vulnerable: if workers' pay is threatened for whatever reason, then 
there is nothing else to bind them to their work. So Westergaard 
attempts to re-interpret some of the Luton data to show how 'social 
apathy' actually co-exists with 'social criticism': 
(i) 67°/o manual and 7&/o white collar workers agreed that 
'teamwork means success and is to everyone's 
20 advantage'; 
(ii) 55>/o manual and 74% white collar workers thought that 
trade unions should "keep separate" from the Labour 
21 Party; 
(iii) 4 3% manual and 7 2>;6 white collar workers thought that 
trade unions had "too much" power. 22 
Yet at the same time: 
(iv) 4D>;6 manual workers felt that 111lllions should also try 
to get workers a s~y in management"; 23 
(v) 74% manual workers thought that the "firm could pay 
more 11 ; 24 
(vi) 6o>;6 manual and 63% white collar workers agreed that big 
business had too much power; 25 and 
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(vii) 72>;6 manual and 59>;6 white collar workers agreed that there 
was "one law for rich and another for poor11 • 26 
Goldthorpe et al. themselves admit that: 
"Although, by all indications, these firms operate with 
some considerable amount of success, this they appear able 
to do without securing the 'integration' of their labour 
forces in other than a fairly minimal, economic sense. 11 27 
Workers, therefore, appear to show no effective or moral commit-
ment to their firms. Westergaard's criticism is that notenough is 
made of this point: 
'"Individualistic' aspirations are linked with a sense of 
social injustice and of exploitation characteristic of an 
unequal power situation. 11 28 
He claimed that the developing shop-floor organization of the 
1950s and 1960s could generate a network of extra-local links between 
workers through which 'parochial' matters could become politicised. 
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We shall return to this point, in fact, when we come to analyse the 
significance of work-ins, co-operatives and alternative corporate 
plans in Chapter Eleven. In the meantime, we agree with Westergaard 
that the 'Affluent Worker' reports do not recognise properly or build 
on the contradictions apparent in their own findings. We have already 
noted Coates' point that the most aggressive sections of the trade 
union movement are often the best paid; 'instrumentality' is not 
necessarily foreign to class conscious workers (which is not, of 
course, to imply that 'instrumental' workers are class conscious). 
Mackenzie, in another powerful critique, concentrates less on 
re-interpreting the evidence, and rather more on emphasising that the 
market and work situation of affluent workers still determine their 
objective class position: 
" ••• the analysis of the class structure of capitalist 
society requires an examination of structured inequality 
and life-chances - which ••• typically depend upon position 
in the division of labour. To be sure ••• community and 
family structure potentially reinforce various forms of 
social consciousness generated within differing types of 
work situation ••• But the crucial fact remains that 
community and family structure are shaped by the Industrial 
and therefore the occupational structure of a particular 
area or region."29 
Affluence in itself does nothing to alter life chances or access 
to economic power in the market - job security, opportunities for 
career mobility, source or size of income and still less a redistri-
bution of wealth. Nor does affluence alter the worker's role in the 
division of labour, which involves occupying a particular socio-
technical environment in the factory and performing monotonous tasks. 
Furthermore, in so far as workers' responses to these conditions 
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are not automatic but depend on prior expectations, then the 'affluent 
worker' is not typical in any case. The selection of Luton was made 
deliberately by Goldthorpe et al. to provide the best chances of 
success for the 'embourgeoisement' thesis; when the thesis failed 
to apply it was reasonable to assume that it would fail as well in 
less propitious cases. But for the same reasons, Mackenzie continues, 
the sample is "less than ideal" as a foundation for generalisations 
about narrow, instrumental orientations of workers' behaviour elsewhere: 
" ••• it is not a portrayal that is grounded, as any study 
of class structure must be, in the material base, or 
30 division of labour, of the community or society concerned." 
Westergaard and Mackenzie, then, summarise two Marxist angles of 
a critique on the 'affluent worker'. 
Another critique, developed by w. w. Daniel, operates within the 
terms of the social action perspective itself. 
(2) Social Action Critique 
Daniel had already written on the work orientation of process-
industry operators, who, he discovered, would often express apparently 
conflicting attitudes towards their jobs. On the one hand, they 
would claim that relations with management were good, and that work 
itself was rewarding - "they're not telling you to do something, they're 
asking you". Such attitudes dominated day to day behaviour. Yet on 
the other hand, operators complained about the wage/effort bargain and 
the low level of pay. Work was then portrayed as drudgery. Such 
attitudes dominated the negotiation of contracts with the employer. 
As one operator succinctly put it: "on the job, we work as a team -
when it comes to money, we're on opposite sides. It's as simple as 
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that". 31 
This 'split' in work orientations led Daniel to criticise 
Goldthorpe et al. for the crudity of their methods in measuring those 
of the affluent workers. 32 Notice that this split is not between 
levels of consciousness, but within the same level - orientation to 
work on the shop..floor. Like Westergaard, Daniel points out some 
of the contradictory evidence in the studies - though he does not 
have recourse to structural class analysis to underpin it. For 
instance, he remarks that the fact that workers are satisfied with a 
job (as the best bargain in the circumstances) is not to say that 
they are satisfied_!!! it (as the process operators are). Indeed, 
workers may keenly sense job dissatisfaction as a source of depriva-
tion in their lives 
Goldthorpe et al.33 
a point recognised, but not exploited by 
So, Daniel calls for a refining of work orien-
tation typologies to take into account differing work contexts -
choosing a job, actually performing it, pay bargaining and so on - in 
which the~ worker can find himself. Daniel's argument is that 
Goldthorpe et al., in their questionnaires, asked workers why they 
stayed in a job but used the orientation thereby derived to explain 
all other contexts (sources of gratification, responses to supervision, 
relationships with fellow workers, and so on).34 In the course of an 
increasingly acerbic interchange,35 Daniel attempted to establish his 
point: in different work situations, the attitudes of the same workers 
could alter dramatically. Using case study material from process 
industry productivity bargaining exercises, Daniel maintained that 
"there was a complete reversal of priorities and attitudes when the 
context was the work situation as opposed to the negotiating situation".36 
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Without entering the full technicalities of the debate, it does seem 
clear that workers have a range of priorities, each one becoming 
salient in different contexts. No one consistent set of priorities 
serves as a basis for evaluating all occupational experiences. To 
focus attention solely on, say, reasons for staying with a firm, 
entails a possible misdirection of emphasis away from other work 
contexts. As we shall see, ·some work contexts are more permeated 
with reformist labour ideology than others; they are the ones which 
are more conflictual (though Daniel himself does not pursue the issue 
in this way). 
A summary of our position so far reveals that while bourgeois 
hegemony ensures a basic acceptance amongst the working class of 
social inequalities, a reformist labour ideology permits the articula-
tion of opposition to both the political and industrial structure 
opposition which becomes most visible and apparent in work-place 
behaviour. Workers hold contradictory attitudes towards their work-
place both at the same time (as Westergaard observes) and over time 
in different work contexts (as Daniel observes). These contradictions 
exist within an unequal class structure (Mackenzie) which still depends 
on the cash nexus as one - but certainly not the only - means of main-
taining work discipline. 
The approach we are left with could be called 'Marxist social 
action•. That is, it accepts Marxist class analysis whilst at the 
same time acknowledging the complexity of the ideological dimension 
which has accompanied the development of nee-capitalism. Such an 
approach seeks to clarify this ideological dimension through analysing 
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how workers' perceptions of the social structure are formed and how 
they result in 'contradictory consciousness'. Hyman sums up this 
position well, though without giving it a name: 
"There is, in other words, a complex two-way process in 
which men's goals, ideas and beliefs influence and are 
influenced by the social structure. To do justice to 
its complexity, industrial sociologists must be attuned 
to this dynamic interaction between structure and 
consciousness. A static or a one-way analysis necessarily 
distorts social reality,. and is therefore an inadequate 
basis for understanding industrial behaviour or predicting 
its development. The greatest potential'for further 
progress in the sociology of industrial conflict (and the 
same is indeed true of sociology in general) must lie in 
the elaboration of a dialectical approach."37 
Such a dialectical approach is, then, adopted here. But before 
we finish Part I, we must investigate the patterns of contradictory 
attitudes and behaviour which have emerged. We have now seen that 
the theoretical and empirical bases for contradictory consciousness 
are overwhelming. But is conflictual behaviour random? And if not, 
what account can we give of its patterns and regularities? 
Behavioural Rationales 
It is, then, quite easy to pick out some of the contradictory 
elements in the thinking of the 'affluent worker'. During the 1970s 
a series of research projects - associated with .Armstrong, Beynon and 
Nichols amongst others - centred on work-place behaviour and in the 
process have thrown light on some of these contradictions. The 
research has all been strongly empirical, with the authors' presence 
on the shop-floor recognised and accepted by all concerned. Their 
premise has been that: 
" ••• the key problem is not how to divide and rule workers 
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the better but that they.!!!. ruled, and d.ivided."38 
Since we can now appreciate the truth of this assertion, we shall 
attempt to draw up a typology of these 'divisions'. 
During a discussion of 'factory consciousness' at Fords, Beynon 
states: 
"The stewards' critique of management can be presented in 
terms of two dimensions. The one structural, which places 
the action of management within the structure of the large 
capitalist corporation; the other moral, which involves a 
criticism of the action management take in the plant and a 
moral judgement of the managers as men."39 
This is an important distinction because the stewards themselves 
drew a line between the 'system• - an impetus to reduce costs and raise 
output - in which Ford management folll'l.d itself, and the individual 
managers who were frequently subject to considerable work pressure 
themselves. Yet between these structural and moral dimensions lccy-
something else: 
"Management may be pawns, they may be just doing their job, 
they mccy be nice blokes, but by challenging the moral 
rights of workers they make themselves morally culpable. 
It is by this means that the stewards come to activism. 
It is this which gives force to the ideology of trade 
unionism and the idea of trade union principles."40 
So the plant becomes the site of limited class conflict: 
''Management may be pawns, but in a car plant they' re paid to be lethal 
pawns. 1141 
:Beynon himself unravels three strands within the shop stewards' 
critique. First, the structural one, which is a given; ~econd, union 
activity as a limited response to achieve at least some reform at the 
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margins; and third, a moral understanding - sometimes even sympathy 
- towards the position of individual managers. In accounting for 
the particular 'balance' likely between these strands amongst stewards 
at Fords, Halewood., Beynon makes reference to a number of factors: 
the technology of assembly belt production; a particular, militant, 
Liverpudlian working class culture; a TGWU closed shop and aspects 
of TGWU organization, especially its shop-floor based branch structure; 
the mistakes of the Ford, Dagenham, shop stewards' committee in 1962; 
management style, and so on.42 All these elements, as we shall see, 
provide workers with reference points, or rationales of a motivational 
sort with which to oppose management. 
In other oases, where militancy is lacking, such rationales are 
lacking as well. Nichols and Armstrong, for instance, in a study of 
1 ChemCo 1 - a chemical complex in the South of England - state: 
"Chemeo workers are internally divided. They lack solidarity, 
are isolated from one another, are stratified by a grading 
system, lack experience of active trade unionism, and certainly 
lack any radical political tradition."43 
Reasons for their lack of radical political tradition are put 
forward elsewhere: the site employed a •green' labour force; the work-
force is separated from the national union which undertakes wages 
negotiations for them; union dues are collected through check-off, and 
not by a steward; the development of a shop stewards' committee was 
blocked; and because of the process nature of the industry, workers 
are particularly exposed to management ways of looking at things.44 
The authors present a study of workers at ChemCo whose conscious-
ness is characterised by "divided (and inconsistent) strains of thought", 
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and whose experience - both direct and indirect - is fragmented.45 
Many of the men hark back to hard times in the past, up North, where 
there was a "sense of cormnunity"; but now that things are better 
unions are less necessary and there is no reason to go on strike -
"the modern generation has got it soft". Directors deserve their 
salaries and most of the workers accept the profit motive, and 
approve of shareholding. Still: 
"There remain things they just cannot understand. More 
than this, though, if share prices jump, if there is a 
GOver.nment decision affecting the product, if a plant is 
closed, they do not expect to understand ••• Confronted 
with the incredible, they reach for readily available 
clich6s to render it credible. Out of a reality which 
is not their reality they seek to negotiate sense. 
'They' - the 'they' who say this are in newspapers, on 
TV, in Parliament, in the works' magazine - ••• this 
'they' provides plenty of well trodden idea-ways along 
which the lost can wander. 1146 
Unlike the Ford workers, those at ChemCo lack any rationales to 
interpret their own experience more coherently or satisfactorily away 
from these "well trodden idea-ways". With largely the same 
experiences as Ford workers, those at ChemCo make a very different sense 
of reality out of them: they have neither the structural critique nor 
the union activism, and rely on a guarded moral criticism of management, 
centring mainly on 'conditions'. 
Management occupies its own office block, away from the production 
plants; it is dry and warm, unlike the shop-floor and this creates 
resentment, especially when management tries to impose its own ideas 
of 'normal chemical conditions' which in fact are often noisy and 
dangerous. Yet: 
••• what most ChemCo workers experience in such situations n 
is not ••• the birth of a political consciousness but a 
non-understanding tempered by resignation. Like Ivan 
Denisovitch in his prison camp, so for them too 'there is 
no point in expecting someone who is warm to understand 
someone who is cold'."47 
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The moral critique becomes subordinate, then, to the hegemonic 
view of the factory: the normalcy and obviousness of capitalist 
structure. Such divisions are superbly summed up in a quotation 
an answer made in response to one of the researchers: 
"'You mean it's OK, big money controlling things?' 
'Yes, if they've got the know-how. I don't understand 
these economic crises and things. I mean, don't 
misunderstand me. I like the way the country's run: 
the democratic Conserva:ti'Ve way. I don't believe in the 
communism/socialism state, not like some. It's true that 
the ordinary working man doesn't have much say, but he's 
happy. If he's got his mortgage and his car, he's OK. 
But I worry sometimes. Why haven't I got any money, all 
the hours of hard work I've done? 11148 
Apathy, active assent, disapproval of socialism, partial approval 
of socialist criticism, apathy again - then bewilderment all follow in 
the same passage. 
Nichols and Beynon took up many of these strands in another work 
on Chem.Co, which placed it in the wider setting of capitalist society.49 
This time, they include foremen and managers in the interview schedules. 
The authors are careful to show that management ideology is not the 
hermetic set of beliefs that it is sometimes made out to be; managers 
are themselves employees of a firm and subject to the same hegemonic, 
structural pressures as shop-floor workers. The divisions in their 
work orientations occur between the structural level and their own 
moral natures. One manager, George, questioned about who.is respons-
ible for creating redundancies, exclaims: 
"'The thing is I don't think they (workers) think it's 
~· I don't think they think it's my boss. They think it's 
'them'. But we're them. But it's not E!.• It's something 
above us. Something up there.' 
As he finished this complex soliloquy he gazed up at the 
ceiling - and lifted up his arms. His sense of confusion is 
perfectly understand.able."50 
It is exactly this kind of human inclination which when identified 
by workers in managers makes ·them "nice blokes". However, the tension 
is resolved by managers' own rationales: the notions of managerial 
prerogative and responsibility at ideological level, and those of 
profit and efficiency at hegemonic level. Though employees, managers 
are more shielded from the unpleasant aspects of shoP-floor production 
by status, higher salary and, as we saw, superior conditions. Yet, 
as with George, "their company-fashioned ideological armour is not 
completely bullet-proof either. 11 51 
Management's moral qualms are prevented from turning into the 
bewilderment experienced by ChemCo workers because of a supportive 
managerial ideolog:y. The source of such qualms, however, is best 
understood in terms of Goffman's concept of role distance: 
"Disdain for a situated role is a result of respect for 
another basis of identification."52 
Managers, like everyone else, limit the extent to which they behave 
.!!!. stereo-typed managers; they have "manifold attachments and commit-
ments"53 to other social institutions, including those basic rituals 
which accord to any other human being - qua human being - the quality 
of being a moral agent in his or her own right. 54 Th.is nagging human 
sympathy which underlies all face-to-face social interaction gives 
leverage to 'role distance' - and taken far enough, often enough, makes 
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a manager into a "nice bloke". 
But, all in all, as Nichols and Beynon point out, given the 
images of contradiction, fantasy and hope shown on TV - the 'window 
on the world' : 
"Really it would be surprising if people didn't carry within 
themselves conflicting feelings and understand.ings."55 
A Typology of Behavioural Rationales 
At this stage it becomes possible to draw up a simple typology 
of the kinds of •rationales' available to workers and managers used 
to make sense of their "conflicting feelings and understandings" and 
to justify their behaviour at the work-place. These rationales refer 
to aspects of the social structure as analysed so far - to bourgeois 
hegemony, managerial ideologies and reformist labour ideology. 
TABLE TWO 
Rationales Available at the Work-place to: 
Working Class: Working Class: Line and Middle Ideal Types Radical Non-radical Management (e.g. Fords) {e.g. ChemCo) 
Non-observable Hegemony Hegemony Hegemony 
Aspect of Power 
partially supportive oppositional 
Observable Labour Little or no Managerial 
Aspect of Power Ideology Labour Ideology 
(Union activism) Ideology (Uni ta:ry/ 
Pluralist) 
Mobilisation of Experience: Experience: Experience: 
'Rationales' conflictual, conflictual, partially 
(Legitimisation leads to fa.ctory leads to conflictual, 
of conflictual consciousness bewilderment leads to moral 
behaviour) qualms (role 
distance) 
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For reasons that will soon become apparent, this l!! only a crude 
typology: 'levels' are not so easily definable in practice. Never-
theless, it focuses attention not only on theoretical levels of 
industrial ideology, activity and experience, but also on the way in 
which the constraints of incorporation, successfully implanted at the 
'higher' levels, must contend with the experience of conflict at the 
lower. It also points out the crucial distinction between radical 
and non-radical workers in terms of the latter's lack of even labour 
ideology as a rationale with which to mobilise and order their 
experience on the shoP-floor. 
Some of these points are developed by Armstrong, Goodman and 
Hyman, though with different emphasis. Their analysis is based on 
a year's observation in three small engineering companies aro'lm.d 
Manchester. During the observation, they were struck by "the dynamism 
or impermanence of the network of shop-floor rules."56 The negotiated 
order on the shop-floor regulating the practice of industrial relations 
- that is, the rules system - was continually changing at the margins 
as managers and workers coped with changing conditions - introduced 
either from outside, like new laws, or from inside on a daily basis, 
because of machine breakdowns, absences, the arrival of new foremen, 
and so on. Adjustments to the status quo - for example the effort/ 
reward bargain, manning levels, holiday arrangements and job evaluation 
gradings - occurred in consequence. These were all issues of consider-
able importance on the shoP-floor and on each there was something 
approaching a balance of power. The authors, who are well aware of 
the immense class inequalities implicit in the organization of industrial 
relations,57 contend that this 'frontier of control' is negotiated 
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through articulating those (marginal) interests which can be most 
convincingly legitimised and hence mobilised in any given context 
(and given class inequalities). So the authors' aim is to discover 
in detail how 'legitimising principles' are mobilised by workers and 
management on the shop-floor to rationalise their own behaviour and 
undermine that of the other side. As we shall see, these principles 
bear a strong resemblance to what we have so far been calling 
•rationales' of action. Explaining why they consider 'legitimisation' 
to be a central concept in industrial relations, the authors maintain: 
" ••• our focus is more on the question of which of their 
wide range of interests workers and managers actually pursue 
than on the issue of which would, in theory, be to their 
greatest ultimate advantage. In this connection it seems 
that power can most economically be deployed behind those 
interests which can most effectively be legitimised."58 
Such legitimisation is achieved through manipulation of 
•vocabularies of motives•. There is now an established literature59 
on the concept of a motive derived from Wittgenstein's observation: 
"An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and 
institutions 11 • 60 Armstrong et al. make use of this family of insights 
via c. Wright Mills: 
"As over against the inferential conception of motives as 
subjective •springs' of action, motives may be considered 
as typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in 
delimited societal situations. Human actors do vocalise 
and impute motives to themselves and to others. 1161 
It is always necessary to know the context of an action before 
motive can be ascribed to an agent - without it the action remains 
62 puzzling. The importance of this for industrial relations is that 
•vocabularies of motives', by drawing on different contexts with their 
related worker or management ideologies, become highly fragmented on 
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the shop-floor. Given the mismatch between bourgeois hegemony and 
labour ideology on the workers' side, as well as the considerable 
differences between labour ideology and management ideologies - all 
of which is illustrated in Table Two - then the context or setting of 
workers' motives for action is liable to be the subject of confusion 
both from the part of management and from the part of workers them-
selves. The attribution of motives to workers, or by them, makes 
use of different levels of rationale which, because of their frequent 
mutual inconsistency, often conflict with one another. 
Now, for Armstrong et al., a legitimising principle is an aspect 
of a vocabulary of motives: 
"(The) concept of a 'vocabulary of motives' ••• suggests 
that in a:ny cultural setting there are certain acceptable 
motives for action (what we will call 'legitimising 
principles') which are, in turn, embedded in the character-
istic world view (ideology) of that culture. Thus, in his 
'mobilisation of bias' a shop steward must link his policies 
to acceptable motives already existing in the culture of his 
constituents ••• The same considerations apply when he 
presents an argument to management. 1163 
So it is the acceptability of a motive which makes it a 
legitimising principle to the other side. Not all workers' motives 
are legitimising principles. A steward may know that a worker wants 
to work in the storeroom to give him more time to do reading; but to 
legitimise the transfer to management he would have to present the case 
that, for example, the storeroom was currently undermanned. 
What, then, makes a motive acceptable? The answer must involve 
its relation to a context in which the other side's interests are 
either promoted, or left intact, or else harmed but with recompense in 
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another area. All that is necessary here is to stress that this 
context is defined by management. 
Armstrong et al. define three types of 'legitimising principle'. 
First, there are those announced explicitly, having general application; 
for instance, the maintenance of differentials is justified as a reward 
for long training. Second, there are those based on management 
ideology; 'management prerogative' becomes "a shorthand expression" 
to justify managerial control in the face of union encroachments, or 
a term like 'restrictive practices' denounces as illegitimate forms of 
behaviour which by implication damage output or efficiency. And third, 
there are appeals to "self-evident common sense". 
"'Of course' the supervisor should be paid more than those 
he supervises. 'Of course' the workers are found other 
work when the machines stop. Here the investigation of 
legitimising concepts takes an ethnomethodological turn as 
one is looking at the ideas which people use to construct 
their taken-for-granted reality. 1164 
This ethnomethodological slant on legitimising principles is 
crucial. Once again, we ref er back to the non-observable aspect of 
power, hegemony. If elementary forms of the social structure -
labour as a commodity, hierarchical reward and so on - form the assump-
tions of taken-for-granted reality in factory conversation, consultation 
and negotiation, then those inequalities implicit in the social 
structure disappear as issues: 
"Talk is 'a constituent feature of the same setting that it is 
used to talk about•. It is available for a member as a 
resource, for his use, as well as being something that while 
using and counting on he also glosses. 1165 
This reflexivity of assumptions - with respect to industrial 
relations - is what makes the typology of 'rationales' in Table Two 
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rather crude. The typology looks as though it reflects 'social 
reality•. In fact, of course, it also creates and accomplishes that 
reality. 
66 We cannot pursue this line of argument here, but it should 
just be pointed out that 'legitimising principles' - through their 
relation to hegemonic assumptions - contain heavy biases in manage-
ment's favour. 
The main point about incorporation is that though least successful 
where there is a counter, labour ideology, the very worst management 
normally faces is a factory conscious work-force. In such cases, with 
industrial action as a threat, an organized work-force can explicitly 
use precedent like custom and practice, and 'fairness', as principles 
with which to defend conditions and even to encroach on managerial 
prerogative at the margins. The limits to these encroachments fo:rm 
a major theme in Part IV, but here we should add that even the principle 
of fairness tends to be applied by the shoP-floor less to the relation-
ship between manager and worker than to the relationship between worker 
and worker. The fact of management hierarchy is not thereby challenged.67 
Sometimes workers, in non-radical environments, are able to turn 
management ideology on its head to legitimise an issue for themselves. 
This is one way to make sense of conflictual experience on the shop-
floor when labour ideology is lacking. For instance, incentive schemes 
can be justified by showing how they increase production and profits; 
or else, payment for extra administrative duties can be claimed by 
reference to the principle of 'hierarchical reward'. The effect of 
this, of course, strengthens the long-term legitimacy of such manage-
ment ideology even though it brings short-term benefit to workers. 
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Finally, there may simply not exist legitimising principles 
available to workers to contest, say, certain technical functions of 
management (like merger or take-over policy, investment strategy and 
so on). At its most insidious, then, the power of capital is exerted 
through there being no principle popularly available to workers to 
counter its hegemonic interests (especially over the disposal of 
property). 
"At present there is not, in the culture of most workers, 
anything corresponding to the principle of managerial 
prerogative which could justify any demand for increased 
contro1. 1168 
This asynnnetry in rationales means that workers usually cannot 
legitimise workers' control even to themselves. Unlike management's, 
workers' legitimising principles tend to be fragmentary, having 
assimilated dominant hegemony as well as many aspects of managerial 
ideology itself.69 
We have now returned full cir c 1 e to the concept of contradictory 
consciousness, though we can now re-phrase it slightly: bourgeois 
hegemony restricts the range of legitimising principles available as 
rationales to the shop-floor in its dealings with management. This 
is because, although allowing the development and maintenance of a 
labour ideology within its ambit, bourgeois hegemony prevents the 
working class from achieving a full-scale, alternative interpretation 
of the reality which it actually experiences. The existence of class 
conflict is denied both through the legitimation of private property, 
hierarchical reward and so on, as well as through the day-to-day 
operation of managerial ideologies on the shop-floor. Yet class 
conflict is experienced on the shop-floor in all the ways we have 
detailed, and workers themselves feel like pawns in a game of chess. 
The result is at most factory consciousness, and at least apathy and 
frustration. 
In Part TV, we attempt to show how the boundaries of this 
conflictual experience may be gradually edged outwards into a more 
general questioning of the role of industry in society. :au_t first, 
still within those boundaries, we analyse in Part III how industrial 
democracy has been used as the 'frontier of control' between manage-
ment and workers since 1945 - with the incorporation of work-place 
behaviour as management's main objective. 
PART THREE 
"The basio issue is not the right of co-determination 
or of representation in itself. We are in reality 
facing one of the central problems of modern industry: 
how to strengthen the feeling of cohesiveness between 
the management of a company and its employees." 
Dr. Sjur Lindebraekke, quoted by F. E. Emery and 
Einar Thorsrud, Form and Content in Industrial 
Democracy (London: Tavistock, 1974), p.15. 
CHAPTER SIX 
"The difficulty of endowing our political words with 
unambiguous meanings is of course great because we 
(political scientists) share our vocabulary with 
political operators who have a vested interest in 
ambiguity. n1 
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Faced by De Jouvenel's observation, what is to be done? If 
we coin new phrases then these too will presumably become debased 
through political usage, and if we bind ourselves to strict defini-
tions the problem still remains how to discover which definitions to 
use. It might perhaps be tempting to surrender by making the 
confusion itself into a theoretical principle. Weldon, for instance, 
maintains that the meaning of political terms is: 
" ••• to know how to use them correctly, that is, in 
such a way as to be generally intelligible in ordinary 
and technical discourse, and there is nothing more 
lurking behind them which you might discover if only 
you had some special qualification as a member of a 
philosophical C.I.D."2 
The assumption that there is one "correct" use of political 
terminology is indeed misguided. One of the most interesting terms 
in this respect is 'industrial democracy•. Few terms are so 
ambiguous, a fact stressed by many writers.3 There are so many 
different definitions put forward, so many schemes proposed, and so 
many postures adopted by so many interests that, as Eaton and Fletcher 
point out, it all results "in confusion in the mind of the onlooker". 
They continue: 
" ••• under the smoke screen of industrial democracy 
there may be implied reforms ranging from minor 
improvements in consultation procedures (which do not 
in any way affect existing systems of property 
relations) to complete workers' self-management under a 
socialist economy which in effect transcends the current 
framework of power and property relations. 0 4 
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Yet in such circumstances, pace Weldon, some philosophical -
or sociological - detective work is clearly required. We can begin 
with the Eaton and Fletcher quotation. Straight awaywe notice the 
range of schemes included within the scope of the term: from "minor 
improvements in consultation" to "workers' self-management". Quite 
clearly, the former is primarily in management interests, the latter 
in workers' interests. Immediately we can see that one way of 
analysing the concept is to explore how it serves the interests of 
either side of industry at different levels. Indeed, it will be 
argued here that 'industrial democracy' serves as a rationale or 
legitimising principle available to management and labour in the 
practice of industrial relations. So Weldon is correct in stressing 
the use of political terms as a key element in their definition, but 
he is wrong to ignore that many different uses may exist of the same 
term, each one legitimate to its users - and most crucial, that each 
usage is structured, and not arbitrary. That is, consistencies will 
emerge within usages as features become identified with the protection 
of dominant interests. For example, management in its treatment of 
'industrial democracy' always stresses employee (not union) represen-
tation and consultative channels below Board level, since these are 
most likely "to further the success of the enterprise". 5 
Approaches to 'Industrial Democracy' 
But why should management be at all interested in 'industrial 
democracy' given their power within the enterprise? We have already 
hinted at the answer in Part I. Industrial relations 'problems' of 
the 1950s and 1960s were dealt with in the Donovan Report, and liberal 
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pluralist solutions advanced. Yet the solutions failed because they 
could not come to grips with countervailing behavioural rationales on 
the shop-floor itself. Despite the commissions, the regulations and 
the incomes policies, conflictual experience on the shop-floor was 
constantly present to fuel residual, anti-management behaviour. This 
is a conceptual as well as an empirical point. These circumstances 
have always existed in capitalist enterprises, and - basically - there 
are two 'responses' open to management: 
"The direct control strategy involves maximising the 
separation of conception from execution of work tasks for 
the vast majority of workers, the centralisation of 
conceptual activities into few hands related to those with 
high management status, and the maintenance of managerial 
authority through close supervision and financial incentives: 
in short, the Taylorian ideal of scientific management. 
The responsible autonomy strategy involves allowing 
individual workers or groups of workers a wide measure of 
discretion over the direction of their work tasks, and the 
maintenance of managerial authority by getting workers to 
identify with the competitive aims of the enterprise so 
that they will act 'responsibly' with a minimum of 
supervision. n6 
These responses correspond brcadly- but not exclusively - to the 
'unitary' and 'pluralist' managerial perspectives analysed in Chapter 
One. There are, of course, elements of both responses in all manage-
ment styles: production methods in the most 'enlightened' factory 
organization create a tendency towards direct control, and minimal 
confidence in even the least 'enlightened' that workers will not, for 
instance, sabotage production creates a tendency towards responsible 
autonomy. Over time as well, the balance changes - as unemployment 
rises management finds it easier to impose direct control. 7 
Conversely, however, whenever power at the margins tips against manage-
ment, 'industrial democracy' becomes a rationale with which to extend 
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responsible autonomy and thereby integrate workers more neatly into 
the factory structure. .Any development of such industrial democracy 
- especially participation schemes - on the shop-floor is designed to 
undermine the conflictual, labour ideology otherwise available to a 
work-force. This point is made by Roy, in reference to a participa-
tion scheme introduced at the Hormel Packinghouse in Minnesota; 
supported by the union, the scheme was designed to increase production 
and sharpen workers' acquisitive values: 
"Such values, emphasised by both company and union in the 
protective and incentive provisions of the Hormel system, 
served only to stimulate superficial feelings of partici-
pation in the workers. Identifications were found to be 
shallowly rooted in dependency on company prosperity and 
appreciation for economic security. Identification with 
a labour eschatology, which might serve to integrate work 
and life, giving work meaning in its relation to a 
community of people and ideas, seems to have declined 
with the union's success in implementing the values dominant 
in our culture. 118 
This managerial orientation to industrial democracy has well been 
called "integrative" by Guest and Fatchett who list its three character-
istics as "a method of increasing organizational efficiency", designed 
"to stimulate.a consensual acceptance of (unitary) objectives", based 
on "direct and task-related" participation to increase work satisfac-
tion and motivation. 9 
Organized labour, on the other hand, has a very different 
orientation which is usually intended to consolidate and extend control 
at the work-place. Such an approach Guest and Fatchett call 
"distributive", and sum it up as the view that "workers and their 
representatives have insufficient power ••• (so) a broader distribution 
of control within organizations is called for"; conflict is assumed to 
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be endemic to capitalist enterprises and, in addition, any scheme not 
designed to increase workers' control will be opposed. 10 Indeed, 
the common elements in Labour Party and TUC policy on industrial 
democracy (in 1975), as sunnned up by Ferry, well illustrate this 
orientation: the unions are to form the sole agencies of worker 
representation in any scheme with no employee representation through 
works councils; the major thrust of industrial democracy is to be 
through the extension of collective bargaining; the role of the shop 
steward is to be strengthened; a stress on disclosure of company 
information with its context is made; and there is to be an erosion 
of managerial prerogative through worker representation on company 
11 boards. 
The main difference, at this stage, between the integrative and 
distributive approaches to industrial democracy concerns how and 
where the 'frontier of control' is to be drawn between management and 
work-force. 
However, it should be clear that both approaches are quite 
compatible with the hegemony of the dominant classes: market competi-
tion, private property and the division of labour are all untouched 
(which is not to say, of course, that workers' control at the margins 
will be accepted by management). This point is well made by Schmiede: 
" ••• the 'economic democracy' conception of industrial 
democracy - assumes that no basic structural changes need be 
made in the existing capitalist mode of production to secure 
for the wage-dependent population a degree of consultation 
broad enough for their interests to be realised. 
By contrast the other version - which could be called 
the 'socialist' conception of industrial democracy - sees 
the interests of the working population as being secured 
only through an extensive self-determination of the masses 
over social production and reproduction. Here the aim 
is not so much the social legitimation of what is held 
to be necessary domination, but rather its abolition."12 
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Both 'integrative' and 'distributive' approaches can be located 
within Schmiede's 'economic democracy' conception of industrial 
democracy. According to him, basic changes in the relations of 
production are necessary before 'socialist' industrial democracy is 
possible. Only then might workers control working arrangements 
(e.g. the ratio between mental and physical input in a job), the type 
of technology and productive processes possible (e.g. the degree of 
co-operation which could be introduced in a given setting), and the 
basic problems over what use production and growth can play in society. 
The 'integrative' approach reinforces both bourgeois hegemony 
and managerial ideology. The 'distributive' approach, on the other 
hand, reinforces bourgeois hegemony - because it conditions workers to 
present demands within the existing inequalities of the economic 
structure - but also strengthens labour ideology because it whittles 
away at the margins of this economic structure. As a result, though, 
both can be seen in opposition to the 'socialist' conception of 
industrial democracy which is posited on the abolition of bourgeois 
hegemony itself. It is, then, crucial to grasp that there is a 
structural •gap' between 'industrial democracy' from the point of view 
of labour ideology and from the point of view of those seeking to 
construct a 'socialist' hegemony. Vanek also highlights this gap 
when he makes a distinction between "capital-controlled or dehumanised 
systems" in which workers are still dominated by the objectives of 
capital "most often external to the collective" and "self-managed" 
151. 
systems, in which workers determine their own economic interests. 13 
In other words, the labourist approach to industrial democracy does 
not form a smooth continuum with a socialist approach to industrial 
democracy. Coates and Topham make the following coIIUnent: 
"For many work-people, the object of workers' control has 
already become much wider (than just humanising the 
factory): to speed the process of transition to socialist 
social relations under which assembly-line and machine-shop 
labour is progressively abolished, not simply made more 
'interesting'. Every rational trade unionist will agree 
that we should try the limits of reform within the given 
order of industry, but it is also important that we should 
resist the temptation to formulate our ultimate ambitions 
so that they conform to those limits."14 
The implied danger is that the "limits of reform" could well 
consolidate bourgeois hegemony. That is, by consolidating workers' 
control at the margins - especially on the shop-floor - it is possible 
that reform increases workers' security and sense of a stake in the 
social relationships of the enterprise as they are. We have, after 
all, already seen how reforms like the extension of the adult 
franchise consolidated bourgeois hegemony in the political sphere 
by allowing the working class apparent influence over the methods 
(i.e. elections) by which political choices are made. Such a concern 
lies behind Scargill's assertion: 
"It is my firm belief that workers' control means in effect 
the castration of the trade union movement, means in effect 
a total collaboration as far as the working class is 
concerned, and certainly in practice, will result in com-
promise with society as it exists."15 
For Scargill, the classless society can be achieved only through 
abolishing the profit motive; otherwise, even if workers were to 
control whole industries within the capitalist market structure they 
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would themselves become implicated in rationalisation, wage control 
and manipulative work organization. Only the coIIDilon ownership of 
the means of production would transform society. Not all socialists 
t h . 16 f d accep sue a view, o course, an we shall consider this debate 
later on in Part IV. For the time being, though, we should state 
the salient points about the term 'industrial democracy': 
- that it is a concept with diverse meanings and connotations 
which correspond to different types of rationales available to both 
management and work-force to consolidate and extend their power; 
- and that from the work-force's angle, there is a structural 
dilemma in the implementation of industrial democracy - namely, that 
its extension through labourism could actually impede the development 
of socialist hegemony. 
Part III presents a way of looking at industrial democracy which 
attempts to de-mystify its role in industrial relations. Using 
theoretical insights from Part II on contradictory consciousness, we 
oan begin to see how definitions, programmes and schemes for industrial 
democracy form structured responses, within bourgeois hegemony, to 
promote or hinder management or worker interests as the case may be. 
At the margins of control we shall show that organized labour may 
encroach on managerial prerogative, but that the thrust of 'mainstream' 
industrial democracy is integrative. 
Part IV is based partially on empirical case study material 
which will illustrate exactly how structural constraints operate on 
unions to prevent their gaining control over their working environment. 
Despite a strongly developed labour ideology and commitment, the non-
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observable aspects of power - hegemonic domination - prevent unions 
from managing to articulate their members' interests in a way 
meaningful to them. However, we shall also examine those conditions 
in which socialist hegemony - albeit of a transitory nature - manages 
to assert itself: in work-ins, co-operatives and alternative 
corporate plans. Part IV, then, illuminates the relationships 
between labour ideology and socialist hegemony, and our conclusions 
will echo Friedman: 
" ••• to treat worker resistance which is informed by 
•narrow' trade union consciousness and circumscribed by 
the particular factory or firm within which those workers 
are employed as a secondary and primitive form of 
resistance because it is relatively ineffective for over-
throwing capitalism, is to neglect an extremely powerful 
and growing force in the development of the capitalist 
mode of production. 1117 
Aspects of Industrial Democracy 
(1) Job Restructuring 
Undoubtedly, from the management angle, 'industrial democracy' 
is now most frequently equated with job-restructuring on the shop-
floor~ and usually at the same time with participation in decisions 
affecting work organization: 
"Concern with the restructuring of an individual's work 
will surely be overshadowed - as evident in developments 
in other countries - by efforts to create autonomous, 
responsible work groups, within the context of worker 18 participation and the democratisation of the shop-floor." 
In this quotation, Wild suggests that industrial democracy and 
participation are means of achieving "responsible work groups" - and 
hence the "restructuring of an individual's work". The notion of 
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work-restructuring can itself be broken down into discrete elements. 
Chichester-Clark, for instance, separates four such elements - job 
satisfaction, job enrichment, job enlargement and job rotation: 
" ••• my concern in using the term job satisfaction is 
with the satisfaction to be derived from the content and 
organization of a particular job; job enrichment with 
extending the responsibility of the individual doing the 
particular job; job enlargement with increasing the 
variety of tasks to be performed; and job rotation with 
individuals moving between jobs. 1119 
It should be noticed that these elements involve different 
degrees of participation from workers.20 All of them could, in fact, 
be imposed from above by management: job rotation in particular can 
mean simply doing several boring jobs instead of just one. However, 
there is now a long-established literature asserting that partici-
pation in the decisions relating to work organization - and not simply 
the imposition of new forms of work organization from above - is what 
1 d t k t . f t• 21 ea s o wor sa is ac ion. Indeed, the famous Mayo experiments 
of the 1920s and 1930s have also been re-interpreted along these 
22 lines. 
But there is, of course, a second aim behind these management 
pressures besides mere concern for the quality of working life. As 
Chems puts it: 
"The other objective has been the increased efficiency of 
work organizations. Usually the two objectives have 
been reconciled by the tacit assumptions that better 
quality of working life means better jobs; that better 
jobs mean greater job satisfaction; that greater job 
satisfaction means better job performance, and that better 
job performance means improved functioning of the 
organization. 11 23 
This thread runs through all management writing on the subject. 
For instance, D. Wallace Bell states baldly: 
" ••• many managers believe - and there is plenty of 
evidence for this - that effective participation is 
basically good business. Labour turnover and 
absenteeism are likely to decrease; productivity to 
increase. 11 24 
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And then, not only is efficiency increased but also resistance 
to change can be overcome. An OECD Report states equally baldly 
that management will ensure a greater contribution from workers 
towards company goals "only by giving employees the opportunity to 
discuss changes or ~ to participate in the decision-making process 
•t lf u25 1 se • 
These objectives are clearly integrative in the sense in which 
we have defined the term above. The unions - and the Left in general 
- tend to be at least suspicious of this form of participation and at 
most openly hostile; the view is often that the 'crisis of capitalism' 
has led it to intensify exploitation of workers through making a fuller 
use of their psychological reserves, and that the whole approach has 
"become an important ideological weapon for the monopolies in their 
offensive against the Labour movement. 1126 It is true that partici-
pation through job satisfaction schemes does ignore the union movement. 
(2) Joint Consultation 
To an extent, so too does the second main meaning given by 
management to industrial democracy: joint consultation. The aim 
here is also often integrative, but whilst job re-structuring is a 
method involving workers directly, joint consultation is an indirect 
method: employees' representatives are elected on to a committee 




Although even by 1968 the British Institute 
of Management felt able to declare that the hopes placed in joint 
consultation had "not been fulfilled 11 , 28 one major survey in 1972 
could maintain that: 
"(though) provisions for formal joint consultation have 
declined since (the late 1940s) ••• consultative bodies 
are still numerous. 11 29 
Whilst we examine the history of joint consultation in the next 
chapter, it is clear that many managers still view it as a viable 
form of industrial democracy.30 The framework of such coIIDilittees is 
defined very much on management terms. One writer, for instance, 
the founder and chairman of the Walpole Group of Companies, wrote in 
1944 that there were three principles which he "believed to be essential 
to the successful operation of joint consultation". They were: 
" Readiness to tell employees all that can properly be 
told about the business of which they are members. 
Recognition of a paramount common interest shared by 
Management and Employees. 
1 - Absolute good faith on both sides."3 
CoIIDilunication·s, assumptions of a common interest and "good faith" 
are key elements of unitary managerial ideology as discussed in Chapter 
One. Furthermore, the limited powers of joint consultation connnittees 
which may or may not operate in conjunction with trade unions - can be 
appreciated from the "Constitution of a Works Council" published by the 
Industrial Welfare Society as an illustration of the kinds of rule 
which could be adopted. Its advisory functions would concern "matters 
of mutual interest", that is, working conditions (such as washing 
facilities, heating and lighting), suggestions to improve work organiz-
ation, accident prevention, works discipline, health services, canteen 
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facilities, education and training, transport, holiday arrangements, 
recreation and so on. A section on "limitation of functions" 
declares: 
ti on 
"The works council shall not discuss any question which is 
covered by an operative agreement between the company and 
any trade union, except by written consent of the trade 
union conoerned: nor shall it discuss wage rates and 
related subjects."32 
The trade unions have, of course, also supported joint consulta-
as we see in the next chapter. Lord Citrine, for example, 
argued that joint consultation was the "natural development of trade 
unionism". 33 Still, such a view is not the dominant one within the 
Labour movement, which has instead always concentrated on collective 
bargaining. 
(3) Collective Bargaining 
Whilst with consultation the ultimate decision-making power resides 
with management, negotiation involves notional equality between the two 
sides in both influence, responsibility and use of sanction in the case 
of deadlock. T. L. Johnston points out that there are two ways of 
seeing the relationship between joint consultation on the one hand and 
collective bargaining on the other. The first, the "separatist" view, 
we have already analysed: it considers that consultation is to do with 
common interests - improving understanding and creating responsible 
relationships between employer and employee. Collective bargaining 
is to deal with conflictual issues, in particular pay and conditions. 
The seoond, the "continuum" view, refuses to accept such a rigid 
distinction. Consultation merges into negotiation because many issues 
defined by management as common turn out, when considered by the union, 
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to be conflictual - an improvement in work organization, for instance, 
will have an impact on wages and conditions, which are both negotiable 
. 34 issues. 
The existence of a "continuum" rather than "separatist" approach 
would seem to depend on the level of unionisation in the plant.35 
Collective bargaining is the central method utilised by the trade 
unions for gaining influence at most levels of industry, and there is 
a tendency for them to try to convert consultative procedures into 
negotiating ones. Indeed, a number of influential Fabian writers have 
identified collective bargaining with industrial democracy itself. 
This was the intention of the Webbs in their book on the subject,36 and 
also that of Clegg: 
" ••• industrial democracy consists, in part, of the opposition 
of the trade unions to the employer, and, in part, of the 
attempt of the employer to build his employees into a team 
working together towards a common purpose ••• 1137 
This particular approach, subject to a critique by Blumberg,38 
still forms the basis of many Labour writers' analysis of industrial 
democracy in that they identify it with an extension of collective 
bargaining. One clear example is: 
"The scope and subject matter of collective bargaining 
should be extended so that all the elements of management 
(dismissals, discipline, introduction of new machinery, 
forward planning of manpower, rationalisation and so forth) 
are within the sphere of negotiations at plant and national 
level. 11 39 
Another one is: 
"(Collective bargaining must be extended) until it includes 
all facets of working life - from discipline and redundancy 
to manning and the introduction of new machinery. Collect-
ive bargaining would begin to become much more a matter of 
formulating joint rules, and would thus involve the 
development of a continuous system of joint regulation 
and joint determination. The area of unilateral 
management action would therefore be sharply reduced."40 
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Unions defend collective bargaining because it guarantees their 
independence from management. This helps to explain their suspicions 
towards other forms of industrial democracy - especially participation 
schemes which they often fear· may 'suck' them into the structure of 
company decision-making.4 1 Some unions, as we see in the next two 
chapters, will have nothing whatever to do with any form of industrial 
democracy not squarely based on collective bargaining for this same 
reason. 
Yet there are two limitations to this view. First of all, 
collective bargaining is not based purely on a conflict model of 
industrial relations. At its very roots - as we saw in Chapter Two 
it has a collaborative aspect. Collective bargaining has evolved a 
system of jointly agreed and protected procedures for resolving conflict. 
Indeed, as Wedderburn puts it: 
" ••• collective bargaining based on conflict of interests 
in one respect also involves compromise, collaboration, 
and, indeed, trade union responsibility for the bargain 
struck - a responsibility which, the foreign observer is 
quick to note, despite the absence of legal obligations, is 
in fact in Britain very strongly observed. 1142 
Only those who hold aloof from any contact with management -
perhaps the anarcho-syndicalists - could claim to be free of respons-
ibility for joint decisions in industry. 
But there is a second limitation to this stress on collective 
bargaining. Not only is there an 1.Ulevenness of its presence in 
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industry - depending on unionisation43 - but it is also totally 
absent at company level in certain areas. It is true that a shop 
stewards' combine committee might be able to negotiate at company 
level on, say, pensions. However, there are a series of areas -
marketing and pricing policy, mergers, take-overs and investment 
strategy for instance - which are outside the collective bargaining 
reach of the unions. To quote Wedderburn again: 
" ••• the mechanism of collective bargaining as we have 
known it for a century ••• is not easily adjusted to the 
new task of joint regulation of strategic corporate 
decisions. One may say that in a sense there is a gap 
at company level in the collective bargaining system if 
in the next transition the desire is to be achieved for 
more democracy at the work-place."44 
This observation leads us to the fourth, and in Britain, the 
most recent formulation of 'industrial democracy': worker directo·rs 
at board level. 
(4) Worker Directors 
In the 1970s, and particularly following Britain's accession to 
the EEC in 1973, considerable attention was paid in the press and 
elsewhere to the various worker director schemes throughout Europe 
especially in Germany, Holland and Scandinavia - as possible ways to 
ease industrial relations 'problems' in Britain.45 However, two 
commentators sounded a cautionary note: 
"Different systems of employee representation on the 
boards of companies have been developed under different 
historical, economic and social conditions. Comparisons 
between the different systems are consequently very 
difficult to make. 1146 
Some systems have employee as opposed to union representation; 
161. 
some, equal representation of workers and management with the presence 
of independents, others with just minority worker representation; 
some, one-tier, others, two-tier boards; some are mandatory in 
companies over a certain size, others voluntary - and so on. 
Organized management opinion in Britain is very different from 
that in, say, West Germany. The fear is expressed that collective 
bargaining would 'creep' into the boardroom if workers were represented 
at that level. Pat Lowry, for example, Director of Industrial 
Relations at British Leyland from 1970 to 1977, states: 
"Given the conflict-based nature of our employee relations, 
I certainly do not accept the conclusion of the Bullock 
majority that employee participation can only flourish at 
all levels if, as an initial step, a place is found for 
worker-directors on company boards."47 
Instead, Lowry stresses shop-floor participation to 'build up• to 
board-level since conflict should be eradicated at the spot where it is 
bred - the shop-floor; since workers need to develop experience before 
being allowed on to the board; and since only worker representatives 
who have "proved themselves" at shop-floor level could retain credibility 
at higher levels. 
Union and labour attitudes towards worker directors are, as we 
shall see, far more fragmented. Some sectors accepted the recommenda-
tions of the Bullock Report, others rejected it and yet others, accepting 
that collective bargaining was not an appropriate method to gain 
influence at board level, detailed conditions under which worker directors 
could be valuable - for instance, by mandating them on lmown issues; 
insisting on report-back over issues arising for the first time; full 
disclosure of company infonnation, and so on. 48 However, historically, 
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the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress officially opposed 
worker representation even on the boards of nationalised industries 
unless worker directors' links with the union movement were severed -
as was the case in the 1967 'experiment• in the steel industry.49 
(5) Industry and Government Levels 
The fifth, and final form of influence we might refer to in 
passing as 'industrial democracy' is at industry level - for instance, 
the work of the Industrial Training Boards, the Economic Development 
Councils ('Little Neddies') and the Sector Working Parties established 
under Labour's Industrial Strategy (1974-79); and at national level 
for instance, the National Economic Development Counc.i.l, as well as 
Q;UANGOs dealing with industrial relations, such as the Heal th and 
Safety Executive, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 
and so on. 50 However, we have already considered some of the issues 
raised by corporatist approaches to industrial relations in Chapter 
Four - and they fall outside our remit here as 'industrial democracy' 
because they rely on political initiative for their success or failure. 51 
A Theory of Industrial Democracy 
Here then in broad terms are five common notions of 'industrial 
democracy•: participation at shop-floor level, particularly in the 
redesign of jobs and. introduction of technical change; joint consult-
ation; collective bargaining and its extension; worker directors on 
the board1 - and we might include industrial, regional and national 
representation of Labour's interests on a variety of government 
committees and QU.ANGOs through individual unions and the TUC. 
This sifting out of definitions, however, still leaves us with 
a problem: what is it about them whicn makes them relate to 
'industrial democracy'? How are we to develop our own theory of 
'industrial democracy' for use in analysing those pressures towards 
it? 
It will be argued here that industrial democracy expresses a 
relationship between management and workers, and that, in consequence, 
the terms defining that relationship must always be specified. 
Indeed, the theory advanced here suggests that there are always three 
terms which need specifying when ref erring to any arrangement in industry 
as 'industrial democracy'. 
First of all, level. Any scheme takes place at one or more 
levels in industry at which decisions are taken - that is, department, 
plant, division, company and industry. Participation and joint 
consultation occur typically at departmental and plant level; 
collective bargaining at all levels (though infrequently at multi-
plant company level); and worker directors operate at board level -
company, or division and industry in the case for instance of British 
52 Steel. Most writers distinguish such levels of industrial democracy, 53 
which is especially important in discussions on workers' control because 
the influence of organized labour may vary considerably between levels. 
Strong shop steward presence in the plant may well be counteracted by 
unilateral management decision-making on the board. A campaign to 
oppose a closure, for instance, at one level may be totally ignored 
by management at another. As Hunt puts it: 
"It is possible for work people to be free of inter-
ference by management at one level but in the normal 
course of events, this will be the result of militant 
trade union action which, in the context of capitalism, 
will meet with opposition at higher levels."54 
Secondly, within each level, there is a range of areas which 
may or may not be covered by industrial democracy. We have already 
noted those typically covered by plant-level joint consultation 
(p. 156). But at the same level, are shop stewards able to bargain 
over manning or redundancies, as well as the bonus system, for example? 
And at company level, would worker directors find themselves rubber-
stamping decisions already taken elsewhere by general management? At 
each level, a spectrum of subjects may be influenced by workers or 
their representatives - and the 'cut-off' lines along the spectrum are 
themselves a matter for discussion and bargaining. Clarke et al. 
identify in general terms four areas for management decision: wages 
and redundancy, work methods, work discipline and finance.55 Each 
one illustrates an area of management prerogative which could be 
progressively eroded by the unions. 
Finally, within each area, there is a degree of influence obtained 
or obtainable by labour. Globerson expresses the point well, though 
he uses a terminology different from ours: 
" ••• a participative situation should be analysed through 
a two-variable approach: spheres that express participation, 
and levels that indicate the degree or depth of participation 
in each sphere."56 
We are putting forward a three-, not a two-dimensional approach, 
since Globerson omits what we have here called 'levels' of industrial 
democracy. But the nub of his point, that there are degrees or depths 
of participation within what we have called areas, is well taken. For 
instance, within the area of 'decision-making', Globerson lists 
degrees of influence, from minimum to maximum, as follows: provision 
of general information to workers by management; joint consultation; 
passive participation in management; active participation in manage-
ment; self-management. And this fonnulation provides us with a 
further insight - that degrees of influence depend largely on the methods 
adopted by labour. That is, ·at each level and for each area, greater 
degrees of influence are obtained through some methods or procedures 
than others. In Britain, unions prefer collective bargaining to joint 
consultation. However, self-management would provide still greater 
control, other things being equal. Pateman, in this context, makes a 
distinction between pseudo-participation (in which a feeling of 
participation is created); partial participation (in which workers 
can only influence decisions); and full participation (in which every 
individual has equal power to determine the result of decision-ma.king).57 
Similarly, Guest and Fatchett refer to "forms of control"5S and Clarke 
et al. to "the forms of participation within the enterprise". The 
latter develop this point by showing how "organizational variables" 
unionisation, company size, technology, ownership, and management styles 
as well as "enviromnental influences" - the class structure, the educa-
tional system and attitudes towards authority - are all linked to the 
degree of control workers are able to exert at their work-place. 59 
This, then, is a three-dimensional approach to 'industrial democracy• 
within nee-capitalist societies. It is broadly similar - though with 
different emphases - to the one presented by the Labour Party in a 
discussion document entitled Industrial Democracy. That states: 
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"The forms in which the workers make their influence felt 
























Trade Unions through 
Labour Party. TUC direct 
to government. 
N.E.D.C. 
Many committees of, e.g. 
Ministry of Pensions, 
Labour, etc. 
Little Neddies; Industrial 
Training Boards; J.I.Cs. 
etc. National negotiating 
machinery and procedure for 
settling disputes. 
Planning Councils 
Employment Committees, Youth 
Employment Committees. 
Trade Unions, shop steward 
organization, negotiating 
machinery - ad hoc negotiation. 
Consultative or advisory 
machinery. 1160 
In this chapter we have expanded principally on the "level of the 
fi:rm" as specified above. We have also elaborated on the notion of an 
"area of influence" and analysed the "form" - or degree - of industrial 
democracy, though without the strong political bias of the NEC document. 
It is, in principle, possible to slot any scheme for industrial 
democracy into this three-dimensional approach, once all three of its 
terms have been identified. 
It should also be clear that the kernel of industrial democracy 
here is the ever-changing 'frontier of control' at the margins, as 
defined by the level, area and degree which together form the points 
of contact between management and work-force. Other writers have 
used the term 'participation' as the expression to define "the 
opportunity to influence and share consciously in the decision-making 
process." 
61 
It can now be ~ppreciated, however, that 'participation' 
forms only one strand to 'industrial democracy' along with others such 
as collective bargaining, and workers' control. 
So, here, 'industrial democracy' within a nee-capitalist context 
is taken to mean any scheme or process whereby management and workers 
mediate control at a given level of industrial activity, within a 
given area of influence, and with the intention there of securing a 
greater degree of control. Indeed, the to-ing and fro-ing of this 
frontier of control is what is meant by referring to industrial 
democracy as either integrative or distributive - according to the 
direction of the balance of marginal power, away from or towards workers. 
We can represent the three-dimensional approach graphically by 











The level of influence does partially determine, of course, the 
area. Canteen arrangements, for instance, are not an area for the 
board; investment planning is not normally an area for the plant. 
However, there may be a mismatch between level and degree of influence. 
We have already observed that unions feel that management-inspired 
participation schemes could undermine their independence and therefore 
their strength in collective .bargaining. Likewise, British manage-
ment fears that worker directors could lead to an extension of 
collective bargaining into the board-room; if they are to be there 
at all, management would like to ensure that they are advisory or at 
most consultative. 
The box itself on the preceding page represents the hegemonic 
structure of nee-capitalism - that is, the ultimate constraints on 
workers' influence within the economic and social relationships of 
advanced Western societies. The box, then, sets the limits of the 
'observable' aspects of power - the subjects which can be raised and 
the degrees of influenc~ that can be exerted within those that are 
raised. The terms of any industrial democracy scheme alter the 
observable aspects of power between labour and capital at the margins. 
As we saw, if the scheme is integrative workers lose independent 
influence; if distributive, they gain it. 
(1) Property Relations 
At this stage, a few points should be made about the relationship 
between industrial democracy and property relations - in particular, 
the ownership of capital. 
According to Marx, writing in 1847/8, 
" ••• modern bourgeois private property is the final and 
most complete expression of the system of producing and 
appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, 
on the exploitation of the many by the few. 1162 
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However, this observation is far too simple, as is illustrated 
by the gradual development over the last century of advanced neo-
capitalist societies characterised by joint-stock companies, welfare 
provisions and mixed economies. Within these societies, the patterns 
of capital ownership may vary considerably. As we saw earlier, Vanek 
makes a distinction between "self-managed" systems and "capital-
controlled or dehumanised systems" of industrial democracy. Focus-
ihg on this second category he lists seven possible patterns of capital 
ownership under which "either conflicts of interest or the possibility 
of domination by capital can occur", all of them compatible with an 
overall nee-capitalist economic structure.63 These seven patterns of 
capital ownership include ownership by the State, collectives of 
employees, individual employees, consumers, labour unions, suppliers 
and private individuals.64 They all touch only what we have been 
calling the 'observable aspect of power', leaving intact the 'non-
observable aspect' • 
As theorists have realised, the question of industrial democracy 
concerns control, and not just pure ownership. Bell, for example, 
has pointed out that: 
"In recent years there has arisen a sophistication whioh 
understands that the abolition of private property alone 
will not guarantee the end of exploitation. 1165 
Nationalisation within a mixed economy has not led in Britain 
to the restructuring of industry, no doubt at least partially because 
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"workers' control was rejected, but workers' participation was 
provided instead. 1166 Still more alarming is the fact that state 
ownership in Eastern Europe has not led to the emancipation of work-
ing life either. Mikl6s Haraszti, for example, has provided a 
graphic portrayal of the shop-floor in a Hunga:nian tractor factory. 
He attacks the piece-rate system and the profit motive for dehuman-
ising work: 
"In fact, (rate-fixers are) there to work out the method 
which will yield the biggest profit ••• Anyone who works 
in a factory knows, without the need of statistics, that 
for those who work to norms, complex arguments about 
whether or not they own the means of production are 
nothing but empty talk. 1167 
As Beynon observes in a review of Haraszti's book, the nub of the 
'work problem' is not ownership in itself but the control of profits; 
he adds that a different purpose from the pursuit of profits should 
order production and suggests the slogan: 'the right to work - on 
(£ 
our terms'. 
Indeed, more generally, many critiques of the Soviet-style model 
of society centre on the same issue: lack of workers' control and the 
continuance of the profit motive~9 It is these factors operating 
independently of the different forms of capital ownership which account 
for the degradation of work. 
Moving away from the examples of nee-capitalism and state owner-
ship, this point has also been well expressed by E. R. Pease in 
relation to profit-sharing schemes. In a pamphlet published by the 
Labour Party in 1921 he evaluates the case for profit-sharing and 
concludes: 
"Profit-sharing and co-partnership furnish no solution to 
the problems of the control of industry because they do 
not lead towards those fundamental changes in social 
structure for which the Labour Party is working. They 
assume that, in the future, as in the present, there will 
be an employing class, owners of capital, and an employed 
class, receivers of wages. We shall be satisfied with 
no tinkering reforms which involve the permanence of the 
vicious system of production for private profit, and that 
unequal distribution of wealth and of the opportunities 
for happiness which it necessarily produces. 11 70 
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And so too do these observations apply to co-operative ownership. 
As we shall see in Chapter Eleven, the development of producer 
co-operatives within nee-capitalism has tended to mean that workers 
have had to carry out exactly the same kind of decision relating to 
production methods, wage rates, manning and so on that any conventional 
management would have done. Mandel makes the point succinctly: 
"The fundamental principle underlying self-management, 
which is the liberation of labour, whereby workers 
dominate the process of production, decide for themselves 
the speed of the assembly line and the organization of 
work in the factory, and which is part and parcel of the 
sort of socialist society we are trying to build, is 
unrealisable in an economy which allows the survival of 
competition. 11 71 
Fox also acknowledges that the abolition of the private ownership 
of capital will not lead, in itself, to the "liberation of labour": 
"Public ownership is the necessary but certainly not the 
sufficient condition for any change in the primary 
objectives and methods of work organizations. 1172 
Nationalisation must involve the erosion of both the profit 
motive and competition as the twin principles underlying industrial 
production. So although the ownership question is an important one 
since nationalisation, profit-sharing and co-operative production all 
form planks in many strategies towards industrial democracy, for our 
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purposes control remains the central issue. 
(2) Changing Dimensions 
Given the many different views on industrial democracy we can 
now see that all its different forms provide rationales with which 
management and workers legitimise their competing claims within 
industry. Conflict may tak~ place over the implications and hence 
the desirability of a particular scheme, and it may take place over 
the interpretation or meaning of a particular scheme. Either way, 
interests are mediated through the observable aspect of power in 
industrial relations - the frontier of control. 
Now, many writers have claimed that the late 1960s was the time 
when an upsurge of interest in industrial democracy took place. For 
example, according to Levinson: 
"'History will record, I believe, that 1968 was the year 
that industrial democracy advanced to the centre of the 
industrial relations stage.• 1175 
This is a confusing way of speaking. In fact, as the next 
chapter will show, industrial democracy has remained alive throughout 
the whole of our period (1945-80). What does change is the precise 
location of the term on our three-dimensional diagram (p.167). 74 In 
other words, emphasis changes: joint consultation in the 1940s and 
early 1950s; work-place collective bargaining from the mid-1950s; 
and (from the management side) job restructuring in the mid-1960s, 
and (from the tmion side) an extension of collective bargaining in the 
same period. In addition, there was limited interest in worker 
directors from sectors in the Labour movement in the 1970s. The 
question is then less: "why industrial democracy now?" than 
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"why the changes in emphasis?". The argument here will be that events 
within the economy alter the kinds of rationale available to labour 
and management with which control issues can be broached. For example, 
industrial rationalisation led to the growth of multi-plant bargaining 
and with it the recognition by some unions that there was an 'influence 
gap' at company level. Then, the British entry into the EEC in 1972 
- with subsequent discussion.of the Fifth Directive on company law 
reform - provided the context within which the Labour movement could 
tackle this 'gap' through worker directors. Industrial rationalisa-
tion on the one hand and the EEC on the other provided the backcloth 
against which attention could be re-focused on a new area of industrial 
democracy (new, that is, for Britain). 
In this way, we provide the link between social structure 
(developments within nee-capitalism) and social action (the way in 
which human activity leads to outcomes, in this case, through industrial 
relations). This approach elaborates on Femia's model of Gramscian 
Marxism. He distinguishes two different Marxist models explaining 
the relationship between the economic substructure and forms of 
consciousness: 
11 
••• (a) base determines the form of consciousness 
(classical, 'scientific' Marxism); and (b) base determines 
what forms of consciousness are possible. Gramsci fits 
into this latter category, which we might call 'open' Marxism. 
The economic base sets, in a strict manner, the range of 
possible outcomes, but free political and ideological activity 
is ultimately decisive in determining which alternative 
prevails. There is no automatic determination: only the 
creation of a more or less favourable atmosphere for the 
diffusion of a new ethos. 1175 
Our intention here is first to illustrate the rather vague terrain-
ology of "more or less favourable atmosphere" and "the diffusion of a 
174. 
new ethos" by investigating how management and workers have used 
'industrial democracy' at different times in the pursuit of their 
own (usually sectional) interests. Like this, we shall also 
elaborate on the observation made by .Armstrong et al., which strangely 
parallels Femia's: 
" ••• it should be pointed out that the availability of a 
stock of legitimising principles does not determine the 
use to which they are put in practical situations. There 
is constraint - some demands cannot be convincingly justi-
fied - but not determinacy. 1176 
Our second intention is to analyse the ways in which the structure 
of industrial relations itself reflects bourgeois hegemony and impedes 
control by labour at different levels. The industrial democracy 
schemes looked at in the next two chapters all help to consolidate 
the structure within which the Labour movement organizes. This is 
not to say, of course, that the Labour movement is unable to encroach 
on managerial control at the margins through its own schemes. Yet 
the insistence of, for example, the Fabians that trade unions must 
retain their independence from management betrays an admission of 
their ultimate powerlessness:77 if withdrawal and opposition is their 
weapon of last resort then it is a negative weapon, showing that they 
are unable to initiate moves in the places where the critical 
decisions are made. This is why the solutions to industrial relat-
ions problems advanced by liberal pluralist writers are so inadequate: 
if the structure which leads to bewilderment and hostility from workers 
is reinforced, then the bewilderment and hostility are also reinforced. 
~ Fox, there is no escape unless workers' creative energies are 
tapped - but this requires non-reformist solutions; in Part IV we 
shall turn to examine the conditions in which unions may manage to 
break through the bounds of the industrial relations structure. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
'Industrial democracy' is, then, a rationale used to defend or 
advance the frontier of control in industry. The next question to 
consider concerns the conditions under which different forms of 
industrial democracy are most likely to be implemented. In the 
following chapters we show how management and unions have exploited 
changes in economic and political circumstances in order to take 
initiatives which promote their interests in industry. These changes 
- at the observable level - include the stage of the trade cycle, 
trends in employment levels, the complexion of the government in power 
and its industrial policies, and even the state of international 
relations, amongst others. There is little predetermined about the 
way in which management and unions respond to such developments which 
may, of course, themselves be influenced directly or indirectly by 
t d 
. 1 managemen an unions. However, they establish the contex·t within 
which each side operates by setting limits on the kinds of behaviour 
which can be successfuliy legitimised. For example, it is unlikely 
that unions faced by high levels of unemployment and an unsympathetic 
Conservative government in a revived 'cold war' will easily manage to 
mobilise their members to extend collective bargaining, while manage-
ment in the same conditions will be less bothered about incorporating 
shop stewards through participation committees - which may then fall 
2 into disuse. 
For this reason we have put forward a broad framework for the 
analysis of industrial democracy designed to prevent its identifica-
tion with any one particular form - for example, with participation 
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or job restructuring. This allows us to understand the full range 
of responses available to management and unions. So, in the case 
above, the election of a Conservative government in 1979 led the 
unions to re-think their strategy on industrial democracy in working 
out with the Labour Party a range of proposals covering extension of 
their statutory rights, corporate planning and collective bargaining 
to be implemented by a future Labour government.3 The decline of 
participation committees did not mean that the unions lost interest 
in industrial democracy. The main point is that management responses 
over industrial democracy elicit their own responses in turn from the 
Labour movement; unable to achieve much on the shop-floor it plans 
for political intervention at a later date. Use of 'industrial 
democracy' as a legitimising principle then becomes a tool of militancy, 
and not a measure against it. 
Many of these points grow clearer as we proceed to outline the 
development of industrial democracy in Britain since 1945. Outlines 
produced until now have·been couched either in institutional terms4 
or have focused on only one element of our broad framework, such as 
participation,5 collective bargaining6 or government-level consulta-
tion. 7 Here we shall relate the shifting interpretations of 
'industrial democracy' to changes in economic and political conditions 
- for the time being, within the context of bourgeois hegemony. 
Till 1945 
It is impossible, in the space available, to produce a detailed 
analysis of industrial democracy in Britain before the Second World 
8 War. Still, a few points need to be made by way of introduction. 
177. 
The first is that the economic climate considerably weakened the 
Labour movement between the wars: 
"After the unparalleled reverse of the General Strike, in 
a time of wide-spread unemployment, any post lock-out 
remnants of the shop-stewards' movement in the factories 
were winkled out. Militants everywhere were summarily 
dismissed, and the generation of resourceful and intelligent 
men who had led the wartime strike movements found them-
selves either leading unemployed demonstrations or working 
on sufferance in complete subjugation. 11 9 
Although shop steward activity was not dead in this inter-war 
period,
10 
only the Second World War returned to shop-floor organiza-
tion a degree of influence. 
From the management side, McGivering and others, in a review 
of managerial ideology during this period, point out that despite the 
reforming attempts of certain industrialists like Sir Alfred Mond 
later Lord Melchett, Chairman of ICI -
" ••• in the traditional industries ••• little had been 
done to foster welfare for workers, even as a slogan, as 
late as 1939. 11 11 
In heavy industry, harmonious industrial relations were achieved 
through comparatively high wage rates and joint consultation; in 
light industry, the newer companies had often established personnel 
departments, or even initiated profit-sharing, though, of course, 
aggressive attitudes towards unions persisted. 
"There was ••• no widespread extension of 'welfare' 
policies or of personnel management until after the 
beginning of the last war. The large scale development 
of these practices came about directly as a result of 12 Government example and pressure, followed by compulsion. 11 
The outbreak of war, however, demanded an immense, industrial 
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effort: new factories and equipment, and widespread re-distribution 
of manpower - within the first three years, over four million workers 
were transferred to jobs away from home. 13 During the course of the 
war, "the Trade Unions accepted a massive responsibility for the 
planning of production at every level of industry - national, regional, 
local, and in the works. 111 4 
A National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC) was established in 
October 1939 with fifteen representatives each from the TUC and (what 
was then) the British Employers' Confederation, plus representatives 
from Government. In May 1940, a Joint Consultative Committee - a 
constituent of the NJAC - was formed with seven representatives from 
each side to advise the Ministry of Labour on labour affairs. Then, 
during 1941, discussions took place between engineering employers and 
unions about production committees. By 1942, there was a three-
level system in operation: a National Production Advisory Council, 
with various industry panels at national level; eleven Regional 
Boards, with district committees in important towns; and at works 
level, there were Pit Production Committees in the mines, Yard and 
Site Committees in shipbuilding and construction respectively, and 
Joint Production Connnittees (JPCs) in engineering. They were all 
voluntary committees except in the Royal Ordnance Factories and the 
Royal Dockyards. 
alone. 15 
By 1944, there were about 4,500 JPCs in engineering 
Whilst JPCs were concerned,as their name suggests, with production, 
the Factories' Medical and Welfare Services' Orders (1940) empowered 
inspectors to insist on the appointment of welfare officers, whom the 
Government trained, in enterprises employing over 250 people. The 
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Factory and Welfare Advisory Board advised on appropriate schemes. 
In addition, the Essential Works Orders circumscribed management's 
rights of recruitment and dismissal. All these measures taken 
together had a significant impact on the relationships between 
Government, employer and worker in industry. In 1944, for instance, 
the Workers' Educational Association produced a study outline which 
asked some critical questions: 
"Do these provisions simply increase the power of the 
Government to control industry? Or do they enable the 
workers, through their unions, to exercise a degree of 
control? 1116 
The answer, as we should now begin to see, was both - but along 
different planes. On the one hand, JPCs for instance undoubtedly 
helped the war effort. Their object was to aid the exchange of views 
between management and workers "on matters relating to the improvement 
of production, to increase efficiency for this purpose and to make 
recommendations thereon. 111 7 Examples included maximising the utilisa-
tion of capacity, maint~nance, the elimination of waste and so on. 
Yet on the other hand, under government auspices, management clearly 
felt concerned about the encroachment of workers' influence. Walpole, 
for instance, stated that a JPC's function was "clearly advisory and 
not executive"; it was to provide a channel of coIImlunication between 
labour and management and "on the psychological side, it canalises 
the legitimate aspiration of labour to have a voice in the industry to 
18 which it contributes so much." This is a strong plea for management 
prerogative. And well it might be, as some political leaders were 
already well aware of the potential that JPCs and Works Councils possessed. 
Sir Stafford Cripps, then Minister of Aircraft Production, declared in 
1943 that: 
"It is the beginnings of democracy in the factories, with 
the elected representatives of the workers to disouas and 
suggest, just as Parliament discusses and suggests, while 
the Government has to decide and act."19 
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Indeed, unlike during the First World War, the shop stewards' 
movement responded favourably to the call for production in the Second. 
As Coates and Topham point out, 20 Nazism had suppressed independent 
trade unions in Germany - and after June 1941, the Soviet Union was 
also in the war on the allies' side. Jack Owen, a prominent 
Communist, praised the "solid wall of Red .A:rmy men" who had repulsed 
the Nazi tanks and continued: 
"The :British Labour movement, with its powerful influence 
over a vast army of highly skilled workers, can, and must, 
play a dominant role in the call to its members to greater 
effort, in the fight to bring our factories to a higher 
state of efficiency, and, in the field of politics, to work 
to remove from positions of power all sympathisers with the 
Fascist system and thus strengthen the will of the Govern-
ment to more positive action. 11 21 
All this began to have an effect on management ideology. Unaware 
or unmindful of the way in which participation in industry bolstered 
the hegemonic nature of the prevailing industrial structure, some -
though not all - sectors of management became bitter about workers' 
encroachments into their prerogative. 
"Sir Walter Puckey writing in 1944 coIIUilented that this 
extensive introduction of joint committees meant that 
'the theory of the "infallibility of management" was 
severely shaken.' In fact, the whole process of admoni-
tion from the State was a stigma on :British management. 
As the war proceeded, a number of publications fanned the 
flames of criticism by their indictment of managerial 
inefficiencies, and by reporting how hostile managers 
frequently were to new methods of accommodation with 
labour."22 
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By the time the war ended in 1945, Labour was apparently in 
the ascendancy •••• Management, unable to appeal to its authority 
to justify prerogative, was increasingly compelled to look instead 
to the notion of consent. 
1945-1951 
In 1945, a Labour Government was returned to power, committed 
to socialism and full employment. On the one hand, its aim was to 
further the "dignity of man": 
"Political freedom, the classless society, industrial 
democracy, the acceptance of individual responsibility 
for service to the community - all these are necessary 
to the complete achievement of a society in which the 
dignity of man is recognised •••• 11 23 
.And on the other hand, "production" was "the bridge" to such a 
society: 
"But between the war-afflicted Britain of today and the 
glorious Socialist Commonwealth of tomorrow lies a gap. 
There is only one way to bridge that gap - by higher 
production. 11 24 
Production was necessary for exports to survive; for full 
employment; for social services; and to keep prices down. The 
great question was: "Will the country carry the load?". 
All the agreements made during the war between labour and manage-
ment had lapsed so in 1947 the NJAC agreed to recommend joint 
consultative machinery at national level: it was to be voluntary and 
advisory; it would deal with issues outside collective bargaining; 
and it was left to individual industries to work out local arrangements. 25 
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Joint consultation was promoted both through the Regional Boards 
for Industry with their district committees and through the local 
offices of the (then) Ministry of Labour and National Service. By 
the end of 1948, of the 54 industries subject to an ILO survey of 
joint consultation, four broad categories emerged: first, those 
industries where national organizations on each side had agreed to 
recommend to their members t~e setting up of joint· committees, with 
model constitutions (e.g. engineering, iron and steel, electric 
cables); secondly, those in which national reconnnendations had been 
made, though the form of machinery was left up to local undertakings 
(e.g. chemicals, printing, boot and shoe manufacture); thirdly, those 
in which national organizations were satisfied that existing proced-
ures for joint discussions would permit local agreements on joint 
consultation (e.g. cement, asbestos, cocoa and chocolate manufacture); 
and finally, those in which existing machinery was considered adequate, 
though no formal machinery did in fact exist locally for joint consul ta-
tion (e.g. cotton, heating and domestic engineering, paper and paper-
board). 26 The fragmentation of joint consultation procedures in 
British industry is well illustrated by this survey. 
During this period, the Communist Party - strong within the shop 
stewards' movement - supported this drive for production: 
"If the unions wish to play a real part in planning, they 
must undertake a systematic campaign to revive the Joint 
Production Committees and to induce the Government to make 
them legally compulsory in all firms employing more than 
fifty workers, and help the workers' representatives on 
them to frame an adequate policy. 1127 
This uncritical support for joint consultation - as well as its 
fragmented character across industry - did not facilitate appeals for 
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workers' control from other sectors of the Labour movement. In 
addition, since nationalisation itself had led only to a subsidiary, 
advisory role for the unions in its operation, 28 it is clear that 
labourist ideology was dominant and that any opportunity to advance 
proletarian hegemony had been missed. The struggle was set firmly 
within the framework of bourgeois hegemony. 
Following the First World War, the Labour movement had questioned 
management at its roots, up to and including the principle of conven-
tional management itself. 29 Following the Second World War, manage-
ment functions were accepted, whilst management performance came under 
criticism. Child sums this point up quite neatly: 
" ••• this difference in setting had some bearing on the 
fact that the renewed attempt at social legitimation to 
be found in management thought in the 1940s and early 
1950s was part and parcel of the human relations tech-
niques upon which it relied. There was a profound 
difference between this kind of legitimation, which in 
essence followed from what was considered to be effective 
technique, and the notions formulated around 1918 of 
renunciation, shared control and the like, which in a sense 
had been advanced prior to 'technical' considerations. It 
would not be too far wrong to simplify and conclude that 
the earlier type of legitimation was aimed at securing the 
right of managers to perform at all, while the later type 
was much more a justification of the methods that were 
chosen to obtain effective performance. 1130 
Human relations techniques could flourish in an atmosphere so 
conducive to productivity after 1945. 13y the time of a resurgence in 
militancy with the start of the Cold War, consultative machinery had 
been established and considerable agreement existed over its validity 
and effectiveness. Mitchell, for instance, rejecting legally compulsory 
joint consultation as inappropriate to :British industrial relations, 
stated that, since "a spirit of co-operation" on either side could not 
184. 
be enforced, propaganda was the best method far ensuring its voluntary 
expansion. She concludes: " ••• so far it seems that the most 
helpful road (to industrial democracy) is to more consultation".31 
:Meanwhile, management was g-radually coming to view joint consult-
ation as the best means of winning back the authority lost during the 
war to government intervention. Walpole states categorically: 
" ••• I should like to see in each of these works (endangered 
by industrial relations trouble when the war ends) a really 
live Joint Works Council where everybody in the concern, from 
the youngest labourer to the Chairman, are keen on hanging 
together through thick and thin for the benefit of the concern 
itself - just as a football team play the game right through 
even though they are being beaten. They play on, through a 
losing match, determined to win another day. 11 32 
The perspective contained in this viewpoint is classically 
unitarist. Indeed, the Conservative Party in the post-war period also, 
not surprisingly, maintained similar attitudes. In 1946, for instance, 
it produced a report which 
rr ••• spoke of the need to foster a healthy climate based 
on good human relations in order to help Britain resolve 
her acute economic difficulties. There was an urgent 
need to continue the valuable work of many joint consult-
ative bodies set up during the war years. 11 33 
During this period, then, joint consultation did provide the focus 
for industrial democracy in private industry for both sides. The common 
aim - production and efficiency - produced a temporary consensus. But 
it was, of course, an artificial one because both sides had very 
different reasons for supporting it. During the war and shortly after, 
militants were concerned to support the Russian anti-Fascist effort; 
the purposes of the allies and the Soviet Union coincided. The unions 
supported the war and subsequently the Labour Government in its attempts 
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to create a welfare state founded, as we saw, on "Production - the 
Bridge to Socialism". Employers managed to channel workers' efforts 
into JPCs, and later joint consultation committees, and thereby 
attempted to reassert their prerogative through consent. And 
Government, faced by massive drains on the country's resources, needed 
to establish industrial harmony to avoid the disruptive effects of 
strikes and so on. One author summed up the achievements of JPCs 
like this: 
''No matter how limited their concrete results may appear to 
be, they bring management and workers closer together as 
human beings by enabling them to meet jointly on wider 
issues than wages and conditions of employment. Through 
the work of the JPCs there has developed a growing apprecia-
tion of the fact that the future of industry is of common 
concern to all people who are part of it. 11 34 
In all this, 'increasing production' and 'joint consultation' 
became the legitimising principles of both management and unions. 
Indeed, during 1948-9, incomes policy also succeeded in providing 
wage. and price stability. However, it was not to last. As soon as 
economic conditions improved, the ostensible convergence of workers• 
and managements' interests diverged again. In the first place, under 
full employment shop-floor bargaining became more important, especially 
in those industries characterised by piece-rates. This led in the 
1950s to wage drift as shop stewards moved out of the control of 
national union leaders. And in the second place, post-war reconstruc-
tion, the devaluation of the pound in 1949, and the Korean war 
stimulated inflation - and an industrial context in which shop-floor 
wage bargaining became one of the key methods with which workers could 
defend their living standards.35 
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1951-1964 
The change in mood between the 1940s and 1950s is well summed up 
by Coates and Topham, who are worth quoting at length: 
11 
••• strange as is the thought that the leading men of the 
Clyde and the hunger marches should be caught up in the 
neutralisation of control demands, into humble efforts at 
'participation', it is even stranger that the vecy Cold War 
which brought the militants' efforts at co-operation to an 
end created the conditions for the next major upswing of 
their traditional demand. It was full employment, under-
pinned by a technological revolution based on the war effort 
of the fifties and early sixties, which not only disoriented 
a movement that had come increasingly to concentrate its 
fire against 'inefficiency' and to ignore the traditional 
protests against 'wage slavecy': but also created, in 
factory work-shop organizations of unparalleled strength 
and security, the mood to begin another push for the old 
objectives."36 
Already in the 1950s a French writer, having noted how difficult 
it was to provide an overview of joint consultation in Britain owing 
to lack of legal regulation or even co-ordination of schemes in the 
private sector, stated: 
"If workers' welfare has undergone developments in the majority 
of factories with a consultative committee, we have been able 
to verify that in England as elsewhere workers and bosses 
have different ways of conceiving the common interest, the 
improvement of their relationships and the solution of problems 
in the company. Attitudes towards consultative committees 
differ accordine to the position from which they are regarded. 11 37 
Indeed, during the 1950s, a series of factors were to alter 
attitudes towards consultative committees in particular and industrial 
democracy in general. 
First, full employment was seen to lead to decreased labour 
discipline. Pleas for the integration of workers into their place of 
work became more common during this period, for example through the 
extension of 'occupational democracy•: 
"The need for this development has been sharply accentuated 
by post-war conditions, for full employment has robbed the 
old-fashioned employer of one of his most powerful whips. 
Because the worker is no longer goaded forward by the fear 
of 1:lllemployment, his pace has in many cases slackened 
considerably. Yet increased productivity is an urgent 
necessity, not merely to the employers but to the whole 
well-being of the people, for without it we face economic 
decline. 11 38 
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Such was the view in 1956 of the Progressive League, describing 
itself as "a politically independent organization. 11 39 
Recognition of the problem of "slackening pace" had been one of 
the factors leading to the establishment of the Joint Committee on 
Human Relations in Industry by the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research and by the Medical Research Council in March 1953. 
The research areas sponsored by the Committee included: factors 
influencing the effectiveness of incentive payment schemes; character-
istics of management organization influencing productivity; factors 
facilitating and restricting the introduction of new production 
techniques and methods; and industrial education, promotion and 
training. At the end of their four year term, the Committee announced 
that: 
" ••• we have seen a real development of research in the 
field of human relations in industry, and, what is equally 
important, a big growth of industrial interest in such 
research."40 
Official concern about productivity levels is well reflected in the 
Committee's research headings. 
In addition to the general question of "slackening pace", we have 
already stressed that the main problems in industrial relations at this 
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time were seen as wage drift, restrictive practices and the rising 
level of unofficial strikes. In this respect, the shop stewards' 
movement was again attracting increasing criticism. Noting that full 
employment had made labour a more valuable commodity, a publication of 
the Institute of Directors remarked in 1958 that employers will 
frequently pay above union-negotiated rates to retain labour: 
"In their growing away from the trade union chain of 
command, shop stewards have set up national and inter-
national organizations. They pioneered the abortive 
but troublesome proposal that redundant workers should 
be kept on payrolls until other work could be found for 
them. The co-operative union official who might reach 
a reasonable settlement with employers if left to him-
self is often helpless in the grip of shop stewards backed 
by gullible work-people. 1141 
Despite the unitary perspective implicit, this observation does 
highlight two apparently important features of industrial relations 
at this time. First, the relative swing in the balance of power on 
the shop-floor towards stewards; and second, the tension between them 
and the •official' union movement - a dichotomy which influenced 
subsequent discussions in terms of the 'formal' and 'informal' systems 
of industrial relations. 
There is little doubt that the comparative decline of interest in 
joint consultation dates from this time. In a survey of 157 firms in 
British industry published in 1959, the European Productivity Agency -
like other commentators42 - emphasised the fragmented nature of joint 
consultation. It also noted: "In some factories it can be built into 
the machinery of negotiation, in most it is best kept apart."43 It 
is not surprising that shop stewards and rank and file should have 
preferred negotiation to consultation especially when economic conditions 
189. 
were in their favoux, since consultation in the end always involves 
a management decision. Indeed, the report showed that: 
"Support for joint consultation ••• was strong among 
workers' representatives, fair among shop stewards and 
weak among the rank and file."44 
80';6 worker representatives "supported" joint consultation whilst 
2CY;6 "accepted" it; 65% stewards were in support, 30';6 accepted, and 5% 
rejected it; whilst 4CY;6 workers supported it, and 6CY;6 accepted it.45 
Joint consultation became increasingly associated with the discussion 
of trivia, which led to a consequent lack of interest on the part of 
the rank and file. 46 .And from the management side, given the growth 
of work-place bargaining, by the late 1950s the problem was not how to 
consult but rather how to re-assert management prerogative and to 
integrate. Not only was full employment raising the price of laboux, 
but also - as we shall see - the development of technology, especially 
continuous process industry, was giving labour a more strategic role in 
production. 
One major technique used to re-assert management prerogative, 
pioneered at the Esso oil refinery at Fawley, was productivity bargain-
ing. 47 In an acute analysis of its significance, Nightingale separates 
three facets of this development: "the economic, the ideological and 
the political. 1148 In the first place, faced by a crisis of profita-
bility in British industry, management extended the scope of collective 
bargaining to include formerly non-negotiable items, such as work 
practices and piece-rate systems. These were "bought out", and instead, 
job evaluation, measured day-work and the elimination of restrictive 
practices were introduced. Secondly, such a strategy fitted into the 
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liberal pluralist management ideology, based on new attitudes of 
authority through consent; it also suited many trade unions as well. 
As we saw above, they too had lost a certain degree of control over 
their memberships, since, for instance, payment by results systems did 
not require official sanction to operate. However, the emergence of 
productivity councils at local level allowed unions to re-exert 
influence in bargaining over payment systems. And thirdly, the State 
approved of productivity bargaining as a convenient, decentraJi.sed way 
to re-assert control and improve efficiency. However, opposition on 
the shop-floor to many productivity bargaining changes increased over 
time - and drove a further wedge between stewards and union officials. 
Still, as Nightingale points out, the development of productivity 
bargaining cannot be seen either as purely an "employers' offensive" 
or as "creeping worker control". 
"(Its development) was characterised above all by unevenness, 
since, for various reasons, its attractiveness was limited to 
particular companies and industries and varied over time."49 
Relating this discussion to our own conceptual framework, we can 
see clearly in this period how attempts are made by management and 
work-force to extend or consolidate positions. Commitment to joint 
consultation and interest in the human relations approach as methods 
of integrating shop-floor behaviour did not prevent an increase in 
shop steward representation, especially in engineering, on the shoP-
floor. 50 Consultation could be by-passed, and so new ways were needed 
to curb the controls - albeit marginal ones - that stewards possessed. 
Productivity bargaining can be seen as one such way: the employers, 
by building on the rationales already available by dint of an evolving 
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pluralist ideology, and indeed by extending bargaining into new 
areas, managed to meet the stewards' movement on its own ground and 
attempt to diminish its influence. As Topham puts it: 
" ••• what may appear a tolerable waste at plant-level 
appears as a fatal weakness to the giant international 
combine, or to the national economy in search of 
controllable wage rates and an end to wage drift. 
Hence the economic crisis of capitalism, which nationally 
and internationally produced the search for incomes policy, 
reaches out and down to the plant level, where it appears 
as a drive for labour intensity achieved through a . 
concentration of power in management hands (via productivity 
bargaining). 11 51 
These trends were to be exacerbated in the next period of analysis. 
1964-1970 
The economic background to the Labour Government during these six 
years has been covered amply elsewhere.52 
However, in brief, inflation was rising to comparatively high 
levels; competitiveness in international markets was being eroded; 
the balance of payments was running increasingly high deficits; and in 
1967, the pound was devalued. The stop-go cycle of economic policy 
continued, nevertheless, and sterling remained weak. All this high-
lighted Britain's persistent failure in maintaining smooth progress 
towards greater growth and productivity. 
At national level, the new Labour Government carried out a series 
of measures to cope with the crisis of productivity. First of all, 
amongst several new departments were the Department of Economic Affairs 
(DEA) and the Ministry of Technology. The DEA was concerned with 
establishing a voluntary prices and incomes policy; preparing a National 
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Plan, with a joint statement of intent signed by the Government and 
representatives of the TUC and industry; improving industrial policy 
mainly through the Economic Development Councils; and organizing 
regional policy. Under the DEA, the Prices and Incomes Board was 
set up in 1965, and then the Industrial Reorganization Corporation 
(IRC). Turner has connnented on the IRC as follows: 
"It used its power and irl.rluence to push through mergers 
which might not have taken place if the market mechanism 
had been allowed to operate freely ••• ; it used public 
money to buy shares and achieve a merger which it approved 
and, in doing so, was instrumental in frustrating the offe_r 
of another company which might otherwise have been 
victorious ••• ; and, by the novelty of its approach, 
created all the alarm which would be produced by a stunt 
pilot flying a supersonic jet under Tower Bridge."53 
The Ministry of Technology was engaged in similar activity. Its 
role was to manage scientific resources - in particular, Government 
research establishments - and to channel money into industry-related 
research and development. At the same time it aided industries in 
financial trouble and "played a significant role in the rationalisation 
of the motor and computer industries."54 
Meanwhile, the Monopolies Corrnnission - which after 1965 was 
empowered to investigate mergers as well - appeared not over-eager to 
challenge these trends towards industrial concentration. As Turner 
puts it: 
"On the contrary, it was convinced that a good deal of 
rationalisation was essential if British industry was to be 
capable of facing full-scale international competition."55 
Details of these trends towards rationalisation can be found 
elsewhere.56 But given our perspective - that economic conditions 
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provide the parameters within which 'industrial democracy' comes to 
be defined - the question arises: what impact did these events have 
on labour at shop-floor level in the 1960s? 
The increasing pace of economic rationalisation and concentration 
provides the background against which an apparently renewed interest 
in 'industrial democracy' can best be understood. Hughes, having noted 
these trends, states that concentration does not in fact create greater 
stability. Not only does it require greater public accountability: 
" ... it also produces violent competitive pressures, often 
highly destructive of capital and of existing jobs and job 
expectations; in other words, a system in which each giant 
firm is having to run very hard (in research, in innovation, 
in cost reduction, in the exploitation of marketing techniques) 
to maintain its long-run security. Thus the typical company 
of this era is a multi-plant, multi-product company, and 
increasingly one that operates multi-nationally •••• 11 57 
Changes in industrial structure along with the highly de-centralised 
system of work-place bargaining characteristic of British industrial 
relations - especially engineering - help to explain the increase in 
militancy during this period. The Donovan Report, for instance, was 
particularly bothered about unofficial strikes: 
" o•• unofficial strikes have shown a strong general 
upward trend in numbers in recent years. ••• some 95 per 
cent of strikes are unofficial. The general increase 
in the number of strikes in industries other than coal-
mining is attributable almost wholly to an increase in 
the number of unofficial strikes. 11 58 
In its subsequent analysis of such strikes between 1964-1966, the 
Report - noting that about half were attributable to wage disputes 
concentrated on those in the motor industry. First, the Report blamed 
the wages structure: 
"If groups of workers see that other groups with whom 
they have hitherto enjoyed equality are able to improve 
their position because of the vagaries of the pay system, 
it is not surprising if they feel indignation and seek to 
recover a position of parity. 11 59 
Obviously, "the vagaries of the pay system" are likely to be 
exacerbated if the industry itself is in a state of expansion and 
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turmoil; workers in a plant newly taken over are likely to look to 
their new colleagues elsewhere in the company for pay guidelines, in 
particular if a payment by results system is operated.60 
Secondly, regarding those unofficial strikes arising over "working 
arrangements, rules and discipline" and "redundancy, dismissal, suspen-
sion etc.", the Report notes: 
"Disputes from such causes reflect in part the insecurity of 
the industry. They also reflect the increased power and 
readiness of workers, in conditions of full employment, to 
resist unwelcome disciplinary or other managerial decisions 
by their employers."61 
So whilst inadequate wages structures and dispute procedures are 
considered the immediate cause of unofficial strikes, the Report itself 
concedes the underlying role played by economic conditions as well. 
Not only is reference made to Government's part in the economy - in that 
fiscal measures influence demand and in turn "insecurity of employment 
and earnings", 62 but also technological development is cited in relation, 
for example, to iron and steel: 
"Changing technology has altered the importance of different 
groups of workers in the production process, and as a result 
maintenance craftsmen, whose pay is settled separately from 
that of process workers, have become increasingly dissatis-
fied with the wages structure. 1163 
Clearly, the problems with which the Donovan Report was concerned 
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have their roots deep within industrial and structural developments 
within the economy.
64 
And, in broad terms, the reference to "process 
workers" in the last quotation brings us to the second, major change 
underlying interest in industrial democracy. 
It did not escape the attention of industrial sociologists during 
this period that changing production technologies were likely to have 
an effect on work organization. 65 
As technology, especially in chemicals, oil and petroleum refining, 
becomes more complex, workers find that their importance increases as 
the labour/capital ratio alters in their favour. Management recognises 
that a series of effects resuliBfrom this: 
"First, labour has stopped being cheap and will become 
ever more expensive ••• Secondly, labour's bargaining 
power has become immense (especially) because technological 
development has been such that small groups are now in a 
position to disrupt whole industries •••• 1166 
The author adds a page later that "thirdly, and most important, 
labour has stopped being labour". What he means by this is that 
staff and technicians now often outnumber blue-collar manual workers 
the implicit assumption being that their position in the labour market 
is radically different. 
But the important point here is that the centrality of white-
collar staff and technicians in process industries does create a new 
tension in the relationship between management and work-force. Offe, 
for example, in a book criticising the 'achievement principle' in 
industry - the notion that social and economic rewards depend on one's 
performance - notes that technical skills are not distributed 
cumulatively throughout an organization. 
"As a result the higher authority cannot have a monopoly 
of the definition either of the work goals or of the 
technical rules that specify how these goals are to be 
achieved ••• In this situation, if the organization's 
goals are to be carried out, it is a functional necessity 
that this loss of external control is compensated for by 
internal controls, i.e. the individual must now himself 
interpret the goals and carry them out independently. An 
organization of this sort can only exist if an internal 
system of goal-oriented decision-making rules and action 
orientations and a normative commitment of the worker 
replaces the detailed hierarchical controls of the craft 
workshop type of unit - in which work tasks can be fulfilled 
merely by following the necessary technical rules. 1167 
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In other words, the enterprise - to avoid potential disruption 
by labour - must ensure that all its staff are fully incorporated (in 
the sense of value integration see p.114) into its own goal defini-
tions. Personnel management, therefore, has to oversee not only work 
discipline but also work interpretation so that production continues 
smoothly. The extension of discretion to the work-force for the 
purposes of technological development must mean at the same time 
improvements in its socialisation. 
Both management and workers are aware of this. In 1964, for 
instance, a Wages Structure Panel was set up in ICI to establish how 
best the company could adapt itself to a changing environment in 
chemicals. The result was a series of trials to improve Manpower 
Utilisation and Payment Structures (MUPS), which was basically a 
productivity exercise. Roeber explains: 
"It was not just that jobs were to be examined, analysed 
and re-designed, but also that the process of doing so 
was to be - which no area of managerial decision-making 
had been before - co-operative as had been the process 
leading to MUPS itself. It was a complete departure 
from the ICI tradition of decision-making, of technical 
expertise deployed within a framework of managerial 
prerogative. A logical result of this process was a more 
participative style of management. 1168 
He adds, in the conclusions, with an engaging honesty: 
"The energy for the change came from its hoped-for value 
in securing the company's commercial survival - and there 
is nothing paradoxical or unexpected in a company's acting 
in its own interest. 1169 
This approach - defined by the company as joint consultation 
appears well established: "effective management has to become a 
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shared objective", claims an ICI Works Manager, continuing that "one 
oi' the priorities in industry must be to find ways of taking employees' 
views into account before major decisions are taken."70 
these views may not necessarily weather a recession.71 
Even so, 
Nevertheless, the seriousness with which management began to 
treat participation and productivity bargaining - especially in process 
industries72 - is vindicated perhaps by some of the claims being made 
for white collar militancy at the same time by some Marxist writers. 
Mallet, for instance, drawing on French experience, denied that 
technical staff were well integrated into technologically advanced 
industry, even though they are largely responsible for running it. 
He claimed that the 'new working class' is revolutionary - not in the 
traditional sense of wanting to seize political power but in the sense 
of wishing "to modify the existing social relations fundamentally". He 
continues: 
" ••• the more the modern worker reconquers on the collective 
level the professional autonomy which he had lost during the 
period of the mechanisation of work, the more will demands for 
control develop. 0 73 
Evidence for this view is adduced from the events of May 1968 in 
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France; the demands of the advanced sectors of the French working 
class went well beyond the traditional areas of wages and conditions 
to challenge as well "the techno-bureaucratic centres which direct 
the economy". Mallet concludes: 
"Precisely because its elementary demands are largely 
satisfied, the new working class is led to ask itself 
other questions whose solutions cannot be found in the 
sphere of consumption."74 
The question here is less whether or not white-collar workers 
are at the forefront of militancy - though there is certainly some 
evidence for this from Britain as well75 - than what the effect of 
their potential militancy has been on management perceptions of industrial 
relations: during the 1960s, management began to appreciate the 
potential threat that small numbers of highly trained workers could 
have on the production process. 
Now, a rise in militancy - either because of economic or techno-
logical circumstances - has an effect not only on employers and 
Government (both of which prefer to control it) but also on trade unions. 
On the one hand, they are to represent their members' interests, yet on 
the other they are, as we have seen, systematically integrated into 
the social system. Up until the middle 1960s, as Hyman demonstrates,76 
union leaders frequently tried to play a neutral role in serious, 
unofficial stoppages, often advising a return to work but rarely 
instructing it. However, towards the end of the 1964-70 period, and 
especially in the early 1970s, unions began to sanction strike action 
more and more. A series of strikes during this period were not just 
unofficial, but also anti-official. Unions began to recognise that 
"to keep some form of control over the situation, a degree of endorse-
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ment of militant action may well appear the most prudent course."77 
Unions, then, also had good reasons for channelling militancy 
into acceptable procedures. This point is well summed up in the 
following quotation from the Labour Party Working Party report, 
Industrial Democracy, published in 1967. It explicitly links economic 
rationalisation with the need to ensure adequate union defence of 
workers' interests: 
" ••• the scale of (mergers) has multiplied several times 
over as compared to the 1950s, so that hundreds of firms and 
thousands of plants a year may be affected. Although the 
1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act provides a system of public 
investigation and control that can do much to ensure that 
consumer interests are not neglected, no such protection is 
afforded the workers. Yet the impact of 'rationalisation' 
following such take-overs may fall harshly and arbitrarily 
upon large numbers of workers - whether it takes the form of 
outright closures of plants or managerial insistence on new 
wage systems or procedures. For the shareholders concerned 
there is the protection of company law, for consumer interests 
anti-monopoly statutes, but for the workers concerned, no 
statutory protection - and this in a situation where trade 
union organizat;i.on may not be able to ensure an adequate 
defence."78 
During the late 1960s productivity bargaining began to decline. 
In 1967, a statutory incomes policy was introduced which made rises 
in production central to the justification of pay increases. 
"Thus an important element of classical productivity 
bargaining, that it should be a continuous process to 
secure ideological acceptance of change in order to 
qualitatively restructure the balance of power at plant 
level, was replaced by a narrow concentration on the 
achievement of measurable improvements in 'effort' in 
return for short-term wage increases."79 
Dissatisfaction with incomes policy and rising unemployment 
together help to explain the following figures: 80 
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No. of productivity 
bargaining agreements 
Jan. 1967 - June 1968 
July 1968 - Dec. 1968 
Jan. 1969 - June 1969 





Thereafter, the number of agreements fell drastically. 
Union leaders were constrained by their members to use different 
rationales for wage increases as discontent with Labour's economic 
policies grew; and, as Nightingale points out, though the process 
had begun earlier, 
"By 1972 it was clear that unemployment rather than 
productivity bargaining was to be at the centre of the 
State's economic strategy. 1181 
Emphasis on joint consultation also declined throughout the 1960s. 
In 1966, the CBI produced a report arguing that consultation and 
negotiation procedures should not be confused or else decision-making 
would become a matter of negotiation, thereby abnegating the role of 
prior consultation; and that negotiation machinery should represent 
the entire work-force, not simply union members. 82 However, the 
British Institute of Management was to state in 1968: 
"Although joint consultation in both public and private 
industry has produced many notable successes in solving 
particular social problems and in smoothing the way for 
change, the hope that joint consultation would be the 
means of producing a new industrial society has not been 
fulfilled. 1183 
This was alleged to be because consultation had not in itself 
managed to involve workers sufficiently in the process of change: 
"It is possible therefore if joint bargaining at plant, 
factory or company level is given impetus and standing 
by the Donovan Report and the Industrial Relations 
Commission which is envisaged, that industrial democracy 
will blossom and flower from the grass roots of industry 
(sic). This would be its natural means of growth -
from the bottom up. The false starts from the top have 
not been successful or satisfying. 1184 
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It is, of course, in this quotation - with its reference to the 
Donovan Report - that the main orientation towards industrial 
relations problems in the 1960s is found. We have already illustrated 
at length in Chapters One and Two the pluralist assumptions underlying 
the Donovan Report's :proposals, and its emphasis on collective bargain-
ing. However, the Commission considered "collective bargaining" as 
something apart from industrial democracy, which it pondered in Chapter 
XV, "Workers' Participation in Management". Here, it focused almost 
exclusively on the TUC's proposals put forward in its evidence85 for 
trade union representation on company boards, as well as workers' 
representation at intermediate and plant levels within the enterprise. 
These proposals were rejected - because of the possible conflict of 
86 
interests for worker directo+s, amongst other reasons - in favour 
of a series of proposals including the registering of collective agree-
ments with what was then the Department of Employment and Productivity, 
the setting up of an Industrial Relations Commission dealing with 
issues like union recognition, and the protection of employees from 
unfair dismissal. It did not suggest the legal enforceability of 
collective agreements. 87 Donovan, then, in proposing the regularisa-
tion of collective bargaining as the means best suited to contain the 
most disruptive aspects of industrial relations practice, failed to 
identify collective bargaining with industrial democracy. 
The Labour Party Working Party on the same subject, however, had 
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a different view. First, its declared purpose in examining the 
extension of industrial democracy was to advance the "development of 
the individual", the protection of employees at work, management by 
consent, industrial efficiency and social accountability. 88 Secondly, 
it considered participation to be closely associated with union 
organization, which was to provide a single channel of representation 
in industry. And thirdly, it explicitly identified the extension 
of collective bargaining with industrial democracy: 
"The basic approach of the Working Party was to plan for a 
considerable extension in the scope and content of 
collective bargaining. But a major pre~equisite of this 
extension, it recognised, is 'the general and effective 
recognition of the rights of workers to organize, represent 
and participate in major matters affecting their working 
lives'. And this requires the full backing of the 
resources of the State."89 
The realism of Donovan in acknowledging collective bargaining 
as the central process in British industrial relations, and the emphasis 
of the Labour Party in focusing on it as the key to greater union 
influence in industry came together at the end of the 1960s in a well-
knO\m White Paper. As disillusionment with nationalisation grew, so 
a swing took place within the Labour Party towards more collective 
bargaining. As Eaton and Fletcher put it: 
"The extent of this conversion may easily be judged by 
reference to one document which may be regarded as the 
synthesis of Labour's industrial relations policy in the 
late 1960s, 'In Place of Strife' (1969). This highly 
contentious White Paper emphasised, amongst other issues, 
the central role to be played by collective bargaining as 
a method for advancing industrial democracy."90 
'In Place of Strife' envisaged a Commission on Industrial Relations 
to disseminate good practice in reforming collective bargaining, as well 
as the imposition of discretionary conciliation pauses in unconstitu-
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tional strikes, strike ballots in the case of major official strikes 
and an Industry Board to impose financial penalites for breaches of 
such orders issued by the Secretary of State for Employment and 
Productivity. 91 
The reaction of the press was favourable on the whole. The 
Observer , for instance, stated that: 
" ••• inasmuch as it (the White Paper) will transform the 
position of trade unionists from that of licensed outlaws 
to citizens with defined rights and obligations, it should 
be welcomed by them."92 
The White Paper was not, of course, welcomed by the unions. 
The TUC, a large number of Labour MPs, the Labour Party NEC - as well 
as a May Day strike in protest - all demonstrated opposition to the 
penal aspects of the proposals. In June 1969, the Government 
announced its withdrawal of legal sanctions from the measures. There 
was an easy advantage to the Conservatives in this. The following 
year they won the general election with the reform of industrial 
relations as a major part of their manifesto. 
This period shows very clearly - against a background of militancy 
and industrial conflict - how several different forms of industrial 
democracy failed to reduce conflict on the shop-floor. Joint consult-
ation, productivity bargaining and the attempted regulation of 
collective bargaining through legal sanctions were unable to cope with 
the effects of structural changes in the economy. None of these 
measures managed successfully to reinforce managerial ideology on the 
shop-floor or to undermine Labour ideology. 
The tradition of voluntarism was particularly important in 
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:supplying rationales with which workers could oppose the regulation 
from outside of collective agreements at either industry or plant 
level. By this stage only the TUC had raised worker directors as 
an issue - as a means to achieve greater influence at company level. 
The Conservatives were still to attempt to regulate collective 
bargaining through the law before the notion of worker directors 
would emerge as the last novel approach to solving Britain's industrial 
relations problems. In the next chapter, we continue our analysis 
into the period 1970-1980. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
In the last chapter we analysed the development of industrial 
democracy in Britain between 1945 and 1970. Using the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter Six, we showed how different forms 
of industrial democracy had caught the attention of management and 
work-force in varying economic conditions. These forms differed 
according to level, area of interest and degree of influence accord-
ing to their perceived suitability in resolving industrial relations 
problems. So, for example, with the economic boom of the 1950s, 
joint consultation gave way to negotiation at plant level as the 
method then most efficient in mediating control between the two sides. 
However, by the 1960s, with concern expressed about shop-floor 
'anarchy', interest was stimulated in new methods of control - in 
particular, productivity bargaining and legal regulation. 
In this chapter, we analyse discussions about, and schemes for, 
industrial democracy in the 1970s. Three major areas of interest 
emerge: attention to the quality of working life and participation; 
the extension and consolidation of collective bargaining through legal 
rights; and the 'social contract•, with the notion of worker directors 
as a major theme. These methods advocate - in Friedman's phrase -
1 "responsible autonomy". However, the decade is bracketed at each 
end by "direct control" methods: the Conservative Government (1970-
1974) was committed to widescale reform of the British industrial 
relations structure through legal regulation, and the one elected in 
May 1979 was committed to public expenditure cuts and cash limits. The 
effect has been to erode unions' influence through the creation of 
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unemployment and an anti-union ideology. This ten-year period can 
therefore be divided into five sections for our purposes. 
Direct Control, 1970-1974 
The Conservative Government, which was returned in June 1970 with 
industrial relations reform as a major plank in its manifesto, soon 
published an Industrial Relations Eill and Consultation Document to 
accompany it. Macdonald comments: "In spite of its title there was 
no attempt as in 'In Place of Strife' at persuasion". The Conservative 
Government extended the basic legal regulation of Labour's proposals 
"but they were a good deal more uncompromising and exhaustive •o••"2 
Indeed, as Fox points out, the frame of reference of the Industrial 
Relations Act - passed in August 1971 - had become unitary with a heavy 
reliance on punitive sanctions.3 .Among its main features were a Code 
of Industrial Relations Practice, "new rights and protections for the 
individual", the maintenance of these rights through "a new Industrial 
Court", "a new system of registration for trade unions and employers' 
associations", and the introduction of "new methods of settling disputes 
••• and for improving procedures for handling industrial relations".4 
It is not necessary here to trace the history of the Act except 
to say that it was vigorously opposed by the organized Labour movement 
and that it was repealed by the Labour Government elected in 1974. 5 
Indeed, this campaign of opposition helped to spawn a new phenomenon 
the work-in, first of all at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders - which was to 
have a major impact in the 1970s on alternative forms of industrial 
democracy. The demise of the Industrial Relations Act spelt the end 
of plans involving legal regulation of industrial relations through 
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registration and Industrial Courts. Not even the Thatcher Government 
was to attempt this after its election in May 1979. 
'Post-Material Values' and Job Restructuring 
The perceived problem, of course, remains: how is industrial 
disruption to be minimised; how is workers' behaviour to be regularised? 
From the late 1960s onwards, attention became increasingly focused 
on the question of 'post-material values'. According to Garson, for 
instance: 
"Since the Second World War, an intergenerational shift in 
attitudes has occurred, de-emphasising traditional values 
like order and security in favour of new emphasis on free 
speech and participation. n6 
In addition, the same process is often alleged to have eroded the 
work ethic. Several writers, such as Nossiter7 and Forester~ have 
pursued this theme in relation to Britain, not necessarily unsympathet-
ically. The view, albeit a controversial one, is that as prosperity 
increases, people become more and more interested in non-material 
values, such as leisure and the "quality of life". As Chems points 
out: 
"The post-materialist values represent a complex of 
attitudes towards economic, political and social issues: 
while broadly liberal and permissive on social issues, 
they tend to be egalitarian and consumer-oriented on 
economic ones. Most prominent is an insistent humani-
tarianism and urge towards the exploration and fulfilment 
of self. Post-materialist attitudes towards work emphasise 
its role in obtaining self-fulfilment, rather than money or 
security or power."9 
This background certainly helps to explain the gathering interest 
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in the late 1960s and 1970s in job satisfaction and the quality of 
working life. Indeed, the Code of Industrial Relations Practice 
established by the Industrial Relations Act emphasised: 
"the point that managements, recognising the need of 
employees to achieve a sense of satiSfaction in their 
jobs, should provide for it so far as is practicable." 
This statement, written ~y Maurice Macmillan, in 1973 Secretary 
of State for Employment, continues: 
"They (management) can do so by creating conditions in 
which, for example, individuals or groups have greater 
varietyin their work, a bigger share in making the 
decisions which affect it and the greatest possible 
autonomy."10 
This pamphlet recommended that the Research and Planning Division 
of the Department of Employment should monitor projects designed to 
make jobs more satisfying, since 
11 
••• modern work systems can be devised to meet the needs 
of a competitive economy while at the same time affording 
a range of jobs which are at the least ~omparatively 
satisfying and progressive for most of the people available 
to do them. u11 
In June 1973, the Government set up the Tripartite Steering 
Group on Job Satisfaction. It met quarterly, representing the Govern-
ment, TUC and CBI to investigate shop-floor participation. 12 On its 
recommendation, the Department of Employment established a Work Research 
Unit in November 1974 to continue analysis of job satisfaction in greater 
depth. 13 The Steering Group itself in a booklet stated: 
"If we accept the reality of the problems and tackle them with 
understanding, imagination and common sense, we can do some-
thing to make work a more satisfying experience for many 
people, and at the same time make it more efficient in produc-
ing the goods and services we all need."14 
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Work satisfaction and productivity are the pillars on which job 
design experiments rest; from the management point of view, they 
provide the links with the promotion of joint consultation in the 
1940s. Though the Industrial Relations Act disappeared, the partici-
pation ideas contained in its Code of Industrial Relations Practice 
have persisted, especially in relation to the introduction of 'new 
technology•. 15 This is connected with what is sometimes seen as 
the changing basis of management authority. Management prerogative 
once rested on property rights, but the development of the joint stock 
company and the mixed economy - it is alleged - have undermined that 
t . 1 16 ra iona e. In its place has come technical expertise, the 
possession of which was to justify management authority. However, 
strategic decisions are made by managers on the basis of expert advice 
from elsewhere - lawyers, systems analysts, accountants and so on. 
It would follow then that many more groups than generally appreciated 
could co*tribute to decision-making, a fact which has provoked unease 
amongst management, wa:ry of attacks on their prerogative. Radice 
illustrates this unease by quoting from w. c. Adamson's inaugural letter 
to members on his appointment as Director-General of the CBI in 1970: 
''Managers do not - if they ever had - have a divine right 
to manage. There is no automatic prerogative to make 
decisions and expect them to be carried out. The process 
of decision making will have to be more and more justified 
and demonstrated to be right in order to command the respect 
not only of the people working in the company but the 
community as a whole!'1 7 
A third legitimation of management prerogative therefore appears 
after property rights and possession of technical skills: consent. 
Given this, recourse to participation and shop-floor job restructuring 
appears quite natural as they are in direct conceptual line with human 
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relations and neo-human relations approaches to management: they all 
stress 'responsible autonomy' and consensus as the best means to 
h . ff' . 18 ac 1eve e 1c1ency. There are numerous examples of managements' 
achieving their aims - increased productivity, reduced absenteeism 
and turnover - through participatory job satisfaction schemes: in 
Britain, 19 in Sweden20 and in the USA. 21 As we shall see, the Bullock 
Minority Report - emanating exclusively from the industrialists on the 
Committee - favoured shop-floor participation of one form or another 
above any other. 
From the unions' side, however, there is considerable scepticism 
over job satisfaction projects. Commenting on the Conservative 
Government's statement, "On the Quality of Working Life", Hughes and 
Gregory criticise, first, its assumption that the life of workers has 
improved to such an extent that only work satisfaction remains to be 
achieved, and second, its view that work satisfaction is something 
apart from issues like shift-work, health and safety, workload and, 
indeed, increased leisure. 
"Consequently, we do not think that trade unions will share 
the government's view of the area of industrial life which 
might be affected by job enrichment. They cannot forget 
other aspects of industrial life, including the social 
impoverishment and physical damage associated with low pay and 
excessive hours of work: with shift working: with 
industrial accidents, unemployment and job insecurity. 
Hence unions are unlikely to treat job enrichment as a 
separate issue. 11 22 
The authors point out that the quality of working life can be 
bettered only by a comprehensive look at "the total work situation". 
"There is a clear need to bargain about the whole sequence 
of managerial decisions which really control job content, 
security and prospects. These start with the prior plan-
ning of the human aspects and labour requirements of the 
new investment programmes."23 
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This view is developed by Hull, who argues for a broadening of 
the definition of work organization to embrace decisions and actions 
not at first sight connected with the design of a particular job. 
"The factors which shoul.d concern unions include changes 
to pay and reward systems, autonomy and discretion on the 
job, the organization of support services, training, 
organizational structure, changes in technology, task 
variety, information and feedback and interpersonal and 
group processes."24 
Hull maintains that unions must understand the links between the 
'higher-levels' of decision making in a company and the work environ-
ment. The introduction, for instance, of cost-reducing new machinery 
can have a major impact on the "quality of working life" - though the 
unions may not have been able to negotiate over its introduction in 
the first place. Elsewhere, Hull lays down a possible strategy for 
unions to adopt over work organization. First, they should "test" 
management to discover whether its motives over a work organization 
scheme are sincere or not (for example, by insisting that money be set 
aside for training in the new work techniques); secondly, they should 
ensure adequate protection for their members against certain disadvan-
tages the scheme may have - for example, redeployment or redundancies; 
and thirdly, they should insist on joint control over the implementation 
and administration of the scheme. 25 
On the whole, then, the Labour movement has tended to remain 
suspicious of job-restructuring, and few socialist writers have claimed 
that it could, in itself, help to raise workers' consciousness. 26 
Extension of Collective Bargaining and 
Industrial Strategy 
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When the Labour Government was elected in March 1974, its first 
objective in the industrial sphere was to repeal the Industrial 
Relations Act. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act was passed 
on 31 July. Its main purposes were to "repeal the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971",·. to "restore ••• traditional provisions concerning the status 
and regulation of trade unions and employers' associations" and to 
"restore ••• the traditional legal immunities" for unions involved in 
disputes. 27 Thereafter, the filnployment Protection Act was passed in 
November 1975; it built on the conclusions reached by the Labour Party 
Working Party Report, Industrial Democracy, in 1967 by concentrating 
on collective bargaining and attempting to strengthen union organization 
as the single channel of employee representation: 
"The purpose of the Act is to encourage the extension of 
collective bargaining. A procedure is laid down whereby 
unions can apply for recognition and the disclosure of 
information for collective bargaining where employers do 
not do this. 11 28 
Amongst other provisions, it established ACAS and the CAC; required 
employers to disclose information to representatives of recognised trade 
unions for the purposes of collective bargaining; and conferred a series 
of rights on employees - maternity rights, time-off entitlements and so 
on - all of which conceded new areas for collective bargaining at the 
appropriate level in industry. 29 Meanwhile, the Health and Safety at 
Work Act laid down the rights for trade unions at the place of work 
with respect to health and safety. 
In 1976, the Department of Employment commissioned a major survey 
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of the different forms of industrial democracy in British companies, 
one purpose of which was "to describe the environment within which 
future change takes place. 1130 Out of 296 manufacturing companies 
which responded, just over half had joint consultation committees 
at company level, and of these two out of five covered all employees. 
Whilst only half of such joint consultative committees were union 
based, in most cases the convener was a member. Asked about which 
issues were not negotiable, 
" ••• the most common answers related to capital investment 
and, to a lesser extent, new product planning at both company 
and establishment level."31 
The author adds the interesting comment: 
"(this suggests) that management may sometimes offer the 
limited concession of consultation when they are not willing 
to sacrifice their prerogative to collective bargaining."32 
Otherwise, issues for consultation tended to overlap with those 
for negotiation. Consultation procedures, then, were still fairly 
widespread in the middle 1970s - though the extension of union involve-
ment to board level decisions was soon to become the major issue of 
the decade. 
In addition to strengthening collective bargaining, the Labour 
Government had a second strand to its industrial policies: it aimed 
to increase the influence of trade unions over the national formulation 
of economic and industrial strategy. (We have already examined some 
of the issues raised by this policy in our discussion of 'corporatism' 
in Chapter Four). The approach, outlined in an influential book by 
Stuart Holland, envisaged a National Enterprise Board (NEB) as a state-
holding company to take a controlling interest in the 'meso-economic' 
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sector of the economy (the top one hundxed leading companies) with 
the aims, amongst others, of: 
1. stimulating investment; 
2. creating employment; 
3. increasing exports and decreasing reliance on imports; and 
4. promoting industrial efficiency.33 
Such were the objectives of the NEB, as set forth in the Labour Party's 
Election Manifesto in October 1974. At the same time, workers were 
to be represented through the planning agreements system. 
"This was to include not only the new public enterprises 
brought into the National Enterprise Board and independent 
public authorities such as the nationalised parts, but also 
such existing single-sector nationalised industries and 
services as the Steel Corporation, the Coal Board, British 
Rail, the Post Office, and so on. 11 34 
The principal intention was to secure the agreement of those 
enterprises within the system to help the Government meet its social 
and economic objectives - for instance, job creation. 
These measures, implemented through the Industry Act (1974), 
along with the Government's Industrial Strategy, the setting up of 
tripartite Sector Working Parties - and, of course, the Bullock 
proposals - formed the backbone of what became known as the Social 
Contract with the TUC.35 Voluntary pay restraint was to be secured 
in return for greater union involvement in areas such as pensions, 
the distribution of investment and company-level board representation. 
"In effect, the trade union leaders were saying it was no 
longer enough for them to have their own Labour Party in 
power; they must also develop a special working relation-
ship so that the Labour Government developed and carried 
out its policies in partnership with the unions. The 
vehicle for this social contract relationship was the 
Labour Party - TUC Liaison Committee ••• in which top 
union leaders were brought together in regular monthly 
policy-influencing meetings with ministers, free of the 
trappings of the Civil Service. 11 36 
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However, the strategy soon ran into difficulties. Ralph Bateman, 
then President of the CBI, pledged all out opposition to the Industry 
Bill, calling it 'Big-Brother style' legislation.37 Taylor, in an 
analysis of the Social Contract, concluded that the unions achieved 
much in the first six months of Labour Government in 1974, but later, 
despite TUC submission to pay policy, the Government acted independ-
ently.38 Faced by recession, it deflated the economy and sharply 
restricted the powers of the NEB to invest in large businesses. The 
NEB ended up as a home for ailing companies and the Sector Working 
Parties as little more than discussion forums.39 
Cataloguing the cuts in public expenditure, wage restraint, 
"subservience to the International Monetary Fund", the increase in 
unemployment and "a total failure to mobilise the power of business 
in the so-called industrial strategy for the regeneration of British 
industry", Holland concludes that "the periods of Labour government 
since 1964 have left no major record of radical policies or irrever-
sible advance. ,,40 
We return to these points - in relation to the prospects for 
industrial democracy - in the Conclusions. However, it should be 
clear that the Labour Government had relatively little success at 
national level in tilting even the observable aspect of industrial 
power in favour of organized Labour. We now must consider whether 




The 1970s was undoubtedly the decade which witnessed a great 
upsurge of interest amongst certain sectors of the Labour movement 
in board-level representation. Elliott draws a comparison with the 
ten years before: 
"Back in the mid-1960s however there was little active 
interest in the concept of worker directors, and the 
Labour movement was still wedded to the doctrine of 
industrial democracy handed down at the turn of the 
century by the Webbs which was based on the tradition 
of collective bargaining between unions representing 
workers and management and the representatives of 
capital."41 
As we have seen, the regulation and the extension of collective 
bargaining were the aims of the Donovan Report and the Labour Party 
Working Party Report, Industrial Democracy, respectively. Although 
the TUC Evidence to the Donovan Commission contemplated encouraging 
union representation at board-level, the Labour Party Report did not 
consider it as a suitable starting point - it "is likely to arise 
in the main after a further process of the extension both of collect-
ive bargaining and of statutory protection. 1142 The Donovan Report 
itself did not favour the appointment of worker directors, taking the 
view that the split in loyalties could impose too much strain on an 
incumbent. Three members of the Commission wanted voluntary 
experiments and only two - Eric Wigham and Andrew Shonfield - suggested 
legislation to oblige companies with over 5,000 employees to have at 
least two worker directors, appointed by the unions. 43 
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(1) Pressures Towards Worker Directors 
Several events in the early 1970s were, however, to concentrate 
the collective mind of the Labour movement on the issue; the election 
of the Conservative Govenunent in 1970 is central in this. 
First of all, on 1 January 1973, Britain had joined the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Over the long term, one of its aims is 
to harmonise company law between member countries (amongst other areas 
of law). A series of proposals has been published over the years by 
the EEC on employee participation, each of which has stressed board-
level representation, as well as a flexible attitude towards the 
procedures through which such representation is to he carried out.44 
For our purposes, the most important proposal put forward by the 
EEC Commission is the Draft 5th Directive, published in October 1972.45 
Using Dutch experience as a model, it proposed that limited companies 
in each member state should adopt a two-tier board structure: the 
management board should be appointed by a supervisory board on which 
there should sit one third workers' representatives. The Directive 
was to cover companies with over 500 employees. (The EEC Commission 
was later to publish both a Green Paper,46 discussions on which were 
to open up revisions of the 5th Directive, and a European Company 
Statute,47 to form the basis of future 'European Companies'). 
The Fifth Directive, to quote Schmitthoff, 
" ••• clearly expressed the change in company law 
philosophy from the company as a means of profit maximis-
ation in the interest of the shareholders to that of an 
enterprise in the national economic order which must serve 
the interests of shareholders who provide the capital, of 
employees who provide the labour, and of the community as 
as whole."48 
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We shall see whether British industry itself consented to such 
moves later on. However, the Conservative Government, committed to 
the EEC, was also committed to this Directive. There are of ten 
misunderstandings over how long the EEC takes to act, and indeed 
even by the early 1980s still little progress on its implementation 
had been made. 49 But according to Hugh Clegg, Mr. Heath, then Prime 
Minister: 
" ••• was very much an advocate of going into Europe, 
both in this respect and in others, because he felt that, 
having tried the Industrial Relations Act, and having 
tried a statutory incomes policy, there must be some way 
of improving British industrial relations, and conceivably 
this could be it. 11 50 
The Conservatives' espousal of the Fifth Directive clearly 
entailed a response from the other sides of industry. Both manage-
ment and unions believe that entry into the EEC was the main reason 
for sudden concern with board level representation. According to, 
for instance, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, 
" ••o this groundswell of ideas towards greater 'industrial 
democracy' - however defined and understood - has been swept 
into prominence by the activities of the European Economic 
Community. 11 51 
Similarly, APEX acknowledges: 
" ••• the significance of ••• Britain's membership of the 
EEC (in structuring the Bullock Cammi ttee' s terms of 
reference as pa.rt of) the moves towards the progressive 
harmonisation of industrial practices throughout the 
Commun! ty. "52 
Another factor in stimulating interest in worker directors has 
already been alluded to. As we have seen, the legislative approach 
to the regulation of industrial relations finally failed with the 
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concerted opposition to, and eventual repeal of, the Industrial 
Relations Act. Yet the same problem remained: how to incorporate the 
shop-floor in general and the stop stewards' movement in particular. 
The intention that board-level representation should incorporate 
the work-force more effectively is made explicit in the body of the 
Bullock Report itself: 
" ••• the major advantage to the board of employee 
representation lies in the greater acceptability its 
decisions will have if agreed to by employee represent-
a ti ves and in the regular two-way flow of views and 
opinions to and from the employees."53 
And again: 
"We see considerable value in shop stewards being the key 
figures in a system of board level representation. They 
are almost invariably elected by trade union members at 
the work-place and because their constituencies are small 
••• they are kept in close touch with those they 
represent ••• They are generally 'supporters of order 
exercising a restraining influence on their members in 
conditions which promote disorder ••• more of a lubricant 
than an irritant•. We think that companies will find it 
useful to have such people on their boards."54 
These observations are made in conjunction with the belief that 
employee representatives must be given: 
" ••• a real, and not a sham or token, share in ma.king 
the strategic decisions about the future of an enterprise 
which in the past have been reserved to management and 
the representatives of the shareholders. 11 55 
This apparent paradox is resolved by understanding that partici-
pation in strategic company decisions in no manner impinges on the 
nature of the economic and industrial structure itself. A shift in 
what we have termed observable power relationships in favour of the 
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work-force can be seen to improve or strengthen the non-observable 
power relationships implicit in a market economy. However, within 
the Labour movement moves towards employee representation at board-
level, when favoured, were supported for reasons closely related to 
taking advantage of a possible shift in power towards Labour in 
observable power relations. 
Clegg, for example, claims: 
"When it became known by the General Council (of the TUC) 
that Mr. Heath was going to propose supervisory boards 
with one-third representation for workers, Jack Jones 
(then General Secretary, TGWU) said to his colleagues, 
'Look, the one thing you cannot do is to say "No". When 
a Conservative Prime Minister says "Unions, do you want to 
go on the board?", you can't say "No, we reject this, 
Prime Minister". That's not the way to negotiate, as you 
lmow. If the management comes and asks you if you want 
something, you don't say that you don't want it: you say 
you want more'. Anyway, he said fifty percent •••• 11 56 
Indeed, Elliott relates a similar tale.57 
The TUC .Annual Congress in September 1973 accepted the TUC's 
proposals for 50-50 worker representation on supervisory boards. 
The Statement of Policy, endorsed by the TUC in 1974, stressed that: 
11 ••• appointments to supervisory boards are acceptable 
and desirable only if made through trade union machinery 
at company level (the precise manner might vary), and 
retaining a representative character and links with the 
trade union machinery. 11 58 
This document became the TUC's evidence to the Bullock Committee 
though in supplementary notes endorsed by the TUC in 1976, they 
modified their views to allow a reconstituted unitary board. 
Despite the confusion at the 1976 annual TUC - where inconsistent 
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motions on industrial democracy were passed59 - it was felt quite 
widely that the presence of worker directors on company boards 
would help to achieve influence outside the scope of collective 
bargaining. The main reason for TUC interest in worker directors 
lay, then, in the appreciation that collective bargaining did have 
certain limitations which board representation - the chance of which 
the EEC had presented - could possibly overcome: 
''Major decisions on investment, location, closures, 
takeovers and mergers, and product specialisation of 
the organisation are generally taken at levels where 
collective bargaining does not take place, and indeed 
are subject matter not readily covered by collective 
bargaining. New forms of control are needed. 1160 
The TUC called for a mandatory system of worker representation 
on supervisory boards, appointments being made through the trade 
unions. The specific details here are of less importance than the 
way in which the TUC grasped the opportunity of EEC membership to 
develop new rationales for itself in extending union influence. 
The existence of a 'gap' in influence between plant and national 
level had long been recognised in the Labour movement 
by Butt61 as well as, more recently, by Wedderburn. 62 
for example, 
Two major 
limitations of collective bargaining are that, first, it is uneven 
because density of unionisation varies in different industries and 
companies resulting in correspondingly different bargaining strengths; 
and secondly, it is insufficiently timely or continuous, since unions 
must frequently react to events rather than initiate them. APEX, in 
its submission to Bullock quoted four areas which are "not amenable 
to resolution by existing negotiating procedures": a merger with 
another company; establishment of subsidiary companies overseas; 
establislunent of new factories within the UK; and improvement of 
information disclosure to the unions. The section concludes: 
"For these reasons we do not consider that an extension 
of collective bargaining alone can result in the intro-
duction of effective industrial democracy. 1163 
By the middle 1970s, then, considerable impetus had built up 
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behind the notion of worker directors. It attracted headlines for 
several reasons. First, it.was related to Britain's entry into the 
EEC, still a controversial issue, as the referendum in June 1975 made 
clear. Secondly, it was - in British terms - a new departure in 
industrial democracy. As we have seen in this and the previous 
chapter, the term 'industrial democracy' comes to alter its content 
and connotations as economic conditions alter. Joint consultation 
and collective bargaining are concepts with an old lineage in British 
industrial relations and so worker directors seemed to offer new 
opportunities. Thirdly, there is little doubt - as we shall see in 
the rest of this chapter - that the issue did involve a shift in the 
balance of observable power towards organized labour, and therefore 
aroused new debates. And fourthly, attention was focused on the 
deliberations of the Bullock Conunittee. In all, about 330 individuals 
and organizations are listed in Annex A under the heading: "List of 
Those who S.ubmitted Evidence. 1164 
The Conservatives lost the February 1974 election before they were 
able to produce a Green Paper on industrial democracy. However, under 
the new Labour Government the subject of worker directors emerged 
again with Giles Rad.ice's Private Member's Bill to amend the 1967 
Companies Act. The Institute for Workers' Control commented: 
"It was a good thing that this Private Members' Bill was 
carried, by the substantial margin of 250 votes to 124 
since it will no doubt now have the intended effect of' 
jogging the Government into bringing forward legislation 
to honour its crucial election pledge for action on 
industrial democracy."65 
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The Bill was based on the TUC's Statement, Industrial Democracy. 
After some prevarication, the Secretary of State for Trade, Peter 
Shore, announced on 5 August.1975 that there would be a Committee 
of Inquiry to advise the Government on board level representation in 
the private sector. The terms of reference were as follows: 
"Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial 
democracy in the control of companies by means of represent-
ation on boards of directors, and accepting the essential 
role of trade union organisations in this process, to 
consider how such an extension can best be achieved, taking 
into account in particular the proposals of the Trades Union 
Congress report on industrial democracy as well as 
experience in Britain, the EEC and other countries. Having 
regard to the interests of the national economy, employees, 
investors and consumers, to analyse the implications of such 
representation for the efficient management of companies and 
for company law."66 
The membership was announced on 3 December 1975, with Sir Alan 
(now Lord) Bullock as Chairman. The report was presented to 
Parliament in January 1977; it consisted of Majority and Minority 
b . . 67 SU missions. The main provisions of the Majority Report included 
single board representation; a 2X + Y formula, in which the 2X 
referred to equal employer/employee representation, and the Y to a 
minority number of "independent" directors agreed and co-opted by the 
2X; union channels to elect worker directors; a union Joint 
Representation Committee (JRC) to organize elections; an Industrial 
Democracy Commission (IDC) to advise on the operation of the legis-
lation; and the proposals were to apply to companies with over 2,000 
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employees. Considerable discussion centred on the role of company 
groups and multi-nationals, as well as on the tasks facing the JRC 
and the IDC. The Minority Report rejected all these proposals in 
favour of participation below board level, voluntary experiments 
with supervisory boards, and the principle of employee - not union 
representation, which should, finally, always form less than half the 
68 board membership. 
(2) Attitudes Towards Worker Directors 
(i) Labour 
For the purposes of analysis, there were four broad responses 
taken towards the Majority Report. These are set out below: 
TABLE THREE 
Interest Response Reservations Examples 
Labour Pro None TUC, TGWU 
Labour Pro Some APEX, IWC, NUJ3E 
Labour Anti - AUEW, CP, EEP/TU 
Capital Anti - CBI, EEIF, IoD 
Capital Pro-Minority Some 
Report 
Taking the position of Labour in favour, Jack Jones - then General 
Secretary of the TGWU and member of the Bullock Committee - wrote in 
his union's paper: 
"We have 3 choices - we could bury our heads in the sand 
and reject these proposals, we could stand on the sidelines 
and criticise them, or we can take up the challenge they 
offer. 1169 
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The TGWU was, amongst the unions, the main supporter of the 
Majority Report: 
"As the Bullock Committee argues, now is the time for 
action. The demand must be to make 1977 a year of real 
progress for industrial democracy. The Government should 
introduce a Bill as promised, this year, to provide for 
seats on the board of private companies along the lines of 
the Report."70 
However, amongst the evidence presented by other sectors in the 
Labour movement, reservations were often expressed. These received 
little publicity - in comparison with objections from private industry 
- perhaps because, as Edmonds points out, only six unions submitted 
written evidence (apart from the TUC), whilst about 250 companies and 
industrial associations did so.71 Many unions simply allowed the 
TUC to present their case, assuming it would represent their views. 72 
Some organizations which did present evidence from the Labour 
movement accepted the principle of worker directors, but called for 
caution. 73 APEX, for example, accepting the notion of supervisory 
boards, was concerned to ensure that the administration of company 
policy should also be democratic; it suggested the establishment of 
50-50 representation on departmental councils "between the grass roots 
and the board room" to monitor policy implementation.74 When the 
Bullock Report was published, APEX called it: 
that: 
" ••• a great step forward towards the achievement of full 
democratic rights for all employees in British industry." 
However, the General Secretary added the comment, amongst others, 
"The JRC really does not get to grips with a central problem 
identified by APEX - that of monitoring and controlling the 
implementation of board policies at lower levels. I 
believe that our proposed central committee drawn from 
. ' unions and management,is critical to the success of the 
restructuring of the board, and the JRC should, there-
fore, be strengthened to transform it into a joint 
negotiating body, with the union side still retaining 
its responsibilities for elections to the main board. 1175 
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The National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE; now the Banking, 
Insurance and Finance Union), on the other hand, submitted in its 
evidence that there should be employee representation on the unita.I"'J 
board - but not necessarily 50lfe; it also emphasised the need for 
representation on regional and local boards as well, rejecting size 
thresholds for such schemes to operate.76 The IWC, again accepting 
the principle of board representation, noted in its evidence that for 
the proposals "to have any chance of acceptance among the more active 
trade unionists" four prerequisites were necessary: trade union single 
charmel representation; worker directors should be subject to recall, 
and form part of a total structure of worker representation at different 
levels in the company; the introduction of worker directors should be 
linked to long-term plarming agreements to ensure programmed pricing 
and investment policies; and company information must be disclosed to 
permit national economic plarming through, for instance, the NF.J3.77 
APEX, Nu.BE and the IWC, then, whilst accepting the notion of board 
level representation, all either stipulated before or connnented on after 
the Bullock Report was published certain conditions for it to be worth-
while. 
A very d.iff erent approach was adopted by a sizeable proportion of 
the Labour movement: those who rejected the very principle itself. 
The AUEW, for example, rejected "the view that there is a point 
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beyond which collective bargaining cannot develop."78 It claimed 
that supervisory boards would not be able to oversee the management 
board; that they would themselves require supervision; that they 
would be diluted by lower and middle management representation so as 
to become useless; and that they would degenerate into management 
rubbers tamps. It called instead for an extension of company level 
collective bargaining and the promotion of co-operatives. John 
(now Sir John) Boyd, General Secretary of the AUEW,pointed out else-
where79 that the AUEW (Construction Section), the GMWU and the 
EET/PU had all submitted resolutions to the 1974 Conference of the 
TUC rejecting the TUC's proposals on industrial democracy. .And then, 
when the Bullock Report was published, Hugh Scanlon, then President 
of the AUEW, declared: 
"We think that industrial democracy can best be strengthened 
by an extension of collective bargaining, to which we know 
no limit. 1180 
The EET/PU took a similar line, and laid out in detail in its 
evidence to Bullock its objections to the notion of board level 
representation. These included "unnecessarily restrictive" terms of 
reference, preventing the Committee from considering the extension of 
collective bargaining, but centred in particular on the problem of 
incorporation: 
"In a world where state power and management prerogative 
has become more concentrated, more pervasive and yet more 
remote from those who are affected by the exercise of those 
powers, the impression that worker directors represent the 
absorption of trade unions into this scenario of corporate 
elitism is even more perilous. It is vital for democracy 
itself that the traditional role of independent trade union 
power as a countervailing force should be maintained and 
strengthened."81 
228. 
Blurred management responsibility; split union loyalties; 
constraints on the disclosure of confidential information; and 
disunity between unions caused during elections were all additional 
reasons advanced for opposition. Edmonds' point - that "the TUC 
82 misjudged the mood of the movement" - has, then, more than just 
an element of truth. The central fear, that unions would lose 
independence, was never seriously analysed by the Committee, with 
the result that many unions remained hostile • 
.And not just unions, of course. Bert Ramelson, National 
Industrial Organiser of the Communist Party, had expressed the view 
in 1968 that: 
"It is a dangerous pipe dream to believe that the appoint-
ment or election of workers' representatives, trade 
unionists, to various levels of management, whether by 
agreement or legislation, would result in workers' control 
so long as the property rights remain vested in the 
shareholders. 1183 
In its evidence to the Bullock Committee, the Communist Party 
noted that the worker director scheme assumed the economics of private 
industry and so would not, in consequence lead to greater worker 
influence: 
"Thus for example (in Germany) the decisions taken by the 
Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG to reduce the work-
force by 25,000 disarmed the workers. Indeed, it is 
because the workers of UCS (Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, in 
Scotland) rejected a somewhat similar proposal that they 
eventually changed Government thinking."84 
The Communist Party proposed not only the extension of collective 
bargaining, allied to stronger union organization and maximum disclosure 
of information in the private sector, but also a public sector 
strengthened through worker representatives on single boards, accountable 
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to the industry and to the corrununity as a whole through Parliament. 
The Corrnnunist Party's reaction to the Viajority Report was, then, 
d
. . . 85 ism1ss1ve. 
The Labour Government itself moved cautiously. It was faced 
by a fragmented union movement and splits within its own ranks. The 
'Manifesto Group' of Labour MPs issued its policy in May 1977 
proposing parity representation on single boards but based on all 
employees - not just the unions. 86 The Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan, appointed an informal Cabinet Subcommittee to try to sort 
out the tangles and a White Paper was eventually published in May 
1978.87 It proposed that companies should be able to work out the 
details of industrial democracy schemes for themselves, but that 
legislation would provide "statutory fall-back rights" to employees 
and unions: legislation would compel companies with over 500 employees 
to discuss with them those policies affecting them; JRCs would have 
the right to discuss industrial strategy with their company boards and 
the right to require the company to ballot the work-force on whether 
they want board representation. Legislation would permit a two-tier 
board system, with up to a third employee representation on the "policy 
88 board", and none on the management board. 
However, the May 1979 election cut off its progress through 
Parliament. 
Within the Labour movement, then, considerable splits were created 
by the debate on worker directors. With a long tradition of collective 
bargaining, the question was raised: could worker directors strengthen 
union influence at board level? If so, should they be introduced? On 
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the one hand, unions like the Allli~/ and the EET/PU felt that the 
presence of worker directors on the board would lead to an erosion 
of influence through incorporation. Collective bargaining should, 
therefore, be strengthened elsewhere, eventually to embrace those 
decisions taken previously at board level. On the other hand, a 
union like the TGWU felt that worker directors would lead to the 
extension of influence throug? the introduction of collective bargain-
ing on to the board. Jack Jones wrote: 
"We will only get this (real say on the important 
decisions of a company), when we have representatives 
on the board. In this sense, the Bullock proposals 
represent an extension and enlargement of collective 
bargaining and of the trade union's role. 1189 
As we shall see, this was the major fear of management - as voiced, 
for instance, by the Institute of Directors: 
11 
••• the effect of these proposals (Majority Report) 
would be to bring the conflict of free collective 
bargaining right into the boardroom. 11 90 
The truth is that the question of worker directors was raised in 
a social vacuum. Far from being the result of drawn-out, social 
development as in other countries - as collective bargaining has been 
in Britain - the issue was presented suddenly, through a political and 
legal event: Britain's joining the EEC. There was little or no 
experience for anyone to use to assess the likely impact of the intro-
duction in Britain of worker directors. Greater incorporation on the 
one hand and greater control on the other were equally matters for 
speculation, which many indulged in.91 
The Bullock Committee itself was well aware that foreign industrial 
relations experience was of limited value as a guide to action in 
Britain. As Davies put it: 
"It is important not to expect comparative study of the 
institutions of other countries to yield easily trans-
plantable models for use in one's ovm society. "92 
Such a point was not lost on the EET/PU in its evidence to 
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Bullock, in which it maintained that specialist evidence from Europe 
had little bearing for Britai!l because "the industrial and trade 
union history in this country is entirely different. 11 93 
Indeed, British evidence on possible results of worker director 
schemes is very patchy. The most well-lmown scheme is undoubtedly 
that at British Stee1. 94 However, worker directors had to relinquish 
union office, withdraw from branch meetings, and experienced problems 
over time-off. In addition, there were only one or two on each 
divisional board, and no attempt was made to help them overcome their 
split role - to the BSC and to the work-force - when faced with wide-
scale redundancies in the industry. Indeed, as Barratt Brovm points 
out: 
"All of this reinforeed the powerful socialising effect of 
board membership and directoral status."95 
.Another worker director scheme could be found in the public sector: 
the Post Office. Details of this experiment can be found elsewhere, 96 
but with the Conservative Government elected in 1979, it was soon wound 
up.97 
In private industry, there is also very little material. Most 
notably there are a series of studies carried out by Chell and Cox for 
the Worker Director Project at the University of Nottingham in the mid-
1970s. 98 The researchers investigated seven private sector companies, 
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all of which had one form or other of employee board level representa-
tion: fifteen worker directors in all. The companies fell into 
three main categories: those with at least one highly organized 
union, a shop steward structuxe and a work-force committed to union 
values; those fairly highly unionised - but lacking a shop steward 
network; and those which had no union recognised for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.99 The authors isolated a series of factors 
influencing the behavioux of worker directors in each category: the 
relative strength of trade unionism in the firm; the level of support 
from other participative bodies in the company, especially negotiating 
structuxes; the amount of training enjoyed; and the orientation of 
management to the scheme, classified as distributive, incorporative or 
cosmetic (cf. Pateman's three categories - p.165). These all formed 
t . t k d" t I b"l"t t h d • . 100 cons rain s on wor er irec ors a i i y o s ape ecisions. 
Chell herself concludes that the key element is what worker directors 
are expected to achieve, which implies a discussion of orientations 
towards them. She states, leaving aside the cosmetic view: 
"If an incorporative view is espoused, then the expectation 
is merely that the board will be apprised of likely shop-
floor reaction to various proposals, and can form its 
decisions accordingly. The worker director is there to 
serve the board, as such he is a tool of management and 
whose function is primarily for the successful running of 
the company (sic). If on the other hand a distributive 
line is taken, then what appears to be needed are worker 
directors who are experienced men, say within their own 
union or some outside organisation, who have already 
acquired the skills of handling financial and policy type 
information, but who would still benefit from some 
training."101 
And which orientation predominates can be assessed from another 
one of the authors' conclusions: 
"Perhaps of greatest significance was that in only one 
company did a worker director have any f onnal co-
ordination with the collective bargaining structure, 
and in this case the individual concerned was at the 
head of that structure. In all the other companies 
the collective bargaining function was kept scrupu-
lously distinct from the worker directorial role. In 
one case it was seen as a pragmatic advantage for all 
sides if this was achieved, in four others it was 
because management and/or the unions would not brook 
involvement by the worker director in bargaining 
issues; and in the case of the non-unionised company, 
the whole concept of collective bargaining is not truly 
applicable. 11 102 
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Of the seven companies, two fell into the first category (highly 
unionised), both worker directors being in a union; four fell into 
the second category (not very unionised, no steward structure); and 
one into the third category (no unions). In the second and third 
categories, none of the worker directors were union members, and all 
of the schemes had been initiated by management. In none of the 
seven categories was there equal representation. 1\n incorporative 
approach is clearly in evidence in all these examples, favoured by 
management as it retains control, though only a distributive approach 
is in the unions' interests, to link in with its collective bargaining 
activities elsewhere. 
British experience, then, does not bear the weight of generalisa-
tion about what impact the Bullock proposals, if implemented, would 
have had on the conduct of industrial relations. Nevertheless, some 
indication of the support which the proposals enjoyed can be gauged 
from a survey carried out by Farnham and Pimlott in the South of 
England. One hundred middle managers, one hundred shop stewards and 
42 full-time union officials were asked: what form should participation 
take in companies? The response rate was 86%, 5076 and 5576 respectively. 
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The answers are given in the following table:t03 
TABLE FOUR 
What Form Should Participation Take in Companies? 
Managers Shop Full-time 
Stewards Officers 
% % % 
More consultation 
with Employees 62 24 9 
Worker Directors 
elected by all 
Employees 26 10 0 
Worker Directors 
elected through 
union machinery 2 26 30 
Extension of work-
place collective 
bargaining 6 24 39 
Worker ovmership 
and control of 
companies 4 12 22 
Non-responses 0 4 0 
Managers' preference for joint consultation is clearly established. 
The findings bear out that management is concerned with worker directors 
only in a non-union, incorporative sense. However, the distributive 
orientation of especially the full-time officers is also well marked. 
As Farnham and Pimlott state: 
" ••• different perceptions about the aims of participation 
and the forms which it might take were generally apparent 
between each group. "104 
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Once again, this ties in with our discussion of perspectives in 
Chapters One and Two. Such a basic fear of the unions' approach 
led to bitter management hostility towards the Majority Report of 
Bullock. 
(ii) Capital 
The Conservative Party registered its opposition to the 
Majority Report from the beginning. The opposition spokesman on 
Employment, James Prior, declared a commitment to a voluntary approach, 
and to an examination of the unions' claim to constitute the sole 
machinery for board representation. 105 In anticipation of the 
Industrial Democracy White Paper, he stated again the Party's opposition 
to union channels of representation and parity on boards, and its 
support for consultation and communication.106 
However, the detailed critique of board representation in general, 
and to the Majority Report in particular, was left to organized manage-
ment circles. Indeed, it has been alleged that the Bullock Report was 
designed to answer management's fears about the redistribution of 
t 1 th than . • f b t . t . 1 o7 d . t . con ro ra er union s ears a ou lllcorpora ion, an 1 is 
true that much of management's evidence to the Committee objected 
strongly to its very terms of reference. The British Institute of 
Management considered them "biased" in accepting the need to extend 
t . 1 d thr ,,,.w, 1 d 0 t 108 indus ria emocracy o\A.5 u emp oyee irec ors. The Engineering 
Elmployers' Federation {EEF) spent the first nine paragraphs of its 
evidence expanding on its opposition to "enforced representation of 
employees on boards of directors"; "the appointment of employee 
directors as nominees of trade unions"; and the relevance of "experience 
in the EEC and other countries" - amongst other points. 109 Similarly, 
the Stock Exchange called the terms of reference "totally misguided". 
It objected to trade union influence at board level and to an alleged 
confusion between "control" and "participation", control in industry 
being "inseparable from the right of property ••• "110 
These objections are explained through the unitary perspective 
which inspired many of the assumptions in management's evidence. 
According to the EEF, for instance: 
"'Political democracy' and 'industrial democracy' are not, 
as the Majority suggests, equivalent concepts. Universal 
political suffrage is necessary to control the unlimited 
power of the state. By contrast,~he scope of industry's 
functions is limited to the production of goods and 
services at a profit, and the state itself closely controls 
the way in which industry discharges its functions. 11111 
Such a view is supported by the belief of the Stock Exchange 
that employees and directors are already of equal status: 
" ••• there appears to underlie the terms of reference an 
assumption that employees are in some sense separate from 
directors of companies. Much of the folklore of industrial 
relations is concerned with 'workers' and 'management' ••• 
but it cannot be too strongly emphasised that executive 
directors and senior managers of companies are employees 
of the company as much as are workers on shop floors or in 
offices. Company law is, and should remain, concerned 
with relationships between the company on the one hand and 
its creditors and shareholders on the other. It should 
not be concerned with relationships between different groups 
of employees. 11112 
Indeed, taking this perspective one stage further, the Institute 
of Directors - after objecting once more to the Committee's terms of 
reference - considers that: 
"At the heart of much of the pressure for 'industrial 
democracy' is a simple quest for power. The emotional 
appeal of this otherwise meaningless concept is a potent 
weapon in the hands of unscrupulous individuals or 
organisations," 
113 who appeal to "the envy inherent in every man". As a result, 
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union appointed worker directors would lead to the following position: 
"Trade union officials, who have neither the responsibility, 
skills, nor commitment, would gain power over the affairs of 
the enterprise system while the management who bear the 
responsibility and possess the skills, would find their 
power further diminished. 11114 
Indeed, the Institution of Works Managers also declared that 
political pressure for union influence in companies should be kept 
apart from "the best way to run a company". Its own explanations 
for pressures favouring industrial democracy included the effects of 
the 1944 Education Act, and hence a "better educated population11 as 
well as: 
" ••• a general malaise throughout society of a lack of 
respect for authority, a fact that right through school 
the emphasis is upon the questioning of authority and 
indeed the school population have seen their teachers 
siding with them against the downward decisions. 11 115 
The picture of management assumptions in evidence to Bullock, 
then, emerges. It consists of the following beliefs: 
(1) the role of industrs is solely to produce goods 
and services; 
(2) the balance of power in industry is already equal; 
(3) politics must be kept out of industry; and 
(4) only trade unionists with subversive motives are 
eager to extend their power to board level. 
The fears of management towards the Bullock proposals were summed 
up by Jan Hildreth, Director General of the Institute of Directors: 
"The Bullock Committee's proposals are irrelevant, 
dangerous and have about as much justification as the 
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Emperor Caligula's idea of making his horse a consul."116 
In more straightforward language, the Chemical Industries 
Association declared, after the publication of the Bullock Report: 
"The British Chemical Industry is highly successful. It 
is a major success in the UK industrial scene. It is a 
success in penetrating world markets in face of fierce 
competition. We want it to stay this way. In conse-
quence we view the Bullock recommendations with dismay, 
and indeed anger. They' threaten this success."117 
So it was that organized management opinion was either opposed 
to any worker directors at board level - because "even one such member 
can be the controlling director if the votes of the other directors 
are evenly divided11118 - or else it imposed so many limitations on 
their organization and behaviour that their presence would have had 
no bearing at all on the mediation of control at board level. Such 
an orientation is, in Chell's phrase, incorporative or cosmetic. 
Many employers' organizations were specifically unsympathetic to "the 
three key principles behind the majority Bullock Report: 
• The imposition by law of trades union nominated 
directors on to company boards • 
• Parity of representation between shareholder elected 
and employee or trades union nominated directors • 
• The monopoly given to the trades unions to choose 
worker d.irectors. 11 119 
If these three principles were relaxed, then it was felt that 
experiments could proceed. 
First, employers' organizations often stressed the need for a 
"voluntary" approach to the question of board representation in line 
with the CBI. 120 
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Secondly, they often claimed to have no objection to employee 
representation on the board in itself: 
" ••• in our member companies there are endless examples 
of responsible board members who have worked their way up 
the ladder from the shop floor. We have always been 
wholly in favour of this system of progression by ability 
and long may it continue. 11 121 
The principle of parity was the perceived problem, which was not 
solved by the Majority Report's proposals for a 'Y' factor of 
independent, co-opted directors on the board. The EEF1, for instance, 
outlined the difficulties implicit in such a proposal: it restricts 
the number of board places for "competent managers"; the 'Y' directors 
would have their own allegiances and prejudices with one side or the 
other; there is unlikely to be such a supply of people with sufficient 
experience to act as the 'Y' factor - and the two 'X' groups may simply 
not be able to agree on the 'Y'. These complications would be 
compounded in holding companies, subsidiaries and the subsidiaries of 
multi-national companies. None of this would arise, however, continued 
the El!:.B' : 
" ••• if the Majority had not committed themselves to the 
damaging principle of parity as between shareholder and 
employee directors. 11 122 
Thirdly, equally importantly, employers' organizations felt that 
all employees - not just trade unions - should be represented on 
boards. For example: 
"The policy of NFl3TE is one of complete opposition to any 
attempt to impose by law trade union-nominated directors 
on Company Boards. We also reject the concept that a 
monopoly be given to trade unions alone to choose employee 
appointed directors. 11123 
The brunt of the constructive side to employers' proposals fell 
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on improving participation below board-level. One common suggestion 
was to strengthen joint consultation. 124 The :rrunority Report echoed 
this view, to ensure that participative "substructures" should lead 
to "constructive co-operation" of all employees in the success of the 
t . 125 en erprise. 
The CBI itself recommended Participation Agreements for companies 
with over 2,000 employees. The main thrust of such agreements would 
have been: 
to: 
"to promote understanding by all employees that their 
contribution to the enterprise results in the creation of 
wealth for the community at large, and thus to higher 
living standards and job security. 11 126 
Communications and consultation were the methods, but they were 
"begin at shop floor or office level, and must cover all 
employees, including managers. 11127 
Though these Participation Agreements were to be voluntary, a 
novelty was that new legislation should stipuJ_ate the aims and 
structure of the Agreemento A company should be allowed four years 
from the passing of the new law during which time an agreement, once 
negotiated, would be validated only by a majority of employees voting 
in a secret ballot. If after four years no agreement had been reached, 
either the employers or employees could refer the matter to a tribunal: 
"If the tribunal thoughtthe case well-founded, it would be 
referred to a new special agency, under tripartite manage-
ment, for arbitration. The company would have to operate 
the arbitrated agreement imposed by the new agency."128 
Parliamentary approval would be required to establish participation 
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agreements in companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees; in 
companies with below 500, Company Councils were envisaged - basically 
a form of works council at company level. A number of employers' 
organizations accepted these proposals, 129 though none of them were 
to be implemented. The White Paper on Industrial Democracy was 
published in May 1978 but no legislation was enacted on the issue 
before the May 1979 election at which Margaret Thatcher became the 
new Conservative Prime Minister. 
Direct Control from 1979 
In the Conservative Party Manifesto for the election, C1hapter 
Two was devoted to industrial relations under the title: "Restoring 
the :Balance". The Conservatives' view of industrial democracy read: 
"Too often trade unions are dominated by a handful of 
extremists who do not reflect the common-sense views of 
most union members •••• 
"We welcome closer involvement of workers, whether 
trade unionists or not, in the decisions that affect 
them at their place of work. It would be wrong to 
impose by law a system of participation in eve-ry company. 
It would be equally wropg to use the pretext of encourag-
ing genuine worker involvement in order simply to increase 
union power or facilitate union control of pension funds. 11 130 
This passage highlights, first, once again the Conservatives' 
unitary perspective on industrial relations, and secondly, the deter-
mination to maintain the existing "frontier of control" - and indeed 
to roll it back in management's favour. 
The new Government's efforts in this area have lain chiefly in 
obtaining legislation to secure trade union reform. The three areas 
singled out in the Manifesto were the right to picket, the closed shop 
242. 
and the provision of public funds for union elections. The 
Government did not attempt to repeal what the Manifesto had called 
Labour's "militants' charter111 31 - including TULRA and the EPA 
but instead published 'Working Papers' in July 1979 to set out its 
attitudes towards legislation on union reforms covering the same 
three areas as outlined in the Manifesto. 132 After an analysis of 
the proposed legislation, Lewis et al. concluded that it was unaccept-
able because, like the Industrial Relations Act, it depended on legal 
review and a unitarist philosophy out of keeping with genuine industrial 
relations solutions. 133 
Nevertheless, the Employment Bill was published in December 1979 -
provoking a hostile response from the TUc134 - and became enacted the 
following summer. 135 In February 1981, a Green Paper invited comments 
on further possible union reforms including the introduction of 
positive rights for unions to replace immunities, the legal enforcement 
of collective agreements, secret ballots prior to industrial action, 
as well as further measures on picketing and the closed shop. 136 
Because these proposals were put forward in the context of severe 
cuts in public expenditure, cash limits on public pay awards, 
denationalisation of certain industrial sectors and rapidly accelerating 
unemployment, many Labour leaders believed that government policy was 
deliberately designed to create unemployment to undermine union influence 
still more. 137 Whether deliberate or not, Pat Lowry, the Chairman of 
ACAS, maintained in his first report that: 
"Managements ••• (have) used the shift in the balance of 
power caused by the current economic recession to disregard 
agreed procedures. 11138 
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Yet some quarters in government and business still felt 
that not enough was being done to press home the advantage over the 
unions. Senior officials of the Prime Minister's policy unit met 
business representatives who were urging a co-ordinated demand for 
new laws,
139 and towards the end of 1981 James Prior was replaced 
as Employment Secretary by Norman Tebbit who was generally considered 
a 'hard-liner' on employment .law. By November, his proposals for 
legislation were introduced in Parliament: they included punitive 
levels of cash compensation for workers dismissed for refusing to join 
a union; the requirement that existing closed shops should be 
regularly re-approved by a high percentage of their members; the 
abolition of labour-only clauses from commercial contracts; and 
limiting the definition of trades disputes to cover only those between 
workers and their own employer, thereby making unions liable to pay 
damages out of their own funds in cases of 'unlawful secondary action•. 14° 
"The Bill is commonly seen as cunningly cast because, 
unlike the Industrial Relations Act, it relies not upon 
new creations like the Industrial Relations Court, but 
upon ordinary courts of law. It also relies heavily on 
••• the employers."141 
In such a climate, it should be clear from our present analysis 
that industrial democracy is an irrelevance: the 1979-82 period falls 
squarely into the management approach defined by Friedman as "direct 
142 control". Relying principally on the non-observable aspects of 
power - the division of labour, the mobility of capital and partic-
ularly property relations and the existing legal framework - management 
has exerted direct control over labour through the recession and has 
not required consensual justification for its behaviour. It appeals 
chiefly to 'economic realities' and 'falling profitability' as the 
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background to rolling back the frontier of control in its favour. 143 
In the last two chapters we have analysed ~he relationship 
between different forms of industrial democracy and the wa;ysin which 
varying interest groups use them to maintain or encroach advantages. 
The development of industrial democracy has been anything but 
even. Upturns in the economy have tended to favour labour, whilst 
downturns have permitted capital to retrench on positions of authority, 
relying on a Gramscian "war of position" strategy to ensure the 
connivance of labour. The perceived threat to industrial relations 
stability has come primarily through the unions' interest in the 
observable aspects of power operating within the structural constraints 
of the non-observable aspects. 
In Part IV, however, we turn to examine more carefully the impact 
of organized labour on these non-observable aspects. In particular, 
we look at the 'social action' dimension of industrial democracy -
that is, how union activists manage to interpret their work environment 
in such a way to allow them to change it in as radical a way as possible; 
or put another way, how they manage to operate within the structure of 
industry to encroach on the frontier of control by developing coherent, 
radical strategies to further their aims. In the next chapter we 
look at unions' involvement at the trustee board level of pension 
funds, whilst in the following two chapters we turn to work-ins, social 
audits, co-operatives and alternative corporate plans. 
PART FOUR 
"A great deal of industrial labour will inevitably remain 
repetitive, and can never have anything better than a very 
low level of choice-making initiative built into it. 
Moreover (though it is unfashionable to mention the fact), 
many of those engaged in it are incapable of initiative, 
and many a.re too stupid to do anything but a simple and 
repeated task." 
Bernard Levin, "The ludicrous case of the incontinent cat", 
the Times, 19 Dec. 1975, p.14. 
"Most people, I believe, would agree that this country's 
situation would be very different if we could draw out 
more initiative, create a greater sense of commitment and 
tap more of the unused potential of those who are employed 
in our manufacturing and service industries." 
Lord Bullock, Preface to John Elliott, Conflict or 
Co-o eration? The Growth of Industrial Democrac (London: 
Kogan Page, 1978 , p. x • 
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CHAPTER NINE 
In Part III, we have painted a picture of industrial democracy 
with fairly broad strokes. We have illustrated the opportunistic 
ways in which unions and employers have espoused those forms of 
industrial democracy - by level, subject area and degree of influence 
- which have most efficiently favoured their interests at the 
frontier of control, or in the observable aspects of power, within 
given economic and industrial relations frameworks. 
In Part IV, however, we shift our focus on to a closer examination 
of these frameworks themselves - that is, the non-observable aspects 
of power. In particular, we try to show how, although they ultimately 
constrain the freedom of action of organized labour, frameworks such 
as the 'market economy', the 'rights of private property' and 
'managerial prerogative' are themselves open to questioning and attack 
under certain circumstances even in an advanced, neo-capitalist society. 
It is just a question of specifying what these circumstances are. In 
this chapter we begin by investigating the role of union trustees on 
the board of two large pension funds and how they have attempted to 
radicalise union policy towards the funds - both the operation of the 
financial markets and management structure have hindered these attempts. 
Yet in the following two Chapters - Ten and Eleven - we shall see how 
organized labour has managed on occasions to challenge and politicise 
a variety of these constraining frameworks. 
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Historical Backg;round on Pension Funds 
In order to understand the significance of the debate surround-
ing occupational pension funds it is important to grasp that there 
are two methods used in Britain for financing pensions. One, the 
method used in the 1946 State scheme based on the Beveridge Report1 
and in all State schemes sine~, operates on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Pensions are financed through the compulsory contributions paid by 
current wage and salary earners. The second method used to finance 
pensions is the occupational pension fund (OPF). Members of such a 
fund contribute regularly into it and these contributions are then 
invested. The income generated from these investments provides 
members' future pensions. A full background to the provision of 
pensions in Britain can be found elsewhere, 2 but it is relevant to 
point out here that private arrangements designed to supplement the 
subsistence 1946 State scheme led to the gradual development of OPFs. 
Not only did they help employers to retain labour as pension rights 
were - and are - rarely ful]ytransferable, but as a TUC Guide points 
out, the State scheme began to disintegrate in the 1950s: the popula-
tion over pensionable age was rising as a percentage of the whole; 
pensioners often had to claim supplementary benefits as the basic 
pension was so low; and flat-rate contributions hit the lower-paid 
particularly unfairly.3 
From 1957 a series of proposals and counter-proposals was set 
out to remedy these deficiencies, each Plan concerning itself in one 
way or another with the two central problems of pension provision: 
(i) the merits of State v. private scheme; 
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(ii) the method of financing - pay-as-you-go v. funding. 
The interest of the unions today in pensions is largely the result 
of the 1970-4 Conservative Government in general and the Joseph Plan 
in particular. Stage Two of the Government's pay code deliberately 
excluded pensions improvements from pay limits in order to stimulate 
union negotiations in pension benefits as envisaged by the Joseph Plan. 
This Plan laid down a State Reserve Scheme to supplement the basic 
State scheme, but at the same time emphasised the importance of private 
occupational schemes. These had to observe certain minimum standards 
to become recognised by the Government and so provided unions with a 
collective bargaining 'lever' into benefit negotiations. 
Since April 1978, the organization and payment of pensions has 
been established by the Social Security Pensions Act 1975 (the Castle 
Plan). This provides a basic state pension and an additional, earnings 
related pension provided either by the State ('contracting in') .2!: by a 
private occupational pension scheme ('contracting out•). There are 
several major differences between the Joseph and the Castle Plans, the 
most important ones for our purposes being that the Castle Plan 
stipulates that the unions must be consulted over a company's decision 
to 'contract out' and that the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) must 
observe strict criteria before allowing a scheme actually to do so. 
The current system, then, represents a compromise between State/ 
private involvement and pay-as-you-go/funding as methods of financing. 
All the major parties to the debate appear now to have accepted the 
terms of this compromise, and one commentator has said: 
" ••• (as) far as can be reasonably assessed, therefore, 
the Castle Plan is to be the basis upon which pensions 
will develop in the United Kingdom for the remainder of 
the oentury."4 
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These arrangements raise, broadly speaking, three issues for the 
trade unions. The first is how to make best use of the new area of 
collective bargaining presented by the emergence of OPFs: pensions 
benefits. This area is now quite well covered as most of the union-
oriented literature on pensions has been concerned with it.5 The 
other two areas, however, are more complex as they involve the investment 
power of OPFs. 
Occupational Pension Funds and Investment 
OPFs represent problems of both long-term and short/medium-term 
strategy for unions. The long-term problem concerns whether the entire 
funding system is to the unions' advantage or not. 6 By 1979, the 
Government actuary estimated that the total assets of British OPFs 
exceeded fjO billion and that they were growing at a rate of £8 billion a 
year.7 This represents a massive accumulation of deferred wages which 
can be tapped by the major companies, the City and the Stockmarket as a 
source of capital for industry. However, these funds are invariably 
drawn into areas defined as 'safe' by the City - for example, gilts and 
the forty or so 'slumbering giants' of private industry. So, whilst 
OPFs are largely the result of employees' contributions, they offer 
labour little or nothing in return by way of job creation, secure 
employment or the promotion of socially desirable investment. There 
are, then, powerful arguments for abolishing OPFs as a lang-term 
strategy in favour of a good, equitable State-run pension scheme 
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financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
However, all this leaves unions with a short-term problem: 
since OPFs do exist and are operating, what strategy should unions 
adopt towards them now? What aims should unions hope to achieve in 
developing OPF investment policies? How should union trustees attempt 
to implement such policies? Or should investment criteria be laid 
down by City 'experts• alone? Unions have paid comparatively little 
attention to these questions, 8 and the intention of this chapter is 
twofold: first, to show how the development of independent union policy 
on fund investment is constrained by the functioning of the well-
established financial interests of British industry; and second, to 
analyse how certain trade unionists have, nevertheless, attempted to 
overcome some of the problems associated with promoting such an inde-
pendent policy. The sheer scale of the difficulties involved can be 
illustrated by outlining in global terms how OPFs are managed. 
The Management of OPFs9 
A distinction to be made when analysing OPFs is between those 
which are internally managed (when investments are controlled totally 
by the company or local authority whose fund is in question) and those 
which are externally managed (when investments are made on behalf of 
the OPF by insurance companies, merchant banks and/or stockbrokers). 
In 1978, about £10 billion of total OPF assets - at that time, 
an estimated third - were managed internally. However only forty 
OPFs account for this figure - the largest ones. It appears that the 
large OPFs prefer their administration and monitoring not to be subject 
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to outside influences, pressures and costs. Amongst the forty were 
the OPFs of private companies like ICI (worth, in 1978, £694m.) and 
Lucas (£209m.); nationalised industries like the NCB {£1,439m.); 
and local authorities like the GLC (£220m.). 10 
In the same year, 1978, £17 billion of the funds' assets (that 
is, around two-thirds) were administered externally. When an insurance 
company is ·responsible, it determines investment policy for the OPF 
whose funds 'disappear' into its other assets, though it will give its 
client options between an 'equity fund', a 'fixed interest fund', a 
'mixed fund' and so on. The Legal and General Assurance Company had 
a business managing OPF assets worth £1 billion in 1978. Whilst the 
insurance companies tend to administer the smaller OPFs, the merchant 
banks tend to specialise in the larger ones. They off er a wider range 
of investment portfolios; in 1978, Hill Samuel managed £1.8 billion of 
OPF assets. Stockbrokers are involved mainly in the administration of 
local authority funds. 
The most striking aspect of these arrangements - apart from their 
sheer size - is that the control of OPFs is concentrated into very few 
hands. Of the total value of externally managed funds (£17 billion), 
about £13 billion are - according to Minns11 - administered by a mere 
24 institutions, principally merchant banks. The remaining £4 billion 
are managed by a further 80 banks, insurance companies and stockbrokers. 
Then, whilst the £10 billion of internally managed funds are 
directed by the company, corporation or local authority, on most,the 
financial institutions are represented either as trustees or advisors. 
For example, trustees of the ICI OPF include a Director of Commercial 
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Union, and a Director of both Sun Life and General Accident. A 
representative of Hill Samuel sits on the investment advisory committee 
of the Lucas pension funds. 
This description of OPF management shows how its structure serves 
a fairly cohesive elite of financial managers who are able to dispose 
of vast sums of assets on behalf of their clients. From the unions' 
point of view, the use made of these assets is critical and the two 
original questions emerge again: how does the structural dimension 
of OPF management constrain the development of union policy, and how 
may unions attempt to overcome it? 
Lucas Staff and Works Pension Funds 
We shall analyse these questions in the specific contexts of the 
Lucas Staff Pension Fund (worth about £200m. in 1980) and the Lucas 
Works Pension Fund (£95m. in 1980).12 
The Staff Pension Fund (SPF) at Lucas Industries Ltd. was set up 
in 1928 but there was no employee representation on it till after the 
war, when management appointed worker representatives as trustees. 
The most recent stage of its history - characterised by union involve-
ment - did not begin until the early 1970s. The staff unions, find-
ing that their questions at the SPF ordinary general meetings 
frequently overlapped, began talks on how to establish a joint 
consultative committee to discuss pensions. These talks were consoli-
dated by the Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, of which Part III 
stipulates that companies can contract out of the State scheme - as 
Lucas did - only if they have consulted the independent, recognised 
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unions representing contributors on the setting up of the OPF. As 
a result, the Lucas SPF Consultative Committee was established in 
June 1975. 
The history of the Works Pension Fund (WFF) also falls into two 
stages: from 1937 when it was founded until the early 1970s, and 
from then (when union involvement began) until the present. During 
the first period, worker trustees were appointed by management. It 
was originally designed just to cover a small, flat-rate pension and 
funeral expenses, but by 1973 pressure had mounted to form a National 
Pensions Committee to consult and negotiate with management on pensions 
issues. The five Lucas divisions - Aerospace, Electricals, C.A.V., 
Girling and a miscellaneous grouping - were divided into 15 areas, each 
one to choose in its own way a delegate for the Pensions Committee. 
The union side of this Committee drew up a constitution in 1975/6 and 
has managed to improve considerably benefits for their members. 
The role of both the SPF Consultative Committee and the WFF Pensions 
Committee, however, extends beyond consultation over benefits. Their 
relationship to the union trustees on the boards of the SPF and the 
WFF themselves is a crucial element in union involvement in pensions 
investments. 
(1) The Structure of Union Involvement in the Staff and 
Works Pension Funds 
(i) Staff Pension Fund 
The board of Lucas Staff Pensions Trust Ltd. meets at least twice 
a year. Its members include four trustees from Lucas Industries Ltd. 
(the principal company) and three union trustees. Each union trustee 
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is nominated by one of the three staff unions at Lucas: APEX, ASTMS 
and TASS. Of the approximately 20,000 staff employees at Lucas 
Industries Ltd., about 7,000 are in APEX, a similar number is divided 
between ASTMS and TASS, and another 3,000 are in smaller unions. The 
remainder (15>fe) are not unionised. However, the whole staff elects 
each trustee for a renewable three-year term. Each year, one trustee 
comes up for re-election, and· each union supports the others' nominees. 
The SPF Consultative Committee also has a management and a union 
side. Four of its members are appointed by management, one of whom 
is chairman and another, secretary, of the Committee. On the union 
side there are nine members. Each of the three staff unions - .APEX, 
AST· MS and TASS - have their own national negotiating committee (NNC) 
to deal with company level matters; each NNC makes three appointments 
to the SPF Consultative Committee, which meets at least three times a 
year. 
Trustees on the SPF are not accountable to the Consultative 
Committee as they are elected separately, but the Consultative Committee 
itself reports back to the NNCs of each of the staff unions. (The 
union side of the Consultative Committee, joined by negotiators from 
the NNCs, acts as the body which negotiates with management over 
pensions benefits.) 
(ii) Works Pension Fund 
Like the SPF, there are four management members of the WPF and 
three union trustees: two AUEW and one GMWU. However, unlike their 
staff counterparts, the works trustees are not elected directly by 
their membership, but are appointed by the WPF Pensions Committee (which 
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we shall call the Consultative Committee in line with the staff side). 
At both trustee board level and at Consultative Committee level, 
the WPF provides interesting comparisons with the SPF. 
First, the membership of the Consultative Committee consists of 
15 delegates, as we have seen. Management does not form an integral 
part of this committee, which.works also on negotiating benefits 
without the need for involvement from outside union negotiators. It 
therefore allows joint union negotiating platforms to develop at 
company level on pensions (the only subject in which this has occurred). 
The SPF Consultative Committee - with its chairman and secretary 
appointed by management - lacks this cohesion. 
Second, on the staff side, the three union trustees are identifiable 
through their union membership: APEX, ASTMS or TASS. Union membership 
amongst union trustees on the WPF, on the other hand, is more diffuse. 
Since each of the 15 works areas chooses its delegate to the Consultative 
Committee as it decides fit there is a joint union approach there which 
tends to transcend individual union membership. This diffusion carries 
on to the WPF Board since the trustees are not elected to represent 
individual unions. 
Third, then, the WPF trustees are elected by the 15 Consultative 
Committee delegates and a condition of being a trustee is to be on the 
Consultative Committee, which ensures a measure of report-back. 
The organization of union representation, then, on the SPF and the 
WPF varies widely. The structure of the WPF would appear to permit 
greater democratic control of union policy than the SPF. Members of 
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the SPF agreed that this was true with respect to benefits, over which 
the WPF has 'caught up' with the SPF in recent years. However, with 
respect to investments, union trustees and the Consultative Committees 
have proved almost incapable of exerting control •••• The next section 
deals with explanations for the unions' lack of sucoess in making the 
same headway on investment policy as they have - especially the blue-
collar unions - on benefits. 
(2) Unions' Lack of Influence on Investment Policy 
(i) Union Policy 
Of all the unions represented on either the SPF or WPF, only APEX 
has drawn up guidelines on investment policy. Roy Grantham, the 
General Secretary, wrote in 1978: 
"Funds can back expansion plans by sharing in the 
underwriting of a company's rights issue. This is a means 
used by companies of raising capital by offering new shares 
for purchase at below their market value to existing share-
holders. In addition, funds can buy their full rights 
issue entitlement, and any not allocated. 
"Funds can offer to purchase companies' unissued 
shares, which could be retained or sold on the market. 
"Finally, companies can be assisted by their pension 
fund taking over some or all of its freehold property. The 
pension fund oan also acquire a new site for the company. 
In either oase, this would release more capital for 
expansion. 1113 
This policy does provide a broad set of guidelines for SPF trustees, 
but two questions emerge. First, how good is APEX policy? The merits 
of its main impact - for funds to buy into their principal company's 
shares - are too complex to be analysed here, though such a policy does 
1 1 . k th h f . "d d al" 14 c ear y ris e c arges o 1ns1 er e ing. The second point, 
however, is how far can suoh a union policy help trustees? Major issues 
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are not touched - for example, the role and accountability of trustees, 
the flow of information to the union on the trusts' investments, and 
how to prepare alternative investment guidelines. On these issues, 
individual union trustees are left to develop strategy (or not) as 
they see fit. 
(ii) The Functioning of Trustees 
Despite the greater accountability enjoyed by WPF trustees to 
their Consultative Committee, the APEX trustee and one of the AUEW 
trustees both agreed that further improvements to the unions' involve-
ment in the pension funds could be made. These included agenda 
meetings by union trustees prior to board meetings; the mandating of 
union trustees on known issues and the not allowing of commitments on 
other issues till after report-back; the formulation of joint-union 
policies on investment strategies; and the use of the funds' proxy 
votes to intervene at the Annual General Meetings of companies in which 
voting shares are owned. 
Whilst these improvements were generally considered potential 
union campaign issues, another one was not. 
possibility of establishing OPF 'consortia' 
This consisted of the 
the co-ordination of 
union trustees' policy towards individual companies. This task was 
considered too great for several reasons. Although union trustees 
receive all information about the SPF and the WPF, they are strictly 
bound by confidentiality, and are not permitted to take papers out of 
board meetings. This applies to, for example, investment portfolio 
breakdowns, which show how much fund money is invested in which 
companieso So whilst union trustees are never refused information, 
257. 
their use of it is severely restricted. 
But in addition, the duties of a pension fund trustee are defined 
in such a way as to exclude any conflict of interest between union and 
management representatives. 15 In other words, the interests of the 
fund as a financial institution come first because this is the way -
so orthodoxy maintains
16 
- to serve the interests of the pension fund 
most efficiently: the greater the value of the fund, the better are 
the benefits payable. This has the effect of equating the members' 
interests with 'the best rate of return on capital'. Many unions 
accept this point of view if only implicitly, with the result that 
certain important issues are never raised, such as alternative invest-
ments in venture capital projects or small companies, and 
t . 17 co-opera ives. This is an example of the way in which the structure 
of the market itself restricts the range of policy options apparently 
available to a union. The relationship between better benefits and 
the maximisation of the OPF's value is presented as a common-sense 
reality: in the unions' lack of willingness to forward a more radical 
policy towards the OPF, the market structure comes to be present on the 
shop-floor. Before analysing the alternative approaches which are 
being developed by some trustees, we need to investigate more fully 
how the management side of the OPFs' operations is able to exert the 
non-observable aspects of power. 
(3) The Structure of Management Involvement in the Staff 
and Works Pension Funds 
Management involvement in the Lucas OPFs takes two forms: one 
direct, through the Investment Department and Investment Advisory 
Committee, and the other indirect, through its general role in financial 
markets. 
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(i) Direct Involvement 
The administration of the OPFs on a daily basis is carried out by 
four staff at the Investment Department located at the principal 
company's London HQ. It operates under guidelines adopted by the 
trustees but which are recommended by the Investment Advisory Committee 
(IAC) which plays the central role in the management of the funds. 
Only trustees have the legal right to create OPF policy, but 
their deliberations - in the case of Lucas - are strongly influenced 
by the IAC which gathers one month before the trustees' six-monthly 
meetings. The membership of the IAC includes the financial director 
of the principal company as well as representatives from two Merchant 
Banks and one union trustee from both the SPF and WPF. 
However, the influence of the union trustees on the IAC is severely 
limited. §ince they attend IAC meetings on a rota, continuity between 
meetings is lost. Though all information relating to the IAC agenda 
is circulated to all six union trustees, it must be handed back. .An 
attempt by the APEX trustee to allow all union trustees to attend all 
IACs and to allow representatives from the Consultative Committtees to 
attend as well has been consistently rejected by the SPF board. As 
things stand, whilst the trustees make decisions on investment policy, 
the IAC provides advice on how it should operate, in particular on 
investment ratios over the subsequent six months (fixed interest assets/ 
shares/property) and on the approved list of companies for investment 
by the Investment Department. The union trustees find it difficult to 
assess the soundness of this advice; indeed their attendance at IACs 
has been patchy, to some extent because certain amongst them feel out 
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of place. 
Another problem for union influence is that the Investment 
Department - in regular consultation with the financial director -
has licence within the broad guidelines to invest how it will on a 
18 
day to day basis. Only once every six months at an IAC or SPF/ 
WPF Board meeting can a union trustee raise questions on the detail. 
It is clear, then, that union trustees work in a vacuum on the 
IAC. On the SPF, they have no structural relationship with the 
Consultative Committee, which in turn has no structural relationship 
to the IAC; indeed,members of the Consultative Committee are entitled 
to no more information about the SPF than any other contributor. 
Whilst the WFF union trustee reports back to his Consultative Committee, 
again, the latter has no formal relationship to the IAC. Though 
ordinary contributors to the SPF and the WPF are circulated with news-
letters, there is no pressure on the shop-floor to demand changes to 
the IAC. ''Nobody ever went on strike over pensions" was the laconic 
comment of a member of the WPF Consultative Committee. 
(ii) Indirect Involvement 
In broad terms, investment managers - whether involved directly 
or indirectly in OPF administration - have two roles, similar to the 
ones outlined by Child {p.6): technical and legitimising. 
First, under the periodic eye of the trustees, the staff in the 
Investment Department every day carries out a series of •technical' 
operations: buying, selling, monitoring and administering the large 
sums of money represented in the SPF and the WPF. This is done within 
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the framework of the"broad guidelines" recommended by the IAC and 
adopted by the trustees. The membership of the IAC - with external 
advisors - is designed to reflect financial experience within the 
same mould as the Investment Department. 
Second, however, both the Investment Department and the IAC have 
a legitimising or ideological role. Both the non-disclosure of 
information·(for example to the Consultative Committees) and the 
selective disclosure of information (till recently, union trustees 
not attending the IAC were not circulated an agenda or minutes) betray 
a concern for confidentiality which itself has several functions: the 
creation of an accountability only in name to the union trustees, who 
lack the professional mystique; and more importantly, the prevention 
of questions being raised on the role of these funds in the economy. 
The conservative, well-worn-in view of the world which runs through 
much of the financial advice - especially concentration on the forty 
top companies and the gilts market - smothers development of alterna-
tives. 
Although the current SPF and WPF Trust Deeds allow the trustees 
to invest in virtually anything, their role in fact is limited to 
drawing up guidelines and approving companies under the eye of the IAC. 
This approach allows the trustees insufficient control over the funds 
in times of rapidly changing circumstances. Trustees in effect delegate 
rights of control to the Investment Department whose decisions are later 
rubberstamped by the IAC. The union trustees lack time and resources 
to present a detailed critique of the Investment Department's activities 
over six months and feel that their main hope lies in imposing further 
restrictions on OPF investments on the one hand and campaigning for 
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more radical approaches towards OPF investments on the other. 
(4) Alternative Union Policies towards OPF Investments 
From the point of view of restrictions on investments, some 
trustees consider that a variety of criteria could be drawn up. 
might include: 
These 
- social considerations: . preventing direct investment in countries 
like South Africa (a policy operated by the National Water Council 
OPF19); 
foreign investments: imposing a limit on the percentage of 
direct investments abroad in order to try and prevent further under-
investment in Britain; 
- property: again, imposing a limit on the percentage of invest-
ment in either property as such or property investment bonds in order 
to try and prevent speculation and the steady rise in land prices; 
self-investment: although investment by the OPFs in the principal 
company has been defended as a buffer against take-overs, the unions 
have been waxy of possible charges of insider-dealing were anything 
serious to happen to the company, and so have tried progressively to 
reduce the percentage of funds so held. 
However, all these restrictions are just that: restrictions, or a 
negative response to OPFs, operating within the terms of their present 
structure. In the final part of this chapter we examine how some 
union activists have attempted to advance more positive and radical 
alternative policies under four headings: organization, union co-opera-
tion, training and alternative investment guidelines. 
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(i) Organization 
In 1976, a Labour Party White Paper proposed that representative 
unions should have the right to appoint at least 50'fe of OPF trustees. 20 
As things are, only about half the OPF boards in Britain contain member 
trustees, and in three-quarters of those that do the employer makes 
the nomination.
21 
The union trustees at Lucas would like 50:50 
representation on the OPF boards, with the union trustees accountable 
to and mandated by their Consultative Committees. In addition, such 
trustees should - they consider - have a background of union activity. 22 
Full disclosure of fund information should also be made to those engaged 
in fund activities, and advice be made available to them, independent 
of the City, to enable more efficient monitoring of investment performance. 
(ii) Union Co-operation 
Benefits are one of the few areas in which inter-union, company-
wide bargaining takes place. Building on this, unions should support 
each other'·s candidates in elections to the board, and attempt two further 
steps towards co-ordination. First, they might co-ordinate their 
trustees to implement union policy. In 1979, for example, ASTMS sent 
a circular to all ASTMS trustees urging them not to purchase assets of 
those public sector companies being de-nationalised by the Conservative 
Government. 23 And second, policy towards individual companies could 
be co-ordinated. Unions could draw attention to those companies with 
poor labour relations, for example, by attending their AGMs and making 
public statements. Such a possibility has been advocated in the USA 
by Lane Kirkland, leader of the AFL-Cio.24 
(iii) Training 
A criticism expressed of courses run by the National Association 
of Pension Funds, the Metropolitan Pensions Association and the 
Financial Times was that they were less training than socialising 
procedures, designed to initiate trade unionists into the ways of the 
City. It was felt that all union members concerned with pensions -
not just trustees - should be.covered by independently run courses. 
They should include both technical subjects (such as OPFs' legal 
requirements to disclose certain sorts of information, an understanding 
of actuarial evaluations of OPFs and so on) and political subjects, such 
as the role of the trustee in democratising OPFs, and their significance 
in the economy. Independent advisors, such as union officials and 
academics, should be on hand to provide specialist services to union 
trustees. 
All these proposals - on organization, co-operation and training -
relate to the union activists' concern to enhance their influence over 
OPFs. It is not difficult to envisage that the 'frontier of control' 
- in the right circumstances - could be moved in their favour at a 
future date. However, the most awkward question of all remains: how 
can funds actually be invested to ensure both the best rates of return 
~their social responsibility? In other words, even if the unions 
controlled the observable apparatus of OPFs - the organization, the 
policy-making bodies and the training courses - what difference could 
this make within the context of a market economy and the non-observable 
aspects of power? 
(iv) Alternative Investment Guidelines 
The noticeable trend amongst OPFs in the private sector is that 
their funds have become increasingly concentrated in the largest 
companies: in 1972, OPFs in the private sector held 74% of their 
funds in companies with assets worth over £40m., a figure which has 
risen to 83.4% by 1977.25 
Investment managers, keen to preserve their jobs, need to ensure 
the 'best rate of return' for their OPF. The safest course is to 
follow 'what everyone else is doing•, so it is not strange that funds 
flow so readily into the large, established companies (though in the 
recession, there has been a swing towards gilts and property). 
It is quite clear, then, that there is a need to develop invest-
ment guidelines reflecting union interests, such as job creation. In 
particular, investment is needed for new, fledgling companies with a 
potential for rapid growth - which in 1981 were reported as finding 
greater support from American capital than from British.
26 
Such 
investment guidelines should reflect views of the economy alternative 
to those assumed by the City - for example, as found in successive TUC 
Economic Reviews. This would provide union trustees with a coherent 
framework within which to assess and discuss the kinds of investments 
suggested by management. 
However, there are two major problems. 
First of all, the role of the trustee. As things are, the duties 
of the pension fund trustee are defined in such a way as to exclude 
conflict between union and management representatives. As we have seen, 
many unions accept the basic perspective that their members' interests 
are served best through maximising returns. As a result, the notion 
of alternative guidelines is never considered. The higher the value 
per member of the fund, the better are the benefits payable. This 
has the effect of equating the members' interests with 'the best rate 
of return on capital'. 
The central question is how to define union trustees' responsi-
bilities. The development of union power in pension funds requires 
a balance between members' short-term and long-term interests. For 
example, property speculation might be highly profitable now, but 
social costs of a long-term rise in land prices plainly cannot be 
ignored by the unions. Foreign investments might also be profitable, 
but social costs of domestic underinvestment and unemployment cannot 
be ignored either. And venture capital, which could well aid the growth 
of innovatory smaller companies, could possibly prove a failure in the 
short-term if returns on capital were less than they have been elsewhere. 
And long-term, political considerations will be well to the fore when 
deciding whether or not to invest in South Africa. 
In all these issues, the same questions arise: is the trustees' 
responsibility to the OPF as conventionally defined, or to wider 
interests? And if to wider interests, how are these to be drawn? 
Should in fact the underlying assumption of OPFs be that of accepting 
social responsibility for equity ownership in the economy? If OPFs 
have tended to 'abolish' the rights of private property in the day-
to-day activity of companies, must union trustees 're-invent' them 
to assert their influence? These problems centre on the balance, as 
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stated earlier, between members' short-term and long-term interests. 
This can be best illustrated by the second problem 
considered here: the precise nature of what an 'alternative invest-
ment' might be. There are four ways in which union trustees could 
begin to demonstrate independence: 
(i) Investigating OPF malpractice. Recent examples of mal-
practice include the Electricity Council OPF, from which the Investment 
Manager was suspended following "errors of judgement" concerning a now 
bankrupt property compa.ny; 27 and an evaluation of the Lucas Staff 
Pension Fund which led to a £46m. drop in its value following a change 
in actuarial assumptions, about which the union trustees were not 
28 consulted. Union trustees could become far more rigorous in their 
investigations of this kind of management behaviour as a prelude to 
promoting their own investment plans. 
(ii) 'Beating Investment Managers at their own game.' In other 
words, union trustees could claim that their own investment guidelines 
were as good in short-term financial returns as management's. Many 
radical union trustees consider this option unwise, as it is hindered 
by the sheer weight of advice from the City institutions. However, 
union trustees could point out the failures and inconsistencies of 
fund investment policies - for example, despite conventional wisdom 
about going for the 'best rate of return on capital', funds have been 
known to bail. out the property and secondary banking sectore 29 
(iii) Extension of investment criteria to include long-run 
returns. An assumption often made during discussions of union control 
on OPFs is that they must be profitable because "it's our members' 
money". However, long-term returns are as important as short-term 
ones. Because British manufacturing industry produces low rates 
of return now, this is not a reason for diverting funds into property, 
as industry forms the productive infrastructure of the entire economy. 
It is not in the interests of pensioners to live out their retirement 
in a society characterised by under-investment, poor social services 
and inner-city decay. That forms the basis of a powerful argument 
for switching funds from capital growth assets (property, gold, works 
of art) into long-term equity investments. And this point leads on 
to the fourth option: 
(iv) Extension of investment criteria to include social returns. 
The notion of a 'social return' must be kept distinct from an •eventual 
long-term economic return•. The point is that certain types of 
investment are important socially, whether or not they produce calcul-
able, economic returns. Making this distinction prevents disillusion 
with investments if economic returns do not materialise. 
Social criteria for investment planning are of two types. The 
first is negative, and includes prevention of investments in certain 
areas. The second is positive, and includes active promotion of 
investment in, say, co-operatives, small firm portfolios, companies 
concerned with labour intensive production, or those engaged in the 
development of socially useful products. 
Changes would be necessary in the OPF Trust Deeds to achieve this 
though a very important step has been taken by the Lucas Staff Pension 
Fund in this direction with the adoption of a venture capital clause. 
~of that Fund's assets can be set aside for venture capital projects, 
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with the possibility of their failure taken fully into account. The 
NCB OPF runs a venture capital scheme through the Midland Bank, as does 
the South Yorkshire Pension Fund through its County Regional Investment 
Scheme (CRIS). CRIS allows capital to be placed directly on to the 
private market in South Yorkshire, with the emphasis on socially 
desirable operations. 
. 30 
CRIS accounts for about 5% of the Fund, and is 
growlllg. 
These four possibilities - with the parallel stress on widening 
the remit of OPF union trustees to include long-run and social invest-
ments in alternative portfolios - form the basis for giving union 
trustees, backed by union policy, an independent stance on the 
activities of OPFs. The development of such alternatives would 
presumably feed into union training programmes and provide~an impetus 
for joint union policies and co-operation. 
In this chapter, we have analysed three levels of union reaction 
to OPFs. First, either passive acceptance of OPFs or perhaps the 
formulation of a basic union policy towards them, as APEX has done. 
This characterises the position of most unions. Second, a critique 
of OPF structure: its organization, the lack of union co-operation 
within it, and pressure for more effective training. These are 
steps taken by some of those trade unionists involved in the Lucas 
Funds. Third, going beyond OPF organization, the questioning of its 
role within the economy and the attempt to establish an alternative role 
for OPFs. Each of these three stages represents greater commitment for 
active involvement on the part of the unions. However, it is important 
to point out that even the third stage does not counter the non-
observable power base of OPFs. 
This is because OPFs form part of banking capital, which is 
highly mobile both between sectors of the domestic economy and between 
economies internationally. If British industry threatens collapse, 
it can move overseas quite easily. OPFs provide a resource with which 
the banking sector supports itself - earning commission, intervening at 
AGMs, directing investments into the banking sector itself, and so on. 
Overall, OPFs help prop up the power of the banks themselves. Inter-
ferenoe (as defined by the City) on any particular OPF would almost 
certainly lead to pressure to change policy towards more acceptable 
objectives. 31 This is why alternative guidelines could end up as a 
cosmetic, a public relations exercise undertaken by the OPFs themselves 
to demonstrate social responsibility. Union trustees on the boards of 
OPFs are unable to touch the market structure. 
In the next two chapters, however, we investigate instances in 
which the Labour movement has exerted more consistent pressure on these 
non-observable aspects of power. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
In the last chapter we illustrated how the structure of financial 
markets has restricted the development of an independent union policy 
towards pension fund investment. One principal problem was that union 
membership did not consider the democratisation of investment funds as 
a problem and so brought no organized pressure for change; their 
short-term interests (•good pension benefits•) coincided with City 
interests ('best return on capital') while the union trustees on the 
board lacked the rationales - for the time being - to press for their 
long-term interests (•a buoyant and diversified economy•) which, by 
concentrating on the social returns of investments, may well have 
conflicted with City interests. As a result, the structure of the 
financial market served to suppress a potential issue - and only the 
most politicised sectors of the unions involved perceived the signifi-
cance of this non-observable aspect of power. 
In Chapters Ten and Eleven, we extend this analysis to include 
examples of conflict where union membership pressure for change had 
mounted up - in particular to challenge, not financial markets, but the 
role of private property as a constraint on working conditions and 
security of employment. 
Management and the Righ.t to Dispose of Property 
Although the 1980 Companies Act requires directors to consider -
though not to act on - employees' interests when making decisions, the 
law places final executive power in the hands of the owners of a company. 
Directors and managers remain the agents of the owners who are, in the 
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case of joint-stock companies, the shareholders. 
"For over 200 years the directors of companies had no duty 
to consider the interest of employees. Indeed if they 
did they acted illegally and could be challenged by the 
shareholders. This happened in 1962 when a shareholder 
sued the directors of the News Chronicle who wanted to pay 
compensation - redundancy pay - to their employees who 
were sacked on the spot one night when it •merged' with the 
Daily Mail (Parke v. Daily News 1962 (High Court)). 11 1 
Such property rights cons.ti tute the fundamental layer of non-
observable power in advanced capitalist societies. As Winkler puts 
it: 
"Sociologically, private property is more than the possession 
of title deeds or share certificates; it consists in certain 
rights in scarce goods, four being crucial: the right to use 
the goods owned, the right to direct their use if one does 
not wish to use them oneself, the right to appropriate the 
fruits of their use, and the right to transfer the property 
to another owner. The enforceability of these rights rests 
ultimately on the State's monopoly of legitimate coercion."2 
However, in industry there are two limiting conditions on these 
rights. First, the State has come to protect the interests of those 
directly affected by the disposal of property. Over the last century, 
employees' rights have been progressively extended at work thereby 
restricting the unlimited power of owners to impose conditions on 
workers. Trade unions have certain immunities from civil prosecution. 
For example, the Truck Act (1896) governs employers' rights to fine 
employees for disciplinary reasons, while the principle of unfair 
dismissal, enshrined in the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act (1974) 
and the Employment Protection Act (1975), prevents employers from firing 
an employee for reasons which do not bear examination by an industrial 
tribunal. And many other similar examples could be cited, although 
the limitations of the law as a •tool' for workers is widely recognised 
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in the Labour movement.3 
Here, though, we are interested in illustrating the second 
limiting condition on property rights. The State may not be called 
on, in certain circumstances, to use its "monopoly of legitimate 
coercion". Fbr reasons of expedience, a company may decide not to 
contest the organized opposition of workers to the disposal of assets 
which would lead to redunda.nci"es. Such organized opposition has 
included the seizure of the company's assets through sit-ins and work-
ins. The Institute of Personnel Management in a booklet published in 
1976 warned against hasty action in the case of occupation because 
"the underlying problem is an industrial relations problem ••• and 
while the civil authorities will intervene at the request of the company, 
they can thereafter handle the situation as they see fit, having regard 
to their law enforcement role rather than to the company's industrial 
relations policies". The authors conclude: 
"It might in some cases be necessary for companies to resort 
to legal action in order to remove the occupiers, but this 
decision should only be taken after serious consideration, 
and should be made only by, say, the chief executive. The 
factors to be taken into account include the damage to long-
term industrial relations which might be incurred by using 
the law; the cost to the company of the occupation; its 
effects on employees not involved in the action and the 
effect of the occupation on the organization's customers."4 
Indeed, if the company falls into the hands of the receivers, the 
government itself has been known - for reasons of expedience or principle 
- to help occupying workers to raise cash to form a producers' 
co-operative. The transfer of assets to the workers is then consolidated. 
In still other cases, faced by the prospect of redundancies, workers 
may demand the extension of collective bargaining to include investment 
decisions, the use of the 'social audit' to take account of the 
interests of the local community faced by closures, and even the 
acceptance of 'alternative corporate plans' designed to save jobs 
and manufacture socially useful products. 
All these strategies - sit-ins, work-ins, co-operatives, 
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investment bargaining, the social audit, and alternative corporate 
plans - have been brought to prominence in the 1970s by the Labour 
movement's struggle against rising unemployment. Besides this, the 
two features they all share in common are: first, the challenge they 
pose to management's right to dispose of property on the basis of 
private profitability alone; and, second, the mass support they have 
aroused from major sectors of the Labour movement. In short, these 
strategies - a form of radical industrial relations - have effectively 
brought property rights into the mainstream of political debate. Put 
another way, one of the foundations of industrial power in Britain 
the free disposal of private property - has increasingly shed its non-
observable characteristics. This challenge requires an analysis both 
of the economic background to these strategies and of the precise nature 
of the experiences which led entire work-forces to take radical forms 
of industrial action. As we shall see: 
" ••• ideologies of workers' management arise during periods 
of political, social, or economic unrest. More specifically, 
however, it seems that these ideologies take root and grow 
when, for one reason or another, the legitimacy of an 
established economic elite is called into question and when 
the status of that group suffers a serious decline. 11 5 
The Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' Work-in 
One of the most significant developments in the sociology of 
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industrial relations since the early 1970s has been the spread of 
the employees' work-in and sit-in. The phenomenon aroused the 
attention of all those concerned in industry, not least organized 
labour and management. In 1974, the TUC for example distinguished 
four types of occupation: work-ins, sit-ins over major management 
decisions (e.g. closures), collective bargaining sit-ins, and tactical 
sit-ins (e.g. as part of a wider strategy).6 Since such occupations 
challenge locally the "unlimited property rights" of managements to 
close factories and carry out policies "that would blight the lives 
of workers (and often the prospects of whole areas and towns)", the 
TUC concluded that their use was "an appropriate trade union tactic 
in certain circumstances".7 The Institute of Personnel Management, 
on the other hand, produced a booklet for its members confronted by 
occupations with tips on preventive, protective and legal counter-
measures. The booklet's introduction noted that: 
"Sit-ins and work-ins, while no longer automatically 
attracting headlines in the national press, are becoming 
a feature of life for many companies since they are 
increasingly being used as an alternative to more tradi-
tional forms of industrial action."8 
Along with these practical concerns, there has also been a stream 
of academic studies analysing the causes and effects of occupations. 9 
Despite the important differences in emphasis in all these works, they 
have one element in coDDnon: the view that the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
10 (UCS) work-in in 1971-2 was the major precursor of the movement whose 
example "transformed the nature of the struggle against unemployment 
and redundancies in Britain11 • 11 Indeed, as one observer put it: 
" ••• if there had not been ucs, there would not have been 
Plessey at Alexandria nor the River Don works at Sheffield, 
nor Fisher-Bendix at Liverpool, nor the wave of Manchester 
sit-ins •••• 1112 
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And another observer noted that since many occupations began 
before the successful outcome of UCS, it was the latter's example -
and not success - which caught the imagination.13 
The background to the story of UCS has been covered many times 
before, by Communists, 14 Conservatives15 and Trotskyites, 16 as well 
as by journalists, 17 academics, 18 and the participants themselves. 19 
There is, then, a need for just the barest outline here. Britain's 
relative share of world shipping had fallen steadily throughout this 
century and, by 1960, one historian of the industry observed that "in 
the next few years there is the possibility that shipyard workers will 
be unemployed on an appreciable scale. 1120 In 1965, the Labour govern-
ment appointed a Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee under R. M. Geddes to 
lay the basis for a streamlined industry concentrated on the Clyde and 
the North-East coast of England. Their report, 21 accepted by the 
government, urged rationalisations and improved industrial relations 
to be supervised through a Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB). The 
SIB subcommittee on the Clyde recommended in July 1967 that all five 
yards on the Upper Clyde should merge into one consortium, Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders (ucs). 22 UCS began trading on 1February1968 with a 
loan of £5.5m. from the SIB. However, problems soon arose: the plant 
had been underinvested, management remained autocratic and the order-
book full of loss-making contracts. Even the Conservative commentator 
observed: 
"One of the few absolutely incontrovertible conclusions to be 
drawn about UCS is that it was acutely short of working 
capital throughout its brief history."23 
Though UCS' financial position had temporarily improved by 1971, 
the Conservative Government - operating its 'lame duck' policy -
decided in mid-June to withhold a further £6m. loan, a decision which 
would lead to many thousands of redundancies. A campaign to change 
the Government's mind was begun, and on 27 July, James Reid, chairman 
of the UCS shop steward conveners and a Communist Clydebank councillor, 
announced plans for a work-in: 
"(an unfavourable governm.'ent decision would spark off) the 
most militant struggle ever seen in the history of 
Clydeside ••• When we speak of occupying the yards we do 
not merely mean a sit-in. We intend to continue producing 
ships. After all, UCS has an order book worth £90m. We 
will have a work-in, which is unique in trade union history. 
People have been out on the street before now, and others 
have been on strike. But no one has ever had a work-in 
before now. 11 24 
On 29 July the Government confirmed that the yards at Clydebank 
and Scotstoun would be closed, with an immediate loss of 6,000 jobs. 
The following day, the Clydebank yard was occupied. 25 
The statement made at Clydebank by Tony Benn, then opposition 
Labour spokesman on trade and industry, captures the exhilaration and 
novelty that clearly surrounded the workers' own perception of events: 
"This is the birthpangs of a new concept of industry. 
We are now showing that people in management are only 
interesting in so far as they help people earn a living. 
It would be a foolish man who thought that you could 
dispose of this movement by asking: 'Where are you going 
to get the paint from? Who is going to pay the 
electricity bill?' 
"These things will be shown to be small in the concept 
of history. This is the stuff of which great events are 
mad.e. 11 26 
Two questions arise at this point: first, what was the nature 
of the relationship between the economic condition of UCS and the work-
force's consciousness of the need to take defensive action against 
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redundancies? And second - more importantly - where did the idea 
of a work-in come from, and why did it take such a firm root? 
(1) Economic Conditions and Militancy 
To begin with, it was clear that the number of jobs lost on the 
Clyde would be very high. The Times, !or example, maintained that 
the UCS reorganization could ~ost 6,ooo jobs, adding that those "of a 
further 6,ooo employed by firms supplying materials to UCS could be 
jeopardised11 , 27 while Benn put the number of jobs at risk in ancillary 
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trades at 15,000. The figures, however, are not so very relevant: 
the fact of mass redundancies in an area of already high unemployment 
would be enough to polarise work-force and government. 
Furthermore, the government was a Conservative one, and Mr. Davies 
was not tactful in his treatment of the issue. The Times correspondent 
reporting the debate on 30 July wrote: ''Mr. Davies's somewhat cold and 
precise statement (on the need to rationalise) and his dismissal in a 
single short paragraph of the redundancies issue, which Labour :MPs 
quickly pointed out could involve the direct and indirect loss of 15,000 
jobs, contributed to the furious reaction. 1129 
Then, most crucially, the workers whose jobs were under discussion 
have had one of the most radical histories of any in the United Kingtlom.3° 
Hunt, who made an empirical study of workers' consciousness during the 
work-in states that "it may be that this background (of class conflict) 
gave many UCS workers an historically evolved form of consciousness 
which was lacking (in other industrial disputes)•.'.31 Certainly, a 
shipbuilding community such as Clydeside does approach very nearly that 
type of 'proletarian traditionalism' drawn up by Lockwood: 
"The most highly developed forms of proletarian tradi-
tionalism seem to be associated with industries such as 
mining, docking, and shipbuilding; industries which tend 
to concentrate workers together in solidary communities 
and to isolate them from the influences of the wider 
society ••• The isolated ••• nature of the community, its 
predominantly one-class population, and low rates of 
geographical and social mobility all tend to make it an 
inward-looking society and to accentuate the sense of 
cohesion that springs from shared work experiences ••• 
Hence the dominant model of society held by the 
proletarian traditionalist is most likely to be a dicho-
tomous or two-valued power model ('them' and 'us•). 1132 
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Although we have already subjected this rather simple model to a 
critique (pp.123-4), the point - that alternative models to capitalist 
society are most likely to evolve in 'solidary' working-class 
coIIDD.unities - is well made and taken. Indeed, it is not strange to 
find as a result that the shop steward leaders of the work-in were 
supported by a wide cross-section of the local population: housewives 
and families, churchmen, the Glasgow City Council and local councils, 
artists and musicians, shopkeepers, middle-management and the special 
recall conference of the Scottish Trade Union Congress.33 80,000 
people joined the demonstration through Glasgow on 18 August and a 
further 200,000 downed tools in sympathy.34 In this case, 'us' 
embraced in a populist fashion all but owners of large-scale capital 
and the Conservatives, who were seen as their agents. A local 
councillor, John Mains, stated: 
"(The government hopes that) a heavy dose of unemployment 
and a few spectacular bankruptcies would frighten people 
into a more submissive attitude."35 
As this view spread, so too support for the UCS work-in spread 
throughout the country. In summary, then, the prospect of mass 
unemployment in an area characterised by a cohesion of interests amongst 
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the various sectors of the community would have reinforced the 
legitimacy of almost any defensive actions taken by the shop stewards. 
The question now arises: why the work-in? 
(2) Origins of the Work-in 
The manner in which the work-in was first articulated is described 
by Thompson and Hart: shop s~ewards from the four affected yards were 
concerned to find an effective initiative with which to answer the 
announcement of liquidation. The convener of stewards at Connells, 
Sammy Barr, first forwarded the suggestion of a work-in which, though 
received sceptically to begin with - one had failed two years 
previously at GEc36 - was accepted on 13 June 1971 as the method most 
likely to publicise "the men's determination in the most dramatic 
fashion possible" to oppose closure.37 Such a description, however, 
hardly passes as an analysis of the social pressures which made the 
work-in possible. Why not, after all, a strike? 
A contrast can be drawn with another factory - later to become the 
Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering (KME) co-operative - which was 
also in difficulties early in 1971. Thorn Electrical Group had taken 
over the factory in April, and it became apparent that management 
intended to improve productivity through halving the work-force. On 
25 June, the workers went on strike. "This was not a powerful tactic 
since it increased the chance of total closure of the plant."3S Only 
sympathy strikes elsewhere saved the jobs in August, but under the 
threat that the whole factory might close the year after.39 
In explaining the divergence of action between UCS on the one hand 
and the Thorn plant on the other, several points must be made. In the 
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first place, there is the question of the leadership. Partly owing 
to the community factors that lead to a •traditional proletarian' 
outlook, and partly owing to the sheer size of UCS requiring consider-
able skills of organization, the leaders at UCS were more confident 
and politically aware than their counterparts at KME: the Communist 
Party had a branch within the consortium, and Jimmy Reid, spokesman 
for the stewards, had been its Scottish Secretary and was in 1971 still 
on the National Executive Committee, whilst Jim Airlie, Chairman of 
the Shop Stewards Co-ordinating Committee, and others soon became used 
to addressing mass meetings and appearing on radio and television.4° 
Already the discussion prior to the work-in demonstrated an advanced 
understanding of strategy, and embraced objections to strike action -
"it would enable the liquidator to put up the padlocks all the quicker" 
- and to a sit-in strike - "that would be almost impossible to maintain 
for the exceptionally long-drawn out battle that was in prospect, 
especially in view of the geographical spread and scatter of the work-
force over the four yards. 1141 It was pointed out that a work-in would 
be unexpected, attract wide support as it is more positive than striking, 
avoid the problems of the other types of action, and by controlling the 
gates challenge the right of owners to dispose of their property in a 
socially arbitrary manner. 
Such a debate is in stark contrast to the eventual occupation of 
the Thorn plant in 1972. Shop stewards and senior management were 
having talks to try to avert closure when a group of workers decided 
they should call a demonstration of support, which in fact grew into 
the occupation: 
" ••• the workers felt they were taking a step into the 
unknown - and were understandably nervous - they had always 
believed that management and their enclave were forbidden 
territory ••• 'when we did get to the boardroom there was 
this invisible barrier, it's got to be said it was a 
barrier ••• You got this feeling ••• and To~, one of our 
senior stewards was jockeyed into the office he wouldn't 
go at first 1 • 1142 ' 
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Although this sit-in was temporarily successful - the co-operative 
was set up later - and it is clear that the leadership was less 
experienced, less confident and less political than the UCS stewards. 
Important though the role of leadership may be, the crucial reason 
for the final vote by the shop stewards committee to take over the UCS 
consortium must involve reference to the political context of the 
decision. It is hardly surprising - both because of its ideology and 
because at the time it was in opposition - that the Labour Party's 
furious criticisms of Mr. Davies were based on the social considerations 
of liquidation, and above all unemployment, rather than with any 
narrowly economic reasons for the closures. The brunt of its attacks 
were, therefore, founded on a set of criteria for evaluating the purpose 
of an industrial enterprise - its capacity to provide stable employment 
- different from those used naturally by the Conservatives, namely 
coIIllllercial viability and 'success'. However, it is far more unusual 
for these alternative criteria to be debated openly and systematically 
by the Labour Party since they question the role of property in legiti-
mising management's authority to dispose of assets - its non-observable 
power. Such alternative criteria - the rudiments of 'socialist 
hegemony' - clearly protect workers' interests (security and income) 
rather than management's (efficiency and profitability). 
Articulation of these workers' interests had already led to the 
emergence of Jimmy Reid as the charismatic leader of the work-in: 
"At any one time, some symbolic forms can provide better 
solutions to the current problems of the group than others 
and those members who create, mobilise, or articulate them 
become potential leaders. It is the structural situation 
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of the group that determines what type of symbols are more 
effective than others and hence what type of leader is 
needed. Charisma is largely a group function, not an 
individual trait. Underlying the symbolic process in the 
development of charisma is the creation of normative 
obligations which bind the members of the group together, 
both the leaders and the -led. As a result, the leader is 
given by the group power which he exercises for the group. ,.43 
But the actions of the stewards' leadership were considerably 
strengthened by the support lent it by the Labour Party, and the 
leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson, who placed his authority at 
national level behind the critique of market values implicit in the 
work-in. We should not condemn, he stated, "any action they (the 
UCS stewards) take, within the law, to maintain their right to work. 1144 
So it was that the work-in became legitimised in Parliament itself and 
did eventually succeed in keeping all four yards open.45 
This discussion ties in with our earlier observations on contra-
dictory consciousness and "abstract and situational" levels of 
normative reference (pp.85-92). 
"On the (abstract plane, the average person) expresses a 
great deal of agreement with the dominant ideology; on 
the (situational plane), he reveals not outright dissensus 
but nevertheless a diminished level of commitment to the 
bourgeois ethos, because it is often in.apposite to the 
exigencies of his class position."46 
It can be argued that the Labour Party managed to present a 
countervailing set of norms at the abstract level which articulated 
those grievances felt at the situational level into a coherent ideology. 
283. 
One example of this is the way that the traditional rights of an 
owner of a factory to dispose of it as he thinks fit had been sub-
verted by workers' insistence on the same property rights on their 
job: they "own" it as they have "invested" their working life in it 
and choose to keep it. In the context of the Parliamentary debate 
following' Mr. Davies' announcement of the liquidation which led to the 
work-in vote, the whole general tenure of Labour's unanimous arguments 
was to question the arbitrary disposal of property, and in the case of 
Mr. Benn in particular to urge workers to occupy the yards. The 
Times correspondent noted that: ''Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Labour 
spokesman for trade and industry, has probably spent more time in 
Clydebank than in his own constituency since the crisis began. Workers' 
control seems assured at least until Mr. Wilson's visit, and probably 
beyond."47 The timidity of workers at the Thorn plant at the start of 
their occupation must be attributed at least in part to the lack of an 
"abstract" ideological mobilisation on their behalf by the Labour move-
ment during their efforts. In this respect, once more, the sheer size 
of UCS - its significance to radicals, its economic importance to the 
West of Scotland, the level of unemployment created by closures and 
its public visibility - played a large part in allowing the development 
of this new form of industrial action and in stimulating the public's 
sympathy for it through the maintenance of an alternative 'social 
reality' by all concerned in the occupation. 
One effect of the work-in, then - given that, as Gretton put it, 
"there is no tradition of this sort of workers' action, no historical 
reference point {since the 1920s)"4B - was to create a measure of public 
tolerance for direct action. Yet its most enduring result, however, 
has probably been the development of the 'social audit' •••• 
The Social Audit 
u:The social audit is seen as an attempt to assess, 
and place before public opinion, some picture of the true 
socio-economic costs of decisions which are taken within 
the narrow rationality of enterprise budgets •••• 
"The social costs of turning the Clyde into an even 
more acutely depressed area than it already was in 1971 
included as a minimum the unemployment and social security 
benefits due to the victims of the process, and very likely 
also the additional costs· of moving, re-employing, housing, 
educating and providing for an infrastructure of transport 
and social services for a whole displaced community."49 
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Barratt Brown carried out the first full-scale social audit of 
UCS; he assessed the external economies of keeping the yards open, 
transformed perhaps into a multi-purpose port with ore and oil 
terminals; the external costs of allowing the yards to run down in 
terms of wastage of assets; the costs to the coIIDnunity in terms of 
the run-down of housing, schools, roads and hospitals if the yards 
closed; the welfare costs of unemployment and social security 
benefits; as well as the grants and loans already awarded by govern-
ments to the consortium (about £21m.) between 1968 and 1971.50 
Another social audit on UCS was prepared as evidence on behalf 
of the IWC to the 'Committee of Enquiry into the Proposed Run-down of 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders•, which was set up by the STUC tm.der the chair-
manship of Professor Raymond Illesley.51 The evidence - prepared by 
Robin Murray - analyses the nature of 'bankruptcy', the effects of the 
'bankruptcy' on the local community, the constraints of 'efficiency' 
at UCS and a comparison of the social organization of UCS and the ship-
yard at Split, in Yugoslavia. 
"Far from promising increased social efficiency, bankruptcy 
promises merely to restore the rate of profit on private 
capital by transfers from other parts of society. But 
••• also ••• in the field of production, as in the broader 
field of social costs raised by Michael Barratt Brown, the 
restriction of discussion to the terms dictated by the 
market can no longer be accepted. For the question before 
us is not how to adjust ourselves to maintain this 
particular economic system, but how to organize the system 
to meet our needs."52 
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The social audit approach was also used with success at the second 
work-in undertaken, in autumn :I-971, at the River Don Steel Works in 
Sheffield. The British Steel Corporation (BSC) had announced plans 
to close the River Don plant by hiving off some orders to private 
competitors and shutting do'\iffi its heavy forge. The unions and middle-
management together approached customers for heavy forgings to ask 
whether they knew of BSC 1 s plans: 
"Since the intended closure would have meant that heavy 
forgings could only be obtained abroad, there was an almost 
instant queue of complainants at Lord Melchett's office 
(the BSC chai:rman), and the decision was revoked. 11 53 
Since then, the approach has been used elsewhere,54 and further 
refined to develop the notion of local participatory democracy. 
Bodington, for example, has set out a model of democracy based on the 
social audit: the community relates social needs to the resources 
available to satisfy them as a way to avoid the inefficiencies both of 
the "automatic market system" and centralisation: 
"A first stage would be for TUs, community action groups, 
political organizations and local authorities to organize 
conferences to consider and discuss the function of social 
auditing in the fight against unemployment. This however can 
only be a beginning since the preparation of a realistic social 
audit will call for (i) time and (ii) expertise •••• 
"The social audit would in fact be an instrument of 
economic and social struggle. It would be striving for 
immediate changes wherever possible and where not possible, 
immediately highlighting financial and legislative changes 
necessary to the realisation of aims which were seen to 
be feasible except in so far as they are blocked by 
structural impediments of society as it is (e.g. borrow-
ing powers, rights to requisition needed property and so 
forth)."55 
Yet the social audit's more immediate - if indirect - impact 
286. 
was on the development of the new co-operatives on the one hand, and 
on alternative workers' corporate plans on the other.56 Both these 
developments were, and are, based on a concept of industry's social 
responsibilities in providing secure, useful employment: the formation 
of co-operatives during the 1970s came to be seen increasingly as a 
way to socialise small companies, and the discussion and propagation 
of alternative corporate plans as a way to socialise large companies. 
Both methods were intended to avoid the free market on the one hand 
and bureaucratic centralisation of traditional nationalisation on the 
other. In the next chapter we analyse the significance of these forms 
of workers' control, both of which 'go beyond' the sit-in and work-in 
by attempting to institutionalise and formalise workers' control on a 
long-term, stable basis. 
287. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
The UCS work-in was, then, highly significant not only because 
it prevented mass unemployment on the Clyde but also because it 
provided inspiration for other occupations. 
In his study of factory occupations, Mills distinguishes three 
•waves' which followed the UCS. example between July 1971 and March 
1974. At first, engineering workers were in the vast majority of 
occupiers ( 91. 5°;6), and it was they who "had a pioneering role in 
initiating and establishing occupation strategy". The second wave 
"brought in other unions, notably the Trat}.sport and General Workers", 
whilst the final wave - beginning in February 1972 - marked "a deeper 
acceptance of the strategy ••• when 28 print workers occupied their 
work premises to protest a pay claim rather than redundancy. Another 
25 occupations (all involving AUEW) over pay disputes followed this 
1 move". 
What is of particular interest is that in February 1972 the first 
producers' co-operative was created out of an occupation. The "final 
wave" of occupations had broadened to include not only disputes over 
wages but also a small group of women workers in Fakenham, Norfolk, 
who, though opposed by the Executive Committee of their union - the 
National Union of Footwear, Leather and Allied Trades (NUFLAT) -
resisted the closure of their leather factory during a seventeen week 
k 
. 2 wor -in. They continued making dresses and bags, and eventually 
obtained financial backing from the Scott-Bader Commonwealth - a 
successful company run on common ownership lines - which provided loans 
of £10,000 over three years. However, the reasons for the eventual 
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failure of Fakenham Enterprises - the name of the co-operative as it 
became - are instructive (it closed in 1977). The demand for shoes, 
in which it had specialised, slumped; the co-operative was under-
capitalised; there was no help from the Labour movement - "the union 
actually hindered the women from trying to get support 
there was little genuine self-management in any case: 
... 3 o••• f and 
"The Fakenham sit-in was.not "managed" by the women shoe-
makers at all, but by an ASTMS full-time officer who became 
involved when their own union gave up on them; he actually 
advised them (through a contact) to carry on the spontaneous 
'sit-in' and thereafter organized the administrative structure 
of the co-operative and put them in touch with Scott-Bader ••• 
The venture failed because of a number of reasons among which 
was the strongly authoritarian leadership provided by a woman 
ex-foreman who eventually alienated many of her colleagues."4 
Wajcman adds: 
"At Fakenham, most workers did not assert their 'right' to 
self-management. They were willing to negotiate about any 
proposals that would have secured their employment ••• 
For these workers, forming a co-operative was the last resort 
before the dole - or.- at best less skilled and lower-paid 
jobs."5 
'!his short account of Fakenham Enterprises does raise two major 
questions for this chapter. First of all, under what circumstances 
does a sit-in or work-in develop into a producer's co-operative, and 
to what extent might this development challenge the role of private 
property in industrial affairs? And second, what chances are there 
for genuinely democratic forms of work organization in neo-capitalist 
societies, especially in larger enterprises, which are not necessarily 
based on common ownership? 
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Sit-ins, Work-ins and Co-operatives 
(1) The Establishment of Co-operatives 
It might be felt that the establishment of a co-operative implies 
a 'higher level' of worker consciousness than a work-in. After all, 
it constitutes an alternative approach to the economic and social 
structure of the factory, and enjoys a permanence in legal terms not 
shared by the temporary work-in. However, not only is there difficulty 
in identifying what might be meant by a 'higher level' of consciousness, 
but also an analysis of the problems facing the formation of a 
co-operative in the 1970s reveals that it is usually best seen either 
as the last resort in avoiding 'lmemployment provided that finance is 
available, .2!: as the effort of a group of enthusiasts keen to promote 
an 'alternative life-style'. In the first category, the workers 
involved do not necessarily have a special regard for the quality of 
their jobs. Amongst the 'new co-operatives' of the 1970s, only at 
Meriden has reference been made to the enthusiasm of the work-force 
for their product (motorcycles) as a factor in eventual success.6 
Furthermore, with the exception of Benn's policies in the mid-
1970s, there has never been a coherent strategy in Britain to advance 
workers' control through co-operatives, with the result that there is 
no political leadership 'on tap' to give systematic assistance in 
developing co-operatives from work-ins.7 For example, in a report to 
the Communist Party's Executive Committee, Bert Ramelson (Industrial 
Organizer} stated that since co-operatives were suited chiefly to 
either distribution or small-scale production: 
" ••• we would be creating illusions if we were to foster 
the idea that it is a major solution or an alternative form 
to nationalization in a highly sophisticated large-scale 
and interdependent industry such as Britain's. 118 
And stephen Parker maintains that: 
" ••• the whole issue of the problem of the market has 
not been seriously answered by the leaders of the struggle 
for a co-operative (at Meriden) ••• The way in which the 
workers are maintaining production means that they have 
also taken upon themselves the penalties which capital 
demands in a crisis situation (i.e. wage reductions and 
redunda.ncies)."9 
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There is considerable validity in these arguments: the original 
work-force of 1,800 at Meriden dropped to 300 when the co-operative 
was launched (though it climbed to 645 a year later) and the unions 
lost their traditional influence on the shop-floor: a.s Felix Keane -
one of the worker directors - has pointed out "there is complete 
flexibility of labour and ••• no demarcation troubles."10 As a 
result, many 'new co-operatives' in their formative stages received 
help over organization and similar issues from individuals rather 
than political groups: Professor Raymond Loveridge at Fakenham; 11 
Professor Tony Eccles at KME; 12 Geoffrey Robinson, MP, at Meriden, 13 
and Ken Fleet, Secretary of the IWC, at Grantham Fashions.14 
A further obstacle to be su:t'lllo1m.ted in forming a co-operative 
is - as Mandel argues15 - the hostility of groups of workers elsewhere 
who fear that their own jobs may be 1m.dermined by a successful co-opera-
tive. Meriden is an example: Norton Villiers Triumph (NVT) was formed 
in July 1973 with £4.am .. of public money, and Mr. Dennis Poore as Chairman. 
That autumn, the Meriden plant was·closed to concentrate production in 
the company' a two other plants at Small Heath and Wolverhampton. But 
after an 18 month sit-in, Meriden workers set up their own co-operative 
(March 1975), though NVT continued to market its products until 1977.16 
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However, Poore warned Benn that motorcycle demand could not sustain 
all three factories, a view shared by the Small Heath workers who had 
angrily told Benn that they feared that the Meriden Co-op threatened 
their jobs. Though Benn emphasised his commitment to re-vitalise 
the industry through the National Enterprise Boa.rd (NEB), both the 
Wolverhampton and Small Heath plants eventually closed - which led to 
another sit-in at Wolverhampton, not supported by Eric Varley, Benn's 
successor at the Department of Industry.17 The Times, in a leading 
article, declared that NVT had been expected to rationalise under the 
programme attracting state aid in 1973 and that Benn's support of 
Meriden had "wrecked" the plan.18 
A similar situation arose during the formation of the Scottish 
Daily News (HDN) as a co-operative.19 Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd. 
decided to close their Glasgow office in May 1974 and so cease printing 
their three Scottish papers. The rationale was that their Glasgow 
printing operations employing 2,000 had to stop to allow those in London 
and Manchester to ca:rry on. The official print unions backed 
Beaverbrook's and so the Action Committee, formed on being notified of 
the closure, decided that means other than applying more pressure on 
Beaverbrook's would be necessary to keep the site open. Faced with 
having to raise money rapidly, the Action Committee soon discovered that 
most Union Executive Councils were hostile or indifferent. Allister 
Mackie, chairman of the Action Committee and later co-chairman of the 
co-operative, wrote: 
"The print unions themselves showed little enthusiasm. 
Perhaps they feared that a successful Daily News would 
jeopardise their members' employment in the other 
Scottish newspaper offices. Whatever their reasons, and 
they were never openly declared, the print unions, with 
the exception of the Scottish Graphical Association, did 
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not give their full, unqualified support."20 
In the event, the SDN co-operative closed in December 1975, after 
running since the previous May. 21 
In view of such opposition to co-operatives - demonstrated by 
mass meetings of shoP-floor workers at Small Heath and official lack 
of interest by unions over SDN·at Glasgow - it is obviously difficult 
to form one without outside support. In at least one case, at the 
Briant Colour Printing work-in, appeals to establish a co-operative 
were voted down on the recommendation of the leadership inside the 
22 plant. 
A further problem in establishing a co-operative lies in its 
product markets. In the case of the new co-operatives, a slump -
leading to liquidation or its threat - had been behind the crisis in 
the plants in the first place. The reorganisation of a company from 
private to co-operative ownership does not in itself regain lost sales 
and declining market shares. This question we analyse below when 
considering a co-operative's finances. 
This section has demonstrated that co-operatives do not emerge 
out of work-ins as workers' consciousness-evolves. Work-ins do not 
necessarily present a glimpse of an alternative form of industrial 
organization: many factors impede this, including contradictory 
consciousness through which the dominant 11abstract11 ideology prevents 
the articulation of alternatives based on "situational" experience. 
Material problems facing workers who attempt to establish co-operatives 
include lack of cohesive political support and the hostility of union 
officials and shop-floor workers who fear for their own employment. 
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Indeed, the motivation to establish a co-operative is usually 
in reaction to the threat of redundancy. As Fletcher puts it: 
"Traditionally the working class in Britain has turned to 
co-operation as a form of self-help at times of economic 
crisis; in the depression after the Napoleonic Wars -
which bred Owenism - in the eighteen fifties and nineties, 
and after the First World War when Tom Ma.nzr was the 
movement's most powerful spokesma.n."23 
The prospect of saving jobs is quoted as the single most important 
motivation in setting up KME, 24 SDN, 25 and Meriden. 26 
One essential condition, then, for a sit-in or work-in to turn 
into a co-operative is the readiness of the shop-floor to support a 
leadership committed to resist redundancies. However, there is a 
further, crucial condition: that is, access to finance. British 
co-operatives, unlike either their French counterparts or the 
Mondragon organization, 27 have no sources of finance or credit 
especially geared to their needs. As a result, a vicious circle 
ensues: lack of credit means that cash reserves disappear, so the 
co-operative is forced to lower its prices to establish a market; 
this further squeezes finance available for expansion and puts the 
co-op at risk. This erodes confidence - and justifies not giving it 
credit which puts it back to square one. 28 It is this kind of struct-
ural weakness which, in Britain, has prevented the co-operative 
movement from challenging vecy strongly traditional forms of private 
ownership in industry. 
(2) Co-operatives, Fina.nee and Private Property 
There is some controversy over the ability of producer co-opera-
tives in general to survive. Derek c. Jones has demonstrated that they 
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do not inevitably decline into non-participatory organizations and 
that, as a result, there is "the need for re-examination of traditional 
beliefs" concerning their viability.29 However, in the public mind, 
the record of the 'new co-operatives' - those aided by Benn in the 
1970s to fight closures - has been poor: their markets have been 
declining and their operations have been undercapitalised, though this 
no doubt reflects the vicious circle of credit starvation outlined 
above rather than any intrinsic faults of organization. 
Because the new co-operative plants had been on the point of 
closure, management has not normally provided funds to continue -
although Beaverbrook's did supply loans of £500,000 unsecured and 
£250,000 secured to SDN. In addition, it is no longer adequate, given 
the scale of modern industrial operations in these instances, to build 
up a fund principally of members' savings as traditionally. The 
remaining three methods of finance outlined below have not been satis-
factory either - with the result that the failure of the new co-opera-
tives has tended to reflect (unfairly) on co-operative organization as 
such, rather' than poor methods of capitalisation. 
First, there has been reliance on an individual benefactor. The 
most notorious example is that of Mr. Robert Maxwell's association 
with SDN. The Government a.greed to pa;y half the £2.4m. required to 
launch the co-operative, on condition that the Action Committee found 
the other half privately. Robert Maxwell provided the outstanding 
£114,000 in exchange for the co-chairmanship of the works council. 
Maxwell had already had a dubious business career; in 1971 Department 
of Trade and Industry inspectors had considered him "not ••• a person 
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who can be relied on to exercise proper stewardship of a publicly 
quoted company."30 Although the Government could have met the extra 
to exclude him - they had originally offered support of £1.75m. - they 
chose not to. After quarrels on format, price and editorial line, 
Maxwell eventually managed to achieve full control of SDN. Mackie, 
the original chairman of the Action Committee, and co-chairman of the 
co-operative, wrote: 
"This was the basic weakness of the co-operative. 
Maxwell had conditioned the members into believing 
that their only chance of survival was to give him 
absolute authority; there was no other means of 
salvation. In effect, the members had renounced already 
their co-operative principles in the mistaken belief that 
31 by doing so they were securing employment for themselves." 
The SDN was eventually liquidated, and the occupiers evicted in 
autumn 1976. 
Grants from central government were a second source of finance, 
associated with the period Benn spent as Secretary of State for Industry 
between March 1974 and June 1975. These grants - notably to KME, SDN 
and Meriden - attracted considerable adverse criticism during a time of 
economic crisis. The Industrial Development Advisory Board (IDAB), 
established in 1972 by the Conservatives to advise the Secretary of 
State for Industry on selective financial assistance for industry, 
opposed the loans to SDN and Meriden, and over the £4Jn. loan to KME 
exercised its right to lay a statement before the Commons in protest.32 
The following June, when Varley took over Benn's post, the government 
began to take a harder line over such grants. Varley allowed the 
repossession of the Imperial Typewriters factory in Hull where workers 
had occupied in the face of closure and drawn up a social audit; he 
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also refused to aid the NVT Wolverhampton sit-in and eventually 
allowed KME into liquidation in March 1979 after attempts to take it 
over by Worcester Engineering failed to satisfy the co-operative's 
oreditors. 33 Government grants, then, a.re erratic and too heavily 
dependent on political factors to provide co-operatives with a stable 
source of funds. 
Finally, other co-operatives and - especially - co-operative 
agencies have helped to finance new ventures. Scott-Bader, for 
example, the well-known common ownership enterprise operating in the 
plastics and chemicals industry,34 has aided Rowen Engineering (Glasgow),35 
Rowen Onllwyn36 and Fakenham Enterprises. And more systematically, the 
Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM), founded in 1958 with inspir-
ation from Scott-Bader, provides financial assistance through Industrial 
Common Ownership Finance Ltd. (ICOF). ICOF, itself founded in 1973, 
is a non-profit making loan fund deriving finance from individual 
contributions and the provisions of the Industrial Common Ownership 
Act, 1976.37 Under this Act, £250,000 was made available over five 
yea.rs from the Department of Industry for loans to common ownership 
enterprises. By the end of 1979, ICOF had received £80,000, but had 
22 different advances out totalling almost £145,000.38 The projects 
ICOM and ICOF can aid a.re, therefore, very small.39 Fmids available 
from other agencies - such as the Co-operative Development Agency (CDA), 
established by the Labour Government in 1978 - a.re likewise very 
limited.40 
However, it may well be that in the longer run, the co-operative 
sector is most likely to flourish through ICOM and the CDA. Indeed, 
as the Guardian put it: 
"The collapse of KME, sad though it may be, does nothing 
to discredit the CDA. Indeed, the future of worker 
co-operatives lies more with the hard-headed realism of 
the agency than with the generous but essentially soft-
hearted sympathies of those who launched Kirkby. 1141 
This view may well be correct. The Conservative Government 
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allowed the CDA to contin·ue al though with its activities curtailed, 42 
and support for co-operatives re-emerged in the early 1980s through 
the Manpower Services Commission's various job creation programmes, 
local councils and •management buy-outs• - for instance, the take-over 
of the State-owned National Freight Company by management and other 
employees.43 Dr. David Owen, at ICOM's spring conference in March 
1980,summa.rised co-operative development in Britain by saying that after 
its peak at the turn of the century it had declined for 75 years but 
then "during the last five yea.rs had grown exponentially"'. The total 
number of co-operatives in Britain had been 75 in 1977; 140 in 1978; 
162 in 1979; and would be an estimated 250 in 1980.44 
However, such co-operatives are both very small as enterprises 
and constitute only a tiny proportion of industrial output.45 Benn 
himself stresses that the new co-operatives were aided only because 
they were self-selective: 
"When people say to me 'Why didn't you set up a co-operative 
at Aston Martin, for example?' I have to reply that in 
Newport Pagnall, male unemployment was l.Sofa; and quite 
frankly the workers at Aston Martin didn't want a workers' 
co-operative and there was nothing that I could have done to 
get a co-operative going if that was not what they actually 
wanted. 1146 
Success is not, however, achieved through enthusiasm alone; self-
selected experiments, if they fail, tend to reflect on the co-operative 
movement as a whole rather than on the specific problems faced by those 
examples themselves.47 
Several points emerge, then, in relation to property and market 
constraints on the development of co-operatives. 
First, co-operatives aided through ICOM and the CDA tend to be 
small and economically unimportant - albeit worthwhile as enterprises. 
They cannot be said to challenge the ownership structure of private 
industry. 
Second, the new co-operatives - whilst larger and more noticeable -
relied on enthusiasm and public funds, the supply of which turned out to 
be erratic. Indeed, their intention - to save jobs - sometimes led to 
an organizational structure not always regarded by everyone as genuinely 
co-operative. Jo Grimond, for instance, dubbed them "Government funded 
syndicalist enterprises. ,AB The main difficulty was that they were 
not supported by a coherent government strategy. Benn's comment about 
UCS can be extended to the co-operatives: 
" ••. UCS sit-in was (not) basically about industrial 
democracy. As became clear, it was about the right to work."49 
Given the discussion of "abstract" and "situational" frameworks 
earlier, this is not surprising since the impulse to find work is still 
deeply implanted in our society.50 And when workers at Meriden, KME 
and SDN shifted their interest from a 'mere' defence of their jobs 
towards an alternative industrial (not social) structure, there was 
no unambiguous strategy of support from the Labour Party - as there 
had been for UCS. 
"To give the movement real shape and direction, a committed 
approach would be necessary from the Labour Party itself. 
This would not mean simply handing round the hat to 
individual co-operatives, but would involve an acceptance 
of this form of enterprise as part of a political 
programme and strategy. 11 51 
Yet no such committed approach has ever been forthcoming. 
Workers' Alternative eorporate Plans 
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Co-operatives have a tendency to be small not only because small-
ness favours direct democratic accountability, but also because the 
process of capital accumulation is more restricted: co-operatives 
must finance expansion purely from within and cannot rely on raising 
funds on the stock market. 
However, what of workers in, for example, large, multi-plant 
engineering companies? What strategies have they formulated to counter 
the threat of rationalisation and redundancies? 
These questions bring us to analyse the second major development 
in the institutionalisation of radical industrial relations during the 
1970s - the emergence of workers' alternative corporate plans (ACPs). 
The central intention of an ACP is to present to management a possible 
investment strategy based on three principles: 
(1) to save jobs; 
(2) to produce 'socially useful' products; and 
(3) to achieve these aims by adapting the existing 
technology and equipment already installed in 
the company, and therefore avoid capital 
expenditure on new plant. 
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These principles are best illustrated by examining the first and 
best known ACP - that at Lucas Aerospace. 
Lucas Aerospace - a division of Lucas Industries Ltd. - began to 
rationalise its operations and lay workers off towards the end of the 
1960s, when it employed around 18,000. In 1974, the Lucas Aerospace 
Combine Shop Stewards' Committee (LACSSC) - then representing 14,000 
members in 13 unions on 17 sites - began to develop a constructive 
strategy to oppose mass redundancies.52 It circulated a question-
naire amongst the work-force for ideas on products which, first, could 
be made with plant and skills already on hand in the company and which, 
second, would be socially useful. On the basis of returned question-
naires, the LACSSC drew up in 1976 a list of 150 such products, grouped 
under six headings: 
• ocean.ice (e.g. equipment for marine agriculture); 
• telecheiric machines (e.g. robotics for mining, 
firefighting and underwater use); 
• transport systems (e.g. a combined road/rail vehicle); 
• braking systems for coaches and railways; 
• alternative energy sources (e.g. hybrid motors 
incorporating internal combustion engine, generator 
and batteries); and 
0 medical (e.go kidney machines, mini-radar devices for 
the blind).53 
To begin with, the LACSSC advanced some of these proposals ad hoc 
to managemento For example, in June 1975, Lucas Aerospace threatened 
480 redundancies at Hemel Hempstead, a threat which was withdrawn when 
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stewards put forward their plan for industrial ball-screw production.54 
Then, in January 1976, the LACSSC presented the 'Alternative Corporate 
Plan' to Lucas management and the media. It ran to six 200 page 
volumes, each of which was devoted to one of the six product areas 
listed above. 
"The Combine felt that a number of the product suggestions 
could be conventionally profitable, but others might be less 
so, and it was the Combin~'s intention to enter discussions 
with the management of the company and 'offer' a profitable 
product in exchange for production on a so-called 'unprofit-
able producti.55 
The company refused to discuss any of the proposals contained in 
the ACP. From then on, the LACSSC engaged in complex and lengthy 
discussions with the company itself, the national unions involved, the 
Labour Party, the TUC and the Department of Industry to gain recognition 
for the ACP. 56 
Two events in 1978 led to new developments. In January 1978, the 
LACSSC and the North East London Polytechnic (NELP) jointly established 
the Centre for Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems (CAITS) 
with a grant from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.57 CAITS was 
located in the Engineering Faculty of NELP, the Dean of which became 
responsible for it to the Director of NELP. It was directed by 
representatives from both NELP and the LACSSC with a full-time co-
ordinator (Mike George) in da;y-to-day charge. An advisory committee 
of about twenty-five academics and trade unionists oversees the Centre's 
activities, the aims of which are to act as a 'clearing house' for the 
Lucas Aerospace ACP, to promote the notion of socially useful production 
in union negotiations, and to provide research and experience for shop 
stewards wishing to set up joint combine committees and ACPs of their 
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own. 58 
Two months later, in March 1978, Lucas Aerospace announced 
that it wanted to cut its labour force from about 12,000 to 10,000 
by closing three factories in Liverpool, Bradford and Coventry. 
At this point, the LACSSC decided to involve the Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) - the confederation of 
unions which negotiates at national level for the shipbuilding and 
engineering industry. 
"We decided that unless we tested this proper channel, 
we would lose a lot of our support. Government ministers 
and union officials had managed to persuade many supporters 
of the initiatives of the combine committee that the CSEU 
was the only channel to go through if we wanted our ideas 
and organization to be taken seriously. They, together 
with the company, said that we were an 'unofficial body' 
even though everyone was a properly elected shop steward. 1159 
In fact, relationships with the CSEU were to be as thorny as 
those with management, unions, Labour Party and Department of Industry. 
Yet, under the auspices of the CSEU, the Lucas Aerospace Trade Union 
Committee - with assistance from CAITS - produced a 400 page report 
on possible investment initiatives at Lucas:60 
"In 7 sections the Report makes market assessments of 
potential Lucas business in the booming aerospace sector, 
it criticises management, almost on a site by site basis 
(Lucas Aerospace has 17 sites), it puts forward eight 
product suggestions for the sites under threat, and it 
proposes a Government-aided Job I"1aintena.nce Programme; 
the Report is backed up by 29 appendices." 61 
It also included a social audit of Lucas Aerospace's closure 
plans (Section 4). 
Lucas Aerospace did agree to consider the Report and not to carry 
out compulsory redundancies. 62 In the event, only a relatively small 
number of jobs were lost. In September 1980, GAITS reported: 
11Although it is still not certain that the company will 
make these products, there are clear signs that it might 
soon be forced to do so - and remember that Lucas cut 
5,000 jobs in the 4 years before the Plan and only 100 
since then •••• 11 63 ' 
The originality of the LACSSG ACP, as Coates argues, consists in 
its attempt to present a solution to four interwoven aspects of the 
underlying industrial crisis: unemployment, lack of democracy, unmet 
social needs and environmental conoern. 64 For these reasons, no doubt, 
it attracted attention both favourable·- the LACSSC was nominated for 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979 - and unfavourable.65 
Most importantly, the Lucas ACP - aided by GAITS - has stimulated 
much debate amongst shop stewards' combine committees facing redundancies 
in other multi-national companies. Some combine committees have 
66 established their own ACPs, as at, for example, Vickers. Other 
combine committees have acknowledged the importance of ACPs and have 
drawn up 'rational strategies' for their industry though in less detail, 
67 as at, for example, c. A. Parsons. Still others have discussed 
possible transfers of work to the plant under threat - though not in 
the same systematic manner associated with an ACP, as, for example, at 
68 BL in Liverpool. 
On 17 November 1979, CAITS and the LAGSSG organized a one-day 
conference on ACPs at NELP to discuss the opportunities and risks which 
ACPs involve in a variety of different sectors: aerospace, heavy 
engineering, motors, power engineering, and telecommunications and 
postal engineering. A decision was taken at the conference to attempt 
to create and maintain links between shop steward combine committees 
through regular meetings. This decision was interpreted in some 
quarters as a step further towards an effective way to deal with the 
emergence of multi-union, multi-plant, multi-national companies. 69 
Assessment of Alternative Corporate Plans 
The development of ACPs raises important issues. To begin with, 
they presume the existence of a united shop stewards' combine committee. 
It is not certain how many of these exist in Britain, still less what 
different types there are (division, company or industry-wide), or how 
united, effective and independent they are, or how they derive their 
. 70 mcome. 
Secondly, not every industry is necessarily amenable to the 
development of an ACP. For example, at c. A. Parsons, Newcastle, the 
corporate union committee stated: 
"The most important difference in our approach is that we 
cannot apply the same formula as at Lucas Aerospace where 
socially useful products are posed as an alternative to 
military productiono We see the production of turbine 
generators for electrical power transmission as socially 
useful work in itself, essential for production and 
essential to maintain living standards of workers 
generally. 11 71 
The Committee added that the technology in the company was 
suitable only for the production of turbine generators, of which only 
a few were manufactured a year: 
"Many of the workers are highly specialised; much of the 
plant would be only of limited use for other heavy engin-
eering products and useless for small-scale productiono 11 72 
Faced by government pressures to rationalise turbine production, 
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the corporate union connnittee attempted to build a campaign to prevent 
private mergers - it also drew up a 'rational strategy• for the company 
to develop turbine generators using wind/wave/tidal energy, intermediate 
turbine generator technology, and combined heat and power generators. 
Indeed, the objection that factories are often purpose-built - and so 
not amenable to ACPs - has been made elsewhere as well.73 However, 
GAITS does acknowledge the diversity of possible forms of ACPs, and has 
produced guidelines on "what needs to be done" if a combine connnittee 
decides to develop one.74 
The most serious objection raised against ACPs is that they lead 
to some form of incorporation: 
"The Corporate Plan has been criticised as a fuzzy reformist 
demand which removes workers from a position of direct 
opposition to management. 1175 
Senior shop stewards are alleged to run the risk of co-option into 
top-level consultations with management, which could undermine their 
independence; meetings and discussions could be used as delaying tactics 
whilst redundancies go ahead; shop steward 'corporate planners' could 
equally become distanced from their constituents; and ACPs could become 
enmeshed in bureaucratic procedures of tripartite planning, or else 
degenerate into glorified suggestion bo:x.es for management. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that because ACPs are complex -
involving the defence of jobs, use of technology and social need - they 
allow workers to advance along a series of 'fronts• at the same time, 
and therefore strengthen bargaining positions. This might encourage 
the independence of shop stewards because attention is drawn to the fact 
that other interests in industry - the company itself, government and 
union leaderships - cannot be relied on to save jobs: 
"All of the planning initiatives by workers in the recent 
past have of course arisen in response to immediate or 
forthcoming redundancies and closures, and as mentioned 
earlier, these plans do at least provide a way of develop-
ing an offensive bargaining position. For that reason, 
many workers have mobilised around this form of struggle 
in a straightforward defence of jobs. But perhaps it is 
not so straightforward - there is for instance an assumption 
that reliance on the company, the State or union leaderships 
to maintain threatened jobs is an inadequate or unwise move 
- this sentiment alone if ~aken up by large numbers of 
workers would have significant implications for the dominance 
of the ma.nagerialists. 1176 
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The process of promoting ACPs may itself, then, tend to politicise 
those involved and provide an example, or a point of reference, for 
struggles elsewhere. Most importantly, however, workers' plans extend 
collective bargaining in a radical way: 
"Workers' plans and reports are not objects, rather they are 
processes of expropriation over managerial prerogatives. 1177 
The extension of collective bargaining into new areas - information 
disclosure, investment and product planning, marketing strategies, 
factory location, and takeovers - forms a major incursion into the 
traditionally defined areas of management's 'right to manage'. From 
the point of view of the shop stewards, the merits of this approach are 
that it does not compromise their independence; furthermore, not only 
do their members readily understand it, but it also significantly extends 
members' involvement in bargaining strategy as their own ideas and views 
form its foundation. 
As Wise puts it: 
"The greatest contribution of the Workers' Plan is that it 
depends on workers thinking constructively about their own 
work and people's needs."78 
As a result, the ACP is based on workers' own view of the aims 
of industrial production and so creates links between the formation 
of economic, industrial and social policies. 79 
Both the development of co-operatives and ACPs, then, represent 
attempts to institutionalise alternative forms of industrial organiza-
tion which place the interests of labour above those of capital. A 
co-operative is designed to ensure that production, finance and 
management are all controlled by the work-force through a directly 
elected workers' executive committee. ACPs, on the other hand, 
acknowledge that the interrelationships between plants in multi-plant 
companies are so complex that the struggle to prevent redundancies must 
take account of the companies' operations as a whole. Indeed, amongst 
the new co-operatives, two - SDN and Meriden - were individual plants 
owned and controlled by multi-plant companies - Beaverbrook's and NVT 
respectively. As co-operatives, the first failed, opposed by plants 
in Manchester fearing their own job losses, whilst the second succeeded 
- but at the expense of the two other plants at Small Heath and 
Wolverhampton, both of which closed. In neither case, then, had the 
unions involved formed a company level structure - that is, a joint 
shop stewards' combine committee - to consider redundancies at company 
level. Instead, there was a mismatch of levels, with the unions 
involved fighting at plant level, which was in fact quite inappropriate. 
Co-operative organization is, therefore, best suited to single 
plant enterprises; it is not surprising that the •second wave' of 
co-ops in the 1970s, aided by the CDA, ICOM and other agencies, have 
been small enterprises based on one unit of production, organized and 
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financed from the start as co-ops. 
The ACP of the LACSSC is an organizational breakthrough in union 
negotiating strategy in a multi-plant multi-national company. It both 
consolidates and extends the principles of collective bargaining, on 
which industrial democracy in Britain has traditionally been founded. 80 
Both co-ops and ACPs demonstrate how managerial prerogative -
based on discretionary control through the property rights of share-
holders - can be challenged. In co-ops management is reduced to a 
technical function directly accountable to the work-force, and therefore 
shorn of the need to legitimise itself through property rights. ACPs 
leave traditional management structures intact, but advance the 'frontier 
of control' into planning decisions and forward thinking. An ACP pre-
supposes that a union will take positive action - and not simply react 
in a negative fashion to events outside its control, such as the sudden 
announcement of closures and redundancies. An ACP rejects management's 
definition of what may or may not be negotiable, though some authors 
have correctly noted that co-ordination is required to prevent individual 
attempts at workers' control from being 'picked off': 
"The necessity to encourage workers to make their own Plans, 
which would then need to be co-ordinated to fit with national 
resources and needs, would face any workers' government. No 
changes of ownership, putting enterprises or industries into 
state hands, will meet the case unless accompanied or preceded 
by the development of Workers' Plans and this different relation-
ship with workers. State ownership with capitalist philosophy 
can have more weapons to use against workers even than a private 
monopoly has. A state-owned boss is not socialist as long as 
it is a bosses' state. (And a workers' state is a mockery 
unless the workers are also the planners). 11 81 
This is the theme we return to in our general conclusions. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N S 
"There are limits to what we can conceive of, or 
make intelligible to ourselves, as a possible 
general structure of experience. The investigation 
of these limits, the investigation of the set of 
ideas which forms the limiting framework of all our 
thought about the world and experience of the world, 
is, evidently, an important and interesting 
philosophical midertaking ••••" 
P. F. Strawson, The Bomids of Sense: an Ess on 
Kant's Critigue of Pure Reason' London: Methuen, 
1973), p.15. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSIONS 
The argument of this thesis has reflected the massive paradox 
which lies at the heart of industrial relations theory: in the absence 
of any widespread revolutionary movement amongst the working classes in 
late 20th century Britain, pluralism remains - in any practical sense 
the only realistically progressive approach to industrial relations 
problems even though its assumptions about power in industry are funda-
mentally wrong. 
In contrast to unitarism, pluralism seems to promise both a plausible 
descriptive account of how industrial relations are conducted as well as 
a set of reasonable prescriptive conclusions on how they ought to be 
conducted. Indeed, the unreasonableness of unitarism highlights the 
reasonableness of pluralism which, in consequence, has maintained its 
hold amongst many influential writers on industrial relations, some of 
whom have tried to improve its capacity to resolve problems by refining 
the principles on which it stands. 
Yet pluralism rests on a fundamental misunderstanding about the 
nature of power in industry when it assumes that both sides enjoy equal 
resources of it. Such a view focuses on the observable aspects of 
power - institutional arrangements for taking decisions - and ignores 
the fact that these arrangements themselves reflect an industrial 
structure institutionalising disparities of power - in its non-observable 
aspects - which favour management interests: this structure embraces 
the division of labour, hierarchical reward systems, a legal framework 
which protects private property, the pursuit of efficiency, rationalis-
ation and growth - none of which are, as principles, normally open to 
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discussion or negotiation. An alternative reading of Durkheim - on 
whose work pluralism draws heavily - reveals that he was, in fact, 
concerned about the impact of these structural factors on social 
cohesion and recognised that without equality of power resources in 
all its aspects - consensus stood little chance of evolving. In its 
more sophisticated forms, associated in particular with Alan Fox, 
pluralism acknowledges the significance of these questions yet not even 
Fox is able to off er a convincing account of how these structural 
inequalities may be overcome. Despite their central role in protect-
ing the vital interests of an economy based on the free market, Fox in 
the end relies on exhortation, education and the 'good sense' of 
management as the means to illustrate the necessity of change in avoid-
ing social disintegration. But without an account of what might lead 
managements to draw such conclusions, his theory is like a train without 
an engine. 
Other writers du.ring the 1970s have drawn attention to the emergence 
of 'corporatism' or at least a 'corporate bias' in British political and 
industrial life du.ring the 20th century. What is meant, in broad terms, 
is that governments have induced institutions representing employers and 
unions - most recently, the CIBI and the TUC - to form with them a 
triangular relationship within which problems can be discussed and 
solutions jointly pursued. Even if such a tendency exists - and it 
remains a highly controversial point - it has had little effect on 
industrial behaviour, and the issue of reducing industrial conflict is 
still a critical one for many people. Even if the TUC were to become 
a State corporation it nevertheless faces two major problems: the first 
is that it has little or no hierarchical control of its affiliated unions 
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{with expulsion as a weapon of last resort); and the second is that 
it is unable to manufacture consensus with the memberships of its 
affiliates, who may well oppose TUC policy {such as over the Social 
Contract). The independence of the shop steward movement is always 
likely to curtail severely the significance of the TUC as a State 
corporation. 
Both pluralist and •corporatist• writers tend to consider shop-
floor workers as the 'problem' - as the unruly element which, once 
controlled, would allow British industry to increase production, compete 
more efficiently and lead the way to prosperity for all. Because they 
mis-diagnose the source of conflict at the observable rather than the non-
observable level, they tend to see conflict as 'bloody-mindedness' and 
persistently fail to realise that conflict is not random or arbitrary. 
It follows patterns, as a protest against tighter management controls, 
the effects of rationalised production processes, or simply boredom. 
Workers themselves will not, of course, define their own conflictual 
behaviour as a 'problem' but instead will rationalise it collectively 
by reference to a countervailing labourist - or "situational" - ideology 
which may be either well articulated or not. At an individual level -
for example, as expressed through absenteeism or turnover - conflictual 
behaviour may not be rationalised at all. 
It is the motive force of such labourist ideology which Marxists 
are inclined to over-estimate. In stressing the role of workers in 
initiating industrial change, they often ignore exactly what the 
pluralists emphasise too much - the "abstract" ideology to be found in 
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workers' thinking, that is, the hegemonic or consensual aspects of 
everyday images of society. Workers usually not only accept, but 
actively defend, a view of social reality which envelops a national. 
unity, equality of opportunity and democratic consensus - even though 
their experiences are frequently at variance with such beliefs. On 
the one hand, then, pluralists and corporatists focus on the "abstract", 
consensual ideology, and seek to. draw it down to the shop-floor while 
ignoring there the sources of conflict; and on the other hand, 
conventional Marxists focus on the "situational", conflictual rationales 
and seek to draw them up to the political level while ignoring there 
the deeply-rooted nature of hegemonic consensus. Both theories are 
therefore flawed as each concentrates on only one aspect of workers' 
attitudes and behaviour. 
The implementation of industrial democracy during this period -
1945 to 1980 - is best seen as an attempt to consolidate or advance 
the 'frontier of control' between management and work-force. It is 
not surprising, from our previous discussion, that managements have 
attempted to introduce industrial democracy from the shop-floor, through 
joint consultation, job restructuring or participation committees, while 
i.mions have tended to concentrate on higher levels, in particular 
extending collective bargaining to decisions made at company level, and 
in some cases developing closer links with Labour governments in order 
to promote favourable legislation. Industrial democracy may be analysed 
in a 'three-dimensional' approach: 
(1) level, at which the 'frontier of control' is located 
(such as plant, company or industry); 
(2) ~, or subjects covered (which may range from towels 
and toilets to planning agreements); and 
(3) degree of influence, or method of influence, used to 
advance policy (along a spectrum from unilateral 
management control, consultation, negotiation, to 
workers' control). 
From the management angle, industrial democracy is designed 
specifically to incorporate workers• shop-floor behaviour. This has 
always been its aim, although the methods used to implement it may 
change over time: joint consultation connnittees are meant to facilitate 
technical changes in :production; job-restructuring is meant to remove 
the worst excesses of the shop-floor environment, such as excessive 
sub-division of labour; and participation committees are meant to win 
the confidence of shop stewards on a range of issues relating to the 
shop-floor. Management usually attempts to restrict the level of 
industrial democracy to the shop-floor over a fairly narrow range of 
areas - and to concede consultation at most, :preferably avoiding union 
representation if at all :possible. 
However, industrial democracy - from the managerial viewpoint -
suffers from two major drawbacks. One is that it also serves as a 
rallying cry for labour in extending its own influence at the margins 
of 'observable' :power. The term, therefore, is inevitably conce:ptual.ly 
ambiguous and its meaning depends on the conditions under which it is 
used; the possibilities for misunderstanding are immense. The other, 
more serious, drawback is that industrial democracy, like all :pluralist-
type policies, fails to come to grips with the real origins of conflict 
in their non-observable aspects. A participation scheme, for example, 
may well delay the outbreak of conflict during the introduction of 
new technical processes, but only until workers feel that conditions 
are so altered that protest is called for: absenteeism persists despite 
job rotation in car plants; industrial action continues despite worker 
directors in the steel industry; and shop stewards withdraw from 
participation committees when th.eY feel that they are being manipulated 
over plant rationalisations. It is, therefore, too simple to conclude, 
as some commentators have done, that: 
" ••• most schemes for industrial democracy will involve an 
absorption of workers' representatives into capitalist forms 
of control, not a transcending of these: they will bring 
about the more effective integration of workers into existing 
economic and social relations rather than produce any basic 
alteration in the capitalist system. 111 
At the observable level of power, workers' representatives may 
become absorbed if the necessary safeguards - such as regular report-
back to the stewards' committee - are not adopted, though this is to 
overlook the dynamic of the non-observable level. Workers' "situational" 
or labourist ideology - sustained by continual experience of work-place 
conflict - will never permit a genuine absorption of the shop..floor 
itself into the structure of industry as it exists now in nee-capitalist 
societies (compare the circumstances, for example, under which the shop 
stewards' movement was originally born during the First World War). In 
addition, avoidance of schemes for industrial democracy at plant level -
that is, the defence of independence for the sake of independence - will 
not, by itself, lead to a transcending of capitalist forms of control 
in any case. At most it may preserve a limited factory consciousness. 
A more practical suggestion for shop..floor representatives would be to 
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take advantage of all such schemes - management initiated or not -
just as long as they can be used to defend constituents' interests, 
and to withdraw as soon as this becomes impossible; the effect would 
be to treat schemes like any other collective bargaining situation. 
A common question at the time of the Bullock Report, for instance, 
was whether the proposals would lead tb a genuine increase in workers' 
power or not. Our analysis here permits an answer: labour would 
have gained genuine observable power (which employers feared) because 
it would have been party to board-level decisions, unless companies 
had taken evasive action. Yet the moment that labour had accepted 
the rationality of management decisions in - for instance - closing 
plants or rationalising production, it would, at that level, have 
become incorporated into the non-observable aspect of power. Labour's 
influence, once diverted towards explaining such decisions to the shop-
floor, would have become a sham. However, neither decision - to 
participate or ~ot to participate at board-level - would in itself 
have led to the transcending of capitalism. This would have required 
not only a strengthening of the Bullock proposals but also, at least, 
steps to develop workers' planning at industry and State levels. 
Furthermore, once pluralist solutions are considered exhausted, 
only the unitarist ones - because of "abstract" ideology - appear to 
remain. It then becomes possible to appeal over the heads 0f the 
unions to work-forces directly in the name of 'national tmity' and 
perhaps develop purely cosmetic forms of industrial democracy as well 
as, more certainly, impose direct control methods in industry through 
legislating to weaken organized labour - and thereby reduce or remove 
llllions' 'observable' power which is commonly perceived as an impediment 
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to production, competition and 'national recovery'. 
The analysis of industrial relations rendered so far may have 
given the impression of an uneasy stalemate between government, 
employers and unions. Such an impression, however, would not be 
strictly accurate. Since May 1979 Thatcherism has demonstrated one 
wa;y out by relying on unitarism, direct control and free market 
economics to break what power the unions have. The costs have included 
soaring unemployment, de-industrialisation and social disruption on a 
scale unprecedented since the war. 
There is, however, another possible way out which is based on 
developing the radical aspects of labourist ideology whenever possible 
within the context of democratic industrial planning. One example we 
have examined involved the attempts of union trustees on pension fund 
boards to question the role of investment policy as a means of social-
ising the economy, though as yet with little active support from their 
memberships. However, on occasions, workers do break through with 
their own "abstract" ideology which manages to articulate in a coherent 
fashion their conflictual work experience. Such examples include the 
UCS work-in, sit-ins, the use of the social audit and the development 
of co-operatives and alternative corporate plans (ACPs). The case of 
UCS in particular illustrates how an embryonic 'socialist hegemony' may 
emerge when a number of factors coalesce: a radical cultural tradition; 
the prospect of mass redundancies; an unpopular and reactionary govern-
ment to blame; a strong and politically conscious leadership; support 
from the Labour movement at all levels, in particular the national level; 
and, above all, popular support from all sectors of the population, 
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united in a sense of outrage. 
It may be possible to build on such a movement. For example, 
it has since been established that workers have a right to occupy their 
work-place when involved in a trades dispute, such as a closure (under 
Sections 13(2) and 30 of TULRA) - a decision which clearly strengthens 
workers' rights in a struggle against the so-called logic of closures 
and redundancies. 2 In addition, the Labour movement may over time 
come to recognise the value of democratic control of investment funds, 
the role of co-operatives and the function of ACPs as alternative 
methods of socialising industry. ACPs in particular have, up till 
now, tended to elicit attacks from unions wary of being usurped by 
shop steward combine coIIllilittees even though they remain an original 
response to the problems posed by multi-plant, multi-product, multi-
national companies which increasingly dominate both the economy and 
industrial relations. 
Yet over and above all these chances for progress there threatens 
a series of structural obstacles: 
the unresolved problem of how to combine workers' control at 
plant-level with genuinely democratic planning at industry and State 
levels; 
the ability of private interests to provoke a backlash against 
a government clearly intent on socialising the economy; and, most 
intransigent perhaps of all, 
the power of international capital to pressurise, harass and 
destroy domestic socialism. 
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Examination of these issues necessarily lies outside the remit 
of this thesis, yet the development - however opportunistically -
of a 'socialist hegemony' must be the central aim if we are ever to 
cast off "the mind-forged manacles 113 which will otherwise continue 
to restrict and oppress. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
The problems of preparing and writing a thesis are wonderfully 
summed up by Alexander Pope in his poem "A Little Learning", part 
of which declaims: 
"Fired at first sight with what the Muse imparts, 
In fearless youth we tempt the heights of Arts; 
While from the bounde.d level of our mind 
Short views we take, nor see the lengths behind, 
But, more advanced, behold with strange surprise 
New distant scenes of endless science rise!" 
And the poet concludes, rather disconsolately: 
"The increasing prospect tires our wandering eyes, 
Hills peep o'er hills, and Alps on Alps arise!" 
Quite so. The story of this thesis - and hence its method -
is the story of an expedition into the Alps, and then back through 
the foothills, eventually down to their lower reaches - though not, 
I hope, as far as the mere bumps and hummocks on the plain. 
The thesis began as an ambitious attempt to examine the relation-
ship between Wittgenstein's concept of language games and the 
sociology of knowledge. It then retreated - for reasons of practical 
application - to an attempt to examine the role of meaning structures 
in industry; that is, how the different connotations of industrial 
terms and expressions might affect the relationships of management, 
unions and workers on the shop-floor. However, the sheer unlikelihood 
of access to all three such groups led to a subsequent refinement: the 
study of one such term - 'industrial democracy' (then in vogue) - and 
how its meaning might change in the eyes of shop stewards as a 
particular scheme was implemented. Yet even this project still suffered 
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from one major drawback - it required a real shop-floor and real shop 
stewards to study! 
So I then visited four companies in Central and Eastern Scotland, 
all of which operated schemes for industrial democracy in one form 
or another. However, none of them was willing to grant me sustained 
access, usually for good reasons (for instance, two were already the 
subject of research projects considerably more prestigious than my 
own). I also failed in a subsequent attempt to study the establish-
ment of Fife Enterprises, a holding company designed in 1977 by Fife 
Regional Council to promote co-operatives in the area. 
After well over a year, the Alps were still too close for comfort, 
but fortunately I had two decisive discussions. The first was with 
Professor Tom Burns, who advised me to avoid an empirical study 
altogether in favour of the more rewarding task of attempting a 
theoretical overview of all the other empirical studies of industrial 
democracy. The second was with my friend and colleague, John Rodger, 
who suggested that I might try the angle of incorporation, and directed 
my reading towards Gramsci. From then on, regular discussions with 
fellow students - in particular John Holford and John Rodger - were 
the main 'sounding-board' of my developing ideas on the role of 
industrial democracy in British industrial relations. There is no 
doubt that had I not written a theoretical thesis I would not have 
written any thesis at all. 
This thesis, then, in its final fonn, is based on a mix of the 
following methods: 
Library research and literature surveys. 
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- Visits and interviews at A. H. Mcintosh (Kirkcaldy) which 
operates 'open' management and joint consultation; Scottish and 
Newcastle Breweries (Edinburgh) which has introduced job restruct-
uring; Tanney (Coatbridge), also with job restructuring on a major 
scale; and Wilkie and Paul (Edinburgh) which runs a joint 
consultative committee. (An attempt to visit KME, the co-operative 
in Kirkby, fell through after ~scussions.) 
Extended visits to the TUC and Labour Party libraries in 
London in order to gain access to more specialised, historical material 
on industrial democracy. 
A postal survey (March 1977) of around 80 employers' associa-
tions, trade unions, professional institutions and large private 
companies on their attitudes towards the Bullock Committee and Reports. 
- Personal interviews with Tom Burns, Tony Eccles, Alan Fox, 
J. F. B. Goodman and Ray Loveridge on aspects of my work, in addition 
to correspondence. 
A case study of an occupational pension fund which I carried 
out and wrote up during almost two years (1978-1980) at Ruskin College, 
Oxford, as a Research Officer on an SSRC financed project investigating 
the use which trade unions make of company information. For the 
purposes of this thesis I abridged and re-interpreted the original 
case study. 
- A return to library research and in-depth scanning of the 
literature in the light of the emerging focus of the thesis. 
This research has not involved exact hypothesis testing. The 
returns from the postal survey represented very small samples of the 
total populations and were not statistically representative: 
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TABLE FIVE 
Type Number Number Percentage 
surveyed replying replying 
fil:nployers' 
organizations 24 17 70.s 
Trade unions 27 15 55.6 
Professional 
institutions 13 10 76.9 
Private 
companies 2 2 100.0 
Nationalized 
concerns 8 5 62.5 
Total 82 56 6s.3 
All the same, this survey met its main objective, which was to 
gain an overall impression of organized opinion about Bullock, the 
most important initiative taken on industrial democracy in Britain 
during the 1970s. 
These sources, then, taken together were used to build up a 
theoretical approach to industrial democracy as the 'frontier of 
control' between management and labour at different levels of industry; 
and to analyse the significance of industrial democracy as just one 
set of relationships between management and labour (another being, for 
example, direct control) as well as the circumstances under which each 
of its various forms was most likely to evolve. 
An extended consideration of the European experience of industrial 
democracy was abandoned for reasons of time and space. However, there 
is nothing in this experience which - in my understanding - would 
radically alter the conclusions arrived at for Britain. 
Notes and References 
All emphases are in original quotations unless indicated 
by the words •emphasis added'. 
Abbreviations are listed on pp.(i)-(iii) of the thesis. 
Notes and References: Introduction (pp.(viii)-(xiii)) 
1. Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Socie 
of the British System since 1911 London: Andre 
p.461. 
2. Carter L. Goodrich, The Frontier of Control: a Stud in British 
Workshop Politics (1920: rpt. London: Pluto Press, 1975 • 
3. Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Develo ment of 
Economic Theory London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971 , p.22. 
4. William Morris, "How We Live and How We Might Live", in 
William Morris, ed. G. D. H. Cole (1934; rpt. New York: 




Notes and References: Chapter One (pp.1-23) 
For a definition of the Industrial Revolutiont see D. s. Landes, 
The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), Ch. 2, esp. p.41. 
For an evaluation of the debate surrounding these issues see 
E. P. Thompson, The Makin of the En lish Workin Class 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981 , Ch. , esp. pp.22 -232. 
3. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1968), pp.82-83. 
4. Ibid., p.105. 
George Daltont Economic Systems and Society (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1968), p.41. 
6. G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London: Longmans, 1945), 
p.546. 
7. Ben Hooberman, An Introduction to British Trade Unions 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), Ch. 1; Henry Felling, A History 
of British Trade Unionism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), Parts 
1 and 2; Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism 
(London: Chiswick Press, 1898). 
8. Karl Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit", in Karl Marx and Frederick 
En els: Selected Works in One Volume (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1970 , p.209. 
9. Robin Blackburn, "The Unequal Society", in The Incompatibles: 
Trade Union Militano and the Consensus, ed. Robin Blackburn and 
Alexander Cockburn Harmondsworth: Penguin Special, 1967), p.39. 
10. J. E. T. Eldridge, "Industrial Relations and Industrial Capitalism", 
in People and Work, ed. G. Esland, G. Sala.man and M. Speakman 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1975), p.309. 




Pluto Press, 1975). 
E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism", 
Past and Present, No. 38 (Dec. 1967), pp.56-97. 
Harry Braverman, Labor and Mono~oly Capital (New York and London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 5. 
Ibid., p.68. 
15. John Child, British Management Thought (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1969), p.13. 
16. Ibid., p.23. 
325. 
17. For example, in response to the question "What is management?" 
one text-book replies: "Putting it into very broad, general 
terms, 'management• is concerned with seeing that the job gets 
done: its tasks all centre on planning and guiding the 
operations that are going on in the enterprise". E. F. L. Brech, 
ed., The Principles and Practice of Management (London: Longm.ans, 
1955), p.a. 
18. P. F. Drucker, Man ment: Tasks onsibilities Practices 
(London: Heine_m_ann ___ ,.._1_9_7_4..__,-p-.-....~---.-.-.......,;;~-.....-.-...;.;;;.~"--..-.-..;..--.....~ 
19. Giles Radice, ed., Working Power, Fabian Tract 431 (London: 
Fabian Society, 1974), p.5 •. 
20. Ibid., p.6. 
21. For an introduction to individual management thinkers, see 
H. R. Pollard, Developments in Management Thought (London: 
Heinemann, 1974). 
22. Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations, Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations Research 
Paper 3 (London: HMSO, 1966). 
23. Ibid., para. 9, p.3. 
24. Conservative Manifesto 1 (London: Conservative Central Office, 
April 1979 , p.9. 








Conservative Manifesto, p.9. 
Andrew Sykes, The Crisis in Labour Relation~ Salisbury Papers 5 
(London: The Salisbury Group, 1979), n.p. .rf]. 
Alan Fox, Be ond Contract: Work Power and Trust Relationshi s 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1974 , p.251. 
A Group of Conservative Trade Unionists, Participation - A New 
Way Ahead, forword (~ic) by the Rt. Hon. James Prior, MP (London: 
CTU, n.d. /J978V'J, p.6. 
Fox, Beyond Contract, p.251. 
Conservative Trade Unionists, p.5. 
The One Nation Group of MPs, One Nation at Work (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, May 1976), p.7. 
See, for instance, the Bullock Report, Minority Report, paras. 
23-7, pp.175-6. 
326. 
34. Stephen Abbott, How to Bring Democracy and Participation to the 
Trade Unions (London: Aims for Freedom and Enterprise, February 
1976), p.4. 
35. For a discussion of "the mainsprings of conflict" in industrial 
relations, see Richard Hyman, Strikes (London: Fontana, 1974), 
Ch. 4, esp. pp.83-94. 
36. Sir Frederic Hooper, Management Survey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1960), p.117. 
37. Ibid., p.119. 
38. Ibid., p.119. 












Branko Pribi6evid, The Sho Stewards' Movement and Workers' 
--------------------------------------Control, 1910-1922 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959 , Ch. 2. 
Fox, Industrial Sociology, para. 28, p.7. 
Chris Argyris, "The Organization: What Makes it Healthy?", 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 36, No. 6 (1958), pp.107-116. 
Donovan Report, para. 59, p.15. 
Fox, Industrial Sociology, para. 13, p.4. 
Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1975), Ch. 1, esp. pp.15-16. 
See, for example, Norman Macrae, "The People We Have Become: A 
Survey of What's Gone Right and Wrong with Britain", The Economist, 
28 April-4 May 1973, 36 page insert between pp.60-1. 
Department of Employment, The Reform of Collective Bar ainin at 
Plant and Company Level, Manpower Papers No. 5 London: HMSO, 
1971)' p.1. 
Alan Fox, "Industrial Relations: a Social Critique of Pluralist 
Ideology", in Man and Organization, ed. John Child (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1973), pp.203-5. 
Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society 
(London: RKP, 1976), p.180. 
Ibid., p.186. 
Roy Lewis, "The Historical Development of Labour Law", in~' 
Vol. 14 (1976), pp.1-17. 
E. H. Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial Relations 













J. F. B. Goodman and T. G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards (London: 
Pan Books, 1973), pp.199-200. 
Ford, p.254. 
Elton Mayo, Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New 
York: Macmillan, 1933); Social Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization (Boston: Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, 1946); Political Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization (Boston: Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, 1947); F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. 
Dickson, Management and the Worker (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1964). 
Child, British Management Thougtit, pp.168-175. 
Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1971). 
Tom Lupton and Sheila Cunnison, "Workshop Behaviour" in Closed 
S stems and en Minds, ed. Max Glucklnan (London: Oliver and 
Boyd, 19 4 , pp.103-128. 
Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1964); John Goldthorpe, "Technical Organization 
as a Factor in Supervisor-Worker Conflict", in BJS, Vol. 10 (1959), 
pp.213-230; E. L. Trist and K. w. Bamforth, "Technicism: Some 
Effects of Material Technology on Managerial Methods and on Work 
Situation and Relationships", in Industrial Man, ed. Tom Burns 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp.331-358; Joan Woodward, 
Management and Technolog.y, Department of Industry: Problems of 
Progress in Industry Series, No. 3 (London: HMSO, 1958). 
Ad 'ustment of Workers to Technical Chan at Plant Level, Report 
of Int. Conf. 15-18 Nov. 1966 Paris: OECD, Manpower and Social 
Affairs Directorate, 1967), p.28. 
David Silverman, "Formal Organizations or Industrial Sociology: 
towards a Social Action .Analysis of Organizations", Sociology, 
Vol. 2 (1968), pp.221-238. 
Tom Lupton, "Industrial Conflict':', New Society, 14 November 1963, 
pp.11-13. 
Child, British Management Thought, p.205. 
Ibid., Ch. 8. 
Mildred Wheatcroft, The Revolution in British Management Education 
(London: Pitman, 1970), p.13. 
v. L. Allen, Militant Trade Unionism (London: Merlin Press, 1972), 
p.98. 
328. 
67. Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 
1977), pp.52-3. 
68. See, for example, Allan Flanders, Industrial Relations: What is 
Wrong with the Srstem? (London: Institute of Personnel 
Management, 1966 • 
Notes and References: Chapter Two (pp.24-59) 
1. For a full analysis of this neo-Durkheimian critique, see 
Bernard H. Casey, "Industrial Relations - Back to Durkheim?", 
unpublished paper, London School of Economics (Oct. 1976). 
329. 
2. J. H. Goldthorpe, "Industrial Relations in Great Britain: A 
Critique of Reformism", in Trade Unions Under Capitalism, ed. 
Tom Clarke and Laurie Clements (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), 
p.184. 
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1968), paras. 65-71, pp.31-34. 
Basil 
4. Goldthorpe, p.216, note 2. 
5. H. A. Clegg, ''Pluralism in Industrial Relations", ~' Vol. 13 
(1975), pp.309-316. 
6. Allan Flanders, Trade Unions (London: Hutchinson, 1972), pp.122-3. 
7. Allan Flanders, "Collective Bargaining: a Theoretical Analysis", 
in his Man ment and Unions: The Theo and Refo:rm of Industrial 
Relations London: Faber and Faber, 1975 , pp.213-240. 
8. Allan Flanders and Alan Fox, "Collective Bargaining: From Donovan 
to Durkheim", in Flanders' Management and Unions, pp.241-276. 
9. H. A. Clegg, Introd., Ma.na,gement and Unions, p.7. 
10. Allan Flanders, "Collective Bargaining: Prescription for Chanage", 
in his Mana,gement and Unions, pp.155-211. 
11. George Bain, "Allan Flanders: Socialist Extraordinary - Industrial 
Relations", Socialist Commentary (Dec. 1973), p.7. 
12. Flanders, "Collective Bargaining: a Theoretical .Analysis", p.215. 
13. Ibid., p.216. 
14. Ibid., pp.218-9. 
15. Ibid., p.219. 
16. Ibid., p.221. 
17. Ibid., p.225. 
18. Neil w. Chamberlain 
York: McGraw-Hill, 
and James w. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining (New 
1965), Ch. 5, esp. p.113. 
19. Flanders, "Collective Bargaining: a Theoretical .Analysis", p.232. 
330. 
20. Ibid., p.236. 
21. Ibid., p.238. 
22. Allan Flanders, "Industrial Relations: What is Wrong with the 
System?" in his Management and Unions, pp.94-99. 
23. Donovan Report, para. 143, p.36. 
24. Ibid., para. 150, p.36. 
25. Flanders and Fox, p.247. 
26. Ibid., p.249. 
27. Ibid., p.251. 
28. Ibid., p.255. 
29. filnile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Sooiet:v, trans. George 
Simpson (1933; rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp.2-3; 
quoted by Flanders and Fox, pp.258-9. 
30. Flanders and Fox, p.265. 











Steven Lukes, "Alienation and .Anomie", in Philosophy, Politics and 
Socie , Third Series, ed. Peter Laslett and w. G. Runciman 




.Anthony Giddens, Ca italism and Modern Social Theo : an Anal sis 
of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber Cambridge: CUP, 
1974), p.77. 
John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (Southern Illinois: 
University Press, 1958), p.383; p.18. 
For a critique of such selective reading of Durkheim, see 
Alessandro Pizzorno, "Lecture Actuelle de Durkheim", Archives 





42. Ibid., p.378. 
43. Ibid., p.379. 
44. Ibid., pp.380-1. (Emphasis added) 
45. Ibid., p.381. 
46. Emile Durheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, trans. 
Cornelia Brookfield (London: RKP, 1957), pp.213-4; quoted 
by Casey, p.10d. 
47. Durkheim, The Division of Labour, p.353. 
331. 
48. Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations, Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and Employers• Associations, Research Paper 3 
(London: HMSO, 1966). 
49. w. E. J. McCarthy, The Role of Shop Stewards in British Industrial 
Relations, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations Researoh Paper 1 (London: HMSO, 1966). 
50. Arthur Marsh and w. E. J. McCarthy, Disputes Procedures in British 
Industry, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 
Research Paper 2, Parts 1 and 2 (London: HMSO, 1966). 
51. George Bain, Trade Union Growth and Recogn.ition, Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and E:nployers'Associations Research Paper 6 (London: 
HMSO, 1966). 
52. Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement (London: Hutchinson, 1974), Preface, 
n.p. 
53~ Ibid., Preface, n.p. 
54. Ibid., pp.3-4. 
55. Fox, Beyond Contract (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p.14. 
56. Ibid., p.64. 
57. Ibid., pp.68-9. 
58. Ibid., p.365. 
59. Fox, "Industrial Relations: a Social Critique", p.217. 
60. Ibid., p.222. 
61. Ibid., pp.219-220. 
62. J. Playford., "The Myth of Pluralism" in Decisions, Organizations 
and Socie ed. F. G. Castles et al. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
197 , pp.381-2. 
332. 
63. Ibid., p.388. 
64. Ibid., p.385. 
65. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet 
Books, 1973), pp.73-4. 
66. Alan Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry (London: Collier-
Macmilla.n, 1971), p.139. 
67. Fox, Man Mismanagement, pp.139-40. 
68. Ibid., p.140. 
69. Personal interview with J. F. B. Goodman, 15 August 1978. 
70. Fox, Beyond Contract, p.366. 
71. Fox, Man Mismanagement, p.176. 
72. ·Stephen Wood and Ruth Elliott, "A Critical Evaluation of Fox's 
Radicalization of Industrial Relations Theory", Sooiolog,y, Vol. 11 
(Jan. 1977), pp.105-125. 
73. Fox, Beyond Contract, p.366. 
333. 
Notes and References: Chapter Three (pp.60-92) 
1. Fox, Beyond Contract (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p.366. 
2. Bertrand Russell, "The Ancestry of Fascism", in In Praise of Idle-
~ (1935; rpt. London: Unwin Books, 1973), p.56; see also 
Josd Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (1930; trans. 1932; 
London: Unwin Books, 1969), pp.56-7. 
3. Fox, Beyond Contract, p.286. 
4. Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies 
(London: Hutchinson, 1974), p.121. 
5. Ibid., p.121. 
6. Ibid., p.122. 
7. Ibid., p.121. 
8. Ibid., p.122. 









In particular, R. A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democrac and Power in an 
American City (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 19 1 • 
In particular, N. w. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963). 
Lukes, p.15. 
Peter Baohraoh and Morton s. Baratz, Power and Poverty~ Theory and 
Practice (New York: OUP, 1970), Ch. 1. 
E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Soverei Peo le: A Realist's View 





Dorothy Tuunet, "The Concept of Power", Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, New Series, Vol. 54 (1953/4), p.26. 
c. J. Friedrich, "Authority, Reason and Discretion" in NOMOS, Vol. I 
on Authority (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p.35. 
Peter Winch, "Authority", Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 32 (1958), 
p.228. 
334. 







Heinemann, 1974 , pp.37-40, 371-8; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and 
Class Conflict in Industrial Society (London: RKP, 1969), Ch. 2. 
James Burnham, The Manar.rial Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1945), Ch. VI, esp. p.6 • 
G. c. Archibald, "Static Alternatives to Profit Maximization", in 
The Theory of the Finn, ed. G. c. Archibald (Hannondsworth: 
Penguin, 1971), pp.249-251. 
Peter Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism 
Came to .America (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp.2-3; discussed by 
Richard Minns, Pension Funds and British Capitalism (London: 
Heinemann, 1980), pp.1-20. 
For a discussion of 




these issues see Stephen Hill, Competition 
(London: Heinemann, 1981), Chapters 9-10. 
29. The standard biography is Giuseppe Fiori, Antonio Gramsci, Life of 
a Revolutiona.ry, ~rans. Tom Nairn (London: New Left Books, 1970; 
New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971). 
James Joll, Gramsci, Modern Masters Series (Glasgow: 
Collins, 1977), p.7. 
Fontana/ 
31. See, for example, Phil Cozens, Twenty Years of Antonio Gramsci; a 
Biblio a of Gramsci and Gramsci Studies ublished in En lish 





For an examination of the development of Gramsci's thought, see 
Alastair Davidson, Antonio Gramsci: Towards an Intellectual 
Biography (London: Merlin Press, 1977; New Jersey: Humanities 
Press, 1977). 
Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci", in Gramsci and 
Marxist Theory, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: RKP, 1979), p.170. 
Victor Kiernan, "Gramsci and Marxism" in Socialist Register 1972, 
p.6. 
Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology", pp.168-2040 
GwYn A. Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia 1 in the Thought of 
Antonio Gramsci: some Notes on Interpretation", Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 21 (1960}, p.5870 
Roger Simon, "Gramsci 1 s Concept of Hegemony", Marxism Today:. (March 
1977), Po78. 
38. Stuart Hall, Bob Lumley and Gregor McLennan, "Politics and 
Ideology: Gramsci", in On Ideology, Centre for Contemporary 
Studies (London: Hutchinson, 1978 , p.49. 
335. 
39. Tom Nairn, "The British Economic Elite", New Left Review, No. 23 
(Jan.-Feb. 1964), p.19. 
40. John Merrington, "Theory and Practice in Gramsci's Marxism", in 
Socialist Register 1968, p.153. 
41. G. Nowell-Smith, "The Question of Hegemony", Radical Philosophy, 
No. 5 (Summer 1973), p.24. 
42. Williams, p.587. 
43. Lukes, p.57. 
44. Quentin Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, Introd., Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks of .Antonio Gramsci, ed./trans. Q. Hoare and 
G. Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p.lx. 
45. Ibid., p.lxiii. 
46. Perry .Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", New Left Review, 
No. 100 (Nov. 1976-Jan. 1977), p.42. 
47. Ibid., p.21. 
48. Ibid., pp.8-11; .Antonio Gramsci, "State and Civil Society", in 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp.234-5. 
49. .Anderson, p.22. 
50. Ibid., p.32. 
51. Ibid., p.30. 
52. Ibid., p.25. 
53. See, for example, Bertoldt Brecht, "Szene 10: Der Spitzel", Furcht 
und Elend des Dritten Reiches (Frankfurt-am-Ma.in: Rowohlt Verlag, 
1965), pp.83-96. 
54 • .Anderson, p.13. 
55. J. E. T. Eldridge, Sociology and Industrial Life, (London: Nelson, 
1973), p.200. 
56. Ibid., p.201. 
57. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: RKP, 1964), p.3; 
quoted by Eldridge, p.202. 
58. Herbert Marcuse, Counter-revolution and Revolt {London: 
the Penguin Press, 1972), p.28. 
Allen Lane, 
336. 
59. .Antonio Gramsci, "Il Materialismo Storico e la Filosofia di 
Benedetto Croce", in Collected Works, Vol. II (1948), pp.5-6; 
quoted by Joseph Femia, "Hegemony and Consciousness in the 
Thought of .Antonio Gramsci", Political Studies, Vol. 23 (1975), 
p.33. 
60. Femia, p.33. 
61. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" 
in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp.206-261. 
62. J. Cousins, "The Non-Militant Shop Steward", New Society, 3 Feb. 
1972, pp.226-s. 
64. Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (st. Albans: 
Paladin, 1.975), p.95. 
65. Ibid., p.95. 
66. Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action amon the Western Workin 
Class (London: Macmillan, 1973 , pp.12-13. 
67. However, for a discussion of the origins of mechanistic materialism 
in some schools of Marxism, see Shlomo Avineri, The Social and 
Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: CUP, 1971), Ch. 3, esp. 
pp.66-67. 
68. Michael Mann, 0 The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy", !.§.g, 
Vol. 35 (1970), p.437. (Emphasis added) 
1. 
2. 
Notes and References: Chapter Four (pp.93-120) 
Ken Coates, "ls Socialism Possible?", in Ess~s on Industrial 
Democracy (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1971 , p.53. 
Ibid., p.53. 
337. 
John H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Industrial 
Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge Studies in Sociology 1 (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1968); John H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: 
Political Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge Studies in Sociology 
2 (Cambridge: CUP, 1968); John H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent 
Worker in the Class Structure, Cambridge Studies in Sociology 3 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1969). 
W. G. Runciman, Relative De rivation and Social Justice 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972 , pp.31-2. 
5. Stephen Mennell, Sociological Theory: Uses and Utilities (London: 
Nelson, 1974), p.128. 
6. J. E. T. Eldridge, "Industrial Relations and Industrial Capitalism", 
in People and Work, ed. G. Ealand, G. Salaman and M. Speakman (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1975), p.316. 
1. Norman St. John-Stevas, "The Disappearing Consensus", in Wh.y is 
Britain becoming harder to govern?, ed. Anthony King (London: BBC, 
1976), p.59. 
s. Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy'', ASR, Vol. 
35 (1970), pp.423-4. ---
9. There is also a problem sometimes in distinguishing between beliefs 
and values; see Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research 
(London: Duckworth, 1970), Chapters 3-4. 
10. Mann, p.432. 
11. Alan Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry (London: Collier-Macmillan, 
1971), pp.8-10. 
12. See, for example, c. B. Macpherson's outline of 'equilibrium democracy' 
in his The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 1977), 
Ch. 4. 
T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class", in Sociology at the 
Crossroads and other Essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), p.74. 
Ibid., p.73. 
15. Ibid., p.90. (Emphasis added) 
16. Ibid., p.122. 
338. 
17. R. Bend.ix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York and London; 
Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp.101-2. 
18. Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism (London: Merlin Press, 
1973), esp. p.13. 
19. Part of Clause IV(4) of the Labour Party Constitution, as printed 
on membership cards. 
20. Frank Field, Une ual Britain: A Re ort on the Cycle of Inequality 
(London: A:rrow Books, 1974 ; Peter Wedge and Hilary rosser, 
Born to Fail? (London: Arrow Books, 1973). 
21. Michael Barratt Brown, "The.Welfare State in Britain", in Socialist 
Register 1971, pp.197-205. 
22. For a discussion of this view see Peter Leonard, "Restructuring 
the Welfare State", Marxism Today (Dec. 1979), pp.7-13; Colin 
Duncan, Low Pa; - its Causes and the Post-war Trade Union Res onse 
(Letchworth: Research Studies Press, 1981 , pp.71-2. 
23. J. Cunningham, "The Cuts you heal with a Wallet", Guardian, 9 Feb. 
1981, p.13. 
24. Dorothy Wedderburn, "Facts and Theories of the Welfare State", 
Socialist Register 1965, pp.127-146; Frances F. Piven and 
Richard A. Cloward, Re atin the Poor: the Functions of Public 
Welfare (London: Tavistock, 1972 , esp. p.xiii. 
25. Quoted by Peter Brannen et al., The Worker Directors: a Sociology 
of Participation (London: Hutchinson, 1976), p.3. 
26. Eric A. Nordlinger, The Workin Class Tories: Authori Deference 
and Stable Democracy London: Macgibbon and Kee, 19 7 , p.13. 
For an analysis of the appeal of •authoritarian populism' since 
the mid 1970s, see Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show", 
Marxism Today (Jan. 1979), pp.14-20. 
27. H. F. Moorhouse, "The Political Incorporation of the British Working 
Class: an Interpretation", Sociology, Vol. 7 (1973), pp.341-359. 
28. Engels made such an analysis; see Richard Hyman, Marxism and the 
Sociology of Trade Unionism (London: Pluto Press, 1973), pp.8-11. 
29. Moorhouse, p.353. 
30. Ibid., p.353. 
31. Ibid., pp.344-353. 
32. Ibid.' p.354. 
33. Steven Lukes~ "Political 
Vol. 9 (1975 , p.301. 









"Conditions (today), of course, are different from the Thirties. 
Welfare State benefits stop those who have lost their jobs from 
sinking into real penury". From "A Disnnited Kingdom", Editorial, 
The Observer, 4 Jan. 1981, p.10. 
J. T. Winkler, "Corporatism", European Journal of Sociolog:Y, 
Vol. 17 (1976J, p.103. 
Ibid., p.100. 
For a discussion of the structural reasons behind this trend, see 
Michael Barratt Brown, "The Limits of the Welfare State", in 
Can the Workers run Industry?, ed. Ken Coates (London: Sphere 
Books, 1968), pp.19-35. 
40. The Social Contract 1976-77 (London: TUC, n.d. /J91TJ). 
41. Such a process does take place in Sweden, for example. See 
G. K. Ingham, Strikes and Industrial Conflict - Britain and 
Scandinavia (London: Macmillan, 1974), Chapters 4 and 5. 
42. David Marsh and Wyn Grant, "Tripartism: Reality or Myth", 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 12 (1977), p.197. 
43. Ibid., p.197. 
44. Ibid., p.201. 
45. Ibid., p.210. 
46. For broadly similar conclusions in relation to Britain, see: 
47. 
Colin Crouch, "The Intensification of Industrial Conflict in the 
United Kingdom", in The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western 
Euro e since 1 68, Vol. 1, National Studies, ed. c. Crouch and 
A. Pizzorno London: Macmillan, 1978), pp.251-3; Stephen Hill, 
Competition and Control at Work (London: Heinemann, 1981), pp.249-
256; Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1976), pp.246-253. 
Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: 
Books, 1973), p.186. 
Quartet 
48. Winkler, p.133. 
49. An analysis which is undertaken by Paul Corrigan, ''Popular Conscious-
ness and Social Democracy", Marxism Today (Dec. 1979), pp.14-17. 
50. Winkler, p.134. 
340. 
51. J. M. Cousins and R. L. Davis, "'Working Class Incorporation' -
A Historical Approach with Reference to the Mining Communities 
of S.E. Northumberland 1840-1890", in The Social Analysis of Class 
Structure, ed. Frank Parkin (London: Tavistock Publications, 
1 97 4), PP• 276-7 • 
52. Karl Marx, Letter to Liebknecht, 11 February 1878, quoted by Hyman, 
Marxism and the Sooiolog,y of Trade Unionism, p.9 (see also Hyman's 
discussion of Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy', pp.14-17). 
53. For a case study see Huw Beynon and Hilary Wainwright, "The Changing 
Thoughts of Lord Robena of Woldingham", in The Workers' Report on 
Viokers (London: Pluto Press, 1979), pp.34-5; for an aocount of 
the Labour movement's views .on honours, see w. G. Runciman, Relative 
Deprivation and Sooial Justice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
pp.124-7. 
54. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Eve 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974 , pp.133-4. 
55. See also Erving Goffman, Encounters (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
p.114. 
56. Guenther Roth, The Social Democrats in 
in Workin Class Isolation and National 
: a Stud 
Bedminster Press, 19 3 , p.8. 
57. For a survey of such clauses see Ken Gill, "Marxism and the Trade 







H. A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1960), p.22. 
Basil 
Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis", New Left Review, 
No. 23 (Jan./Feb. 1964), p.41. 
E. P. Thompson, "The Peculiarities of the English", in Socialist 
Register 1965, p.344. 
Ibid., p.354. 
See, for instance, Richard Hyman, Foreword, The Frontier of Control, 
by Carter L. Goodrich (London: Pluto Press, 1975), pp.xxvii-xxx. 
Paul Ferris, The New Militants: Crisis in the Trade Unions 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), Ch. 2. 
D. Lockwood, "Sources of Variation· in Working Class Images of 
Society", Sooiol. Rev., Vol. 14 (1966), pp.249-267. 
John Saville, "The Ideology of Labourism" in Knowledge and Belief 
in Politics: the Problem of Ideolo , ed. R. Benewick et al. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1973 , pp.215-6. 
Ibid., p.226. 
341. 
67. Richard Hyman, "Workers' Control and Revolutionary Theory", in 
Socialist Register 1974, pp.241-278. 
68. Michael Barratt Brown et al., "Workers' Control versus 
'Revolutionary' Theory", in Socialist Register 1975, p.298. 
69. Ibid., p.302 
70. Ibid., p.297. 
71. See for example Stuart Holland, The Socialist Challenge (London: 
Quartet Books, 1978), pp.37-8. 
72. Perry Anderson, "The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union 
Action", in Trade Unions under Capitalism, e d • Tom Clarke and 
Laurie Clements (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1978), p.333. 
73. In a few neo-oapitalist societies, the union movement does have a 
role in running industry. For a discussion of the Histadrut in 
Israel, for example, see Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: the 
Sociology of Participation (London: Constable, 1971), pp.150-6. 
342. 
Notes and References: Chapter Five (pp.121-144) 
1. Jack Jones, "Unions Today and Tomorrow", in The Incompatibles: 
Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus, ed. R. Blackburn and · 
A. Cockburn (Harmondsworth: Pengulii, 1967), p.122. 
2. For discussions on the range of industrial conflict see Pierre 
Dubois, Sabot~ in Industry, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Ha:rmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1979~ Ch. 1; Ernie Johnston, Industrial Action (London: 
Arrow, 1975). 
Inflation itself may be seen.as a manifestation of industrial 
conflict: John H. Goldthorpe, "The Current Inflation: Towards a 
Sociological Account", in Fred Hirsch and J. H. Goldthorpe, eds., 
The Political Econom.y of Inflation (London: Martin Robertson, 
1978), pp.186-216. 
3. Robin Blackburn, "The Unequal Society", in The Incompatibles, 
pp.48-51. 
4. A case study can be found in Mick Jenkins, Time and Motion Strike, 
Manchester 1 the Wiredrawers• Stru le a ainst the Bedau.x 
System at Richard Johnson's, Our History Series, Pamphlet 0 London: 
History Group of the Connnunist Party, Autumn 1974). 
5. L. Sayles, Behaviour of Industrial Work Grou s (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1958 , p.1 , as quoted by Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology 
and Industrial Relations, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers• Associations Research Paper 3 (London: HMSO, 1966), p.21. 
6. R. H. Guest, "Work Careers and Aspirations of Automobile Workers", 
.!§.!!, Vol. 19 (1954), pp.155-163. 
7. Geoffrey K. Ingham, "Organizational Size, Orientation to Work and 
Industrial Behaviour", Sociology, Vol. 1 (1967), pp.239-258. 
8. Earl Hopper, "Some Effects of Supervisory Style", ~' Vol. 16 (1965), 
pp.189-205 • .. 
9. Sylvia Shimmin, "Extra-Mural Factors Influencing Behaviour at Work", 
Occupational Psycholog;y, Vol. 36 (1962), pp.124-131. 
10. A. J. M. Sykes, "The Cohesion of a Trade Union Workshop Organization", 
Sociology, Vol. 1 (1967), pp.141-163. 
11. I. c. Cannon, "Ideology and Occupational Community: a Study of 
Compositors", Sociology, Vol. 1 (1967[, pp.165-185. 
12. R. K. Brown and P. Brannen, "Social Relations and Social Perspectives 
among Shipbuilding Workers - a Preliminary Statement, Part Two", 
Sociolog:y, Vol. 4 (1970), p.207. 
343. 
13. John H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Industrial 
Attitudes and Behaviour, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 1968); John 
H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes 
and Behaviour, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: CUP, 1968); John H. Goldthorpe 
et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Vol. 3 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1969). 
14. John H. Goldthorpe, "Attitudes and Behaviour of Car-assembly 
Workers: a Deviant Case and a Theoretical Critique", BJS, Vol.17 
(1966), p.240. ----
15. Ibid., p.240. 
16. Blackburn, p.51. 
17. Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action Amon the Western Workin 
Class (London: Macmillan, 1973 , p.49. 
18. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 1, pp.195-6. 
19. J. H. Westergaard, "Rediscovery of the Cash Nexus", in Socialist 
Register 1970, pp.111-138. 
20. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 1, Table 29, p.73. 
21. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 2, Table 13, p.26. 
22. Ibid., Table 13, p.26. 
23. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 1, Table 47, p.109. 
24. Ibid., Table 34, p.87. 
25. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 2, Table 13, p.26. 
26. Ibid., Table 13, p.26. 
27. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 1, p.89. 
28. Westergaard, p.125. 
29. Gavin Mackenzie, "The 'Affluent Worker' Study: An Evaluation and 
Critique", in The Social Anal sis of Class Structure, ed. Frank 
Parkin (London: Tavistock, 1974 , pp.242-3. 
30. Ibid., p.247. 
31. w. w. Daniel, "Automation and the Quality of Work", New Society, 
29 May 1969, p.835. 
32. W. w. Daniel, "Industrial Behaviour and Orientation to Work - a 
Critique'.~~' Vol. 6 (1969), pp.366-375. 
33. Goldthorpe et al., Vol. 1, p.180 (note 2). 
344. 
34. Daniel, "a Critique", p.367. 
35. J. H. Goldthorpe, "Social Action Approach to Industrial Sociology: 
a Reply to Daniel", .:ill§., Vol. 7 (1970), pp.199-208; w. w. Daniel, 
"Productivity Bargaining and Orientation to Work - a Rejoinder to 
Goldthorpe", JMS, Vol. 8 (1971), pp.329-335; J. H. Goldthorpe, 
"Daniel on Orientations to Work - a Final Comment", JMS, Vol. 9 
(1972), pp.266-273. ----
36. Daniel, "a Rejoinder", pp.332-3. 
37. Richard Hyman, Strikes (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972), p.73. 
38. Theo Nichols and Peter Armstrong, Workers Divided: A Study in 
Shop-floor Politics (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976), p.9. 















Ibid., Ch. 3. 
Nichols and Armstrong, Workers Divided, p.127. 
Theo Nichols and Huw Beynon, Living with Capitalism: Class 
Relations and the Modern Factory (London: RKP, 1977), p.129. 




Nichols and Beynon, Living with Capitalism. 
Ibid., pp.41-2. 
Ibid., p.43. 
52. Erving Goffman, Encounters (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p.126. 
53. Ibid., p.126. 
54. See also Erving Goffman, Relations in Public (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1972), Ch. 3. 




P. J. Armstrong, J. F. B. Goodman and J. D. Hyman, Ideolo~ and 
Shop-floor Industrial Relations (London: Croom Helm, 1981:, p.19. 
Ibid., p.16. 
Ibid., p.15. 
59. See, for instance, A. I. Melden, Free Action (London: RKP, 1961), 
Ch. 9. 
60. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1968), §.337, p.1o8e. 
61. c. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive" in 
Symbolic Interaction, ed. Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), p.394. 
62. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy (London: RKP, 1973), pp.80-3. 
63. Armstrong et al., p.36. (:Emphasis added) 
64. Ibid., p.54. 
65. Harold Garfinkel, "The Origins of the Term 'Ethnomethodology'", in 
Ethnomethodology, ed. Roy Turner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 
p.17. 
66. For discussions on the creation and accomplishment of 'social 
reality' see: Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Realit~ (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), Part One; 
Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1967), Ch. 3; Don H. Zimmerman and Melvin Pollner, 
"The Everyday World as a Phenomenon", in Understanding Everyday 
~' ed. Jack D. Douglas (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 
pp.80-103. 
67. Armstrong et al., p.102. 
68. Ibid., p.43. 
69. The conceptual problems involved in analysing 'bourgeois' hegemony 
are therefore very different from those in analysing the emergence 
of 'proletarian hegemony•; see George Lichtheim, A Short History of 
Socialism (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1978), p.324. 
346. 
Notes and References: Chapter Six (pp.145-174) 
1. Bertrand De Jouvenel, "Authority: the Efficient Imperative", in 
Authority, NOMOS I, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1958), p.159. 
2. T. D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1953), p.19. 
3. See, for example: Ernie Roberts, Workers' Control (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1973), p.22; J. Schregle, "Comparative Industrial 
Relations: Pitfalls and Potential", International Labour Review, 
Vol. 120 (1981), p.22. 
4. J. Eaton and A. Fletcher, "Workers' Participation in Management: a 
Survey of Post-War Organized Opinion", Political Quarterly, Vol. 47 
(1976), p.82. 
5. Bullock Report, the Minority Report, paras.· 16-22, pp.174-5. 
6. .Andrew L. Friedman, "Responsible Autonomy versus Direct Control over 
the Labour Process", Capital and Class, Vol. 1 (Spring 1977), p.48; 
see also .Andrew L. Friedman, Indust and Labour: Class Stru le at 
Work and Monopoly Capitalism London: Macmillan, 1977 , pp.78-9, 
Ch. 7 and pp.106-108. For a similar, though non-Marxist, account of 
these two management responses see Tom Lupton, "Industrial Conflict"~ 
New Society, 14 Nov. 1963, p.13. 
7. In the early 1980s, management has been able to reassert its 
prerogative over wage settlements and manning levels because of the 
recession: "Suddenly, nobody in industry ••• is afraid of the unions 
because, suddenly, they have no more clout than a wet handkerchief" -
Graham Turner, "What about the workers?", Daily Telegraph, 16 February 
1981, p.16. 
8. Donald Roy, "Review of Fred Blum's 'Towards a Democratic Work Process: 
the Hormel Packinghouse Workers' Experiment'", ASR, Vol. 19 (1954), 
p.500. 
9. D. Guest and D. Fatchett, Worker Partici ation: Individual Control 
and Performance (London: IPM, 1974 , pp.1 -17. 
10. Ibid., pp.15-16. 
11. Alex Ferry, "Industrial Democracy and Workers' Control", in The Red 
Paper on Scotland, ed. Gordon Brown, {Edinburgh.: Ed.in. Univ. 
Students Publications Board, 1975), p.101. 
12. R. Schmiede, "Technical Change and Industrial Democracy", in 
Industrial Democrac : International Views (Univ. of Warwick: 
Industrial Relations Research Unit, 1978 , p.63. 
347. 
13. Jaroslav Vanek, Introd., Self-Man ment: Economic Liberation of 
~' ed. Jaroslav Vanek Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975 , p.13. 
14. Ken Coates and Tony Topham, The New Unionism: the Case for Workers' 
Control (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp.214-5. 
15. Arthur Scargill, Audrey Wise and Mike Cooley, A Debate on Workers' 
Control, IWC Pamphlet No. 64 (Nottingham: IWC, 1978), p.4. 
16. See, for instance, Tony Topham, "Arthurian Myth and Legend 
Reconsidered", Workers' Control, Nos. 1-2 (1981), pp.15-22. 
17. Friedman, "Responsible Auton~my", p.44. 
18. Ray Wild, "The Nature and Context of Job Restructuring in the 
Engineering Industries of Europe", in Job Satisfaction, ed. Mary 
Weir (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976), p.278. 
19. Robin Chichester-Clark, "On the Quality of Working Life", in Weir 
(ed.), pp.27-8; see also Democracy at Work (London: BBC, 1977), 
Ch. 3. 
20. A brief history of worker involvement in participation schemes can 
be found in Weir's Introd., Job Satisfaction, pp.9-22. 
o) 
21. For example, J. French, J. Israel and D. As, "An Experiment on 
Participation in a Norwegian Factory", Human Relations, Vol. 13 
(1960), p.7. 
22. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democrac : the Sociolo 
(London: Constable, 19 8 , Chapters 2 and 3. 
of Partici ation 
23. Albert Chems, "Better Working Lives - a Social Scientist's View", 
in Weir (ed.), p.43. 
24. D. Wallace Bell, Partici Le islation? The Choices for 
Britain - a Background Paper, IPA Study Paper No. 3 London: 
Industrial Participation Association, 1975), p.4. 
25. Ad"ustment of Workers to Technical Chan at Plant Level, Int. Conf. 
15-18 Nov. 19 Paris: OECD, Manpower and Social Affairs 
Directorate, 1967), p.38. (Emphasis added) 
26. N. Bogolomova, 'Human Relations' Doctrine: Ideolo 
the Monopolies Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973 
of 
27. For a discussion of the organization of joint consultation committees, 
see: National Institute of Industrial Psychology, Joint Consultation 
in British Industry (London: Staples, 1952), Ch. 10. 
28. Industrial Democrac : BIM Occasional 
29. 
Papers New Series , No. 1 London: 
R. o. Clarke, D. J. Fatchett, B. c. Roberts, Workers' Participation in 
Mana.gement in Britain (London: Heinemann, 1972), p.73. 
348. 
30. Ibid., p.74; w. R. Hawes and c. c. P. Brookes, "Change and 
Renewal: Joint Consultation in Industry", Employment Gazette 
(April 1980), pp.353-361. 
31. G. s. Walpole, Technique of Successful Joint Consultation, an 
Address delivered to the London Central District's Master Printers' 
Assoc., 8 Aug. 1944 (London: n.p., 1944), p.2. 
32. Works Councils and Committees (London: Industrial Welfare Society, 
1947), pp.28-9. 
Productivity Agency, 1955 , p.5. 
34. T. L. Johnston, Industrial Demoorac Revisited, Third Marlow 
(Scotland) Lecture Glasgow: The Institution of Engineers and 
Shipbuilders in Scotland, 1969), pp.3-4. 
35. Clarke et al., pp.76-7. 
36. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1897), Vol. 2, Part 3, Ch. 4, esp. pp.818-823. 
37. H. A. Clegg, Industrial Democrac and Nationalization (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1951 , p.121, as quoted by Blumberg, p.141. 
38. Blumberg, Ch. 7. 
39. Industrial Democracy, Talking Points Series No. 14 (London: 
Party, 1968), p.4. 
Labour 





Report, Information Paper No. 27 London: 
Dept., 1972), p.7. 
Michael Gold, Hugo Levie and Roy Moore, The Shop Stewards' Guide to 
the Use of Company Information (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), 
pp.91-5. 
K. W. Wedderburn, "Industrial Democracy and Company Law" in Industrial 
Democracy: the Implications of the Bullock Report, Proc. of a 
Conference at the Univ. of Leicester, 4-5 April 1977 (Univ. of 
Leicester: Dept. of Adult Education, 1977), p.1.19. 
Hence the establishment of wages councils "in industries where there 
was both a low level of pay and inadequate collective-bargaining 
organization"; see c. Craig et al., Abolition and After: the 
Cutlery Wages Council, Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 18 
(London: HMSO, 1981), p.ix. 
Wedderburn, p.1.2. 
349. 
45. See, for example, "Director Symposium: Participation, 
Professionalism and the Role of the Board", Director (April 1976), 
pp.58-61. 
46. F. E. Emery and E. Thorsrud, Form and Content in Industrial 
Democracy (London: Tavistock, 1974), p.2. 
47. Pat Lowry, "The Bullock Committee's Report and Management", in 
Industrial Democracy: Implications of Bullock, p.2.3. 
48. Ken Coates and Tony Topham, The Shop Steward's Guide to the Bullock 
Report (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1977). 
49. For an account of the debate.over worker representation in the 
nationalized industries in the 1930s and 1940s, see Eirene White, 
Workers' Control? Fabian Tract No. 271 (London: Fabian Society, 
1951), pp.4-12. 
50. Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions: the 
British Experience 1964-1979 (London: Heinemann, 1982), Part IV. 
51. For a case study of the Conservative Government's relationship with 
the Industrial Training Boards, for example, see: "The MSC reports 
on continuation of industrial training", IDS Report, No. 359 (London: 
Incomes Data Services, Aug. 1981), pp.21-2. 
52. Peter Brannen et al., The Worker Directors: a Sociolo of 
Participation (London: Hutchinson, 197 , Ch. • 
53. Clarke et al., p.133; Guest and Fatchett, p.13. 
54. Pauline Hunt, "Development of Class-Consciousness in Situations of 
Industrial Conflict", M.Phil. Thesis, Univ. of Edinburgh, 1975, p.129. 
55. Clarke et al., p.85. 
56. Arye Globerson, "Spheres and Levels of Employee Participation in 
Organizations", .fil.IB, Vol. 8 (1970), p.256. 
57. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theor,y (Cambridge: CUP, 
1975), pp.68-71. 
58. Guest and Fatchett, pp.12-13. 
59. Clarke et al., Ch. 2. 
60. Industrial Democracy, A discussion document presented by the NEC for 
discussion at the sixth national conference of the Labour Party Young 
Socialists held in Llandudno on 25-26 March 1967 (London: Labour 
Party, 1967), p.12; this scheme was first set out by Professor 
K. J. w. Alexander in a Labour Party internal paper written for the 
Labour Party Working Party on industrial democracy (1966/7). See 
K. J. w. Alexander,•'lndustrial Democracy", Research Dept. Paper 
Re.22/July 1966. 
350. 
61. Ian Gordon-Brown, Partici ation in Indust : an Introducto 
Guide (London: Industrial Co-Partnership Association, 1972 , 
p.7. 
62. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto {Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 
p.96. 
63. Vanek, p.16. 
64. Ibid., p.14. 
65. Daniel Bell, Meanin in Work - a New Direction {London: Labour 
Party Research Dept. Reprint~, July 19 0 , p.1. 
66. Workers• Partici ation in Indust , ICFTU Study Guide No. 3 
Brussels: ICFTU, 1954 , p.22. 
67. Mikl6s Haraszti, A Worker in a Workers' State {Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1977), pp.130-1. 
68. Huw Beynon, "The Carcase of Time", New Society, 13 Oct. 1977, p.80. 
69. See David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR {London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1972), Ch. 6. 
10. Edward R. Pease, Profit-Sharing and Co-Partnership {London: Labour 
Party, 1921), p.8. 
71. Ernest Mandel, "Self-Management - Dangers and Possibilities", 
International, Vol. 2 (Winter/Spring 1975), p.5. 





Charles Levinson, "Collective Bargaining in Perspective", Report 1B 
of the Trade Union seminar on New Perspectives in Collective 
Bargaining (Paris: Social Affairs Division, OECD, 1969), p.6 quoted 
by G. D. Garson, "Reoent Developments in Workers• Participation in 
Europe", in Self-Management, ed. Vanek, p.161. 
Failure to appreoi~te this is what leads commentators to identify 
'industrial democracy• purely with its most recent location, say, 
participation committees or board-level representation. See: 
Tim Congdon, "The Economics of Industrial Democracy", New Society, 
30 Oot. 1975, pp.255-7; Charles D. King and Mark van de Vall, 
Models of Industrial Democracy {The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978), 
p.v.; M. J. F. Poole, "A Power Approach to Workers' Participation 
in Decision-Making", Ph.D., Sheffield Univ., 1969, p.5. 
Joseph Femia, ''Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio 
Gramsci", Political Studies, Vol. 23 (1975), p.38. 
P. J. Armstrong et al., Ideology and ShoP-floor Industrial Relations 
{London: Croom Helm, 1981), p.51. 
H. A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1960), Ch. 3. 
Basil 
351. 
Notes and References: Chapter Seven (pp.175-204) 
1. For a discussion of union 'responses' to industrial rationalisation 
in the 1960s see John Hughes, "British Trade Unionism in the 
Sixties", in Socialist Register 1966, pp.86-113. 
2. " ••• when painful decisions are being made, the principle of 
extensive consultation tends to clash with the managers' belief 
in their right to manage." Nick Garnett, "A consultation 'ideal' 
clashes with reality", Financial Times, 6 March 1981, p.15. 
3. Paul Routledge, "Labour revives plans for worker involvement", 
The Times, 9 April 1981, p.17. 
4. R. o. Clarke, D. J. Fatchett and B. c. Roberts, Workers' Participation 
in Management in Britain (London: Heinemann, 1972), Ch. 1. 
5. Harvie Ramsey, "Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in 










H. A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1960). 
Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions: the 
British Experience 1964-79 (London: Heinemann, 1982). 
See Rodger Charles, The Develo ment of Industrial Relations in 
Britain 1911-1939 (London: Hutchinson, 1973 for developments in 
collective bargaining during this period. 
Ken Coates and Tony Topham, Shop Stewards and Workers' Control, 
Vol. II of Industrial Democrac in Great Britain, ed. Coates and 
Topham (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1975 , p.49. 
Ibid., pp.49-66. 
I. c. McGivering, D. G. J. Matthews and W. H. Scott, Management in 
Britain (Liverpool: University Press, 1960), p.97; for details on 
Lord Melchett, see Geoffrey K. Ingham, Strikes and Industrial 
Conflict: Britain and Scandinavia (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp.75-7. 
McGivering et al., p.98. 
Ibid., p.98. 
Industrial Democrac~ 'Towards Tomorrow• Series No. 1 (London: 
Labour Party, n.d. 94.§7), p.7. 
Workers' Participation in Industry-, ICFTU Study Guide No. 3 (Brussels: 
ICFTU, 1954), p.21. 
16. J. Price, Democrac in Indust 
Control, Study Outline No. 11 
- the Problem of Workers' 
London: WEA, 1944 , p.39. 
352. 
17. Works Councils and Committees (London: Industrial Welfare 
Society, 1947), p.25. 
18. G. s. Walpole, Management and Men (London: Jonathan Cape, 1944), 
p.43, in Coates and Topham, Shop Stewards, p.89. 
19. Sir Stafford Cripps, "Address to aircraft workers", 9 Jan. 1943, 
quoted in Works Councils, IWS, p.24. 
20. Coates and Topham, Shop Ste~ards, pp.50-1. 
21. Jaok Owen, War in the Workshops {London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
n.d • .Lf94y), pp.B-9. 










Production the Bridge to Socialism, Address presented by the NEC 
of the Labour Party to its Annual Conference in Scarborough, 
April 1948; reprinted as a pamphlet (London: Labour Party, 
1948), p.5. 
Ibid., p.7. 
Ministry of Labour and National Service, Joint Consultation in 
Industr:y, Industrial Relations Handbook, Supplement No. 3 
(London: HMSO, 1949), pp.3-4. 
Co-o eration and Indus , Studies and Reports (New Series) No. 
2 Geneva: ILO, 1951 , pp.34-9. 
Britain's Plan for Prosperity (London: Communist Party, 1947), 
p.110, in Coates and Topham, Shop Stewards, pp.104-5. 
Michael Barratt Brown, ''Nationalization in Britain", Socialist 
Register 196.4, pp.251-255; Ken Coates and Tony Topham, Industrial 
Democracy and Nationalization, Vol. III of Industrial Democracy, 
ed. Coates and Topham, Ch. 2. 
See, for instance, s. T. Glass, The Res onsible Socie the 
Ideas of Guild Socialism (London: Long1Ilalls, 19 , pp. 0-1; 
J. T. Murphy, Pre arin for Power: a Critcial Stu of the 
Risto of the British Workin Class Movement 1934; rpt. 
London: Pluto Press, 1972 , Ch. x, esp. p.189; Branko Pribi6evic, 
The Sho Stewards' Movement and Workers' Control 1 10-1 22 (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1959 , p.1 o. 
Child, British Management Th.ough!,pp.112-3. 
Joan Mitchell, The Future of Private Industry, .Labour Party 
Discussion Pamphlet No. 5 (London: Labour Party, Oct. 1952), p.20. 
353. 
32. G. s. Walpole, Technique of Successful Joint Consultation, an 
Address delivered to the London Central District's Master 
Printers' Assoc., 8 Aug. 1944 (London: n.p., 1944), p.4. 
33. J. Eaton and A. Fletcher, "Workers' Participation in Management 
- a Survey of Post-War Organized Opinion", Political Quarterly, 
Vol. 47 (1976), p.87. 
34. T. Wylie, A Concise Guide to Industrial Relations {Birmingham: 
Industrial Administration Group, 1951), pp.27-8. 
35. Aubrey Jones, The New Inflation {Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 
pp.47-8. 
36. Coates and Topham, Shop Stewards, p.55. 
37. E. Dorion, "La Participation des Travailleurs a la Gestion des 
Entreprises en Grande Bretagne", in La Partici ation des 
Travailleurs ~ la Gestion des Entre rises Privees dans les 
Princi aux Pa s de 1 1Euro e Occidentale , ed. D. Marcel Paris: 
Librairie Dalloz, 1954 , p.198 author's translation). 
38. Democracy in our Working Lives (London: 
1956), p.4. 
the Progressive League, 
39. Ibid., inside front cover. 
40. Dept. of Scientific and Industrial Research/Medical Research 
Council, Final Retort of the Joint Committee on Human Relations in 
Industry 1954-57 London: HMSO, 1958), p.1. 
41. Understand.in Labour Relations, foreword by Viscount Chandos 
London: Institute of Directors, April 1958), p.10. 
42. For instance, Co-operation and Industry, !LO, p.6. 
43. Joint Consultation in Practice: 
Industrial Version No. 1 Paris: 
1959), p.7. 
44. Ibid., p.31. 
45~ Ibid., p.32. 
46. R. o. Clarke et al., p.41. 
a Surve in British Indust , 
European Productivity Agency, 
47. Allan Flanders, The Fawley Productivity Agreements (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1964), Ch. 2. 
48. Martyn Nightingale, "UK Productivity Dealing in the 1960s", in 
Capital and Labour - a Marxist Primer, ed. Theo Nichols {Glasgow: 
Fontana, 1980), p.316. 
49. Ibid., p.316. 
354. 
50. W. E. J. McCarthy, The Role of Shop Stewards in British Industrial 
Relations, Research Paper No. 1, Royal Commission on Trade Unions 
and Employers' Associations (London: HMSO, 1966), para. 4, pp.4-5· 
51. Tony Topham, ''New Types of Bargaining", in The Incompatibles: 
Trade Union Militano and the Consensus, ed. Robin Blackburn and 
Alexander Cockburn Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p.149. 
52. See for example Samuel Brittan, Steering the Econom,y: the Role 
of the Treasury (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), Chapters 8 and 
9; Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe, British Capitalism, Workers 
and the Profits Squeeze (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), Chapters 
5, 6 and 7. 
53. Graham Turner, Business in Britain (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 
p.75. 
54. Ibid., p.72. 
55. Ibid., p.60. 
56. Michael Barratt Brown, "The Controllers of British Industry" in 
Can the Workers Run Indust . ed. Ken Coates (London: Sphere Books, 
19 8 , pp.36-74; s. J. Prais, The Evolution of Giant Firms in 
Britain (Cambridge: CUP, 1976), Ch. 4. 
57. John Hughes, "Giant Firms and the British Trade Unions' Response", 
in Trade Union Re ·ster 1 o, ed. Michael Barratt Brown and Ken 
Coates London: Merlin Press, 1970), pp.64-5; quoted by Ken Coates 
and Tony Topham, The New Unionism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 
p.34. 
58. Donovan Report, para. 370, p.98. 
59. Ibid., para. 388, p.105. 
60. See Leslie Hannah and J. A. Kay, Concentration in Modern Industry 
{London: Macmillan, 1978), pp.25-6, and H. D. Watts, The Large 
Industrial Enterprise (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp.263-7, for 
discussions of the relationship between company size and industrial 
conflict. 
61. Donovan Report, para. 390, p.105. 
62. Ibid., para. 396, p.107. 
63. Ibid., para. 399, p.108. 
64. For case studies of strikes explained in this way see: Paul Foot, 
"The Seamen's Struggle" in The Incompatibles, pp.169-174; 
Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (London: Collier-
Macmillan, 1964), pp.71-3; Tony Lane and KennethRoberts, Strike at 
Pilkingtons (London: Collins/Fontana, 1971), pp.59-63. 
355. 
65. For example, Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
66. Keith Robertson, ''Managing People and Jobs" in Job Satisfaction, 
ed. Mary Weir (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976), p.33. 
67. Claus Offe, Industry and Inequality (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), 
pp.28-9. 
68. Joe Roeber, Social Change at Work: the !CI Weekly Staff Agreement 
(London: Duckworth, 1975), p.69. 
69. Ibid., pp.309-310. 
70. Geoffrey Richards, Works Manager, !CI Organics Division, Grangemouth, 
quoted in advert for ICI, Sunday Times Magazine, 24 July 1977, p.7. 
71. Garnett, p.15. 
72. Donovan Report, para. 730, p.196. 
73. Serge Mallet, The New Working Class (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 
1975), p.28. 
74. Ibid., p.29. 
75. Clive Jenkins and Barrie Sherman, White-Collar Unionism: 
Rebellious Salariat (London: RKP, 1979), Ch. 5. 
the 
76. Richard Hyman, "Industrial Conflict and the Political Economy: 
Trends of the Sixties and Prospects for the Seventies", in 
Socialist Register 1973, p.107. 
77. Ibid., p.108; for figures on official strikes, see "Large industrial 
stoppages 1960-1979", Employment Gazette (Sept. 1980), pp.997-999. 
78. Industrial Democracy, Labour Party Working Party Report (London: 
Labour Party, 1967), para. 19, p.19. 
79. Nightingale, p.327. 
80. Roeber, p.xviii. 
81. Nightingale, p.329. 
82. Communication and Consultation (London: CBI, 1966). 
83. Industrial Democrac : Some Im lications for Man ement, BIM 
Occasional Papers New Series 1 London: BIM, 19 8 , p.6. 
84. Ibid., p.10. 
85. Trade Unionism (London: TUC, 1966). 
86• Donovan Report, para. 1002, p.258. 
356. 
87. For a summary of the Donovan proposals, see: B. M. Cooper and 
A. F. Bartlett, Industrial Relations: a Study in Conflict 
(London: Heinemann, 1976), pp.111-3. 
88. Industrial Democracy: a Summary of the Labour Party Working 
Par Re ort on Industrial Democrac , Info:cmation Paper No. 27 
London: Labour Party Research Dept., Feb. 1972), p.2. 
89. Ibid., p.9. 
90. Eaton and Fletcher, p.86. 
91. In Place of Strife: a Policy for Industrial Relations, Cmnd. 3888, 
(London: HMSO, 1969). For a summary, see The Times, 18 Jan. 
1969, p.3. 
92. Observer, 19 Jan. 1969, p.12. 
357. 
Notes and References: Chapter Eight (pp.205-244) 
1. Andrew Friedman, "Responsible Autonomy versus Direct Control over 
the Labour Process", Capital and Class, Vol. 1 (Spring 1977), p.48. 
2. D. F. Macdonald, The State and Trade Unions (London: Macmillan, 
1 97 6) ' pp. 197-8. 
3. Alan Fox, "Industrial Relations: a Social Critique of Pluralist 
Ideology" in Man and Organization, ed. John Child (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1973), pp.199-203. 
4. Dept. of Employment and the Central Office of Information, 
Industrial Relations: A Guide to the Industrial Relations Act, 
.1211 (London: HMSO, 1972), p.5. 
5. A. w. J. Thomson ands. R. Engleman, The Industrial Relations Act: 
a Review and Analysis (London: Martin Robertson, 1975). 
6. G. D. Garson, "Recent Developments in Workers' Participation in 
Europe", in Self Mana ement: Economic Liberation of Man, ed. 
Jaroslav Vanek Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975 , p.161. 
/ 
7. Bernard D. Nossiter, Britain: a Future that Works.(London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1978), Ch. 3, esp. pp.89-93. 
8. Tom Forester, "Do the British sincerely want to be rich?", New 
Society, 28 April 1977, pp.158-161. 
9. A. B. Chems, "Speculations on the Social Effects of the New 
Microelectronics Industry", International Labour Review, Vol. 119 
(Nov.-Dec. 1980), p.706. 
10. Maurice Macmillan, Preface, On the Quality of Working Life, by 
N. A. B. Wilson, Dept. of Employment Manpower Papers No. 7 (London: 
HMSO, 1973), p.iii. 
11. Wilson, p.44. 
12. Roger Berthoud, "Taking the frustration out of a boring job", 
The Times, 18 Dec. 1975, p.3. 
13. Eric Wigham, "Aiming to improve the quality of working life", 
The Times, 12 Aug. 1975, p.17. 
14. Department of Employment Tripartite Steering Group on Job Satis-
faction, Making Work More Satisfying (London: HMSO, 1975), p.23. 
15. 1 80 Re ort of the Tri artite Steerin Grou on Job Satisfaction 
to the Sec. of State for Employment London: Dept. of Employment, 
Work Research Unit, June 1981), pp.7-9. 
358. 
16. Working Power, Fabian Tract 431, ed. Giles Radice (London: 
Fabian Society, Feb. 1974), p.5. However, for critiques of 
this view see Theo Nichols, Ownershi Control and Ideolo 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 19 9 , Ch. 17; Philip Stanworth and 
Anthony Giddens, "The Modern Corporate Economy: Interlocking 
Directorships in Britain, 1906-1970", Sociol. Rev., Vol. 23 
(1975), pp.5-28. 
17. w. c. Adamson, "CBI Director General's Inaugural Letter to 
Members 1970", in Working Power, p.5. 
18. Theo Nichols, "The 'Socialism' of Management: Some Comments on 
the New 'Human Relations'", Sociol. Rev., Vol. 23 (1975), 
pp.251-8; John Thackray, "The Quest for Quality Work", Management 
Toda,y (March 1982), pp.66-73. 
19. Making Work More Satisfying, pp.11-18. 
20. H. G. Jones, "A fonn of industrial democracy that really works", 
Guardian, 19 Jan. 1976, p.13. 
21. "Stunning turnaround at Tarrytown: workers and bosses co-operate 
to boost productivity", Time Magazine, 5 May 1980, p.65. 
22. John Hughes and Denis Gregory, "Richer Jobs for Workers?" in Job 
Satisfaction, ed. Mary Weir (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1976);-p.254. 
23. Ibid., p.256. 
24. Daryll Hull, "The Quality of Working Life", Workers' Control 
Bulletin, No. 1 (1978), p.a. 
25. Daryll Hull, The Sho Stewards' Guide to Work Or ization 





A notable exception is Michel Bosquet, "The Prison Factory", 
New Left Review, No. 73 (May-June 1972), pp.23-34. 
Department of Employment, Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts 
1974 and 1976 - a Guide (London: HMSO, 1976), p.3. 
Department of Employment, Employment Prot~ction Act - An Outline 
(London: HMSO, 1975), p.3. 
For a guide to the provisions of the Act see Ivor Clemitson, 
A Worker's Guide to the Em lo ent Protection Act (Nottingham: 
Spokesman Books, 197 
Ian B. Knight, Company Organization and Worker Participation, 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division 
(London: HMSO, 1979), p.1. 
Ibid., p.82. 
359. 
32. Ibid., p.82. 
33. Stuart Holland, The Socialist Challenge (London: Quartet Books, 










For an outline of this strategy, see: Ken Mayhew, "The Institutional 
Context of Incomes Policy", in Incomes Policy, ed. Robin E. J. Chater, 
Andrew Dean and Robert F. Elliott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 
pp.32-37. 
John Elliott, Conflict or Co-operation? The Growth of Industrial 
Democracy (London: Kogan Page, 1978), p.35. 
"CBI chief pledges all out opposition to 'Big Brother Style' of 
Industry Bill", The Times, 5 Feb. 1975, p.19. 
Robert Taylor, Labour and the Social Contract, Fabian Tract 458 
(London: Fabian Society, Sept. 1978), pp.5-13. 
Tom Forester, "Neutralizing the Industrial Strategy", in What Went 
Wrong?, ed. Ken Coates (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1979), 
pp.74-94. 
Stuart Holland, "Capital, Labour and the State", in What Went Wrong?, 
ed. Coates, pp.207-8. 
Elliott, p.205. 
Industrial Demooraoy, Labour Party Working Party Report (London: 
Labour Party, 1967), para. 67, p.42. 
43. For full background see Elliott, Ch. 14. 
44. For a summary of these proposals see c. M. Schmitthoff, "The Bullock 
Committee and the EEC" in Industrial Democracy: the Implications of 
the Bullock Report, Proc. of a Conference at the University of 
Leicester, 4-5 April 1977 (Univ. of Leicester: Dept. of Adult 
Education, 1977), pp.6.1-6.5. 
45. Proposal for a Fifth Directive to Co-ordinate the Laws of Member 
States as regards the Structure of 'Societes Anonymes•, Bulletin of 
the European Communities, Supplement 10/72 (Brussels: Com.mission 
of the European Communities, Oct. 1972). 
46. Employee Participation and Company Structure, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement 8/75 (Brussels: Commission of the 
European Communities, Aug. 1975). 
47. Statute for European Companies, Bulletin of the European Commrmities, 



















"EEC Law: the State of Play", IDS International Report, No. 132 
(London: Incomes Data Services, Nov. 1980), pp.3-6; "EEC News", 
IDS International Report, No. 166 (London: Incomes Data Services, 
April 1982), p.5. 
H. A. Clegg, "The Bullock Report and European Experience", in 
Industrial Democracy: the Implications of the Bullock Report, 
p.5.21D. 
Em lo ee Partici ation: a Polio Chambers of Commerce of 
Moves towards Industrial Democracy London: Assoc. of British 
Chambers of Commerce, Nov. 1975), para. 7, p.2. 
Industrial Democrac : Evidence to the Committee 
Industrial Democrac~, by Roy Grantham, Gen. Sec., 
APEX, n.d. /j976/'i} , para. 9.1, p.19. 
Bullock Report, para. 49, p.88. (Emphasis added) 
Ibid., para. 8, pp.111-2. 
Ibid., para. 2, p.160. (Emphasis added) 
Clegg, p.5.21D. 
Elliott, pp.212-3. 
Industrial Democracy, including supplementary evidence to the 
Bullock Committee (London: TUC, Jan. 1977), para. 9, p.36. 
Two resolutions were passed: one supported workers' participation 
through union channels at all levels of industry, and the other 
rejected any participation which weakened union independence; see 
David Lea, "The Bullock Committee's Report and the TUC View", in 
Industrial Democracy: the Implications of the Bullock Report, 
p.7.1. 
Industrial Democracy, TUC, para. 85, p.33. 
Denis Butt, "Workers' Control", New Left Review (July-Aug. 1961), 
pp.24-5. 
K. w. Wedderburn, "Industrial Democracy and Company Law", in 
Industrial Democracy: the Implications of the Bullock Report, p.1.2. 
63. Industrial Democracy: Evidence, APEX, para. 5.2, p.7. 
64. Bullock Report, pp.196-202 (Annex B lists those "with whom discussions 
were held overseas"). 
65. Ken Coates, "The Industrial Democracy Bill", Workers' Control Bulletin, 
No. 23. (Feb. 1975), p.1. 
66. Bullock Report, Preface, p.v. 
67. For summaries of both submissions, plus immediate reactions, see 
The Times, 27 Jan. 1977, p.4. 
68. Bullock Report, Minority Report, paras. 16-59, pp.174-182. 
69. Jack Jones, "Workers on the Boardl", TGWU Record, (Feb. 1977), p.1. 
70. Ibid., p.1. 
71. John Edmonds, "The Bullock CoIIllllittee 1 s Report and Collective 
Bargaining", in Industrial Democracy: the Implications of the 
Bullock Report, p.4.1. 
72. Private correspondence from Mr. J. Macgougan, Gen. Sec., NUTGW, 
11 March 1977. 
73. For a summary of such reservations see Ken Coates and Tony Topham, 
The Shop Steward's Guide to the Bullock Report (Nottingham: 
Spokesman Books, 1977). 
74. Industrial Democracy: Evidence, APEX, para. 5.9, p.9. 
75. ort: Prescri tion for Pro ess (London: APEX, 
' p.3. 
76. The Extention of Industrial Democrac 




Nottingham: IWC, n.d. 
IWC Pamphlet No. 50 
78. An Investi 
AUEW, June 
Seo e of Industrial Democrac (London: 
' p.2. 
79. John Boyd, "Industrial Democracy's Challenge", Industrial 
Participation, No. 560 (Winter 1976/7), pp.2-3. 
so. Hugh Scanlon, quoted in "Some Trade Union Reactions to the Bullock 
Report", Workers' Control Bulletin, No. 35 (n.d.), p.11. 
81. Evidence to the Committee of 
Bromley: EET PU, n.d. _197 
82. Edmonds, p.4.2. 
83. Bert Ramelson, "Workers' Control? 
Marxism Today (Oct. 1968), p.300. 
Democrac 
Emphasis added) 
Possibilities and Limitations", 
84. Evidence to the Committee of In ui on Industrial Democrac 
London: Communist Party of Great Britain, Feb. 197 6, p.5. 
85. Bert Ramelson, "Union card or director's car", Morning Star, 3 Feb. 
1977, p.2. 
362. 
86. Elliott, p.248. 
87. Industrial Democracy, Cmnd. 7231 (London: HMSO, May 1978). 
88. For a summary of the White Paper as well as a response from the 
Conservative opposition spokesman see The Times, 24 May 1978, 
p.4. and p.23. 
89. Jones, p.1. 
90. Jan Hildreth, "Some Further T'noughts on Bullock", Director, Vol. 29 
(March 1977), p.46. 
91. See for example Peter Wilsher, "A Board Meeting after Bullock", 
Sunday Times, 30 Jan. 1977, p.17. 
92. P. L. Davies, "European Experience with Worker Representation on 
the Board", in Eric Batstone and P. L. Davies, Industrial Democracy: 
European Experience (London: HMSO, 1976), p.82. 
93. Evidence, EET/PU, para. 37, p.9. 
94. Peter Brannen et al., The Worker Directors (London: Hutchinson, 
1976); John Bank and Ken Jones, ed., Worker Directors Speak 
(Farnborough: Gower Press, 1977). 
95. Michael Barratt Brown, "The Worker Directors", Workers' Control 
Bulletin, No. 32 (May-June 1976), p.22. 
96. "Two-year industrial democracy experiment introduced in postal 
services", Social and Labour Bulletin (ILO), No. 2 (June 1978), 
p.135. 
97. "Post Office worker directors not re-appointed", Social and Labour 
Bulletin (ILO), No. 1 (March 1980), p.29. 
98. Brian Towers, Derek Cox and Elizabeth Chell, "Do worker directors 
work?", Elnployment Gazette (Sept. 1981), pp.384-393. 
99. Elizabeth Chell and Derek Cox, "Worker Directors and their 
Relationship with Collective Bargaining Machinery and Shop Stewards 
in Seven Private Sector Companies", unpublished paper, 'Worker 
Director Project' carried out by Industrial Relations Unit, Dept. 
of Adult Education (Univ. of Nottingham, Nov. 1978), p.4. 
100. Elizabeth Chell, "Rationales for a Scheme of Worker Participation 
at Board Level - the British Experience", unpublished paper, 
'Worker Director Project' (Univ. of Nottingham, Jan. 1979), pp.19-20. 
101. Elizabeth Chell, ''Worker Participation: Some Problems facing the 
Worker Director", unpublished paper, 'Worker Director Project' 
(Univ. of Nottingham, Dec. 1978), p.10. 
102. Chell and Cox, "Worker Directors and their Relationship", p.19. 
103. David Farnham and John Pimlott, "Who Wants Bullock?", New Society, 
3 March 1977, p.451. 
104. Farnham and Pimlott, pp.451-2 (Emphasis added) 
105. James Prior, text of speech given to Industrial Society conference 
at the Caf6 Royal, 14 Feb. 1977 {London: Conservative Central 
Office News Service, 1977), p.7. 
106. James Prior and John Nott, Letter to Mr. Fred Harman, Chairman of 
the Conservative Trade Unionists• National Advisory Committee on 
Conservative Party Policy on Employee Participation, 15 May 1978 
(London: Conservative Central Office News Service, 1978). 
107. Edmonds, p.4.1. 
108. lo ee Partioi ation, BIM Speaking Notes - Serial No. 4 (London: 
BIM, March 1977 , p.2. 
109. Statement of Evidence to the Bullock Cormnittee of In ui on 
In ustrial Democracy - March 197 London: EEF, March 197 , 
paras. 1-9, pp.1-7. 
110. Committee on Industrial Democrac : Submissions of the Stock 
Exchange London: Stock Exchange, March 197 , pp.1-2. 
111. Comment on the Re ort of the Bullock Committee (London: EEF, 
March 1977 , para. 29 ii , p.14. 
112. Committee on Industrial Democracy, p.1. 
113. Submission to the Industrial Committee {London: Institute of 
Directors, April 1976), paras. 93-4. 
114. Ibid., para. 131. 
115. Industrial Democrac Submission to Bullock {Luton: Institution 
116. 
of Works Managers, n.d. 197 ? , para. 3 a , p.2. 
Jan.Hildretht Press Information (London: 
26 Jan. 1977 J. 
Institute of Directors, 
117. CIA Reaction to the Bullock Committee Re orts {London: Chemical 
Industries Assoc., 2 Jan. 1977 , para. 1, p.1. 
118. Employee Participation, Assoc. of British Chambers of Commerce, 
para. 64, p.19. 
119. The Bullock Report, CBI Talking Points No. 26 {London: 
1977)' p.1. 
CBI, Feb. 
120. Em lo ee Partici ation: NFBTE Evidence to Bullock Committee 
London: National Federation of Building Trades Employers, April 
1976), paras. 5 and 7, p.2. 
121. En ineers Sus icious over Bullock Re ort, Press Information 
Harrow: Engineering Industries Assoc., Feb. 1977), n.p. 
122. Commentary, EEF, paras. 22-3, pp.11-12. 
123. Private correspondence from Mr. K. H. Price, Deputy Director of 
Industrial Relations, NFBTE, 10 March 1977. 
124. See for example Evidence to the Industrial Democrac 
(London: Council of Engineering Institutions, June 197 , 
paras. 17-18, p.4; Industrial Democrac : Statement of Submissions 
on behalf of the Steel Indust Mana ement Association Watford: 
SIMA, 197 , para. 5, pp.10-13. 
125. Bullock Report, Minority Report, paras. 16-22, pp.174-5. 
126. Em lo ee Participation - a New Look, CBI Talking Points No. 19 
London: CBI, April 97 , p.3. 
127. Ibid., p.4. 
128. Ibid., p.3. 
129. For example, private correspondence from: E. Dixon, Deputy Director, 
British Printing Industries Federation, 8 March 1977; M. Reid, 
Director, Clothing Manufacturers' Federation, 8 March 1977; 
130. 
M. L. Jones, Director's Office, Engineering Industries Association, 
15 March 1977; M. K. Smith, Asst. Director Social Affairs, Glass 
Manufacturers' Federation, 10 March 1977. 
Conservative Manifesto 1979 (London: 
1979), p.11. 
Conservative Central Office, 
131. Ibid., p.9. 
132. Workin Pa ers for Consultations on Pro osed Industrial Relations 
Legislation London: Dept. of Employment, July 1979 • 
133. R. Lewis, P. Davies and B. Wedderburn, Industrial Relations Law 
and the Conservative Government, Fabian Trade Union Special 
(London: NCLC Publishing Society, Oct. 1979), p.44. 
134. TUC Cormnentary on the filnployment Bill (London: TUC, Jan. 1980). 
135. Roy Lewis and Bob Simpson, Striking a Balance? ID.n}loyment Law 
after the 1980 Act (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981 • 
136. "The Green Paper", IDS Brief No. 199 (London: Incomes Data Services, 
Feb. 1981), p.1. 
137. See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm's interview with Tony Benn in 
The Forward March of Labour Halted?, ed. Martin Jacques and Francis 
Mulhern (London: Verso, 1981), pp.75-6. 
138. "Recession 'bringing shift of power'", Guardian, 8 May 1981, p.2. 
139. "Thatcher cuts out Prior in moves for union curbs", The Observer, 
24 May 1981, p.3. 
140. For details, as well as union reactions, to this Employment Bill, 
see "Fightback Two", Tribune, 26 Feb. 1982, pp.9-12. 
141. John Lloyd, "All sides set for Tebbit's test of strength", 
Financial Times, 29 March 1982, p.7. 
142. Friedman, p.48. 
143. Though the CBI continued to support consultation committees as a 
means to improve company performance - see "Boost for employee 
consultation", Financial Times, 28 Jan. 1982, p.7. 
Notes and References: Chapter Nine (pp.245-269) 
1. Sir William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services, 
Cmd. 6404 (London: HMSO, 1942), paras. 20-26, pp.11-13. 
2. Michael Gold, "Use of Information on the Lucas Staff and Works 
Pension Fund", mimeo, Ruskin College, Oxford, June 1980. 
3. Occupational Pension Schemes, TUC Guide (London: TUC, 1976), p.15. 
4. Harry Lucas, Pensions and Industrial Relations (Oxford: Pergamon, 
1977)' p.35. 
5. See, for example, Pensions, APEX 'Topics' Research Series (London: 
APEX, April 1977); Sue Ward, Pensions (London: Pluto Press, 1981). 
6. Alan Taylor, "Should Private Pension Funds be abolished?", Workers' 
Control, No. 1 (1982), pp.7-8. 
7. "Pension Funds growing by about £8bn. a year", Financial Times, 
8 July 1981, p.8. 
8. But see Controllin Pension Funds: the Trade Union Role (London: 
APEX, Jan. 1982 ; Michael Gold, The Democratisation of Investment 
by Occupational Pension Funds, TURU Discussion Paper No. 24 (Oxford: 
Trade Union Research Unit, Ruskin College, Feb. 1981). 
9. Much of the background data for this section comes from Richard 
Minns, Pension Funds and British Capitalism (London: Heinemann, 
1980). 
10. Minns, p.34. 
11. Ibid., p.30. 
12. Material for this chapter was first presented in Michael Gold, "Use 
of Information", as part of an SSRC financed project under the 
supervision of Roy Moore at Ruskin College, Oxford, on constraints 
on the use of company information by trade unions. 
13. Roy Grantham, "Pension trustees hold key to boosting investment in 
British Industry", APEX Journal (Dec. 1978), p.4. 
14. See "£20bn. of pension funds in need of regulation", The Economist, 
4 Nov. 1978, p.109-113. 
15. Trustees must behave "honestly, prudently and in good faith"; see 
Anthony Davey, "The Personal Liability of Pension Fund Trustees in 
the UK", Benefits International (Sept. 1981), p.8; also, Sue Ward, 
"Pension scheme trustees - powers and duties", Labour Research 
(Oct. 1981), pp.214-5. 
16. Christine Moir, ''Pension funds 'not obliged to be concerned with 
public good'", Financial Times, 27 Dec. 1978, p.1. 
17. Personal interview with Alan Pickering, Research Dept. EET/PU, 
6 March 1980. 
18. These guidelines exclude, for example, investment in companies 
connected mainly with the aircraft or motor industries as well 
as that in small companies, and stipulate that not more than 
2CY/o gilts should be over 20 years to redemption and none should 
be undated. From "Investments - present policy", Lucas SPF, n.d. 
19. Personal interview with David Pugh, Assistant Investment Analyst, 







Occu ational Pension Schemes: the Role of Members in the Runnin 
of Schemes, Cnmd. 514 Londo~: HMSO, June 197 , para. 30, p.8. 
Minns, p.129. 
A survey carried out in 1980 by ASTMS showed that 60J/o ASTMS trustees 
had never before held union office; see Humphrey Forrest, "The 
Politics of Pension Funds: A Neglected Educational Opportunity", 
Trade Union Studies Journal (Oct. 1980), p.10, Note 4. 
Private correspondence from Richard Minns, 16 Jan. 1981. 
"AFL-CIO adopts new policy on investing pension funds", Labor and 
Investments, Vol. 1 (Jan. 1981), p.1 (published by AFL-C.IO). 
Minns, p.67. 
Nicholas Leslie, "American attitudes gain acceptance", Financial 
Times, Supplement on small businesses, 3 June 1981, p.IV. 
David Pally and Valerie Wise, Trade Unions and Pension Funds 
(London: CAITS, May 1980), p.12. 
David Pelly, ''No influence?", letter, New Statesmen, 20 June 1980, 
p.931. 
29. Bob Dumbleton and John Shutt, "Pensions: the Capitalist Trap", 
New Statesman, 1 Sept. 1979, p.336. 
30. For a discussion on how Local Enterprise Boards could tap pension 
funds to generate productive investment, see Richard Minns, 
"Challenging the Bankers", New Statesman, 21 Aug. 1981, pp.6-10. 
31. Such pressure can be exerted on governments as well. In 1978, the 
financial institutions, including the OPFs, regarded the Labour. 
Government's April budget as too expansionary and refused to buy 
gilts at the prevailing rate to finance it. This forced the 
Government to print money and fuel inflation. The effect was 
higher interest rates and a credit squeeze - none of which the 
Government wanted; private correspondence from Richard Minns, 
16 Jan. 1981. 
368. 
Notes and References: Chapter Ten (pp.270-286) 
1. Jeremy McMullen, Employment Law Under the Tories (London: Pluto 
Press, 1981), p.100. 
2. J. T. Winkler, "Corporatism", European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
18 (1976), p.112. 
3. Paul O'Higgins, Workers' Rigilts (London: Arrow Books, 1976), 
Chapters 8-10; Jeremy McMullen, Rights at Work: a Worker's Guide 
to Employm.ent Law (London: Pluto Press, 1979), Ch. 1. 
4. Sit-ins and Work-ins (London:· IPM, 1976), pp.15-16. 
5. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democrac : the Sociolo of Partici ation 
(London: Constable, 1971 , pp.9-10. 
6. Industrial Democracy (London: TUC, 1974), para. 12, p.10. 
7. Ibid., para. 71, p.31. 
8. IPM, p.1. 
9. See, for example, A. J. Eccles, "Sit-ins, Worker Co-operatives and 
Some Implications for Organization", Personnel Review, Vol. 6 
(Spring 1977); John Greenwood, Worker Sit-ins and Job Protection 
(Farnborough: Gower Press, 1977 • 
10. IPM, p.2; TUC, para. 12, p.10; Eccles, p.39; Greenwood, p.29. 
11. Ken Coates, "Converting the Unions to Socialism: Introductory 
Review", in Trade Union Register 3, ed. Michael Barratt Brown and 
Ken Coates (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1973), p.21. 
12. John Gretton, "To Sit or Not to Sit", New Society, 15 Jrme 1972, p.564. 
13. Albert J. Mills, "Factory Work-ins", New Society, 22 Aug. 1974, p.489. 
14. Alex Murray, UCS - the Fi t for the Ri t to Work, Connnunist Party 
Pamphlet (London: Communist Party, 1971 • 
15. Frank Broadway, U er Cl de Shi builders: a Stu of Government 
Intervention in Industry, Preface by Sir Keith Joseph London: 
Centre for Policy Studies, 1976). 
16. Stephen Johns, Refo:rmism on the Clyde: the Story of UCS (London: 
New Park Publications, 1973). 
17. Alasdair Buchan, The Ri ht to Work: the Sto 
Confrontation, Introduction by Harold Wilson London: 
Boyars, 1972). 
18. Robin Murray, UCS: the Anatomy of a Bankruptcy (Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1972). 
19. Jimmy Reid, "Three speeches made during UCS work-in 1970-1", in 
Reflections of a Clyde-built Man (London: Condor Books, 1976), 
pp.84-98. 
20. J. R. Parkinson, The Economics of Shipbuilding in the United 
Kingdom (Cambridge: CUP, 1960), p.217. 
21. Re ort to 
Mr. R. M. Geddes, 
22. For the ownership structure of UCS, see Willie Thompson and Finlay 
Hart, The UCS Work-in (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1972), p.38. 
23. Broadway, p.30. 
24. "Clyde yards ready for work-in", Morning Star, 28 July 1971, p.1. 
25. "It's Clyde Workers Unlimited now", Morning Star, 31 July 1971, p.1. 
26. "Workers seize control of shipyard on the Clyde", The Times, 
31 July 1971, p.1. 
27. Ibid., p.1. 
28. Buchan, p.73. 
29. "Commons in uproar as Labour MPs attach 'butchery' of Clyde yards", 
The Times, 30 July 1971, p.1. 
30. William Gallacher, Revolt on the Cl de: an Autobio ah (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1942 ; Harry McShane, "The Early Twentieth 
Century - Red Clydeside", WEA Day Conference on Aspects of Scottish 
Working Class History, Falkirk, 4 Dec. 1977; own notes. 
31. Pauline Hunt, "The Development of Class-Consciousness in Situations 
of Industrial Conflict", M.Phil, Univ. of Edinburgh, 1975, p.65. 
32. David Lockwood, "Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of 
Society", Sociol. Rev., Vol. 14 (1966), pp.250-1. 
33. For details of organized support, see: Morning Star - housewives, 
2 Aug. 1971 p.1, and 18 Aug. p.4; churchmen, 2 Aug. p.1; Glasgow 
city Council, 3 Aug. p.1; artists and musicians, 12 Aug. p.5; 
STUC special conference, 17 Aug. p.1. 
34. Morning Star, 19 Aug. 1971, p.1. 
35. Morning Star, 3 Aug. 1971, p.1. 
36. Coates, "Converting the Unions", pp.22-3. 
37. Thompson and Hart, p.48. 
38. A. J. Eccles, "Kirby Manufacturing and Engineering", in The New 
Worker Co-operatives, ed. Ken Coates (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1976), 
p.144. 
370. 
39. For background on·KME, see: Tom Clarke, Sit-in at Fisher-Bendix, 
IWC Pamphlet No. 42 {Nottingham: IWC, n.d.); Eccles; D. McMonnies, 
"KME: Study of a Workers' Co-operative", unpublished diss. for 
Labour Studies Diploma, Ruskin College, Oxford, 1979. 
40. James Reid came third in BBC Radio 4's 'World at One Personality of 
the Year' competition in 1971 ••• after Edward Heath and Enoch 
Powell; Morning Star, 28 Dec. 1971, p.3. 
41. Thompson and Hart, p.48. 
42. Clarke, pp.4-5. 
43. Abner Cohen, Two Dimensional Man (London: RKP, 1974), p.80. 
44. Morning Star, 5 Aug. 1971, p.1. 
45. In February 1972 three of the yards were re-grouped as Govan 
Shipbuilders Ltd. with a government grant of £35m. Marathon 
Manufacturing, an American oil rig construction company, later took 










10 October 1972. For an assession of Govan Shipbuilding, see "Ten 
years on - still a fighting spirit on Clydeside", The Times, 
8 April 1981, p.21. 
Joseph Femia, "Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio 
Gram.sci", Political Studies, Vol. 23 (1975), p.46. 
The Times, 31 July 1971, p.1. 
Gretton, p.566. 
Ken Coates, Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial Democracy (Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1981), p.83. 
Ibid., p.87-99. 
This committee's interim report appears in Trade Union Register 3, 
pp.253-259. 
Murray, p.80. 
Coates, "Converting the Unions", p.32. 
Why Imperial Typewriters MUST NOT Close, a preliminary social audit 
by the Union Action Committee, IWC Pamphlet No. 46 (Nottingham: 
IWC, n.d.). 
s. Bod.ington, "The Political :Economies of Social Auditing", Workers' 
Control, No. 2 (1978), pp.8-9. 
For a summary of the relationships between these strategies, see 
Michael Gold, "When workers take over the works", Tribune, 24 July 
1981, p.6. 
371. 
Notes and References: Chapter Eleven (pp.287-308) 
1. Albert J. Mills, "Factory work-ins", New Society, 22 Aug. 1974, 
p.489; see also Graham Chadwick, "The Manchester Engineering 
Sit-ins", in Trade Union Register 3, ed. Michael Barratt Brown 
and Ken Coates (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1973), pp.113-124. 
2. Ken Coates, "Some Questions and Some Arguments", in The New Worker 
Co-operatives, ed. Ken Coates (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1976), 
pp.11-13. 
3. Judy Wajcman, "The caring, sharing co-op?", New Society, 2 July 1981, 
p.14. 
4. Private correspondence from Prof. Ray Loveridge, 5 July 1977. 
5. Wajcman, p.12. 
6. See, for example, Geoffrey Whiteley, "Triumph at Meriden after one 
year", Guardian, 5 March 1976, p.9; Martin Leighton, "The Workers' 
Triumph", Sunday Times Magazine, 4 June 1978, p.21. 
7. The Institute for Workers' Control, founded in 1968, publishes a 
bulletin and pamphlets, organises conferences and gives specialist 
assistance in matters relating to workers' control; see Michael 
Barratt Brown and Ken Coates, The 'Big Flame' and What is the IWC?, 
Pamphlet No. 14 (Nottingham: IWC, n'.a..). 
8. Bert Ramelson, "Public ownership and industrial democracy", Comment, 
22 March 1975, p.86. 
9. Stephen Parker, "Meriden and Workers' Control", Revolutionary 
Communist, No. 1 (Jan. 1975), pp.28-9. 
10. "Triumph at Meriden", p.9. 
11. Loveridge, 5 July 1977. 
12. Private correspondence from Prof. A. J. F.ccles, 13 Jlllle 1977. 
13. "Save Meriden!", Tribune, 14 Jan. 1977, p.1. 
14. H. Frayma.n, "Grantham's Workers' Co-operative", Workers' Control, 
No. 2 (1978), p.13. 
15. Ernest Mandel, "Self-management - dangers and possibilities", 
International, Vol. 2 (Winter/Spring 1975), p.5. 
16. Jane McLoughlin, "The Meriden baby that fights for survival", 
Guardian, 23 May 1978, p.23. 
17. "Policy of state aid for ailing companies suffers sharp reversal", 
The Times, 8 Aug. 1975, p.l. 
372. 
18. "A forlorn attempt to keep going", The Times, 12 Aug. 1975, p.13. 
19. The full account of SDN can be found in Ron McKay and Brian Barr, 
The Story of the 'Scottish Daily News' (Edinburgh: Canongate, 
1976). 
20. Allister Mackie, "The Scottish Daily News", in New Worker 
Co-operatives, ed. Coates, p.120. 
21. "Final chapter ends for 'Scottish Daily News'", The Times, 17 Dec. 
1975. 
22. Coates, "Some Questions", p.13. 
23. Richard Fletcher, "Worker Co-ops and the Co-operative Movement 11 , 
in New Worker Co-operatives, ed. Coates, p.179. 
24. A. J. Eccles, 11Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering", in New Worker 
Co-operatives, ed. Coates, p.155. 
25. Mackie, p.109. 
26. Parker, p.29. 
27. Jenny Thornley, Workers' Co-operatives: Jobs and Dreams (London: 
Heinemann, 1981), Ch. 7, p.93. 
28. John Pearce, Sources of Finance for Small Co-o eratives, ICOM 
Pamphlet No. 7 n.p.: ICOM, 1979 , p.4. 
29. Derek c. Jones, "British Producer Co-operatives", in New Worker 
Co-operatives, ed. Coates, p.59. 
30. Ian Jack, Phillip Knightley and James Fox, "How Maxwell sabotaged 
the workers' dream", Sunday Times, 21 Sept. 1975, p.17. 
31. Mackie, p.136. 
32. "A dead duck", The Times, 23 Dec. 1974, p.11. 
33. John Elliott, "The workers' co-operative: a political own goal", 
Financial Times, 21 Nov. 1978, p.18; "Assets bid too late to save 
Kirkby co-operative", Financial Times, 28 March 1979, p.42. 
34. Ez-nest Bader, "From Profit Sharing to Common Ownership", in 
Self Management, ed. Jaroslav Vanek (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 
pp.227-237. 
35. Margaret Jarvie, "An Experiment in Industrial Democracy: the Rowen 
Engineering Company Ltd.", unpublished paper, Dept. of Sociology, 
Univ. of Edinburgh, 1968. 
.' 
373. 
36. Roger Hadley, "Rowen, South Wales: Notes on an Experiment in 
Workers' Self-Management", in Self-Management, ed. Vanek, p.248. 
37. David Watkins, Industrial Common Ownership, Fabian Tract 455 
(London: Fabian Society, April 1978), pp.2-4. 
38. "The DoI Fund" and "New Loans", ICOF Newsletter, Nov. 1979, p.1. 
39. "Rebirth co-operative style", ICOM Newsletter, Jan./Feb. 1980, p.1. 
40. Thornley, pp.54-61. 
41. "Co-operatively, to collapse", Guardian, 29 March 1979, p.14. 
42. "Co-operative agency to get £600,000 11 , Financial Times, 25 June 
1981, p.17. 
43. "Workers buy-out at National Freight Co.", Guardian, 13 Feb. 1982, 
p.21. 
44. David Owen, "Exponential growth in industrial co-ops ", ICOM 
Newsletter (March/April 1980), p.1. 
45. Chris Logan, "Do-it-yourself Socialism", New Statesman, 16 April 
1982, pp.6-7. 
46. Tony Benn, "The Industrial Context", in New Worker Co-operatives, 
ed. Coates, p.78. 
47. See for example ''No more Kirkbies", Daily Telegraph, 2 June 1979, 
p.10. 
48. "The workers' co-operative: a political own goal", p.18. 
49. Benn, p.74. 
50. Dennis Marsden, Workless (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp.207-210. 
51. Thornley, pp.177-8. 
52. Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards' Committee, "The Lucas Plan", 
in The Right to Useful Work, ed. Ken Coates {Nottingham: Spokesman 
Books, 1978), pp.212-6. 
53. Ibid., pp.228-231. 
54. Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards' Committee, Democracy versus 
the Circumlocution Office, IWC Pamphlet No. 65 {Nottingham: IWC, 
March 1979), p.3. 
55. "Lucas Plan - still going 
Sept. 1980), p.1. 
" ... , CAITS Quarterly (London: CAITS, 
374. 
56. A full account can be found in Democracy versus Circumlocution 
Office. 
57. J. Proctor, "Alternative Technology Centre Founded", Workers' 
Control, No. 3 (1978), p.7. 
58. CAITS Broadsheet No. 135, NELP (Nov. 1979), n.p. 







Lucas Aerospace Confederation Trade Union Committee, Lucas Aerospace: 
Turnin Industrial Decline into a.nsion - a Trade Union Initiative 
interim report , London: CAITS, Feb. 1979 • 
Mike George, ''New Luoas Workers' Plan to Save Jobs", Workers' 
Control, No. 2 (1979), p.12. 
"Luoas stewards win ground in jobs fight", Guardian, 16 Feb. 1979. 
CAITS Quarterly (Sept. 1980), p.1. 
Ken Coates, "Planning by the People". in The Rie,ht to Useful Work, 
ed. Coates, p.11. 
Mike George, "Behind the scenes: how ATV handled the Lucas Aerospace 
affair", Workers' Control, No. 3 (1979), p.18. 
Huw Beynon and Hilary Wainwright, The Workers' Report on Vickers 
(London: Pluto Press, 1979); Vickers' National Combine Committee 
of Shop Stewards, "Building a Chieftain Tank and the Alternative", 
in The Right to Useful Work, e.d. Coates, pp.233-261. 
Corporate union committee of c. A. Parsons, The Turbine - Generator 
Indust tions and Possibilities, leaflet (Heaton Works, 
Newcastle: CU Committee, Oct. 1979 • 
F. Banton, The Closure of British Leyland's No. 2 Factory at Speke, 
Liverpool, leaflet (n.d.). 





Doug Gowan, "The Bargaining System", in Industrial Studies 2: the 
Bargaining Context, ed. Ed Coker and Geoffrey Stutta.rd (London: 
Arrow Books, 1976), pp.156-7. 
Corporate union committee of c. A. Parsons, p.1. 
Ibid., p.1. 
F. Banton, discussion group leader for motors industry, CAITS 
conferenoe, 17 Nov. 1979; own notes. 
~·· 
74. Mike George, "Combine News: Workers' Plans and Reports", 
Workers' Control, No. 5 (1978), pp.7-8. 
375. 
75. Mike George, "The Pros and Cons of Workers' Alternative Corporate 
Plans", Workers' Control, No. 4 (1979), p.17. 
76. Ibid., p.18. 
77. George, "Combine News", pp. 7-8 _• 
78. Audrey Wise, "Useful Production: the Key to a Worthwhile Industrial 
Democracy", Workers' Control, No. 6 (1979), p.9. 
79. Mike George, "Workers' Plans: what they mean and what they might 
mean", Workers' Control, No. 4 (1981), pp.18-22. 
BO. Though it failed to prevent 1,050 redundancies in Feb. 1982; see 
Michael Donne, "Lucas cuts follow Rolls Royce problems", Financial 
Times, 5 Feb. 1982, p.7. 




Notes and References: Conclusions (pp.309-318) 
Tom Clarke, "Industrial Democracy: The Institutionalized 
Suppression of Industrial Conflict?" in Trade Unions under 
Capitalism, ed. Tom Clarke and Laurie Clements (Glasgow: 
Fontana/Collins, 1978), p.375. 
"Right to stage sit-in upheld in Plessey case", The Times, 
24 March 1982, p.3. 
William Blake, "London", in The New Oxford Book of English 




Anderson, Perry. "Origins of the Present Crisis." New Left Review, 
No. 23 (Jan./Feb. 1964), pp.26-53. 
-----. "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci." New Left Review, 
No. 100 (Nov. 1976/Jan. 1977), pp.5-78. 
Armstrong, P.J., J. F. B. Goodman and J. D. Hyman. Ideology and 
Shop-floor Industrial Relations. London: Croom Helm, 1981. 
Batstone, Eric and P. L. Davies. Industrial Democracy: European 
Experience. London: HMSO, 1976. 
Berger, Peter L. Invitation to Sociology: a Humanistic Perspective 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972. 
and T. Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967. 
Beynon, Huw. Working for Ford. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
and Hilary Wainwright. The Workers' Report on Vickers: 
The Vickers Shop Stewards Combine Connnittee Report on Work, Wages, 
Rationalisation, Closure and Rank-and-File Orga.nisation in a 
Multinational Compa.ny. London: Pluto Press, 1979. 
Blackburn, Robin and Alexander Cockburn (eds.). The Incompatibles: 
Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1967. 
Blumberg, Paul. Industrial Democracy: the Sociology of Participation. 
London: Constable, 1968. 
Braverman, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work 
in the Twentieth Century. New York and London: Monthly Review 
Press, 1974. 
Casey, Bernard. "Industrial Relations - Back to Durkheim'?" Unpublished 
paper. London School of Economics, Oct. 1976. 
Child, Jol:m. British Management Thought: a Critical Analysis. London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1969. 
(ed.). Man and Organization: the Search for Explanation 
and Social Relevance. London: Allen and Unwin, 1973. 
Clarke, R.o., D. J. Fatchett and B. c. Roberts. Workers' Participation 
in Management in Britain. London: Heinemann, 1972. 
Clarke, Tom and Laurie Clements (eds.). Trade Unions under Capitalism. 
London: Fontana, 1977. 
378. 
Clegg, H.A. A New Approach to Industrial Democracy. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1960. 
Coates, Ken. Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial Democracy: the 
Implications of Factory Occupations in Great Britain in the Early 
Seventies. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1981. 
(ed.). The New Worker Co-operatives. Nottingham: Spokesman, 
1976. 
(ed.). The Righ.t to Useful Work: Planning by the People. 
Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978. 
----- and Anthony Topham (eds.). Shop Stewards and Workers' 
Control. Vol. 2 of Industrial Democracy in Great Britain: a Book 
of Readings and Witnesses for Workers' Control. Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1975. 
-----. Industrial Democracy and Nationalization. Vol. 3 of 
Industrial Democracy in Great Britain: a Book of Readings and 
Witnesses for Workers' Control. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1975. 
Cousins, J. "The Non-Militant Shop Steward." New Society, Vol. 19 
(3 Feb. 1972), pp.226-8. 
Crouch, Colin. "The Intensification of Industrial Conflict in the United 
Kingdom." In The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe 
since 1968. Vol. 1, National Studies. Eds. Colin Crouch and 
Alessandro Pizzorno. London: Macmillan, 1978, pp.191-256. 
Currell Brown, Peter. Smallcreep's Day. London: Pan, 1977. 
Daniel, W.W. "Industrial Behaviour and Orientation to Work - a Critique." 
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 6 (1969), pp.366-375. 
Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labour in Society. Trans. George 
Simpson. 1933; rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1964. 
Eaton, J. and A. Fletcher. "Workers' Participation in Management: a 
Survey of Post-War Organized Opinion." Political Quarterly, Vol. 47 
(1976), pp.82-92. 
Eldridge, J.E.T. Sociology and Industrial Life. London: Nelson, 1973. 
Elliott, John. 
Democracy. 
Conflict or Co-operation? The Growth of Industrial 
London: Kogan Page, 1978. 
Esland, G., G. Salaman and M. Speakman {eds.). People and Work. Milton 
Keynes: Open Univ. Press, 1975. 
Femia, Joseph. 
Gramsci." 
''Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio 
Political Studies, Vol. 23 (1975), pp.29-48. 
Fiori, Giuseppe. Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary. Trans. 
Tom Nairn. London: New Left Books, 1970; New York: E. P. Dutton 
& Co., 1971. 
379. 
Flanders, Allan. Management and the Unions: the Theory and Reform 
of Industrial Relations. London: Faber and Faber, 1975. 
Fox, Alan. Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relationships. 
London: Faber and Faber, 1974. 
Friedman, Andrew L. "Responsible Autonomy versus Direct Control' over 
the Labour Process." Capital and Class, No. 1 (Spring 1977), 
pp.43-57. 
Garfinkel, Harold. Studies in Ethnomethodology. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1967. 
George, Mike. "The Pros and Cons of Workers' Alternative Corporate 
Plans." Workers' Control, No. 4 (1979), pp.14-19. 
Giddens, Anthony. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. 
London: Hutchinson, 1974. 
Globerson, Arye. "Spheres and Levels of Employee Participation in 
Organizations." ~' Vol. 8 (1970), pp.252-262. 
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971. 
Goldthorpe, John H. "Industrial Relations in Great Britain: a Critique 
of Reformism." In Trade Unions under Capitalism. Eds. Tom Clarke 
and Laurie Clements. London: Fontana, 1977, pp.184-224. 
-----, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt. The Affluent Worker: 
Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour. Cambridge Studies in Sociology 
Vol. 1. Cambridge: CUP, 1968. 
-----. The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour. 
Cambridge Studies in Sociology, Vol. 2. Cambridge: CUP, 1968. 
-----. The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge 
Studies in Sociology, Vol. 3. Cambridge: CUP, 1969. 
Goodrich, Carter L. The Frontier of Control: 
Workshop Politics. 1920: rpt. London: 
a Stud.y in British 
Pluto Press, 1975. 
Gram.sci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Eds./trans. 
Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1971. 
Haraszti, Mikl6s. A Worker in a Workers' State: Piece-Rates in Hungary. 
Trans. Michael Wright. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. 
Holland, Stuart. The Socialist Challenge. London: Quartet Books, 
1978. 
Hughes, H. Stuart. Consciousness and Society: the Reorientation of 
European Social Thought 1890-1930. St. Albans: Paladin, 1974. 
Hyman, Richard. Strikes. London: Fontana/Collins, 1972. 
Industrial Democracy. Cmnd. 7231. London: HMSO, May 1978. 
380. 
Industrial Democracy: the Implications of the Bullock Report. Proc. 
of a Conference at the Univ. of Leicester. 4-5 April 1977. 
Univ. of Leicester: Dept. of Adult Education, 1977. 
Knight, Ian B. Company Organization and Worker Participation. Office 
of Population Censuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division. 
London: HMSO, 1979. 
Labour Party. Industrial Democracy. Report of the Labour Party 
Working Party on Industrial Democracy. London: Labour Party, 
June 1967. 
Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards' Committee. Democracy versus 
the Circumlocution Office. IWC Pamphlet No. 65. Nottingham: IWC, 
March 1979. 
Lucas Aerospace Confederation Trade Union Committee. Lucas Aerospace: 
Turnin Decline into ansion - a Trade Union Initiative 
London: CAITS, Feb. 1979. 
Lukes, Steven. Power: a Radical View. London: Macmillan, 1974. 
-----. "Political Ritual and Social Integration." Sociolog;y, 
Vol. 9 (1975), pp.289-308. 
Mann, Michael. "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracies." ASR, 
Vol. 35 (1970), pp.423-439. 
-----. Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class. 
London: Macmillan, 1973. 
Marshall, T.H. "Citizenship and Social Class." In Sociology at the 
Crossroads and Other Essa.ys. London: Heinemann, 1963, pp.67-127. 
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in One Volume. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1970. 
Middlemas , Keith. Poli tics and Industrial Society: the Experience of 
the British System since 1911. London: And.re Deutsch, 1980. 
Miliband, Ralph. The State in Capitalist Society: the Analysis of the 
Western System of Power. London: Quartet Books, 1973. 
Mills, c. Wright. The Sociological Imagination. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1971. 
Minns, Richard. Pension Funds and British Capitalism. London: 
Heinemann, 1980. 
Moorhouse, H.F. "The Political Incorporation of the British Working 
Class: an Interpretation." Sociolog;y, Vol. 7 (1973), pp.341-359. 
381. 
Mouzelis, Nicos. Orga.nization and Bureaucracy. London: RKP, 1967. 
Murray, Robin. UCS: the Anatom.y of a Bankruptcy. Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1972. 
Nichols, Theo. Ownership, Control and Ideology: an Inquiry into 
Certain Aspects of Modern Business Ideology. London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1969. 
(ed.). Capital and Labour - a Marxist Primer. Glasgow: 
Fontana, 1980. 
and P. Armstrong. Workers Divided. Glasgow: Fontana/ 
Collins, 1976. 
Nichols, Theo and Huw Beynon. 
and the Modern Factory. 
Living with Capitalism: 
London: RKP, 1 977. 
Class Relations 
Ortega y Gasset, Jos6. The Revolt of the Masses. Trans. anon. 1932: 
rpt. London: Allen and Unwin, 1969. 
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, 
1970. 
Ramsey, Harvie. "Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in 
Sociological and Historical Perspective." Sociology, Vol. 3 (1977), 
pp.481-506. 
Report of the Committee of Inguiry on Industrial Democracy. 
Lord Bullock. Cmnd. 670 • London: HMSO, 1977. 
Chairman: 
Ro al Commission on Trade Unions and Em lo ers' Associations 1 6 -1 68. 
Chairman: Cnmd. 3 23. London: HMSO, 
1968. 
Silverman, David. The Theory of Orga.nizations: a Sociological Frame-
~· London: Heinemann, 1972. 
Thompson, E.P. "The Peculiarities of the English." The Socialist 
Register 1965. Eds. Ralph Miliband and John Saville. London: 
Merlin Press, 1965. 
Thornley, Jenny. Workers' Co-operatives: Jobs and Dreams. London: 
Heinemann, 1981. 
Towers, Brian, Derek Cox and Elizabeth Chell. ''Do Worker Directors 
Work?" Employment Gazette (Sept. 1981), pp.384-393. 
Trades Union Congress. Industrial Democracy: A Statement of Policy 
endorsed by the 1974 TUC together with the supplementary note of 
evidence submitted to the Bullock Committee of Inquiry on 
Industrial Democracy, endorsed by the 1976 TUC. London: TUC, 
Jan. 1977. 
382. 
Vanek, Jaroslav (ed.). Self-Management: Economic Liberation of Man. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975. 
Weir, Mary (ed.). Job Satisfaction: Challen e and Res onse in Modern 
Britain. Glasgow: Fontana Collins, 197 • 
